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Sigla

12/1	Aquinas's text in 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 1
B12/1	Bañez's commentary on 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 1
C12/1	Cajetan's commentary on 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 1
can_n	natural potency
can_f	forced potency
can_i	neutral potency (Scotist)
can_N	potency discovered and explained in NS
can_S	potency revealed and discussed in SD
CG	Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*
CT	Aquinas, *Compendium Theologiae*
Denz.	Denzinger-Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum*
DTC	*Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1902ff.)
Leonine	Fratres Ordinis Praedicatorum, edd., *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia* iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. edita (Romae, 1887ff.)
NDA	Aquinas's natural-desire argument
NG	Dominic Soto, *De natura et gratia* (1549)
NS	natural science
Opera Omnia	Doctoris Angelici Divi Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera Omnia*, 34 volumes (Paris: Vivès, 1873-1880)
PG	Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*
PL	Migne, *Patrologia Latina*
SD	*sacra doctrina*
ST	Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*

Preface

According to the New Testament, Heaven offers exalted knowledge of God and even intimacy with Him. We shall "know as we are known" and see God "face to face." Such descriptions show why Heaven is beyond our grasp. But why is it in the direction of our reach? What chord in us does seeing God strike, that the promise of it should stir up a hope powerful enough to change lives?

Few people know that there has been a long and often fascinating debate about this. It goes back to the 13th Century, when the recovery of Aristotle brought into Europe a sharpened account of human *nature* and, with it, a fuller account of the "flourishing" or "happiness" that one *naturally* desires. Aristotle's account put a question mark after Augustine's famous saying about the human heart. Was it really restless, until it rested in God? Or did contentment come to us as soon as we had the happiness we *naturally* desired and *naturally* understood, as Aristotle had understood it — a philosopher who never heard of Heaven?

By 1240 or so, theologians were sharply divided over how to respond. Many wanted Aristotle's books (the *libri naturales*, as they were called) banned from the universities of Europe. Others thought they should be kept, because a synthesis could be worked out, and this party succeeded at least in winning the curriculum battle. But what was the synthesis to be? What was it going to say?

There is at least one passage in which the greatest of medieval theologians articulated a broadly plausible way to salvage the insights of Aristotle without losing the faith of Augustine. I refer to chapter 63 in the third book of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Contra Gentiles.* There he made use of Aristotle's finding that people "naturally desire" such items as life, enjoyment, social status, rectitude, friendship, and knowledge. Aquinas argued that all these goods are delivered to the saints in the Vision of God in Heaven. The Beatific Vision delivers life in eternal form and in

the company of the elect, the ultimate social status, along with boundless joy, incorruptible rectitude, divine friendship, and transcendent knowledge. So in having God, we shall "have it all," and thus our hearts will come to rest, as Augustine said. It is a remarkable passage.

Unaccountably, however, it is quite isolated in Aquinas. In all his massive output, there is not another text like it. Instead, everywhere else this theologian touched upon the question of what makes Heaven pursuit-worthy, he emphasized just one sort of good and just one "natural desire." The good was *intellectual satisfaction,* and the one desire he stressed was the "natural desire to understand the causes of perceived effects." This desire, he alleged, reached all the way to understanding the First of all Causes, and so it amounted to a "natural desire to see God." Well, the idea that a desire like this could reach so far and still be satisfied fully in human beings was nowhere in Aristotle, and Aquinas offered little explanation of the desire's nature.

On this crucial point, then, Aquinas's synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine was hard to grasp. It touched off a wide debate. Latin Averroists attacked it from the left; Scotists from the right. But the worst of it was that the Thomists themselves could not agree on what Aquinas was saying.

The result has been that, for 400 years, the Thomist school has had an internal debate, running in basically the same ruts, over how the Vision of God compares to human aspiration. Dominic Soto published his famous *De natura et gratia* in 1549, while the Council of Trent was in session. In it he contended for three claims: (1) that human beings have a natural yearning to see God, (2) that this yearning makes the Vision in Heaven our natural end, and (3) that the same yearning is not just a wish of the will but a natural tendency of the mind as such. Dominic Bañez replied in 1587 in his *Scholastica Commentaria in Primam Partem*. He maintained against Soto (1) that seeing God according to His essence is not our natural end, (2) that the only natural desire we could have for it is an elicited act of the will, conditional and inefficacious, (3) that we have from our nature no tendency, no yearning, no potency to the supernatural, but (4) that we have a

natural openness and obediential potency for it. The terms of this debate were almost exactly the same as those in which Henri de Lubac and his critics clashed in the middle of the 20th century. Lubac published his famous *Surnaturel* in 1946, in which he argued that Aquinas had known but one, true end of man, the Vision promised in the Gospel, and that our "natural desire" for it, which was a yearning of created intelligence itself, made it natural to us as our end.[1] Charles Boyer and other critics replied that a supernatural Vision could not be the "natural end" of man, that our potency to it was only obediential, and that our desire for it was an elicited velleity (or, as we say in English, a wish).[2]

Two episodes, almost 400 years apart, but the same trenches. In both episodes, moreover, the same figure was a villain to one side, an authority to the other. That figure was Thomas de Vio, commonly known as Cajetan, the most famous theologian in Europe at the outbreak of the Reformation. He was both a master-general of the Dominican Order and a Cardinal in the Roman Curia, but his fame rested on the commentaries he had written on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*. His hugely successful commentary on the *Prima Pars* was published in 1507, with an appendix, *De potentia neutra,* in 1511, and his commentary on the *Prima Secundae* was published in 1517.[3] He had his critics, however. At Trent, Soto attacked the by-then deceased Cajetan for his view of

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[1] Lubac's thesis was treated as a shocking novelty at the time (as in some respects it was), but the main lines of his case went back to Soto and had already been revived 50 years earlier by J. Sestili: *De naturali intelligentis animae appetitu intuendi divinam essentiam* (Rome, 1896).

[2] Since the Second Vatican Council, the debate has lost its scholastic polish and its prominence, but it has not disappeared. More theologians have moved towards Lubac's theology of nature and grace, in which man is oriented by his very nature to an end above his nature, supernatural in itself (in its entity), yet natural to man as his end. But an important party of natural law theorists, including Germain Grisez, John Finnis, William E. May, and others, continue to insist that the Vision of God is not natural to man, that man must have a genuinely natural end for purposes of natural-law morality (and for many purposes of moral theology), and that the correct conception of this end is an "integral human fulfillment" that is comprehensible without revelation.

[3] The text of these commentaries used in this work is the text printed in the Leonine edition: Fratres Ordinis Praedicatorum, edd., *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. edita* (Romae, 1887ff.) The edition will be cited hereafter simply as `Leonine' followed by a volume number and a page number.

the natural-desire question; Soto saw himself as returning to the authentic line of Aquinas. Lubac did the same 397 years later.

In the 20th century episode, both sides saw the literature of their debate in the same terms: there was a basically unified tradition of commentators running from Cajetan and Sylvestris before the Reformation, to Bañez after it, and then down to John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart, constituting the main body of school Thomism, in which Soto was the odd man out. And to that extent, both sides saw the question at issue between them in the same terms: was this unified tradition right about Aquinas (and the truth of the matter), or was it a serious distortion, as Père de Lubac thought? [4]

But what if both sides are wrong? What if the ruts in which the debate has been running for the last 400 years are missing from Cajetan? What if he held a richer and more sophisticated position than either Soto or Bañez, so that he can be assigned to neither side of their debate? Then it becomes possible, at least, that the debate since the middle of the 16th century has been wrong-headed, that the commentatorial tradition did not come down unified, but was fractured in the thirty-two years of Reformation upheaval between Cajetan and the others, and that Cajetan was the real "odd man out," who alone maintained a position plausibly in line with Aquinas. So far as one can tell, no recent scholarship has investigated this possibility.

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[4] Besides being a theologian, Lubac was an impressive historian of ideas. He pieced together (or wove together: it is hard to find a neutral verb here) a new story of Thomism. Aquinas entered upon his studies in a theological culture normed by the Augustinian tradition; he sought to bring Aristotle into that culture, to be sure, but along lines as compatible as possible with the Augustinian tradition; the exact sense of his delicate achievement was lost, or at least distorted, in the rising tide of 14th-15th century Aristotelianism culminating in Cajetan, who piped the basic tune to which the commentators danced — except for Soto, who recovered the lost Augustinian thread in the real Aquinas. For Lubac's definitive telling of his tale, see his *Augustinianism and Modern Theology*, transl. Lancelot Sheppard (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969). Coincidentally, Étienne Gilson began to detect (or weave) a story broadly similar to Lubac's at certain points, one of them being the "unfaithfulness" of Cajetan as a commentator: "Cajétan et l'existence," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 15 (1953), pp. 267-287; "Cajétan et l'humanisme théologique," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 30 (1955), pp. 113-136.

To put oneself into the right frame of mind to entertain the idea, it is well to recall how violently the Aristotelian corpus lost cultural standing at the outbreak of the Reformation. That body of writing went from being

(1) the natural science of Western Europe (ca. 1220 — 1520)

to being

(2) a maidservant to Catholic theologians (ca. 1530 — 1630).

The demotion was *that* sharp and *that* sudden, because two enormous factors combined to make it so. One was the humanist literary revival. To Erasmus and his large public, the atrociously written works of Aristotle were (with few exceptions) no fit occupation for a civilized mind. The rising taste for literary culture was neglecting the *going* natural science, in other words, as a tedious bore, long before Copernicus and Galileo turned it into *failed* science.

The other factor, of course, was the Reformation itself — not simply because its leaders denounced philosophy in general, as a pretension of the natural man, nor because they derided Aristotle in particular, but because their movement drew the whole energy of Europe into religious controversy. In that maelstrom, nobody was interested in the metaphysical niceties that had intrigued a Scotus or a Durandus. Nobody even wanted Aristotelico-scholastic theology to survive, except a few debaters on the Catholic side (by no means all of them). The calls for a new style of theology, rooted in literary culture, the Fathers and the biblical languages, were loud at the Council of Trent. Melchior Cano and Dominic Soto had their hands full, convincing their own side that Thomism was still a precious wisdom. To do so, they, too, had to denounce the "useless subtleties" of the recent scholastic past, so as to defend philosophy in a new role, suited to the needs of the age: sound mental preparation for Scripture study.[5]

[5] This is an oft-told story, but an especially arresting presentation of it is found in the preface of Bruno Pinchard's *Métaphysique et sémantique* (Paris: Vrin, 1987), pp. 12-17.

In the preface to his *De natura et gratia,* sent to the bishops meeting at Trent, Soto said that his work, in its style and procedure, would not spurn the scholastic form (folio 2v), but that scholastic theology had to be purged of the sophistical tricks and the vain prodigies of metaphysicians.[6] It was time to amputate, in order to renew; and from now on, scholastic method should have no role but to serve the faith.[7]

Cajetan lived long enough to feel the early shocks of this crisis. Hardly was his commentary on the *Tertia Pars* out of his hands, full of "metaphysical prodigies" illuminating the Eucharist and the Hypostatic Union, when Rome was sacked (1527). He and other Cardinals were taken prisoner and shamefully treated. Cajetan's response was to seek retirement to his native Gaeta and spend the rest of his life writing Scripture commentaries. He, too, could see the need of the hour.

But one has to understand that his previous life as a scholastic had been lived in another world. In his formative years, European energies were still engaged in *scientific* disputes, in which the fine-points of Aristotle interpretation were crucial. Medical doctors, jurists, astronomers, naturalists, geometers, and other lay savants took the Aristotelian corpus with utter seriousness as natural science. This was the key feature in which the formative years of Cajetan resembled those of Aquinas. Aristotle's *libri naturales* were a new wave in 1239, when Aquinas came to campus; they were firmly entrenched in 1488 when the young Cajetan did the same. But in the progressive Naples of 1239 just as in the Bologna of 1488, one had to be able to speak the language of those *libri naturales* with accuracy, in order to be taken seriously as a member of the

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[6] . . . a sophismatum quidem nugis, et a metaphysicorum vanis portentis repurganda, f. 3r.

[7] So matters would stand for 80 or 90 years, the whole lifetime of Bañez, until about 1630, when the Aristotelian corpus was exploded natural science in the eyes of everyone. From then on Europe stood within the modern framework of debate, in which Aristotle was either (take your pick) obsolete science but still sound philosophy for the purposes of Catholic theology (Leo XIII, scholastic revival: 1890 to the present) or obsolete science *and* philosophy, an embarrassment to Catholic theology (Malebranche, Rosmini, Blondel, von Hügel, *la nouvelle théologie* and its post-conciliar offspring).

university community.[8] One needed even better accuracy if one was to save one's faith from the objections of the Averroists, like Siger of Brabant (ca. 1240-1284) or Agostino Nifo (1469-1539).[9]

In theology, too, the demands of the age that formed Capreolus, Francis Sylvestris of Ferrara, and Cajetan, made accurate Aristotelianism a *sine qua non.* For Thomism was not the only synthesis of that science with the Christian tradition; there was another, equally vast and detailed, achieved by John Duns Scotus, whose differences with Aquinas were enormous. The Thomists were engaged in a life-and-death struggle against their Scotist rivals, and one could not succeed in that struggle without an exact knowledge of hundreds of *loci* in Aristotle and Augustine alone (not to mention the *loci* in Dionysius, Damascene, and other Fathers, not to mention those in Avicenna, Averroes, and other philosophers, not to mention those in the Scriptures). In those days, therefore, a Thomist had to keep up a difficult bilingualism, established by Aquinas, in which the language of Aristotelian natural science (which I am going to call NS language) was spoken along with that of the Scriptures and traditions native to *sacra doctrina* (which I shall call SD language) — they had to keep it up, I repeat, because Scotism had a *rival* bilingualism. I put the matter this way, because Thomism and Scotism were *not rival theories expressed in a constant language*. Basic NS terms had different construals in the two schools, and stood in different relations to basic SD terms. Capreolus was continually battling against Scotist definitions of key terms in both languages, and the stellar work that he did in defending Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences* was just the sort of work that Cajetan sought to do in commenting on the *Summa Theologiae.*

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[8] James A. Weisheipl, O.P., *Friar Thomas D'Aquino* (Garden City Doubleday, 1974), pp. 15ff.

[9] A good portrait of the young Cajetan's world can be found in Paul O. Kristeller, *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1956) and in Armand Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy* (Toronto: PIMS, 1982), chapter 21.

The way I am using `language' and `bilingual' here is figurative but not fanciful. My use is taken from the recent philosophy of science, in which one speaks of a given theory *T* as having a language, L_T, whether observational (the vocabulary in which its observations are described) or theoretical (the vocabulary in which its laws or explanations are stated). One also speaks of the relation of L_T to another theory *T′* with its language $L_{T'}$. One says, for example, that the laws of Newtonian physics can be stated in the *language* of relativistic physics, but not *vice-versa*. Most of all, one speaks of the relation of L_T to the ordinary English in which the theory may be discussed, compared with another theory (as was done in the last sentence), evaluated as cumulative upon the other, etc.[10] To do these last jobs competently, one must be bilingual, in the sense in which I am using `bilingual', as between L_T and ordinary English. To formulate the laws of Newton in the vocabulary of Einstein, one must be bilingual as between the two theoretical languages, L_T and $L_{T''}$.

I am applying this sort of analysis to the history of theology, where the lines, of course, are not so sharp. To a Medieval Christian, the expression of her faith was mostly like ordinary language, but it involved quite a few special words (*`sacramentum', `gratia'*, etc.) and some technicalities if she wished to express accurately her faith in the Trinity, for example. When one learned Aristotle, one's Christian SD language served partly as the ordinary language in which one discussed the NS-usages of the Stagirite, but partly, too, as another technical vocabulary to be kept straight. The Aristotelian corpus, too, was not all science-jargon by any means. Much of it (though this could be hard to see through bad translations) was ordinary-language philosophizing, as we call the exercise these days.[11] Still, the analysis remains broadly applicable. Aristotle did

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[10] Frederick Suppe, “The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories,” *apud* Frederick Suppe, ed., *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 16-241; W. H. Newton-Smith, *The Rationality of Science* (London: Routledge, 1990).

[11] A good anthology is V. C. Chappell, ed., *Ordinary Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

arrive at definite and distinctive accounts (*logoi, rationes*) of many things for which Christian doctrine had none, or none it was committed to. Hence the L_T of Aristotle's accounts, which I am calling NS-language, was often assimilable within Christian discourse, whose vocabulary for expressing creedal commitments I am calling SD-language.

Looked at in these terms, Thomism had a certain way of *coordinating the two languages*, and Scotism had another. Each had its own *prescriptive bilingual dictionary*. This is what I mean to say in one word with `a bilingual***ism***'.[12]

In the new world that Soto and Bañez inhabited, no lay community of Aristotelian natural scientists was any longer a cultural force. The language of that community was a preoccupation of yesteryear, and Scotism was no longer the enemy. The need to keep up a careful bilingualism had vanished. Thomists were free to banter or mangle Aristotelian terms as their new needs seemed to dictate; no sharp-eyed Averroist was going to call them to account, and the Scotists were otherwise occupied. The very sense that Thomism was *based* on a bilingualism was soon lost. The warriors of Trent turned to fight Luther with a unified "scholastic theology" vocabulary, and that is how things have been ever since.

How has this mattered? Well, in a unified scholastic vocabulary, `natural' has just one *sensus proprius*. Natural desire, natural potency, natural capacity, natural end — all have to be natural in the same sense, if they are "properly" so called. Thus it comes about that the question whether the Vision of God is man's natural end has to have one answer. Put this question to Soto or to Bañez, to Garrigou-Lagrange or to Gilson, to Boyer or to Lubac, and you get one answer: a yes or a no.

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[12] It is much more common, of course, to look at Thomism and Scotism simply as rival theories ("theologies"), each with its own technical/theoretical vocabulary — L_{Th} and L_{Sc} shall we say — which a modern teacher of theology has to learn, etc. This way of looking at the matter is handy for some purposes, no doubt. But the problem with it is that it does not begin at the beginning. Thomism and Scotism *came to be* rival theories, embracing conflicting conclusions as sound theological conclusions, because they co-ordinated the NS and SD languages differently. They *had* rival bilingualisms and therefore *became* rival versions of *sacra doctrina* (and later came to be called rival theologies).

Put the same question to Cajetan, and you get a counter-question. “What do you mean by `natural'? Which sense of `nature' did you have in mind? You see, humankind *potest considerari dupliciter . . .*”

Theologians, like the rest of us, have long divided into those who hate this sort of answer, and those who love it. To the one camp, semantics is an annoying preliminary, to be gotten through quickly on the way to a substantive *intellectus fidei*. To the other camp, semantics is an indispensable part of speculative theology itself.[13] Cajetan was of the second camp. For him, there was no such thing as a proper sense of `natural' *across the board*. Each science that used the word had its own proper sense. There was indeed a sense of `natural' proper to sacred theology, but it was not always the one being used in a theological argument, because there was another sense of `natural' proper to the natural science of biology, and it was often being used in a theological argument put together by Aquinas. And besides the sense proper to either science, there was the ordinary, non-technical sense of `natural', and that could turn up in a theological argument as well.

Oh, and if you wanted your answer in a *sensus proprius* of theology, did you mean a literal sense used by theology (*proprius vs. metaphoricus*), or did you want it in the sense not used by other sciences, the one distinctive to theology (*proprius vs. communis*)?

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[13] For the first camp, speculative theology is a scientific understanding of the mysteries. Its derivations of theological conclusions combine truths of faith and truths of reason in such a way that metaphysical premises have genuine explanatory power. For the second camp, speculative theology is seeing how science clarifies or illustrates the mysteries. In the derivations of theological conclusions, premises drawn from a science (metaphysics included) clarify what the mystery is, or illustrate how it can be so, but never explain it. If the *libri naturales* are taken into theology to help explain, their language must become theological vocabulary and must be corrected in sense, as need be, for that purpose. If the *libri naturales* are taken in to clarify and illustrate, their language should be left in its own integrity (otherwise the illustration is spoiled). As to where Aquinas stood anent these camps, his official position is found in 1 *ST* q. 1. The reader might want to compare a. 2 (*sacra doctrina* is a subaltern science) with a. 5 (*sacra doctrina* is not subaltern to the human sciences or philosophy) and then think hard about the second objection in a. 5 and the answer there *ad* 2. Whether he had adhered to this official position in earlier works, or adhered to it consistently in the 481 substantive inquiries that followed in *ST* itself, is another question.

Well, the unhappy result of this orientation is that it has added another layer of complexity to the Soto-Lubac *vs.* Bañez-Boyer *et al.* debate. (Which debate is already complicated enough, as Chapter One will show.) But the dirty work had to be done, because it provides a way of understanding how the debate arose in the first place. Loss of the sense that two languages were in play left too few senses of `natural'. It will turn out that the same loss, once recognized, solves some other puzzles, such as why Cajetan has been poorly read for centuries.

In the pages which follow, all of the translations from Aquinas and his commentators are the work of the present writer.

Chapter 1

The Source of a Divergence

Thomas de Vio, called Cajetan, Dominic Soto, and Dominic Bañez were three outstanding interpreters of Aquinas, strongly convinced of the soundness of his thought and of its relevance to solving the problems of their own day in philosophy and theology. Yet they departed radically from each other in how they proposed to solve a certain difficulty, one not invented by themselves but forced upon them by texts in Aquinas dealing with proportionate (or natural) and disproportionate (or supernatural) human fulfillment.

Before one attempts to understand the commentators' divergence, one needs to appreciate what the initial difficulty was. And to appreciate what it was, one needs to grasp the complication that gave rise to it. To see the complication, one needs to see what Aquinas said on this same topic in a text in which the complication did not appear. Then one can look at a text in which it did appear, and then one can begin to wonder how the text exhibiting the complication is supposed to fit together consistently with the text lacking it. As soon as one begins to wonder about that, one experiences the exact difficulty that drove Cajetan, Soto, and Bañez (and much later, Henri de Lubac and his opponents) to fashion divergent solutions. One is then motivated to pursue the project of this dissertation: to explore those solutions and compare their merits, whether as interpretations of Thomism, or as contributions to the history of theology as a whole.

The place to begin, then, is with a text in which Aquinas compared the proportionate with the disproportionate in human fulfillment — and did so in an uncomplicated, trouble-free way. Mercifully, such a text is to be found. It is in the Disputed Questions *De Veritate,* q. 27, a. 2. To introduce it, only a few points need to be mentioned. The topic was grace. The issue in a. 1 was whether grace (the kind we now call sanctifying grace) was something created as a positive reality in the soul. Aquinas argued that it was. The issue in a. 2 was whether this reality was identi-

cally the love-for-God called *caritas.* Aquinas thought not. Sanctifying grace was more fundamental than *caritas,* he said, and he offered the following argument.

> After all, diverse natures have diverse ends; and in natural cases, in order for a thing to reach its end, it has to have three items already:
>
> — a nature proportioned to that end,
>
> — a natural inclination towards that end, which is a natural seeking after it *[appetitus]*, and
>
> — a motion towards the end.
>
> One sees as much in the case of [the element] earth: in earth there is a certain nature, whereby lying in the middle [of the world] is what it is primed to do *[competit ei];*[1] and in consequence of this nature, earth has towards the middle place an inclination, wherewith it naturally seeks to be in such a place (since it is kept out of it only by force); and so in the absence of an obstacle, it always moves downward [towards that center]. Well, man is proportioned by *[secundum]* his nature to a certain end, after which he has a natural seeking *[appetitus naturalis],* and he can operate [move] with his natural strengths *[vires]* to reach that end, which is a certain contemplation of divine things — such contemplation of them as is possible for man according to the ability *[facultas]* of his nature. It was in this contemplation that the philosophers said man's ultimate happiness lay.[2]

Let us pause here for background. The ultimate "happiness" of a thing is its natural "end" or fulfillment. Aquinas distinguished what 'fulfillment' *means* from where fulfillment *lies* or is found (2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8, among many other places). As an ideal we all seek, 'fulfillment' *means* a state made complete by compresence of all the goods (as virtually everybody understands).

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[1] *`Proportionatus'* and *`competit'* indicate converse relations. If ***x*** is *proportionatus* to ***y***, then ***y*** *competit* ***x***. To put these relations into English, I have nothing very satisfactory to propose. I have rendered *`proportionatus'* with `proportioned' and *`competit'* with `primed for'.

[2] Cum enim diversarum naturarum diversi sunt fines, ad consecutionem alicujus finis in rebus naturalibus tria praeexiguntur: scilicet natura proportionata ad finem illum; et inclinatio ad finem illum, quae est naturalis appetitus finis; et motus in finem: sicut patet quod in terra est natura quaedam, per quam sibi competit esse in medio; et hanc naturam sequitur inclinatio in locum medium, secundum quam appetit naturaliter talem locum, cum extra ipsum per violentiam detinetur; et ideo, nullo prohibente, semper deorsum movetur. Homo autem secundum naturam suam proportionatus est ad quemdam finem, cujus habet naturalem appetitum; et secundum naturales vires operari potest ad consecutionem illius finis, qui finis est aliqua contemplatio divinorum, qualis est homini possibilis secundum facultatem naturae, in qua philosophi ultimam hominis felicitatem posuerunt.

The text and punctuation are those of the Paris edition: Doctoris Angelici divi Thomae Aquinatis *Opera Omnia*, vol. 15 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 290. Cited hereafter as *Opera Omnia.*

Where it is to be found, however, is quite a problem, since the popular answers (in riches, in fame, in pleasures) are conspicuously wrong. Aquinas inherited and unified two good answers: a revealed one (fulfillment lies in the Vision of God, in which one can participate now by living in grace) and a philosophical one developed by Aristotle. The Stagirite reasoned that each species is present in nature for a purpose, and its members find their fulfillment in achieving that purpose (*De Caelo II,* c. 3; 286 a 10). To discover what the purpose is, one has to look at the highest activity distinctive of the species (the best exercise of its best capability). Man's highest distinctive activity is understanding, and its best exercise is understanding the deepest causes and purposes, and these Aristotle called "divine things" (*Nicomachean Ethics X*, c. 8; 1178 b 22ff). Of course, it is hard to devote oneself to such topics without a well-regulated private life, supported by health, friends, social order, and economic sufficiency; so a person best pursues the intellectual life in a state where all those goods are present (*ibid.*, 1178 b 33ff). Aquinas saw the apologetical potential in Aristotle's answer: if human fulfillment lies in contemplating "divine things" in this world's favorable conditions, how much more must it lie in seeing those things directly in Heaven's favorable conditions, as the Gospel promises? Hence he appropriated Aristotle's idea that man's end lies in understanding certain things (and we shall see the fuller case that he made for it below, in Chapters Two and Three).[3] With these points on the table, we can return to the text.

> It turns out, however, that there is an end for which man is being prepared by God, an end that exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, eternal life, which lies in seeing God through His essence — a feat which exceeds the proportion of any created nature, since it is nature-set *[connaturalis]* for God alone. What is needed, therefore, is that man be given something through which he may not only operate towards this end, or through which his seeking may be inclined towards it, but something through which man's very nature

[3] Critics have called this appropriation "intellectualist," but neither Aristotle nor Aquinas said that understanding was our *only* good, nor did they say that *all* the goods we seek are found in that act alone, apart from its environing conditions, which include moral virtues (*Nichomachean Ethics X* c. 7; 1177 a 10ff). What they said was that, in a fulfilling human life, social and economic blessings *support* intellectual seriousness. A life devoid of interest in the ultimate questions is a shallow and stunted life.

> may be elevated to the dignity at which such an end would be what he is primed for, and this is why grace is given.[4] Love-for-God is given to incline the affection towards this end, and the other virtues are given for performing the operations by which the end is reached. So, just as, in natural things, the nature itself is different from the inclination of the nature and from its motion or operation, so also, in grace-given things, grace is different from love-for-God and from the other virtues. That this comparison is rightly accepted is seen from the second chapter in Dionysius' *Celestial Hierarchy*,[5] where he says that one cannot have a spiritual operation unless one first acquires a spiritual being *[esse]*, just as, for a given nature, one cannot have the operation of that nature unless one first has a "being" in that nature.[6]

As the reader can see, the fundamental comparison is between *naturalia* and *gratuita*. Legitimated by the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius, the comparison says that grace-given things work like a nature — a super-nature. For just as a thing's nature first gives it an *esse* (a *being* this-or-that) and then grounds a kind of operation (doing this-or-that), so also grace-given spirituality first gives us an *esse* (a *being* spiritual) and through it grounds spiritual activity (worshipping God, obeying Him, etc).[7] Behind the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius, of course, lay the authority of the New Testament itself. In several remarkable passages, Paul linked the new life of those who are in Christ to the Incarnation, in such a way as to proclaim a

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[4] In short, grace works on such a fundamental level that it re-proportions man to a higher end, and that end is what man is primed (by grace) to reach/do/achieve.

[5] *PG* 3, col. 391.

[6] Sed est aliquis finis ad quem homo a Deo praeparatur, naturae humanae proportionem excedens; scilicet vita aeterna, quae consistit in visione Dei per essentiam, quae excedit proportionem cujuslibet naturae creatae, soli Dei *[sic]* connaturalis existens: unde oportet quod homini detur aliquid, non solum per quod operetur ad finem, vel per quod inclinetur ejus appetitus in finem illum; sed per quod ipsa natura hominis elevetur ad quamdam dignitatem, secundum quam talis finis sit ei competens: et ad hoc datur gratia; ad inclinandum autem affectum in hunc finem datur caritas: ad exsequendum autem opera quibus praedictus finis acquiritur, dantur aliae virtutes. Et ideo, sicut in rebus naturalibus est aliud natura ipsa quam inclinatio naturae, et ejus motus vel operatio; ita et in gratuitis est aliud gratia a caritate, et a ceteris virtutibus. Et quod haec comparatio sit recte accepta, patet per Dionysium in cap. ii *Cael. hier.*, ubi dicit quod non potest aliquis habere spiritualem operationem, nisi prius esse spirituale accipiat; sicut nec operationem alicujus naturae, nisi prius habeat esse in natura illa. *Opera Omnia*, vol. 15, p. 291.

[7] The *esse* that a form "gave" was not existence but a being-specified, a being-thus-or-such. *Esse homo* contrasted with human operations as "first act" contrasted with "second act." On the authority of Dionysius, the same thinking was being applied here to *esse spirituale* and salvific operations.

two-way communication of natural properties. Christ took on the poverty and sinfulness of our nature, so that we might acquire the richness and righteousness of His nature (2 Corinthians 8:9; 5:21). 2 Peter 1:4 was traditionally interpreted as making the same point with more explicitness: we become participants in the divine nature. Cf. Athanasius, Sermon 4 *Contra Arianos;* Ambrose, *Epistle 38;* Augustine, *In Joannem*, tract 51. Thus the *gratuita* which constitute Christian existence and activity work like a nature because they *are* a nature — God's nature, shared-out to us. Aquinas accepted this exegesis, adding only that the divine nature as shared out to us is just a likeness of the nature as it exists in God (1 *ST* q. 13, a. 9 *ad* 1). Once the comparison is accepted, it dictates certain distinctions. When one looks at natural things, one finds that a nature does not occur alone but brings with it further items related to it but distinct from it and from each other. These items are: an end, an inclination thereto, and some operation(s) directed thereat. If the comparison is sound, super-nature must bring with it corresponding, distinct items. With that much said, Aquinas needed only to identify and match-up the items in question. A chart shows the result:

	naturalia	gratuita
natura/esse	human nature / being human	sanctifying grace / being spiritual
finis	such contemplation of divine things as man can achieve by his natural strengths	seeing God through His essence
inclinatio/appetitus	natural tendency towards such contemplation	infused love for God *(caritas)*
motus/operatio	actions directed to such contemplation with the strength of natural habits	actions directed to seeing God with the strength of infused operative virtues

The items in each column are clear enough, and the two columns appear to have a self-contained character: nothing in the *naturalia* column bears directly upon an item in the *gratuita* column. This is not to deny, of course, that the items in the two columns are related in other ways, as we learn elsewhere.

— Human nature "receives" grace, and grace "perfects" our nature.[8]

— The two ends are "similar," in that, in each column, man's fulfillment lies in an act of understanding, and that act has as its subject matter the reality which is God, although the truth grasped about God is loftier in the *gratuita* column.[9]

— Thanks to this similarity, *caritas* does not suppress or wholly redirect man's natural *appetitus* but "elevates" it.[10]

— And there is also "similarity" between the acts of intellectual and moral virtue connatural to man and the acts of infused virtue grace-given to man.[11]

If this is clear, it is time to face the complication. It arises on the line marked *inclinatio/appetitus*. In many famous passages, Aquinas asserted that there was found in human beings (indeed, in intellectual creatures generally) a *natural desire* to see God through His essence.[12] Let

[8] 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 8 *ad* 2; q. 2, a. 2 *ad* 1; 2/1 *ST* q. 110, a. 3, etc.

[9] 2/1 *ST* q. 3, articles 5, 8.

[10] 1 *ST* q. 60, a. 5; 2/1 *ST* q. 109, a. 3, etc.

[11] See Aquinas's commentary on Colossians 3, *lectio* 4.

[12] These passages include 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 1 (which we shall inspect in detail in Chapter Two); 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8 (to be glanced at here and studied in Chapter Three); *Compendium Theologiae* c. 104 (to be studied in Chapter Four); 3 *CG* c. 51, etc. Historical/exegetical studies of these texts include: Juan Alfaro, S.J., *Lo natural y lo sobrenatural. Estudio historico desde santo Tomás hasta Cayetano* (Madrid, 1952); E. Bris-

us read one of these passages; it is from 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8, where the topic of inquiry is human fulfillment, and where the question on the table is whether our fulfillment lies in seeing God's essence.

> . . . once a man knows an effect and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in him a desire to know also the WHAT-IT-IS of that cause. This desire is wonder, and it gives rise to questioning, as one reads near the beginning of the *Metaphysics.*[13] For example, suppose a person who no-tices a solar eclipse is thinking about the cause from which it proceeds. Because he does not know what it is, he wonders about it. In wondering, he raises questions, and his questioning will not rest satisfied, until he gets to know exactly what that cause is *[essentiam causae]*.
>
> Suppose, then, that human understanding knows the essence of some created effect but does not know any more about God [its cause] than that He exists; in that case, our understanding is not yet so complete as to attain the First Cause unqualifiedly; there still remains in it a natural desire to ask after the cause. So human understanding is not yet completely fulfilled. What is required for complete fulfillment, therefore, is that understanding should reach the very essence of the First Cause. And so man's understanding will have its completeness through being united to God as its object, wherein alone man's fulfillment lies . . .[14]

The drift of the argument is unmistakable. Our intellect, which is part of our nature, has a natural desire in it. This desire will not be fully satisfied until our intellect comes to grasp the essence of the First Cause (who is God). Complete fulfillment requires the full satisfaction of all desire. So

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bois, "Le désir de voir Dieu et la métaphysique du vouloir selon saint Thomas," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 63 (1936) 978-989; 1089-1113; A. Finili, "Natural Desire," *Dominican Studies* 1 (1948) 311 ff.; 2 (1949) 1-15; A. Gardeil, "Appétit" in *DTC;* Bernard Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God," in Frederick E. Crowe, ed., *Collection. Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J.* (London: Longman and Todd, 1966) 84-95; H. de Lubac, S.J., *The Mystery of the Supernatural* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967; J. Sestili, *De naturali intelligentis animae appetitu intuendi divinam essentiam* (Rome, 1896).

[13] Aristotle, *Metaphysics I*, c. 2; 982b11-25.

[14] Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa *quid est.* Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio *Metaphys.* Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit, quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae.

Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi *an est;* nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad objectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit . . . (Leonine VI, pp. 35-36.)

we do not find complete fulfillment until our intellect grasps the essence of that ultimate Being.

The reader might think that a desire belongs in a will, so that a "natural desire" is an odd thing to posit in an intellect. But *`desiderium'* did not have to mean a will-act. *`Desiderium naturae'* or *`naturale'* was a special expression in the Latin of Aquinas, translating Aristotle's *`orexis'*. It was equivalent to *`appetitus naturalis'* which he defined as "nothing but a thing's tendency and ordering *[inclinatio et ordo]* to something suitable to itself, as a stone tends to be borne downward." [15] In biology, where the living thing as a whole had a "nature," so did each faculty within it (2/1 *ST* q. 10, a. 1); and so each brought its own tendency.[16] The intellect had a "natural desire" for the true, as the will had for the good, and as the sense appetites had for their objects. Moreover, Aquinas singled out the natural desire of intellect as reaching peculiarly high:

> . . . no desire reaches so high as the desire to understand the truth; all our other desires, whether for pleasure or anything else people want, can come to rest with other things; but the desire just mentioned does not come to rest unless it reaches the supreme point upon which all things turn, their Maker.[17]

Now the attentive reader is faced with serious questions. Where does this new *desiderium naturale* fit on the chart we saw above? Is it the same as the *appetitus naturalis* already mentioned on that chart, or is it something different? Recall that the *appetitus naturalis* was for such contemplation of divine things as people can achieve by their natural powers. So if the new *desiderium* is the same as the *appetitus* (or is a part thereof), then its object (to grasp the essence of the First Cause) is within the scope of our natural powers. Can that be right?

No, said Aquinas. For (a) the First Cause is not a material thing (1 *ST* q. 3, aa. 1-2) but a pure Form/Act subsisting independently of matter (1 *ST* q. 3, aa. 2-4); and (b) our natural powers

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[15] *De Veritate*, q. 25, a. 1.

[16] 1 *ST* 78, 1 *ad* 3; 81, 1 *corpus* and *ad* 3, etc.

[17] . . . cum nullum desiderium tam in sublime ferat sicut desiderium intelligendae veritatis; omnia namque desideria nostra, vel delectionis vel cuiuscumque alterius quod ab homine desideratur, in aliis rebus quiescere possunt; desiderium autem praedictum non quiescit, nisi ad summum rerum cardinem et factorem pervenit (3 *CG* c. 50).

take us no further than what can be learned from the essences of material things (sense-objects), and the essence of an immaterial being cannot be learned from that source (1 *ST* q. 88, a. 2; 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6; 3 *CG* c. 48; *Compendium Theologiae* c. 104).

So the new *desiderium naturale* must be something different from the *appetitus naturalis* mentioned on the chart drawn from *De Veritate* q. 27. But how can that be right? Wouldn't any *natural* desire of an intellectual creature enter into and form a part of its *naturalis appetitus?* If not, what would prevent it from doing so? Are the *appetitus* and the *desiderium* natural under different senses of `natural'? If they are "natural" in the same sense, do they reside in different parts of human nature? Does the *appetitus* reside in the will; the *desiderium,* in the intellect? Can a *desiderium naturale* reside in the intellect alone? Wouldn't it automatically come into the will as well, since the will *naturally wills* the completions of all one's other faculties (2/1 *ST* q. 10, a. 1)? And even if the *appetitus* and the *desiderium* start out in different faculties, can that be the whole difference between them? Must they not also differ in object?

Well, isn't the object the hardest part? Is the essence of the First Cause the same object as the essence of God? Since the First Cause is the same thing as God, mustn't its essence be the same as His essence? And if we are talking about one and the same essence, how can it be two different objects of knowledge? So suppose they are the same object. Well, we do not naturally know the essence of God, because it lies beyond our natural powers to know it; and we do not naturally seek that object because, if we did, it would be an object of our *appetitus naturalis,* and then the *desiderium* would not differ from the *appetitus* in object, as I just said. In that case, how can a *natural* desire have an object that we do not naturally know and do not naturally seek?

Moreover, if the essence of God is something we do not naturally know and do not naturally seek, it must be an object "supernatural" to us, "grace-given," as *De Veritate* said. Can we have a natural desire for a supernatural object? If we can and do, why do we need another *inclinatio,* called *caritas,* to be grace-given? Does *caritas* differ in object from the natural desire to know

what God is? If so, how?

These problems would be solved, of course, if the *finis* under the *naturalia* column and the *finis* under the *gratuita* column were not two ends but one. Doesn't a species have just **one end** in any case? Isn't there something absurd about the idea of a dyotelic species? Isn't every species monotelic, even if its *telos* is complex? If so, must it not follow that what we have under the two columns of the chart is not two ends but two considerations of the same end? All right, then on the *finis* line, at least, the two columns on the chart are only conceptually distinct. But then wouldn't other lines on the chart present nothing more than conceptual distinctions also? Wouldn't it follow that natural desire and *caritas* are two considerations of the same inclination, and that nature and grace are two considerations of the same *forma,* and that *esse homo* and *esse spirituale* are two considerations of the same *esse?* Alas, the doctrine of the Church will not permit these last moves; orthodoxy requires that nature and grace be really distinct principles in man, yielding really distinct modes of being.[18]

Try another hypothesis. Suppose the corresponding items in the two columns are really distinct, but only partially so, and thus are also partially, indeed substantially, the same. Thus Humpty Dumpty as a whole is partially different from Humpty Dumpty with a piece missing, but they are substantially the same. Could grace be "the missing piece" of human nature? Then being spiritual will be being whole, for man, and just being human is being fragmentary. That way, when we are whole again, the grace-given end becomes connatural to us, as our whole fulfillment, while philosophic contemplation is like a fragment of it, alone connatural to us when we ourselves are fragmentary. Can this be right? Can *caritas* be whole-human love, while natural *appetitus* is broken-human love? Can salvific operations be deeds of complete-human virtue,

[18] See canon 19 from the Council of Orange; Denzinger-Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum* 26th ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1976), # 389 (= old # 192). This work will be cited hereafter as *Denz.* Aquinas certainly thought of grace as really distinct from our nature, calling it a *"forma superaddita"* (2/1 *ST* q. 109 *passim*).

while “merely upright” operations are deeds of fallen-human virtue?

Well, Aquinas did say that grace “completes” nature, and he did compare the Vision to the philosophers' contemplation as complete fulfillment compares to incomplete. But he never said that grace belongs to our nature, as a missing piece belongs to a puzzle. He always said that grace was above our nature — as though the puzzle had all its pieces, as a nature in its own right, and was being raised by grace to the completeness of a higher nature altogether.[19] In that case, the Vision is coming from that higher nature and is quite distinct from anything natural to us.

But how could Aquinas have thought that? Is man really dyotelic? And how can the so-called natural end be an end at all, for Aquinas, if he was prepared to say elsewhere that a *natural* desire in us went beyond it? Isn't the key trait that makes a state to *be* a natural end the trait of bringing fulfillment to one whose end it is? Here is a state, *F;* if I have a natural desire thanks to which I will naturally find *F* unsatisfactory, how can *F* be my “natural end”? Aquinas's position seems to make no sense — unless, perhaps, his view of man was tragic. Are we primed by nature for disappointment, unless and until the *gratuita* arrive?

Let us suspend this line of questioning and turn to face another. Besides bringing with it an end, an inclination, and operations, a created nature also brings with it “potencies” for these things. A “potency” was a real (not merely logical) possibility to be a certain way, like a real ability or vulnerability. Aristotle called it *dynamis.* In Aquinas's thought, it is God, and God alone, who possesses His end, completeness, goodness and fulfillment already in His very act of existing (1 *ST* q. 6, a. 3). Every created entity comes into existence in *potency* towards its end/fulfillment (*ibid.* and 1 *ST* q. 5, a. 1 *ad* 1). Now in order to say that a fulfilling state of affairs *F* is an “end” for a creature *x*, we must be able to say that

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[19] Aquinas stressed the difference between grace and even the integrity of human nature, as it was in Adam before the fall (2/1 *ST* q. 109, a. 2 *corpus*), and his point became a part of official Church teaching in the subsequent condemnations of Baius (*Denz.* ## 1901-1980) of Quesnel (*Denz.* ## 2434-2436) and of the Synod of Pistoia (*Denz.* # 2616).

x can reach *F,*

but this last includes more than one idea. It certainly includes the idea that

x is open to *F (capax),*

and the idea that

x can receive *F (potentia passiva).*

Does it also include the idea that

x is actively able to achieve *F (vis, facultas)?*

Evidently not. As we saw from *De Veritate,* the defining difference between the two *fines* was that the philosophers' contemplation lay within man's active ability to achieve, while the essence-vision did not, yet both were called "ends" for man. Are we looking, then, at the very reason why the one end is *naturalis* (namely, that we have within our nature the *vires* to achieve it) and the other is *gratuita* (namely, that we do not have the *vires* to achieve it within our nature)? Or is this not the reason? Does the exact reason lie in what is and is not *connaturalis* to God alone, so that man could have a *natural* end that was beyond his natural *vires,* provided only that that end was not connatural to God alone? Or does the exact reason lie still elsewhere, so that man can have a *natural* end that is connatural to God alone (and perhaps for that reason also *gratuita)?* Could man have an end that was natural and grace-given at once, or is that a contradiction in terms?

At least `natural' and `non-natural' are contradictory; so let us start again. On what basis should an end be called natural or non-natural to man? Perhaps the answer is: on the basis of his *potency* to it. If our potency to *F* is natural potency, then *F* is a natural end to us; and if our potency to *F* is non-natural, then *F* is non-natural to us.[20] That rule of usage sounds reasonable. But

[20] For Aquinas, a non-natural potency could be "forced potency" *(violenta)* or "obediential potency," the latter being the sort relevant in this context. See *De Potentia Dei* q. 4, a. 1 *ad* 20; q. 6, a. 1 *ad* 18; *In III Sent.* d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qua. 2, *ad* 2 and *ad* 3. In Peter of Bergamo's *Tabula Aurea,* the following texts are selected as worth consulting on the topic of obediential potency: 1 *ST* q. 115, a. 2 *ad* 4; 3 *ST* q. 1, a. 3 *ad* 3; q. 11, a. 1; *In I Sent.* d. 42, q. 2, a. 2 *ad* 4; *In II Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, a. 2; a. 3 *ad* 2; d. 18, q. 1, a. 2; *In III Sent.* d. 1, q. 1, a. 3 *ad* 4; d. 2, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, a. 2, qua. 3 *ad* 3; d. 3, q. 2, a. 1 *ad* 1; *In IV Sent.* d. 8, q. 2, a. 3 *ad* 4; *De Veritate* q. 8, a. 4 *ad* 13; a. 12 *ad* 4; q. 12, a. 3 *ad* 18; q. 29, a. 3 *ad* 3; *De Potentia Dei* q. 1, a. 3 *ad* 1; q. 6, a. 1 *ad* 18; *De Virtutibus* q. 1, a. 10 *ad* 13

now we need another, to tell us on what basis a potency is to be called natural. Suppose we are

- by nature open to *F (capax)* and
- by nature can receive *F (potentia passiva)* and
- have in our nature the faculties to achieve *F*.

Then, no doubt, everyone will say that our potency to *F* is natural potency. Everyone will say that these three conditions are enough. But are they just enough, or are they more than enough? Could we take away one and still have natural potency? Consider the end which is seeing God. The faculties to achieve it are not in our nature. Are we nevertheless in natural potency to it, on the ground that we are

- by nature open to it *(capax)* and
- nature can receive it *(potentia passiva)?*

Or is this an impossible situation? Do active *vires* and passive *potentiae* go together in such a way that, if the one is not in our nature, neither is the other? Suppose they do not go together so tightly as that. Then absent natural active ability, what makes the passive potency natural? It seems hard to say; so suppose they do go together. Suppose that, with respect to seeing God through His essence, neither the active ability nor the passive potency is natural in us. Could we just be

- nature open to it *(capax),*

and by that fact alone be in natural potency to see God through His essence? Does this supposition make sense? Is *capacitas* a distinct issue from *potentia passiva* (as I have been assuming)? If not, the supposition makes no sense. If they are distinct, the supposition does make sense. But is it correct?

Perhaps the question is academic, if we forget to add the complication which has been generating these questions, the *desiderium naturale.* Suppose the human story is that our intellect is both

- nature open to see God's essence *(capax)* and
- nature "desirous" to see it.

Now are we in "natural potency" to the grace-given end? Does the natural desire of itself naturalize the *capacitas* and thereby naturalize the potency? Does at least the combination of natural desire and natural capacity naturalize the potency? If so, how? Does the combination restore natural passive potency (even in the absence of corresponding natural active potency)? If not, could our intellect be

- nature open to see God's essence *(capax)* and
- nature desirous to see it, but
- have only non-natural (say, obediential) potency to receive that vision?

The possibilities seem to be legion, and we are not finished yet. Let us keep all the possibilties and questions in the air, as we turn to look at another text, which will ratchet the bewilderment higher.

The text is *De Malo* q. 5, a. 3. The issue in it was whether unbaptised persons who die before reaching the age of reason (in original sin but without personal sin), and whose only "penalty" is exclusion from the Beatific Vision, experience any sadness at this exclusion.[21] If man cannot rest fulfilled without seeing what the First Cause is (as we just read in 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8), and seeing what the First Cause is = having the Beatific Vision, shouldn't the answer be yes, they will experience a certain sadness? For if these souls in limbo possess intellects in good working order (and separated souls do, says *De Veritate* q. 19, a. 1; cf. 1 *ST* q. 89, a. 1); and if this faculty contains a yearning unsatisfiable apart from the Vision, these children will be saddened in some measure at the yearning's perpetual frustration, won't they? Well, Aquinas thought otherwise.

> Some have maintained that the children feel a sorrow or interior affliction

[21] Cf. *In II Sent.* d. 33, q. 11, a. 2.

> arising from their lack of the divine Vision . . . But there doesn't seem to be any reason why they should be spared the external penalty of sense suffering, if one attributes to them an interior affliction, which is far more punitive . . . And so it seems to others, and more correctly, that they feel no affliction, not even interiorly.[22]

The Common Doctor then explained why he favored this view. He declared that these children have *the same natural desire* for fulfillment as the rest of us, but they suffer no sense of deprivation. Why not? Because everything they are naturally in a position to know about what happiness requires is available to them. They do not "miss" the glory of the saints, because they do not know it exists. Only supernatural revelation, which they did not receive, would have told them of it.

> . . . the souls of the children do not lack natural knowledge, such as is due to the separated soul according to its nature, but they lack the supernatural knowledge[23] which is planted in us in this life by faith, since they neither had the faith in act nor received the sacrament of faith when they were in this life. Now, it pertains to natural knowledge for the soul to know that it has been created for the sake of fulfillment and to know that fulfillment is realized in reaching complete good; but that the "complete good" for which man was made should be the glory possessed by the saints is beyond natural knowing. This is why the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 2:9 that "eye does not see, nor has ear heard, nor does it dawn on man what God has prepared for those who love Him," and further on he adds, "But God has revealed it to us through the Holy Spirit." This revelation pertains, of course, to the faith. And so the souls of the children do not know that they are deprived of this great good, and therefore they do not grieve but possess what they have by way of nature without

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[22] Respondeo dicendum quod aliqui posuerunt quod pueri sentient aliquem dolorem vel afflictionem interiorem ex carentia visionis divinae . . . Sed nulla ratio videtur esse quare subtrahatur eis exterior poena sensus, si attribuitur eis interior afflictio, quae est multo magis poenalis . . . Et ideo aliis videtur et melius, quod nullam afflictionem etiam interiorem sentiant. *Opera Omnia,* vol. 13 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 441.

[23] On the difference between natural knowledge and supernatural knowledge in the angels, see 1 *ST* q. 58, a. 5. On the degree to which the knowledge natural to the separated human soul resembles and depends upon that of the angels, see 1 *ST* q. 89, articles 1-3. According to these articles, a separated soul has three sources of understanding: (1) intelligible *species* abstracted in this life; (2) infused knowledge from God, and (3) direct insight into immaterial things (itself and the angels). A separated soul in limbo would have very little from source (1), since its intellect was hardly functioning in this life, and nothing from source (2), since the gift of knowledge from God was reserved to the baptized, but would have what any other separated soul had from source (3). The soul's knowledge from this source was like that of the angels in being direct and wholly independent of matter or material phantasms, but it was weaker than theirs, suffering from vagueness and generality. In other words, when an angel understood a quiddity, it could see everything that went with it and followed from it, but a separated soul could not; it could grasp the quiddity only in a vague *(confusa)* and general way *(in communi).*

sorrow.[24]

On its face, this answer in *De Malo* means that man's natural desire for fulfillment can be satisfied well enough to exclude all sadness, without the Beatific Vision. For if it were left unsatisfied, absent the Vision, to the point of sadness, these souls would have a dissatisfaction which would prevent them from possessing what they have by way of nature "without sorrow."[25] Now these souls have an intellect which contains by its very nature (we have been told) a desire to grasp what the First Cause is. Moreover, knowledge of "the deepest cause of things," "the deepest reason for everything," is a naturally known good (isn't it?), self-evidently an ingredient of human happiness, since the good of knowing the truth is a self-evident ingredient of our happiness, and the good of knowing the truth self-evidently includes the good of knowing the causes of known effects, which self-evidently includes the good of knowing the causes of the causes, back to the very First Cause (right?). So, what Aquinas seems to be saying here in *De Malo* is that, in his opinion, a human soul can experience its desire for *that good* as satisfied without experiencing the Beatific Vision reserved to the saints. A human soul deprived of the Beatific Vision can still experience its desire to see what the First Cause is as a satisfied desire. Now: does this mean that the desire **is** satisfied, or does it mean that the desire's lack of satisfaction **is not felt**?

If it just means that the lack of satisfaction is not felt, there is a crying need for an explana-

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[24] ... animae puerorum naturali quidem cognitione non carent, qualis debetur animae separatae secundum suam naturam, sed carent supernaturali cognitione, quae hic in nobis per fidem plantatur, eo quod nec hic fidem habuerunt in actu, nec sacramentum fidei susceperunt. Pertinet autem ad naturalem cognitionem quod anima sciat se propter beatitudinem creatam, et quod beatitudo consistit in adeptione perfecti boni; sed quod illud bonum perfectum, ad quod homo factus est, sit illa gloria quam sancti possident, est supra cognitionem naturalem. Unde Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. ii, 9, quod *nec occulus vidit nec auris audivit nec in cor hominis ascendit quae preparavit Deus diligentibus se;* et postea subdit: *Nobis autem revelavit Deus per Spiritum suum;* quae quidem revelatio ad fidem pertinet. Et ideo se privari tali bono animae puerorum non cognoscunt, et propter hoc non dolent; sed hoc quod per naturam habent, absque dolore possident. *Opera Omnia*, vol. 13, p. 442.

[25] The critical bearing of *De Malo* q. 5, a. 3, and related texts was emphasized by Père de Broglie in an appendix he added to his *De fine ultimo humanae vitae* (Paris: Beauchesne et ses fils, 1948). It is appendix III, "Senserintne Aquinas et antiquiores generatim scholastici creaturas spirituales ad visionem Dei necessario vocatas esse?" pp. 245-264.

tion of why it is not felt. Granted, a soul does not feel wonder about things which it does not know exist; and there are many things which a soul never in receipt of revelation does not know exist. But how can those points be germane? A separated soul naturally knows that there are effects (right?), that they have causes, and that behind the proximate causes there is a remote and First Cause (right?). The soul even sees some likeness of that Cause reflected in the forms of the angels (or so it would seem, putting together 1 *ST* q. 56, a. 3 with 1 *ST* q. 89, a. 2). So how can the natural desire to know what that Cause is not be felt? Is the soul's intellect so dazzled by the partial knowledge it does have, that

— its wonder about the rest is forestalled? submerged?

— its wonder is there, but it does not *bother* itself with it?

— its will chooses to ignore it, and so rests content?

If these suggestions do not sound very plausible, one must try the other option. Suppose the *De Malo* text means that the desire **is** satisfied. Then the text is a bombshell. It seems to posit a natural version of the Beatific Vision — a Vision-Lite, if you will, stripped of supernatural glory but delivering all that the human intellect "naturally desires" to know about what God is! Can there be such a Vision-Lite?

If the reader feels that the questions are getting bizarre, let us go back to the chart and revisit the whole question of where the *desiderium naturale* would fit into it. Our questions have been assuming

(a) that the *desiderium naturale* belongs in the *naturalia* column,

(b) that it is not part of the *appetitus naturalis* in that column, and

(c) that it bears upon the *finis* mentioned in the *gratuita* column.

If the above questions were misguided, it looks as though assumption (a) or (c) must have been wrong. Could it have been (a)? Could the *`naturale'* in *`desiderium naturale'* have a different meaning from the word *`naturalia'* used in describing the items in the first column? Could the

desiderium naturale be a kind of pre-grace, so that the souls in limbo never received it, just as they never received the *gratuita* properly so-called, and what is satisfied is really just their natural *appetitus?* Does the chart need a third column, in the middle? Should the whole scheme be that there is a *naturalia* column, from which the *desiderium naturale* is truly missing, then a pre-graced nature column, in which the *desiderium naturale* is added, and then finally comes the *gratuita* column?

If this scheme seems chimerical, maybe assumption (a) was right but assumption (c) was wrong. Could it be that the *desiderium naturale* can be satisfied in the absence of the Beatific Vision because the *desiderium naturale* does not bear upon the Beatific Vision but bears upon an object which, while beyond man's natural powers to achieve, falls short of the grace-given Vision? Could it be the case that "what the First Cause is" can, and in the absence of divine revelation does, lie in a limbo (pardon the pun) between the two columns? Does that mean, again, that the whole chart needs a middle column? If it does, what else would go into it? Are we in natural potency to the items in it (whatever they are)? And why does Aquinas say so painfully little about them? If the object of the *desiderium naturale* has a middle status, but that fact does not mean that the chart needs a middle column (and that is why Aquinas never posited such a column), then how is this outcome to be explained? If the middle status of the *desiderium* itself would require a middle column, but the middle status of its object would not, what is the difference between a *desiderium* and its object?

The questions are by no means exhausted, but the need to raise them probably is. The reader has surely seen enough, by now, to appreciate the *scale* of the difficulty created by Aquinas's one "complication," and the *number* of directions in which his interpreters might reasonably diverge.

Still, there is one more point that needs to be made. Aquinas's classical interpreters lacked the modern reader's developed taste for historical criticism. When they saw texts hard to reconcile, they assumed that Aquinas had a subtle explanation and that it was their job to find it. When

we moderns see texts written by the same author but apparently at odds with each other in doctrine, we first assume that the author changed his mind, and we seek an explanation in the chronology of his works. It is important to realize, therefore, that this preferred modern strategy will not work in the case at hand.[26]

First, although the disputed questions *De Veritate* were written earlier (1256-1259) than the other works cited above, Aquinas never abandoned the distinctions he defended there. They turned up again in the *Prima Pars* (1266-1268), where ordination to an end by nature was contrasted with ordination to an end by election in 1 *ST* q. 24, a. 2; natural *inclinatio* was contrasted with *caritas* in 1 *ST* q. 60, a. 1 *c.* and *ad* 3. Then, in the treatise on grace in the *Prima Secundae* (1269-70), the issues raised in *De Veritate* were worked through again and solved on almost exactly the same lines (2/1 *ST* q. 110, aa. 1-3). So the chart we saw above still reflected Aquinas thinking when he was writing these parts of the *Summa.* Yet the complication appears in both parts (see above, note 11). So it must be supposed to fit on the chart somehow.

Second, whether one dates the Disputed Questions *De Malo* early with Mandonnet (1263-68) or a little later with Grabmann and Weisheipl (1269-72), it was being written at the same time as either the *Prima Pars* (on the early dating) or the *Prima Secundae* (on the later dating). So there was no time for Aquinas to "change his mind" about our intellect's having this natural desire. If souls in limbo are contented without the Beatific Vision, that contentment must be supposed to cohere somehow with their having this desire.

Either Aquinas was inconsistent, then, or else he did have a subtle explanation, as his classical interpreters supposed. Inconsistency is not to be assumed in an author, unless one is driven to it. Hence the solutions of the classical interpreters retain contemporary historico-critical interest.

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[26] For the chronology of Aquinas's works and their historical circumstances, the scholars to consult are Pierre Mandonnet, *Des Écrits authentiques de saint Thomas d'Aquin,* 2nd ed. (Fribourg, 1910); Martin Grabmann, *Die Werke des heiligen Thomas von Aquin,* 2nd ed. (Munster, 1931); James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974).

The following chapters will take up these interpreters in historical order: first Cajetan (whose extensive remarks will require all of Chapters Two through Four), then Soto, then Bañez.

Chapter 2

Cajetan's First Account of the Desire to See God

To understand Cajetan's path through the difficulty, one must begin with his account of the complication, the "natural desire." Of Aquinas's texts on this topic, there are two on which Cajetan commented.[1] In this chapter, the first of them will be presented; in the next chapter, the second. The one to be handled here is 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 1 (hereafter for short: 12/1). After the text itself has been examined, Cajetan's commentary will be presented and analyzed.

A. Aquinas's text

The question of whether God is in any way accessible to a created knower was raised by Aquinas immediately after he had finished arguing out how God would have to be, or rather, not be, in Himself (qq. 2-11). In the philosophical parts of those arguments, God had been posited to exist as what is called today a "theoretical entity": a first cause shown to satisfy certain constraints (to be not-composed, not-lacking, not-bounded, *etc.*).[2] But the nature of that First Cause has the same epistemological standing as the nature of any other theoretical entity posited in a science — namely, a pure conjecture unless there is some experimental access to it — as Faraday rightly posited electrons to exist but wrongly conjectured their nature. Such access was the new topic for q. 12. In other words, once there was a certain amount of coherent theory about God

[1] For the biography of Cajetan and the chronology of his published works, see Giovanni Baptista Flavio, "Oratio de vita Caietani cardinalis S. Xysti," *Revue Thomiste* 17 (1934-5) 480ff.; Isnardus M. Marega, O.P., "Caietani vitae operumque brevis descriptio," in Cajetanus, *Commentaria in Porphyrii Isagogen* (Rome, 1934); Bruno Pinchard, *Métaphysique et Sémantique* (Paris: Vrin, 1987), pp. 27-33.

[2] For an optimal account of what `theoretical entity' means and of the debates over the problematic line between "observational" and "theoretical" terms, properties, or entities in recent philosophy of science, see Frederick Suppe, "The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories," *apud* Frederick Suppe, ed., *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 16-241, especially pp. 27-36, 45-53, and 66-86.

(and revelation provided further description), it was time to ask if there could be any experiential verification of it.

The first question to be addressed, then, was one of bare possibility: is it in any way possible (never mind how or with what help) for a created knower to "take in" God's nature? Aquinas quoted 1 John 3:2 ("we shall see Him as He is") to mandate the answer yes, and he took the same verse to justify reformulatig the question thus: can a created intellect *see* God *through His essence*?[3] The verb `to see' was used to mean `know optimally'. The phrase `through His essence' was not meant to express a physical situation — opposite to seeing Him through an image (that issue was coming up later) — but to express an epistemic ideal. It meant: `in terms of what He is', as one understands humans by knowing that "rational animal" is what-they-are, or as one understands iron by knowing its atomic structure.[4] The job of article 1 was to provide independent arguments to back up the biblical answer. Aquinas stated the need for them as follows.

> Since each thing is open to being known insofar as it is in act, a God who is pure act without any trace of potency is (in Himself) maximally open to being known. But what is maximally knowable in itself may fail to be accessible to a given intellect because, as an object for understanding, it surpasses that intellect — much as the sun, which is maximally visible, cannot be seen by a bat, because its luminosity surpasses [the bat's capacity]. In giving weight to this point, then, some writers[5] have maintained that no created intellect can

[3] Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit Deum videre per essentiam.

[4] Aquinas held that finding its essence is the climactic step in getting to know any entity. Some recent philosophers of science (especially Popper) have denied this, but their case is based on a confusion between the genuine essence-search and a semantic counterfeit. For example, the genuine essence-question, `What is water?', is counterfeited by `What do we mean by `water'?', a question which (be it after usage or a Husserlian *Wesen)* never yields the empirical data for the genuine answer, H_2O. But the "essence" which Aquinas thought it crucial to know was something very like the genuine answer: it was picked out by a scientific account *(ratio);* it was the nature of a thing, not the rôle of its name in ordinary language, nor the rôle of its *Idee* among the "givens" of consciousness.

[5] He may have had Hugh of St. Cher in mind, who was censured at the University of Paris in 1241. Another possibility is Peter Abelard, who was accused by St. Bernard (Epistle 190) of holding this negative opinion. A more remote possibility is Scotus Erigena, *De divisione naturae,* Book III, c. 23 (*PL* 122, column 689). But there can be no question here of Gregory Palamas, of course, who was not born until about 50 years after Aquinas's death.

come to see God's essence.[6]

In other words, Aquinas began by acknowledging a difficulty that seemed to stand in the way of the bare possibility of a creature's getting to know what God is. The rest of the article represented his attempt to undermine the force of this difficulty.

> But this opinion can hardly be right. After all, man's ultimate fulfillment *[beatitudo]* lies in his highest activity, which is that of understanding.[7] So if a created mind can never come to see what God is, then *either* man will never reach his fulfillment, *or else* his fulfillment will lie in [understanding] something other than God. But that idea is foreign to the faith.[8] For inasmuch as each thing is complete insofar as it reaches the source *[principium]* of its being, the ultimate completeness of a rational creature is in Him who is the source of its being.[9]

This last sentence is a hyper-compact summary of an argument which Aquinas presented in larger pieces elsewhere.[10] The largest such piece is in his commentary on the fourth book of the *Sen-*

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[6] Cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum; sicut sol, qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione propter excessum luminis. Hoc igitur attendentes quidam posuerunt quod nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest.

[7] See Chapter One, p. 3.

[8] The Scriptures are explicit that the clean of heart shall see God (Mt. 5:8), that we shall see the objects of our faith "face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12), that we shall see Christ "as He is" (1 John 3:2). These texts certainly seem to promise that the epistemic possibility under debate in this article exists and will be realized (which is why Aquinas used 1 John 3:2 in the *sed contra*). More deeply, what is foreign to Christian faith is the idea that fulfillment might be centered elsewhere than on God. "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also;" so you must "lay up treasure in Heaven" by loving the Lord your God "with all your heart, mind, and strength." Aquinas might have appealed to these teachings (and said: given the importance of understanding to us, we cannot fully love someone whom we are not invited to understand); but he took instead a different line of attack.

[9] Sed hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima ejus operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit vel in alio ejus beatitudo consistet quam in Deo; quod est alienum a fide. In ipso enim est ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quod est ei principium essendi — in tantum enim unumquodque perfectum est in quantum ad suum principium attingit.

[10] A similar summary statement appears in *De Regno ad regem Cypri* I, 8: "Tendit enim uniuscujusque rei desiderium in suum principium, a quo esse suum causatur. Causa vero mentis humanae non est aliud quam Deus, qui eam ad suam imaginem facit. Solus igitur Deus est qui hominis desiderium quietare potest . . ." See Aquinas, *On Kingship*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan, revised by I. T. Eschmann (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1949), p. 37. An interestingly different summary statement ap-

tences, d. 8. Beginning there and putting the other pieces together, the argument seems to have gone as follows.

(1) Each thing is complete when it attains its distinctive strength *(virtus).*[11]

(2) A thing's strength is the utmost in it.[12]

(3) So the complete state of a thing is a matter of its being brought to its utmost.[13]

(4) But the "utmost" of a thing is twofold: there is the *interior* utmost (a strength for action *within* the thing), and there is the *exterior* utmost (the end or goal it seeks as the terminus of its action).[14]

(5) The distinctive strength by the attaining of which a thing is called complete is found in the type of action for whose sake the thing exists.[15]

(6) So the interior utmost of any thing is found in the type of action for whose sake the thing exists.[16]

(7) It is through their interior utmost that things attain their exterior utmost (their end/goal).

(8) So things attain their end/goal through the type of action for whose sake they exist.[17]

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pears in Aquinas's commentary on *Metaphysics I, lectio 1*: ". . . omnibus hominibus naturaliter desiderium inest ad sciendum. Cujus ratio potest esse triplex. . . . Tertio, quia unicuique rei desiderabile est ut suo principio conjungatur; in hoc enim uniuscujusque perfectio consistit. Unde et motus circularis est perfectissimus, ut probatur octavo *Physicorum,* quia finem conjungit principio. Substantiis autem separatis, quae sunt principia intellectus humanae, et ad quae intellectus humanus se habet ut imperfectum ad perfectum, non conjungitur homo nisi per intellectum : unde et in hoc ultima hominis felicitas consistit. Et ideo naturaliter homo desiderat scientiam." Only slightly less summary are the statements of this argument in *De Veritate* q. 8, a. 1, and in *Quodlibet* X, q. 8.

[11] Aquinas, *In IV Sent.* d. 8, q. 1. a. 1, qa. 1 *ad* 1, citing Aristotle's *Physics VII,* c. 3; 246 a 14.

[12] *Ibid.,* citing *De Caelo I,* c. 11; 281 a 8.

[13] *Ibid*.

[14] *Ibid*.

[15] *Ibid.,* citing Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics II,* c. 1 *passim; e.g.* 1103 b 15.

[16] *Ibid*.

[17] Aquinas, *In II Sent.* d. 18, q. 2, a. 2 *ad* 4.

(9) In intellectual creatures, this type of action is their understanding; so such creatures attain their end/goal though an act or acts of understanding.[18]

(10) The exterior utmost of anything is the goal/state in which it has everything it seeks for its completeness.[19]

(11) So the exterior utmost of anything is the state in which it rests in its completeness.

(12) Resting in completeness and corrupting are opposites.

(13) So the state in which a thing rests in its completeness and the state in which it corrupts are opposites to each other.

(14) Corruptibles corrupt because of their wide removal from the source of their being.[20]

(15) So the state in which a thing rests in its completeness is the opposite from removal from the source of its being.

(16) The opposite of removal from anything is conjunction to it.

(17) So the state in which a thing rests in its completeness is conjunction to the source of its being; hence all things seek this in some way in seeking their own completeness or "good."[21]

(18) The First Cause is the Source of being for all.[22]

(19) So the state in which a thing rests in its completeness is conjunction to the First Cause

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[18] 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 2; 3 *CG* c. 25, arg. 2; *Compendium theologiae* c. 103.

[19] Aquinas, *In IV Sent.* d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, qa 1 *ad* 1; 2/1 *ST* q. 1.

[20] Aquinas, *In IV Sent.* d. 8, *loc.cit.*, citing Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione II*, c. 10; 336 b 7 and 31.

[21] 1 *ST* q. 6, a. 1, esp. *ad* 2.

[22] This is the Christian doctrine of creation, a matter of faith expounded by Aquinas in 1 *ST* q. 45. It was denied not only by those philosophers who thought the universe was uncreated but also by those who defended an emanationist scheme, in which the First Cause produced only some first/highest creature, who then produced the next, *etc.*

as Source of its being.[23]

(20) And thus [from (10) above] the First Agent also meets the definition of an ultimate end/goal to be reached.[24]

(21) If the First Cause cannot be seen for what it is (*i.e.* in its essence) by rational creatures, it cannot be understood by them (because their characteristic act of understanding is understanding what something is).[25]

(22) But [from (9) above] rational creatures attain their end/goal through an act or acts of understanding.

(23) So [by (19) above] they would attain conjunction with the First Cause by an act or acts of understanding.

(24) Ergo, if the First Cause cannot be seen for what He is by rational creatures, they *either* cannot attain their goal at all *or else* their goal is to be conjoined-by-understanding to something other than what-God-is and hence (?) to something other than God.[26]

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[23] "The exterior utmost of a thing is the Source from which the thing has being, because, by conjunction to It, a thing is completed and strengthened, while, by removal from It, things fail," *In IV Sent.* d. 8, *loc.cit.*

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Aquinas, *In librum De causis*, lectio 6, citing Aristotle, *De Anima III*, c. 4. *Cf.* 1 *ST* 17, 3 *corpus* and *ad* 1.

[26] The last step in getting to the second alternative is unclear, in that it does not emerge from any point mentioned in the argument so far. Hence I have left a question mark at the point where this step needs to be made. I have a conjecture, however, as to what the step may have been. Perhaps it went like this: what-God-is = God (a point Aquinas established in 1 *ST* q. 3, a. 3, where he showed that there is no composition in God between the divine nature and the God who "has" that nature); ergo, if our fulfillment lies in conjunction-by-understanding to something that = what-God-is, then our fulfillment lies in conjunction-by-understanding to something that = God.

If this conjecture is sound, one can see very clearly that the last, decisive steps of the argument depend upon an assumption about the "conjunction by understanding" in which a rational creature reaches fulfillment, namely, that it requires the coincidence of its physical and intentional termini. I mean, it requires that the terminus of the conjunction be the terminus of the act of understanding. Well, the terminus of a conjunction is the real being to which one is conjoined (here: the First Cause), and the terminus of an act of understanding is the object understood (1 *ST* q. 14, a. 2). So Aquinas's hyper-compacted argument depends on the assumption that a rational creature's "conjunction to the Source of its being" is one in which God is the object which the creature is understanding. (For then, if God = what-God-is, then what-God-is =

Having gestured towards this argument by stating a hyper-compact summary of it, Aquinas switched ground. He had attempted to undermine the no-possibility-of-seeing-God opinion with an argument drawn from the faith; he sought next to undermine it also with an argument drawn from reason.

> The opinion is also unreasonable *[praeter rationem]*. For there is in man a natural desire, when he sees an effect, to know the cause of it; and thus wonder wells up in human beings. Therefore if a rational creature's under-standing cannot cope with the first cause of things, a desire rooted in nature will be left pointless.[27]

This is the famous natural-desire argument (NDA). It is an appeal to Aristotle's work on natural tendency. Aristotle thought that scientific knowledge of a natural kind *K* could be obtained from two sources: (1) how, necessarily, all *K*-things are, and (2) how, necesssarily, all *K*-things, given what they are, strive to be.[28] This last was natural tendency or propensity, about which Aristotle further thought two things: (a) how all *K*-things strive to be is how **most** of them are at any given time or how many of them are **most** of the time, and (b) how all *K*-things strive to be is how a *K*-thing necessarily **can be**. In other words, he thought that a natural tendency was generally satisfied (and so could be read-off from statistical evidence) and that no natural tendency could be

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the object which the creature is understanding, and Aquinas has the point he is after.) But where does this crucial assumption come from? How can it be defended in a non-question-begging way, against a Christian (say, a Palamite) who agrees that our fulfillment is a conjunction to God but denies that the object we shall be understanding is God's essence? I shall return to this question below, after we have a look at Cajetan's comments on this part of the text.

[27] Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam cum intuetur effectum — et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae.

[28] This way of putting the matter is a straightforward inference from two statements made in the *Posterior Analytics*, namely, that scientific knowledge is of why a thing couldn't be otherwise (71b15), and that such knowledge covers not only how the thing is always but also how it is "for the most part" (87b19-27). Aquinas read the texts the same way and took the double scope of science to come from form and matter. In 2/1 *ST* q. 10, a. 1 *ad* 2, he divided how a thing is "by its nature" into (a) how it is by virtue of the form involved in its nature (which is how it must actually be so long as it exists at all) and (b) how it is by virtue of the matter or potentiality involved in its nature (which is how it must potentially be and frequently will actually be).

pointless or unachievable. Aristotle took it for granted that man is a natural kind and that his cognitional doings are natural processes (a position known nowadays as naturalized epistemology).

Aquinas agreed with these points and so felt free (a) to appeal here to the fact that people are generally curious about why something is the case, and (b) to posit a natural tendency (here called a *desiderium naturae)* behind that statistical evidence. Aquinas gave the tendency both an object (to know the cause) and a natural trigger (when an effect is seen). He thus thought that the same natural tendency would be triggered again and again, as the human knower worked back from an initial effect to *its* caused causes to *their* caused causes. When a human scientist sees that the deepest causes he understands are effects (that is, are active as causes only thanks to some unknown and still deeper factor), the natural tendency is triggered again: any scientist who got that far would "naturally desire" to know **what** this further factor (*alias*, the First Cause) **is**. If there is no possible way for a human being to know this, we have a species-wide tendency that is pointless, unachievable *(inane).* Sound ethology does not accept such an hypothesis. Ergo there is a possible way to know.

On this argument, two further comments are needed. First, natural desires were sharply distinguished from incidentally or artificially induced ones, such as Mr. Hunt's desire to corner the world market in silver. Incidentally induced desires are often unachievable, and so the force of the present argument lies in its being about a "natural desire." [29]

Second, Aquinas like Aristotle distinguished arguments that are conclusive *(demonstrativa)* from those that are plausible and suggestive *(dialectica).* Aquinas is correctly read as presenting the latter, unless he says otherwise. The argument here is no more than plausible, because its major premise (`No natural desire of a species is unachievable') is readily distinguished by a procedure at which Aquinas was expert:

[29] For more on the distinction, see Cajetan's commentary on 1 *ST* 19, 1.

none is unachievable in every case *(simpliciter), concedo;*

none is unachievable in some cases *(secundum quid), nego, etc.*

Thus a natural tendency that brings man from abysmal ignorance to the bounds of theoretical science will not be pointless *simpliciter* even if it has no achievable object beyond those bounds. If Aquinas had rejoinders to this sort of objection, he did not introduce them here.[30]

With that very terse presentation of his two undermining arguments, Aquinas concluded:

> The thing to do then is to concede without cavil that the truly fulfilled [the *beati]* do see God's essence.[31]

B. Cajetan's Commentary

Cajetan's usual procedure in the commenting on the *Prima Pars* was to remark first on the wording and force of the title question; then he summarized the argumentation of the article, one part at a time; then he handled any objections to that part. Such was his procedure here, in the famous commentary which we shall call, for short, C12/1.

> The title question asks about a *created* intellect, not just a *human* one; so pay heed. 'Is it *possible?'* is asked without further qualification, [leaving open] whether it be possible through a power in another or thanks to a power in the creature itself. 'See through the essence' means to understand quidditatively, so that one knows how to terminate fully a what-is-He question about God; for to know what-*x*-is is to see *x* through its essence. But when I say terminate "fully" a what-is-it question, I am using 'fully' as it contrasts with 'incompletely', as when we say that one who knows the generic essential traits of *x* knows only incompletely (after all, one who knows the what-it-is of *x* has to have in hand all the essential traits of *x*, down to and including its ultimate specific difference). I am not using 'fully' in the sense in which it would mean *comprehensively*. [That is quite another matter.] For 'know what *x* is' is used with a certain latitude as to the mode of knowing. Mode-of-knowing is divided into *comprehending* and *apprehending*, and apprehending is further

[30] He left the matter to be debated further in 2/1 *ST* q. 3, articles 6-8, to which we shall turn in Chapter Three.

[31] Unde simpliciter concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant.

> subdivided into many levels, as will come out below.[32] — The question, then, is whether it is possible for a created intellect to know, about God, what-He-is. If you have doubts that this exposition of the question is correct, you can check 1 *CG* c. 3, and 3 *CG* cc. 49-50.[33]

With the force of the question thus clarified, Cajetan turned to the task of summarizing the argumentation with which Aquinas had answered it.

> *ii.* In the body of the article, he does four jobs: (1) he posits why there is doubt; (2) he states the negative opinion; (3) he argues against it; (4) he answers the question.
> *iii.* As to job (1), a single claim is made: God is maximally knowable in Himself; yet because of His "excess" *vis-à-vis* another, He is unknowable *to* that other. — The first part of this is supported on the ground that God is pure act. The second part is illustrated with an example about the sun and sight.
> Note in this connexion: from *Metaphysics II* we have it that difficulty in knowing can come from two sources, from the object or from the faculty.[34]

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[32] The allusion is to q. 12, a. 6, where Aquinas maintains that the blessed will differ from one another in how deeply they apprehend God's essence, and to q. 12, a. 7, where Aquinas expounds his view that only God "comprehends" Himself, so that the blessed seeing Him are performing an act that falls short of being "comprehension." But while the exposition of this distinction was thus coming later, the drawing of it was already crucial in a. 1, where Aquinas needed it to get past a preliminary objection. It was an objection from Patristic authority, and read as follows.

> Videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus possit Deum per essentiam videre. Chrysostomus enim exponens illud quod dicitur *Joan. 1* [Jn 1:18], *Deum nemo vidit unquam,* sic dicit, *Ipsum quod est Deus, non solum prophetae, sed nec angeli viderunt, nec archangeli. Quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter videre poterit quod increabilis est?* [Homily 15 on John; *PG* 59, col. 98] Dionysius etiam loquens de Deo dicit, *Neque sensus est ejus, neque phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia.* [*De divinis nominibus,* c. 1; *PG* 3, col. 593].

Aquinas had no choice but to answer that

> utraque auctoritas loqitur de visione comprehensionis,

so as to leave open the possibility that Chrysostom and Dionysius would have agreed with him on the narrower question of a *visio apprehensionis.* In the remainder of his answer *ad* (1), Aquinas attempted to show from the context of each quotation that the authority was talking about comprehension. This was correct. But, of course, those Fathers had never heard of "apprehension" as a separate issue.

[33] In titulo, *intellectus creatus,* non *humanus:* et hoc bene nota. *Possit* absolute, sive per potentiam in alio, sive in se. *Videre per essentiam,* idest intelligere quidditative, ita ut complete sciat terminare quaestionem *quid est* de Deo: cognoscere enim de aliquo *quid,* est videre illud per essentiam. *Complete* autem dico terminare *quid est,* ut distinguitur contra *incomplete,* eo modo quo sciens communia praedi-cata essentialia alicuius, incomplete scit (opportet enim scientem *quid,* habere omnia praedicata quid-ditativa, usque ad ultimam differentiam inclusive): et non sumo *complete,* idest *comprehensive.* Imo sci-re *quid est* habet latitudinem quoad modum sciendi. Dividitur enim in *comprehendere* et *apprehendere:* et rursus, apprehendere habet multos gradus, ut infra patebit. — Est igitur quaestio: An aliquis creatus intellectus possit scire de Deo *quid est.* Et si dubitas de hac expositione, vide I *Contra Gentes,* cap. III, et tertium eiusdem, cap. XLIX et L. (Leonine IV, p. 115.)

[34] Aristotle, *Metaphysics II,* c. 1; 993 b 8-11.

The question here is about just such difficulty or possibility; so, quite suitably, Aquinas did not omit to say that the reason for doubt here is not coming from the object but from the highness of the object above the faculty — which is to say: the difficulty comes from the faculty.

iv. As to job (2), the opinion of some writers is that a created intellect cannot possibly see God's essence. Their reason is the same highness of God above a created intellect, as it says in the text at the words, "In giving weight to this point," *etc.*

Bear in mind here that this opinion, in my judgment, is not Avicenna's thinking, nor that of other philosophers (since at least the first created Intelligence knows what God is, according to Avicenna, since He is its proximate source). Rather, this was the opinion of some Christian writers, I think.[35] And that is why Aquinas disputes it with points pertaining to the faith, as we shall see.

v. As to job (3), the opinion just mentioned is **undermined in two ways**. The first goes as follows. If no created intellect can possibly see God, *[inference:]* then either *[first alternative:]* it will never attain its fulfillment, or *[second alternative:]* its fulfillment lies elsewhere than in God. Drawing this inference is supported on the ground that man's fulfillment lies in his highest activity, which is understanding. — As to the point inferred, the first alternative in it is obviously impossible; the second is foreign to the faith.[36] And lest

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[35] Avicenna believed that we humans had been created by the ninth and last of the Intelligences, and that our beatitude would lie in conjunction with that source. But he believed that the first Intelligence had been created directly by God. See Avicenna, *Metaphysica sive Prima Philosophia,* Book IX, c. 4; L. Gardet, *La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn Sina)* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951).

Since the opinion is taken to deny any possibility of seeing God's essence for any created intellect at all (not only in the sense of comprehending it but even in the sense of apprehending it in any way), it is indeed hard to find writers who may have been known to Aquinas and who held it. I suggested Hugh of St. Cher as a possibility, or Abelard. But as Cajetan was probably aware, this opinion came into its own in the century after Aquinas, in the Byzantine East, where it was advanced by Gregory Palamas and eventually imposed as "orthodoxy" on the eastern believers. Cf. Martin Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1926ff.), vol. II, pp. 47-183.

[36] The first alternative (that rational creatures cannot reach their fulfillment) is also contrary to the faith. Why then does Cajetan interpret 'alienum a fide' as applying only to the second alternative? Why does he interpret Aquinas as *implictly* dismissing the first alternative as "obviously impossible"?

Two reasons come to mind, and perhaps they suffice. First, there were no Schopenhauerian pessimists in 13th Century Europe, nor any Sartreans, nor any novelists like Thomas Hardy. The idea that tragic futility might be the lot of rational beings had not been advanced yet. Not only did the faith militate against it, but so did the "science" of the age — Aristotelian naturalism, with its sunny assumptions about the purposiveness of nature and the fulfillment of each natural species through its distinctive activity. So Aquinas's cultural conditions made it quite possible for him to think that the first alternative was too absurd to need a response. Second, the hyper-compacted argument which was Aquinas's only response to the alternatives (and which Cajetan is about to restate) did not bear upon the first alternative. It gestured hypertersely at a reason to reject the second, as follows. Suppose a rational creature's fulfillment lies elsewhere than in understanding God. Well, the creature's fulfillment is known to lie in conjunction-by-understanding to the source of its being. So the source of its being must be other than God. But that is against the faith, *etc.*

> Aquinas seem to be saying this arbitrarily, he supports it thus. *[Antecedent:]* God is a rational creature's source of being; *[inference:]* ergo the happiness of a rational creature lies in conjunction to God. The inference is supported on the ground that each thing is complete in proportion as it is conjoined to its source. This last is a proposition taken from the *Liber de causis.*[37, 38]

At this point Cajetan breaks off his summary of the argumentation to handle a potential objection and to comment further on how Aquinas breaks down the second alternative (that the in-

[37] The proposition does not appear in the *Liber de causis* in so many words but can be inferred from statements in it with which Aquinas agrees in his commentary. *Propositio 9* in that text, for example, is about how God's action of ruling extends to all creatures. In his commentary, *lectio* 9, Aquinas says the following:

> Each thing is ruled and conserved through a strength of its own by which it achieves something towards its end and resists hindrances thereto; but the strength of a caused thing depends upon the strength of its cause, and not *vice-versa*. For since strength is the source of operating *[principium operandi]* in each thing, it must be the case that the strength of the thing's strength is that whence it has what it takes to be a source of operating. Well it was said in *Propositio 1* that a lower cause operates through the strength of a higher cause; hence the strength of the higher cause is the strength of the strength of the lower cause. (*Opera Omnia* vol. 24 [Paris: Vives, 1875], p. 537.)

In that case, God's *virtus* is the strength with which an intellectual creature has the strength to understand. In that case, immediate contact or "conjunction" with God *(immediatione supposiți?)* is part of any state in which this creature attains its own completeness, *etc.* These points are an alternate route from point (10) to point (17) in the reconstruction given above.

tellectual creature's fulfillment lies elsewhere than in God).

> *vi.* On the support for drawing the inference, a doubt could be raised to the effect that it is arguing affirmatively from a higher [more general] notion to a case falling under it, namely, from "highest activity, which is understanding," to such-and-such exercise of understanding.[39]
>
> But the answer is easy. By the talk of a highest activity, we do not *mean* just a generic kind of doing (say, understanding), as a surface reading of the text suggests, but the *highest* of that kind (*i.e.* understanding the deepest things), *etc.* Hence no fallacy crops up. — Granted, Aquinas did specify a genus of doing here, but he did so because he was talking about man, in whom there are other genera of activity, such as sensations. The reason why he turned to the case of man in this support, even though the argument was about "created intellect" in general, was to give instruction from things better known, to show that the same reasoning would apply to any created intellect. Indeed, he was making an argument *from the least case.* For if man [the least intellectual being] is such that his fulfillment lies in understanding the deepest things, *a fortiori* the happiness of the other intellectual beings [who are pure intellects] will be their deepest contemplations, too.
>
> *vii.* As to how Aquinas breaks down the second alternative in the point in-

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[38] II. In corpore quatuor: primo, ponitur causa dubitandi; secundo, recitatur opinio negativa; tertio, improbatur; quarto, respondetur quaesito.

III. Quoad *primum,* est una propositio: Deus est in se maxime cognoscibilis; propter excessum tamen eius respectu alterius, est alicui incognoscibilis. — Prima pars probatur: quia Deus est actus purus. Secunda vero declaratur exemplo solis et visus.

Adverte hic quod, cum ex II *Metaphys.* habeatur quod difficultas cognoscendi ex duobus oriri possit, scilicet ex obiecto vel potentia; et hic est quaestio de huiusmodi difficultate seu possibilitate; consonum fuit ut non praetermitteretur hic quod causa dubii non est ex parte obiecti, sed ex parte excellentiae obiecti supra potentiam; quod est esse ex parte potentiae.

IV. Quoad *secundum,* opinio quorundam est: Intellectus creatus non potest videre Dei essentiam. Ratio eorum est ipsa excellentia Dei supra intellectum creatum, ut in littera dicitur, ibi: *Hoc igitur quidam attendentes.*

Adverte hic, quod haec opinio, iudicio meo, non est Avicennae aut philosophorum (quoniam saltem prima intelligentia creata cognoscit quid est Deus, apud Avicennam, quoniam ipse est illius proximum principium): sed haec opinio fuit aliquorum Christianorum, ut puto. Et ideo contra eam ex his quae fidei sunt, disputat, ut patebit.

V. Quoad tertium, reprobatur opinio praefata dupliciter. *Primo,* si nullus intellectus creatus potest videre Deum, ergo vel nunquam suam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel beatitudo eius in alio consistit quam in Deo. Consequentia probatur: quia beatitudo hominis consistit in altissima eius operatione, quae est intelligere. — Consequens autem, pro prima parte, est manifeste impossibile: pro secunda, est alienum a fide. Et ne hoc voluntarie dici videatur, probatur. Deus est principium essendi creaturi rationali: ergo felicitas creaturae rationalis consistit in coniunctione ad Deum. Consequentia probatur: quia unumquodque intantum est perfectum, inquantum suo coniungitur principio. Et est propositio sumpta ex libro *de Causis.* (Leonine IV, p. 115.)

[39] An inference such as

> Man finds fulfillment in understanding;
> ergo, man finds fulfillment in understanding trigonometry

is fallacious in this way.

> ferred ["or else his fulfillment will lie in [understanding] something other than God"], notice that Aquinas wanted to convince his adversaries that their opinion went against the Faith. So he brought in a proposition which Christians have to believe explicitly, to wit, that God is the creator of every rational creature; and from this he argued to "Therefore such a creature comes to rest *in God* [and not elsewhere]." Thus the reasoning takes a premise as believed and deduces a consequence by reason. So taken, it concludes quite appropriately for an audience of believers. The interpreters who construe this argument from St. Thomas as being aimed at Avicenna [who did not believe in direct divine creation of anything past the first Intelligence] are off the track, then.[40]

The present writer is inclined to concede that Cajetan is right on the immediate point at issue: the argument which Aquinas hyper-compacted was making appeal to the dogma of creation and was trying to show that the rejected opinion conflicts with where man's happiness must lie, given that dogma.[41] What the modern reader wants to know, however — and Cajetan gives no clue — is why Aquinas put *this* argument forward at all, rather than something more direct and persuasive, such as an exegesis of Paul's `I shall know as I am known.' Did Aquinas think that the Biblical texts were too vaguely worded to support a fine discrimination between *videre per essentiam* and some lesser possibility, such as *videre aliquo modo sed non per essentiam?* Did he suspect that the Eastern Fathers did not support his exegesis of the Biblical texts? The mystery only deepens when one uncompacts the argument he did put forward (as I attempted above). For

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[40] VI. Circa probationem consequentiae, posset dubitari: quia arguit a superiori ad inferius affirmative, scilicet ab altissima operatione, quae est intelligere, ad talem intellectionem.

Sed facile respondetur: quia altissimae operationis nomine non intelligitur *ipsum genus operis*, puta intelligere, ut superficies litterae prae se fert: sed *summum illius generis*, idest intellectio altissima, etc. Unde nulla intercedit fallacia. — Non obstat quod determinaverit genus operis: hoc enim propter hominem, cui insunt alterius generis opera, puta sensibilia, fecit. Meminit autem hominis in probatione, et tamen illatio erat de intellectu creato in communi, ut ex notioribus doctrinam traderet, et eandem esse rationem quoad hoc, de intellectu creato omni, innueret; imo et *a minori* argumentum faceret. Si namque hominis beatitudo in intellectione altissima consistit, a fortiori aliorum quoque intellectualium felicitas altissima erit speculatio.

VII. Circa destructionem consequentis quoad secundam partem, adverte quod, volens Auctor adversarios convincere quod illud sit contra fidem, attulit propositionem quam oportet expresse credere, scilicet quod Deus est creator omnis creaturae rationalis: et ex hac arguit, *ergo in eo quiescit.* Unde ista ratio assumit antecedens ut creditum, et consequentiam ratione deducit. Et ideo optime concludit apud fideles. Et propterea errant, qui contra Avicennam hanc rationem ex s. Thoma referunt. (Leonine IV, pp. 115-116.)

[41] Such is clearly its force in *De Regno* and in *De Veritate* q. 8, a. 1; see above, footnote 10.

even spelled out according to the best clues left to us, the argument never makes it clear why `we can grasp God's essence' must follow. For even with the help of the conjecture I advanced in footnote 26 above (that God's essence = God), the argument suceeds only with the assumption I explained in the same footnote (that a rational creature's fulfilling conjunction to God is one in which the terminus of the conjunction = the terminus of the creature's act of understanding). And that assumption is vulnerable to challenge. A Palamite may grant that (a) an intellectual creature finds its fulfillment in understanding the deepest things it has the strength (or the grace-given light) to understand, and (b) every such creature is created by God, and so (c) every such creature needs to be conjoined to God in order to exist and reach fulfilling understanding. How does it follow that no such creature will be happy except in understanding precisely *what God is?* Why couldn't we attain our blessed conjunction to the First Cause by or in an act of understanding something lesser about Him, if that is the deepest truth we have the grace-given light for?

One answer that comes to mind would take a practical turn and would go as follows. We are happy when we understand what we *need* to, and we need urgently to understand the very conditions on which our existence and happiness depend. For if we do not understand these things, we are anxious, and anxiety undercuts fulfillment. If God is the direct condition for our existence (as dogma says), and *friendship* with Him is to be our happiness (as dogma says), we need urgently to understand what He is. For there is no security without knowing *what* we depend on, and there is no lasting friendship without deep understanding.

Is this answer likely to be, even approximately, what Aquinas had in mind? It does not seem so. Perhaps it would be possible to push Aquinas's comments on the *Liber de causis* in this practical direction — if the strength of my strength to understand and thus to find fulfillment is the First Cause's strength, then I cannot have the security of understanding my own strength, if I don't understand what the First Cause is. But if Aquinas meant to say anything like this, he was cer-

tainly obscure about it here, and (what is worse) he never made it clearer anywhere else.

Rather, when Aquinas did argue this matter out in more detail (as we shall see in Chapter Three), he always appealed to a point about the nature of intellectual creatures: in our conjunction-by-understanding to the First Cause, we cannot be fulfilled without understanding what-He-is, *because we have a natural desire to know what that Cause is.* Well that, of course, is the NDA, the second argument advanced here in 12/1. So perhaps we should cease to view it as a separate and independent argument. Perhaps Aquinas intended the two arguments to work cumulatively. Perhaps he intended the natural-desire argument to complete the conjunction-to-Source argument, as a lemma supportable by natural reason can be used to complete a larger argument that depends on premisses of faith.

Is this second hypothesis likely? Again, probably not. No verbal clue in the *corpus* of article 1 suggests in any way that the conjunction-to-Source argument is incomplete without the NDA. The latter is simply presented as a second and confirming consideration, supported by "reason" apart from the light of faith. Cajetan certainly gives no hint that the second argument was needed to complete the first.[42] There is something of a mystery, therefore, as to what he thought that first argument amounted to. Cajetan repeats it, as we have seen, attributes its crucial premise to the *Liber de causis,* and says no more. In default of a further hypothesis to put forward, we shall have to do the same, for now.

In the next section of his commentary, Cajetan resumed the task of summarizing Aquinas's argumentation, turning now to the argument which is of most interest to the present study, the argument from natural desire.

viii. *Secondly*, the opinion is disproved thus. If a created intellect cannot see

[42] It is interesting that when the conjunction-to-source argument appears in Aquinas's commentary on *Metaphysics I* (see above, footnote 10), it is used to complete an argument about natural desire, not vice-versa.

> God, then *[first consequent]* it cannot see the very cause of things. Then *[second consequent]* a desire of nature will stay unsatisfied. — That the first consequent follows is left as obvious, but that the second follows is supported on the ground that: there is a natural desire in man to see the cause when effects have been seen, as his wonderment shows; ergo.[43]

At this point, Cajetan has mentioned for the first time in his published work the complication discussed in Chapter One. Now we shall begin to see what he had to say about it. Unfortunately, we shall not find his remarks easy to assimilate. He did not write in the way that modern readers find comfortable. The "expository essay" had not been invented yet. Instead, he provided a *disputatio*. This was a genre in which the force of an argument was clarified by posing objections to it, called "difficulties" or *dubia*, drawn from the existing literature or thought-up for the occasion. In the coming section of the commentary (section ix), Cajetan will put two *dubia* to the argument just summarized, and in section *x* he will indicate his solution to them ("Ad evidentiam horum," "To clear these up"). Often, after a solution section of this kind, he would go back over the objections and nail down how his solution affected them ("Ad primum ergo dubium dicitur . . ." etc.); but in the present case he will not. The reader will be left to figure out for himself how Cajetan was defending the NDA — whether it was by breaking the objections, or by dodging them, or by conceding them (and so trimming St. Thomas's argument to fit them). Here is how the *disputatio* goes.

> *ix.* Regarding this argument, two difficulties come up. The first is both about its merit *[simpliciter]* and about its consistency with the author's other views *[ad hominem]*. For it does not seem true that a created intellect would *naturally* desire to see God, because a nature does not bestow an inclination to something that the whole strength of the nature cannot reach. A sign of this is the fact that [a living thing's] nature has given [it] the organs required for any power the nature has put within its soul. And in *De Caelo II*, it says that if the [fixed] stars had [active] power to move forward, [their] nature would have

[43] VIII. *Secundo* improbatur opinio sic. Si intellectus creatus non potest videre Deum, ergo non potest ipsam rerum causam videre. Ergo desiderium naturae erit inane. — Prima consequentia relinquitur per se nota. Secunda autem probatur: homini inest naturale desiderium videndi causam visis effectibus, ut eius admiratio attestatur; ergo. (Leonine IV, p. 116).

> given them suitable organs.[44] [But Aquinas will admit in a. 4, below, that no created intellect can see God by its natural powers.] So his argument seems to imply [irreconcilable points:] that our nature gives a desire for the vision of God and yet cannot give us the requirements for that vision, such as the light of glory, *etc.*[45] — Plus, in St. Thomas's own teaching,[46] as I said in commenting on the first article in this work, man is not ordered on a natural basis to the happiness of seeing God, but on an *obediential* basis.[47] Ergo [the desire in question cannot count as natural, and the argument collapses].[48]

The reader should know that this *dubium* is what most riveted Soto's attention. He thought it represented Cajetan's own conviction. He therefore read Cajetan as betraying his master's doctrine,

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[44] Aristotle, *De Caelo II*, c. 8; 290 a 30-35.

[45] The *dubium* is moving backwards from lack of organs to see God, to lack of active power *(facultas)* to see Him, to lack of *natural* desire to see Him. It was uncontroversial in the schools that we had no organs to see God (since the eyes cannot), nor any nature-given active power to do so (since the agent intellect cannot abstract from sense data what-God-is); so it seemed decidedly odd to posit a *natural* desire where there was admitted to be no *natural* active power to achieve the desire. And please note that the force of the objection does not come from a narrowly Aristotelian idea but from the general perspective of natural science. A nature is never found to provide a tendency to what the powers of the nature cannot achieve, because natural tendencies are posited in natural sciences. For any kind *K*, a natural "desire" or tendency to be N is based on statistical evidence that *K*-things are mostly N (or that a lot of them are most of the time). If being-N is beyond the naturally observable power of a *K*-thing in its naturally observable environment(s), *K*-things are never observed to be N in a natural science. Hence no such tendency would or could be posited.

[46] Both in *De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2, and in 1 *ST* q. 62, a. 2, Aquinas said that natural inclination, even in intellectual creatures, is bounded by the creature's natural active ability *(facultas)*.

[47] The discussion in 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1, was about the supernaturality of the goal to which the human race has been called (the Vision of God in Heaven). Given that we are in "potency" *of some kind* to any goal we can reach *in some way*, the question was whether man's potency to the Heavenly Vision should be called a *natural* potency (like the potency of a yew hedge to be watered from rainfall) or an *obediential* potency (like the potency of the hedge to be shaped like a turreted wall, *i.e.* to receive whatever shape God chooses to give it). Scotus defended the view that our potency to the Vision should be called natural; Cajetan, the view that it should be called obediential. **Desire** or **tendency** (which is the focal issue here) came into that earlier argument only by way of a premise in Scotus's case. We shall examine their entire debate at length in Chapter Four.

[48] IX. Circa hanc rationem, dubium duplex occurrit. Primum est *simpliciter* et *ad hominem*. Non enim videtur verum quod intellectus creatus naturaliter desideret videre Deum: quoniam natura non largitur inclinationem ad aliquid, ad quod tota vis naturae perducere nequit. Cuius signum est, quod organa natura dedit cuilibet potentiae quam intus in anima posuit. Et in II *Caeli* dicitur quod, si astra haberent vim progressivam, natura dedisset eis organa opportuna. Implicare igitur videtur, quod natura det desiderium visionis divinae, et quod non possit dare requisita ad visionem illam, puta lumen gloriae, etc. — Apud s. Thomae quoque doctrinam, ut dictum est in primo articulo huius operis, homo non naturaliter, sed obedientialiter ordinatur in felicitatem illam. Ergo. (Leonine IV, p. 116.)

truncating it so as to make it consistent with this objection. We shall see that the truth is very different. But first we should proceed to read the second *dubium,* still a part of section ix.

> The second doubt is that, even if one grants all the premisses, the intended conclusion still does not follow. For all that follows [from "this desire cannot be pointless"] is just "therefore the First Cause can be seen," not "therefore *God* can be seen." For I may say that what is desired to be seen is just God *qua* cause of things, and not God in His very substance in Himself. Then what will be known [in the desire's achievement] is not what-God-is independently but what-He-is *as* creator, *as* governing things, *etc.*[49]
> We have clear examples of this in our own experience. For example, from [the seen effect which is] the first motion, we desire to know what the substance causing it is *as first mover;* and when its conditions *as that* are known to us, the desire rests content — as one sees in the development of the scienc-

[49] What God is in Himself independently, *i.e.* independently of causing effects, is the Trinity. What Cajetan was pointing out here is that (as Quine often complains) intensional objects can be distinct even when they bear upon the same extensional entity *(res).* Thus even though extensionally the First Cause = the Trinity, a thought of the First Cause need not be a thought of the Trinity — as one sees from the works of Jewish and Islamic philosophers. And so a wonder about the First Cause need not be a wonder about the Trinity; and so a wonder about the First Cause can be felt where no wonder about the Trinity has been felt.

Was Aquinas aware of this? Would he have agreed that two or more intensional objects can bear upon one and the same real entity without being identical to each other? Fr. Peter Ryan, S.J., doubts that the projection of such a distinction onto Aquinas would be sound. See his *Moral Action and the Ultimate End of Man: The Significance of the Debate Between Henri de Lubac and His Critics* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1996), p. 63, footnote 73. But no such doubt is justified. In 1 *ST* q. 2, a. 1 *ad* 1, Aquinas used this very point to deny that we have innate or spontaneous knowledge that God exists, even though we have such knowledge that happiness exists, and God is in fact our happiness. To illustrate, he said that knowing that someone is coming ≠ knowing that Peter is coming, even if, in real being, Peter is the one coming. Many other texts exhibit the same point, the best of them being 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8 *ad* 2, which we shall read in Chapter Six.

The point applies even when the intensional object is the object of a natural desire, for the following reason. In this article, the tendency to wonder is alleged to be *natural* to intellectual creatures *as such,* and hence it must be rooted in what makes them intellectual. What makes them intellectual, for Aquinas, is the intellect itself plus the will, which both take *intensional* objects and are put by those objects into *intensional* states (such as understanding that *p,* desiring that *q,* wondering whether *r).* A capital difference between the "naturalized epistemology" of Aquinas and the "naturalized epistemology" of Quine is that Aquinas allowed intensional states to be natural, while Quine did not. Therefore, if Aquinas is correct against Quine, even a *natural* desire in such a faculty will bear upon an intensional object. Ergo a natural desire to know "what the First Cause is" can be felt apart from any desire to know "what God is apart from causing."

What is at stake here is an extremely important methodological principle for the interpretation of Aquinas's writings. From a premise in Aquinas to the effect that we (with some modality, say, naturally) know or desire *x,* plus a premise in Aquinas to the effect that *x* is really identical to *y,* one cannot infer that therefore, for Aquinas, we (naturally) know or desire *y.* The inference is unsound without the additional premise in Aquinas that we (naturally) know that $x = y$

es.[50, 51]

For readers who find this second objection mystifying, it may be useful to explain why Cajetan thought it important enough to bring up. To interpret Aquinas fairly at this point, one needs to do more than realize that a natural-desire-of-the-intellect has an intensional object. One needs to ask whether that object is supposed to be one that a creature comes to wonder about from its own unaided researches (such as "what the First Cause is") or one that a creature comes to wonder about only when gifted with revealed information (such as "what the Father is," "what the Son was before He became man"). Aquinas wrote here and elsewhere that the natural desire was to know what the First Cause is; but he concluded that we can know "what God is." The modern reader's eye tends to slide over this difference. Cajetan's did not. The modern reader tends to think that the use of `God' is neutral language, abstracting from the difference between natural descriptions and revealed ones. For Cajetan, `God' belonged to the language of *sacra doctrina.* His sense of what `God' meant in an academic context was not drawn, like ours, from comparative religion, but from 1 *ST* q. 13, a. 8, where Aquinas said that `God' is a nature name, signifying the unknown nature that God has in Himself. From that, plus the fact that the natures of immaterial things cannot be learned in human physics or metaphysics (2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6), Cajetan drew a strong contrast between God *as God* (that is, as He is in Himself and can be known to us by reve-

[50] According to his commentaries on 1 *ST* q. 1, articles 3 and 7, Cajetan thought there were four basic sciences, three of which (physics, metaphysics, and sacred theology) would ask after God. In physics God was studied as first cause of change/motion; in metaphysics, as the first necessary Being; in *sacra doctrina* as the self-revealing Trinity. The objection is now suggesting that the natural desire to explain could come to rest in knowing what-God-is for purposes of physics, and that Aquinas's argument does not prove that any more is possible.

[51] Secundum vero dubium est quia, concesso toto processu, non sequitur intentum. Infert enim tantum, *ergo prima causa videri potest:* et non, *ergo Deus*. Dicam enim quod Deus inquantum causa rerum, videri desideratur: et non secundum substantiam suam in se. Et sic scietur, non quid est absolute, sed quid est ut creator, ut gubernator, etc; ut patet in nobis. Desideramus enim ex primo motu scire quid est illa substantia ut primus motor; et huius conditionibus ut sic notis, quiescit desiderium; ut patet in complemento scientiarum. (Leonine IV, p. 116)

lation alone) and God as related to creatures on any basis that makes Him a naturally knowable topic, *e.g. as First Cause.*[52] It was not obvious to him, then, how Aquinas could use a natural tendency to wonder *about the First Cause* to prove the possibility of knowing *about God*. Hence this second objection occurred to him as a way to thrash out an important issue.

Having presented the objections, Cajetan turned to their solution in section x. He wrote as follows.

> *x.* To clear these doubts up, you have to realize that a rational creature can be considered in two ways: (1) *independently [absolutē]*, and (2) *as it is ordered to its happiness [ut ordinata ad felicitatem]*. If a rational creature is considered in the first way, then indeed its natural desire does not extend beyond its natural ability *[facultas];* and if the matter is taken that way, I concede that a creature does not naturally desire to see God *in Himself independently*. But if the creature is considered the second way, then, so taken, it does desire naturally to see God, because, as so taken, the creature knows special effects (of grace, say, and of glory) whose cause is God as God is in Himself independently, not God as He is agent-cause of everything. For as soon as effects are seen, it is natural for any intellectual being to desire an acquaintance with their cause. Hence a desire for seeing *God*, even if it is not "natural" for a created intellect when the latter is taken independently, is nevertheless quite "natural" for it when revelation of the special effects has taken place. It is in this sense that the arguments given both here and in 3 *CG* c. 50 conclude as they do, namely, that a desire belonging to a created intellectual nature would be pointless, if *God* could not possibly be seen.
>
> It was not incumbent upon Aquinas to say in so many words that he was talking here about intellectual creatures as ordered to their happiness, rather than in independent terms. Why not? Because it is a common trait of every science that the terms used in it are understood formally in the sense they have as falling under that science — as one sees with `quantity' in phys-

[52] The interested reader should look at his commentaries on the first *quaestio* in the *Prima Pars* (the one on the scope and nature of *sacra doctrina).* In particular, the reader should look at section iv of his commentary on a. 3, section iii of his commentary on a. 5, sections iv and v of his commentary on a. 6; and the first section of his commentary on a. 7. In these passages, he was stressing the immense superiority of revealed knowledge over metaphysical knowledge and (quite properly) was attaching the word `God' to the revealed knowledge. After all, when a philosopher argues from some kind of perceived effect back to a first cause thereof, he is proving that there is at least one causing-but-not-caused entity behind such an effect, but he is not proving that the said entity is a god. He may rationally *conjecture* that it is, but whether he makes that conjecture depends on what he (or his culture) *means by `god'.* Aquinas had some sense of this; hence the oddly worded way in which each of the "five ways" concludes in 1 *ST* q. 2, a. 3. For an acute recent discussion of the distinction between proving that an uncaused entity exists and choosing to call it God, see Germain Grisez, *Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), pp. 84-91.

> ics.[53] Well, one learns from 2 *CG* c. 4 that the only way creatures come under consideration in *theology* is as they are ordered, governed, predestinated by God unto God, as unto the ultimate End of them all; if this were not so, theology would not be treating its topics in the light of that cause which is at once highest and unique to the theologian. That much is obvious.[54]

There, and very abruptly, C12/1 ends. Many readers have found this terminal section of it bewildering. It certainly does not say everything one feels it ought, if it is to "clear things up." But it says a great deal more than emerges at a glance. To unpack its message, it will be useful to break up the analysis of section x into six steps, at each of which a distinct question is resolved.

C. Analysis of Cajetan's Solution to the *Dubia*

So that the reader may see where the analysis as a whole is going, an initial summary will be helpful. In a nutshell, the six steps will be as follows.

(1) What was the core of Cajetan's solution? (Answer: that the natural desire is variable in the extent of its object, according to the epistemic situation of the creature desiring.)
(2) What of theological interest followed from this core? (Answer: that the natural desire varies even in its ultimate object, according as divine revelation is present or absent.)
(3) Why did Cajetan introduce two "ways of considering" intellectual creatures?

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[53] In physics, `quantity' meant a real amount of something, whereas in mathematics it meant a number (abstracted from discrete quantity) or an expanse (abstracted from continuous quantity).

[54] X. Ad evidentiam horum, scito quod creatura rationalis potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo *absolute*, alio modo *ut ordinata est ad felicitatem.* Si primo modo consideretur, sic naturale eius desiderium non se extendit ultra naturae facultatem: et sic concedo quod non naturaliter desiderat visionem Dei in se absolute. Si vero secundo modo consideretur, sic naturaliter desiderat visionem Dei: quia, ut sic, novit quosdam effectus, puta gratiae et gloriae, quorum causa est Deus, ut Deus est in se absolute, non ut universale agens. Notis autem effectibus, naturale est cuilibet intellectuali desiderare notitiam causae. Et propterea desiderium visionis divinae, etsi non sit naturale intellectui creato absolute, est tamen naturale ei, supposita revelatione talium effectuum. Et sic tam ratio hic allegata, quam reliquae rationes ad idem collectae in cap. L Tertii *Contra Gentes*, concludunt inane fore desiderium intellectualis naturae creatae, si Deum videre non possit.

Non oportuit autem exprimi quod de creatura intellectuali non absolutae, sed ut ordinata ad felicitatem, esset sermo: quia commune est cuilibet scientiae, quod semper intelligantur termini formaliter ut subsunt illi scientiae, ut patet de quantitate in physicis. Constat autem ex II *Contra Gentes*, cap. iv, quod creaturae non sunt de consideratione theologica, nisi ut ordinantur, gubernantur, praedestinantur a Deo in Deum, ut supremum omnium finem: alioquin non in ordine ad altissimam causam et propriam theologo, theologica considerarentur, ut de se patet. (Leonine, *loc.cit.*)

(Answer: because different objects come into view, depending on which consideration one is using, as do different scopes of what one can call "natural.")

(4) Which consideration was St. Thomas using? (Answer: the one proper to theology, which considers creatures in relation to the fulfillment to which God has called them.)

(5) Given the above solution, what was Cajetan's response to the second *dubium*?

(6) Given the above, what was Cajetan's response to the first *dubium*?

The sixth step is the most crucial, because the question with which it deals was answered differently by Soto.

Let us now go through these steps in adequate detail; and at each step, we shall consider what objection can be made against Cajetan's position in that step.

1. What was the Core of Cajetan's Solution?

Cajetan's core contention was that the natural desire complicating Aquinas's story of nature and super-nature was not so tightly focused as to have but a single specific object, but was a broad desire, as broad as wonder itself. It could thus bear upon any of a vast class of objects (the essences of the causes of known effects, including that of their first cause), and therefore it had to vary in the extent of its actual object, according to the knowledge that triggers it (that is, according to which effects, and which kinds of effects, are known).

One will object to this if one conceives the natural desire in question as invariant in its object, so as to have that unique object independently of what effects the creature might know or fail to know. But in order for this conception to be sustained, the natural desire in question must **either** be independent of knowledge altogether, like a blind hunger, **or else** must depend only on knowledge which is inevitably, invariantly, possessed.

Such a conception is implausible for three reasons. First, it is contrary to the description which Aquinas himself gave. He described the *desiderium* with language describing the relevant kind of wonder — the kind that leads to science. "Seeking to know the cause of a seen effect" is what-it-is to have wonder of that kind. Since such wonder applies to a broad range of objects, so

does the *desiderium.* In fact, breadth-of-object characterizes all our natural inclinations, even those that seem to be most independent of knowledge, like hunger and thirst. A human being has a natural sense-appetite for food, which he or she feels even as an infant lacking the concept of food in general. And yet even without a concept to accompany it, the appetite is satisfiable in many ways. It has by its nature a generic object. And hence, even if there happened to be an ultimate food, some ambrosia that, once eaten, satisfied appetite forever, one could not fairly say that man's natural appetite was a hunger *just for ambrosia*.

Secondly, Aquinas's own description included `known effect'. Therefore, the natural desire in question could not be independent of knowledge. Aquinas did say in some places that natural desire did not presuppose apprehension (*e.g. De Veritate* q. 25, a. 1), but he also said that natural desire worked differently in different natures, blindly in natures lacking cognition but rationally in natures endowed with intellect (1 *ST* q. 60, a. 1). If the natural desire of intellect itself is taken Cajetan's way, as *inclinatio* to a broad object, one can see that it is in a way independent of apprehension, in a way not. As soon as a child's intellect is beginning to function, an unfocused wonder is expressed in the child's vocalization of `why', asked about anything and everything and nothing in particular. But as distinct objects are apprehended by the child's intellect as "effects known," the same wonder is focused by those effects onto distinctly conceived objects ("what the cause of *that* is"). This is how, for Aquinas, every natural desire in an intellectual creature worked through rational apprehension. In irrational creatures, a natural desire could remain a blind yearning or an instinctive responsiveness. But in intellectual creatures, the natural desires were focused through intellectual apprehensions onto conceived objects. Aquinas applied this principle even to instincts which do not have their roots in the intellect, such as the natural desire to preserve one's being.

> Each thing, in its own way, naturally desires to exist. But in cognizant things, desire follows upon cognition. Sense cognition grasps existing only as here-

> and-now. But an intellect grasps existing across the board and as pertaining to any time. Hence anything endowed with intellect *naturally desires* to exist always.[55]

The reader will notice that this text supports the idea that a natural desire's object is expandable. For even though man is an intellectual creature, his intellect does not come into operation until some time after birth. Very young children are creatures in whom the sense powers alone are operative. It follows that as their intellects come into operation, their natural desire to preserve their being expands in its object. It changes from the object which is to-live-here-and-now to the object which is to-live-always.

Thirdly, it is implausible to suppose that the natural desire in question bears *solely* upon a unique object, say, the essence of God (or of the First Cause), on the ground that we naturally/inevitably/spontaneously possess knowledge of an effect requiring there to be a God (or First Cause) as its cause and hence naturally/inevitably/spontaneously triggering the desire to know *just what God (or the First Cause) is*. For let it be granted that we naturally/inevitably/spontaneously know our own existence, and let it be granted that this is an effect requiring God (at least in his capacity as First Cause) as its cause. Nevertheless, it does not follow that we naturally/inevitably/spontaneously know that this effect requires that Cause. No ancient people knew any such thing, until it was revealed to the Jews, or until philosophy made rare and happy progress among the Greeks.

Of course, one can take the view that every ancient myth of origin reflected a wonder about "first things" and hence (through many veils of ignorance and error) about the real First Cause, so that wonder about that very Thing existed before it had a name, and the wonder which had been directed along fruitless paths, until philosophy (or revelation) arrived to re-direct it, was (in some anonymous way) wonder about that very Thing. But if this view is true (as Aquinas may possibly

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[55] 1 *ST* q. 75, a. 6: [U]numquodque naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Sensus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc. Sed intellectus apprehendit esse absolute et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper . . .

have thought it was), it is a truth about a *res*, not an *objectum.* Instead of taking the myths and the speculations of the pre-Socratics as lacking reference and so describing nothing, this view takes the myths and speculations as referring to the One Thing that is in fact Origin and First Cause and takes those myths and speculations as (more or less seriously) misdescribing Him.[56] Therefore, if this view is true, it is a truth about the First Cause as an extra-mental thing to which pre-Socratic language *de facto* (and willy-nilly) refers, not about "the First Cause" as an intentional object conceived, distinguished, and further inquired after *as* so conceived and distinguished. Cajetan's core contention is about the object of the desire, and so it is not affected in any way by the truth or falsity of this view.

With these preliminary objections met, Cajetan's core contention seems entitled to tentative acceptance. It gives the *desiderium* to "grasp the causes of seen effects" the breadth and variability of object which Aquinas's own description of it seems to require. It allows that very desire to have object after object, as more states of affairs are seen to be effects, until it has an ultimate object, the first and deepest cause of any seen effect. The very object-desired-to-be-known thus varies as the *explanans* required by the known *explananda* varies.[57]

2. What of theological interest followed from this core?

From this core, something of theological interest follows, in case (a) there is a line of knowables, call it S, for which God is the *explanans* on some basis of what-He-is distinct from the basis on which He is the *explanans* of any other line of knowables, and (b) no knowable in the line S is naturally knowable by creatures — rather any truth in the line S, if known by a creature, is

[56] Aquinas may be read as taking this approach in 1 *ST*, if one compares q. 4, a. 1 with q. 7, a. 1.

[57] The core contention thus locates this *desiderium naturae* as an aspect of the intellect's basic striving to go from imperfect understanding to complete understanding, from rudimentary *cognitio* to *scientia.* In every mind, the dynamic of inquiry proceeds from poor reasons to better reasons, and from surface reasons to deeper reasons. Thus wonder is directed towards deeper and deeper reasons, as inquiry unfolds, according to the natural striving of the intellect.

known by revelation alone.

Cajetan believed, of course, that both these conditions had been met, according to St. Thomas. There was a line of supernatural truths, such as those about grace and glory, which were not about the flowing-out of creatures from God but had rather to do with the return of rational creatures to God. Of these truths, God was the ultimate *explanans* on the sole basis of the Trinitarian love which freely called such creatures to join a spiritual society with Himself.[58] This Love was what-God-is-in-Himself-*absolutely*, that is, apart from any operation *ad extra* producing creatures, and hence apart from any relations-to-creatures consequent upon such an operation, such as the relations of creator-to-creature, governor-to-the-governed, etc. But all other truths known to us are explained ultimately by God as operative Agent producing creatures. Therefore the basis of what-He-is on which God was the *explanans* of supernatural knowables was conceptually distinct from the basis of what-He-is on which He was the *explanans* of any other line of knowables. And finally, no truth of the supernatural line was knowable to a creature apart from divine revelation.[59]

Given these conditions, an extremely important consequence followed from Cajetan's core contention. It was that even the *ultimate object* of the natural desire to grasp the cause of known effects varies according as divine revelation is present or absent. In the absence of revelation, the knowable effects come from God-as-first-cause-productive-of-creatures; hence the natural desire in question extends only to knowing what-God-is as such a productive cause. In the presence of revelation, effects are knowable which come from God-as-He-is-Trinity-in-Himself, and hence

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[58] This is why explanations often run differently in *sacra doctrina* from how they run in physics or in first philosophy; they run back to how Persons relate, or to what it is fitting for Love to do — not to what is necessarily the case given such-and-such a quiddity.

[59] The reader must pay heed to the fact that the distinction here is between two classes of knowables *(objecta intelligibilia, veritates)*, not two classes of things *(res)*. Every *res* in the universe, down to the least particle of matter, has flowed out of the loving Trinity which is the same *res* as the First Agent. But not every point knowable about that particle requires an explanation that mentions revealed topics.

the natural desire extends to knowing what-God-is-as-Trinity.

If one objects to drawing this consequence, one must think that at least the ultimate object of the *desiderium naturae* is unique. To show that it is unique, one might think to argue along the following line. The Triune God is in fact the First Cause, and so His essence is Its essence. Therefore, since the ultimate object of the natural desire is to know that essence, it is a desire for just one thing.

But this argument is worthless. It fallaciously confuses a *res* in real being with an *objectum,* an intensional being. It moves from the fact that phrases such as `essence of God' and `what the First Cause is' describe one and only one *res* to infer that they pick out one and only one object-of-desire.

To see that this move is fallacious, the following points will be useful to recall.

(1) In real being, what the First Cause is = what the Trinity is = the infinite actuality of divine *esse*.

Thanks to this fact, any true description of God is thing-wise identical (*idem in re*) to any other true description of Him. Thanks to this identity (which in modern parlance is called extensional identity), one can say quite correctly that the first cause of motion *is* the God of Abraham, etc. But

(2) it is only in God's own self-understanding that this infinite *esse* is *identically* the object understood and the whereby it is understood.[60]

This is why God's own self-knowing is unique in mode and alone counts as comprehension.

(3) In any creature's act of understanding what God is, God's essence is present only in intensional being, not in its real being.[61]

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[60] 1 *ST* q. 14, a. 2.

[61] 3 *CG* c. 51; see Cajetan's lengthy commentary in 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 2, especially the sections that deal with the answer *ad* 3.

Hence

(4) in any creature, the essence seen through is an intensional object; so

(5) the creature's seeing through the essence is not a matter of accusative knowing (as in `I know Jones') but one of knowing *that* a scientific definition is sound (as in `I know that man is a rational animal'); and so

(6) the creature's "seeing God through His essence" is a matter of grasping Him under a scientific definition (as in `I know Jones to be a rational animal'); but

(7) even things finite-in-essence have as many such definitions *(rationes)* as there are distinct sciences in which they are appropriately studied.[62]

To take a contemporary example, mathematicians and physicists both study the four-dimensional space posited by relativity theory. Mathematicians want to know what-it-is as a pure geometry (the Minkowski space), while physicists want to know what-it-is as the set of all possible path-ways for a particle moving in the actual universe. For the mathematicians, the curvature of the space is simply a mathematical postulate. For the physicists, it is an effect of gravity. The two disciplines are therefore giving distinct definitions, hence seeing the space through distinct "es-sences." And if a graduate student switches his field from mathematics to physics, the natural desire expressed in his wonder expands in its object from being just "to know what the space is geometrically" to being "to know what it is physically as well."

(8) God, who is infinite-in-essence, satisfies limitlessly many such definitions.

This last point is the reason why (a) one blessed creature can be seeing more than another, even when both are seeing God through His essence, and why (b) God can be *apprehended* for what

[62] This is a straightforward consequence of Aquinas's frequently repeated maxim that `essence of a thing' means what its definition picks out. By `definition' he did not mean a linguistic stipulation but a sci-entific account. Since each science defines the things it studies in that science's own distinctive terms, a thing has as many definitions, and hence as many "essences," as there are sciences in which it is studied. This important point has been obscured by the habit translators have of throwing in a definite article, mak-ing *`essentia rei'* come out as *`the* essence of the thing' rather than the equally possible and often correct *`an* essence of the thing'.

He is (even in Himself, as Trinity) but not *comprehended* by a creature, even in an everlasting state of epistemically privileged Vision.[63]

Hence, since the *rationes* of naturally knowable descriptions are distinct from the *rationes* of revealed descriptions, the ultimate objects-of-desire are distinct. One can know what `necessary being' means without knowing what `the Trinity' means. One can know that there are effects of a necessary being without knowing that there are effects of the Trinity. Hence one can believe that there is an entity which is the first necessary being without believing that there is a God who is the Trinity. And hence one can wonder what the one is without wondering what the other is. It follows immediately that Cajetan was correct: phrases such as `essence of *x*' and `what *x* is' do not pick out one and only one object-of-intellectual desire.

And hence, since the desire of an intellectual creature depends on objects-of-knowledge, one's knowledge can so grow that one's intellect's natural wonder does not stop at what the first cause of motion is but can expand into a wonder about what the first cause of being is, or even what the Trinity is.[64]

Before finishing with this objection, however, it is vital to head off a misunderstanding. The theologically significant consequence of Cajetan's core contention has nothing to do with whether, in fact, a human being in the next life can "see God through His essence as First Cause" without seeing Him "through His essence as Trinity." That is quite another matter. God is entirely the master of whether and how He is to be seen, by whom. And if it has pleased Him to limit the eschatological options to two (one in which He is seen through His essence as Trinity *and* as

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[63] 1 *ST* q. 12, aa. 6-7.

[64] The same point can be learned from the repeated uses of the natural-desire argument in the *Summa contra Gentiles.* The NDA first surfaces in 3 *CG* c. 25, where its ultimate object is a human scientific account of the First Cause, such as Aristotle sought. The NDA is used again in c. 48, where its ultimate object is an account we can only achieve beyond this life, and again in c. 50, where its ultimate object is an account beyond our natural powers, and finally in c. 51, where its ultimate object is an account of the First Cause "through His essence."

First Cause, etc., and one in which He is not seen through His essence at all, as anything), that is perfectly consistent with Cajetan's core contention in this commentary and the consequence he draws from it. For the inseparability (or even the real identity) of the seeings is quite different from the matter at issue, which is whether there is a distinction between the objects of desire or wonder.

To see that this is a different issue, consider a simple example. There is a distinction between my wondering how a certain woman would be as my wife and my wondering how she would be as a lover. Now suppose I have the latter wonder without having the former, in that I want the lady's favors with no strings attached. The distinction between these objects remains (and remains morally important) even if she refuses to satisfy my wonder without a wedding ring. In that case, the event which will satisfy the wonder I have becomes inseparable from the event which will satisfy the wonder I do not have. The fact remains that, if I marry her, she is getting a badly motivated husband, because the inseparability of the satisfaction-events does not imply the inseparability of the wonders and their intensional objects.

With the preliminary objection met, let us now turn to a different question. Does the consequence which Cajetan has drawn stand up as an interpretation of his master? Does it make sense of the thought of Aquinas? Does it contribute to solving the mass of difficulties posed in Chapter One?

One may make a respectable case that it does. To recognize a variation in the ultimate object desired and precisely on this basis — according as revelation is present or absent — both springs from the nature of the natural desire as St. Thomas defined it and makes sense out of *De Malo* q. 5, a. 3.

Let us consider these claims in the order stated. In the *Compendium Theologiae* (hereafter, *CT*) chapter 103, Aquinas listed three natural desires in the intellectual creature: to preserve its being, to communicate its being (these two having counterparts in non-intellectual creatures), and

to bring its understanding to a completed state. This third natural desire he described further in *CT* 104 and in 3 *CG* c. 50, as seeking to grasp the cause when effects are seen. Aquinas described it again in exactly the same way here. In light of this description, it is hardly "singular" to draw a distinction between the effects we see and the effects we do not see — whether because they are not there, or because (although they are there) they are not seen, or because (although we see them in a sense) we do not see them as effects or as things in need of an explanation. Hence, it can hardly be amiss to draw a distinction between the divine effects we naturally encounter and the divine effects we only encounter because supernatural arrangements are in place. This is what Cajetan was doing in the solution section. And how could he have done otherwise? For if the desire to see God is actuated by seeing His effects, how can one not ask which effects? If he desire is actuated naturally, how can one not ask which effects we see naturally?

Once the question is raised, its answer is straightforward. We naturally encounter our own selves and the ordered changes in the world of material things around us. In proportion as we take these phenomena to be "effects," the questions which naturally arise will concern the "causes" of being, change, and order. In proportion as the causal search is felt to demand an "ultimate" explanation, the question will turn naturally to a First Cause of being and order (as St. Paul suggested in Romans 1).[65] Whereupon the desire that naturally arises is to know what this First Cause and Order-Giver is — a desire to be able to define what fills those rôles. In a word, the *naturally arising* ultimate object of the natural desire is God as a relatum of creatures. So long as it has this object, the natural desire *would be satisfied* by coming to see God as He relates to us, as Cause to effect, and as Governor to the governed. Nothing is desired as yet about knowing God

[65] Saying that the question "turns naturally" in this direction should not be taken to mean that the turn is unproblematic. In contemporary philosophy there are serious difficulties about justifying the very questions to which the traditional "cosmological arguments" seek to provide a theistic answer. For a contemporary surmounting of those difficulties, see Norman Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Germain Grisez, *Beyond the New Theism* (Notre Dame, 1975), James F. Ross, *Philosophical Theology*, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980).

as He is in Himself, a Trinity independent of creatures.[66]

By contrast, it is by specific supernatural arrangements that we encounter one Divine Person as distinct from another (e.g. the Son incarnated) and encounter interior illuminations, inspirations, sacraments, sermons, and other effects of graces drawing us into friendship with these Persons. What is more, it is only through divine revelation, itself a supernatural arrangement, that we become certain that we have encountered such effects. *When* we become aware that we have encountered them, the natural desire to trace effects to causes is triggered, of course. Questions arise about the Author of grace, the Sender of Jesus, and so on. The desire arises to know — to be able to define — who fills these rôles. This desire will be satisfied only by coming to see God as He is in Himself. The new ultimate object of the desire will be the Trinity, and the fulfillment of the desire, as a part of our supernatural happiness, will be complete only in the beatifying Vision.

Let us now turn to the demands of *De Malo* q. 5, a. 3, and see how a variation in the object naturally desired, based precisely on the presence or absence of revelation, makes sense of that troublesome text. From Cajetan's core contention and what followed from it, we have the following points.

(1) Given revelation, the natural desire to grasp the cause of seen effects has an ultimate object, to see what-God-is in Himself absolutely (call this object U^+).[67]

(2) This desire for U^+ cannot be satisfied apart from the Beatific Vision.

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[66] Cf. the similar opinion of Francis Sylvestris of Ferrara, Commentary on 3 *CG*, c. 51.

[67] Because revelation has come in stages, in some of which it was not explicit that the reward God has for those who seek Him is the face-to-face Vision of Himself, I shall leave it an open question what level of understanding U^+ represents. The plausible hypothesis is that the level is sometimes higher, sometimes lower. For when the desire is informed by the explicit Gospel, the desire for U^+ is a desire to understand what-God-is as described by the Gospel, and the level is very high. When the desire is informed only by rudimentary revelations like the *prima credibilia*, the desire for U^+ is just a desire to see what-God-is that He should want me to seek Him and want to reward me for seeking Him, and the level is lower. But it is still the case that the what-God-is as wanting us to seek Him, etc., is what-God-is as Love and as the Light of intellects through grace, which is *identically* what-God-is in Himself.

(3) A natural desire cannot be in vain.

(4) Therefore, to those given revelation, the Beatific Vision is available, a sight-event delivering U^+.

(5) Apart from revelation, the natural desire to grasp the cause of seen effects has no more ultimate object than to see what-God-is as First Cause (call this object U).

(3′) Again, a natural desire cannot be in vain.

(6) Therefore, to someone not reached by revelation, a cognitive state is available delivering at most U.

Now, to these points, let us add a point on which the doctrine of limbo rests and which is explicit in the *De Malo* text.

(7) In the actual world-plan, intellectual creatures are ordered by God to the Beatific Vision in an economy in which revelation is given but does not reach all such creatures, *i.e.* it does not reach unbaptized humans below the age of reason.

What follows from the above six points plus this new one? Well,

(8) In the actual world-plan, the natural desire to grasp the cause of seen effects exists both in creatures given revelation and in creatures not reached by revelation, but

(9) In those not reached by revelation, the natural desire has a lesser object, being a desire for U *at most*.

This (9) makes excellent sense of Aquinas's argument in *De Malo* q. 5, a. 3, on either of the readings considered in Chapter One.

— If one reads it to say that the natural desire is not satisfied in limbo but the lack of satisfaction is not felt, one now has an explanation. In those souls not reached by revelation, the desire had a much lower object, more difficult to distinguish from what they know of God by grasping His reflection in themselves and in the angels. Hence those souls might not feel the difference between their *de facto* state and a sight-event truly delivering U.

— If one reads the text to say that the natural desire is satisfied in limbo, then the souls' untroubled enjoyment of their state is explained by one precise factor: their failure to receive divine revelation. In its absence, they desire at most U and are in a state delivering at most U and

hence do not miss the state called the Beatific Vision, which delivers U^+ to the saints. So interpreted, this text will present a third eschatological option, but it will still be consistent with Aquinas's apologetical argumentation in *CG* and elsewhere. The apologetical use which Aquinas made of the *desiderium naturale* throughout 3 *CG* required only that reaching U and reaching U^+ be unseparated in the actual world for adults. For given only non-separation in those cases, the naturally-grounded desire of real adults to know what the First Cause is (better than an analogical description permits) will be "pointless," unless what the Christians teach, namely, that God is offering a direct Vision of Himself, is true. If an Islamic Aristotelian could be brought to see this, his own desire to know the First Cause better would act as a motive for him to become a convert. The Christian teaching would become not only "credible" to him philosophically but also something *desirable* to be believed.[68]

But in fact Cajetan's moves provide a third option altogether, a better way to read the text than either of the options considered in Chapter One. When a child dies before reaching the age of reason, it leaves this life with few, if any, intelligible *species* abstracted here, and the direct insight which its separated soul enjoys remains vague and general (1 *ST* q. 89, a. 1). Insofar as its knowledge depends on those sources, then, its knowledge is weak, vague, skimpy, confused. If revelation has reached the child (through baptism), none of the above matters, because the child's soul receives supernatural light and knowledge from another source, from God Himself. But if revelation did not reach the child (through lack of baptism), its soul lies in limbo, where supernatural knowledge is not granted, and so the soul's whole knowledge is weak, vague, skimpy,

[68] Notice, then, that even on this reading, nothing in *De Malo* required a solution to the purely speculative question: might sight-events delivering the two intensional objects have been separated in all cases in some other world-plan, possible for God but not created by Him? An affirmative answer to this speculative question amounts to what was later called the "hypothesis of pure nature," to which Henri de Lubac took great exception. He tried to turn Cajetan into an inventor of the hypothesis of pure nature in C12/1; to do so, Lubac had to assume that Cajetan was addressing this purely speculative question here, and was answering it in the affirmative. G. de Broglie pointed out the error of assuming this in 1939 (*Nouvelle revue théologique* 66 (1939) pp. 437-438.

confused. In the intellect of such a soul, the natural desire exists only with its vague object (to know the causes of seen effects), together with a vague notion of what an effect is, a vague notion of what a cause is, and hence no precision as to how the First Cause differs from others. In such an intellect, the natural desire will be satisfied by almost any understanding of what any cause is! So, yes, in limbo, the natural desire of the intellect to grasp the causes of seen effects is satisfied, but it is satisfied with vastly less than its ultimate object. Hence there is no need whatsoever to posit a Vision-Lite, in limbo or anywhere else.

3. Why did Cajetan introduce two "ways of considering" intellectual creatures?

`Way of considering' translates *`modus considerandi'* in a colorless way. Better would be `way of studying'. In any case, the question here is why two — why these two? A reason emerges from the names Cajetan gave the *modi*. He said the one way was *absolutē,* that is, independently. This adverb was used to mean "independently of further considerations" or "prescinding from further qualifiers," in opposition to "with a further qualifier." [69] In speaking *absolutē,* one was abstracting or prescinding from some further specification. Considering rational crea-

[69] The semantics of *`absolutē'* in Cajetan's usage came out very clearly in section vi of his commentary on 1 *ST* q. 7, a. 1. Aquinas had said in the corpus that form is restricted (finitized) by matter, so that reception in matter indicates incompleteness, whereas a form not receivable in matter, being unrestricted, is more complete. Cajetan posed a doubt. There seemed to be counterexamples to the claim that restriction by matter indicates incompleteness: "the form of a cow and even, for St. Thomas, the intellectual soul *come to completion* as a result of their conjunction with matter. Therefore, form-finitude does not indicate incompleteness but completeness." He then answered the doubt as follows: "I should say that `form' can be taken two ways:

- either *abolutē [i.e. without further qualifiers],* so that form is considered just insofar as it is form,
- or *secundum quid [i.e. with a further qualifier],* so that form is considered insofar as it is of such-and-such a kind, say, the kind that informs matter.

A form *of this kind* comes to completion through conjunction with matter, but not form just *qua* form. In the present context, the discussion is being conducted *absolutē* [*i.e.* without further qualifiers], so as to range across the whole spectrum of form. Along that spectrum, the poorer part is the part that can be completed through matter, while the other part remains free and unconfinable within any bounds of matter. Therefore [there are no counter-examples where form *qua* form is completed by matter] . . ." (Leonine IV, p. 73)

tures “independently” thus meant that one was considering them apart from some important factor which one might otherwise have been expected to take into account. In the present case, what factor was this? Cajetan told us in the name he gave to the other mode of considering: *ut ordinata ad felicitatem,* “as ordered to happiness.” In the second paragraph of section x (beginning `It was not incumbent upon Aquinas'), Cajetan finished explaining what he meant by this second way of considering a rational creature. It became clear that “as related to its happiness” was talking about a *felicitas* not knowable in any science or wisdom *lower than the highest* (which was theology).

Now, what happiness is knowable in theology alone? Certainly not the *felicitas* which is fulfillment as people spontaneously understand it (the ideal of complete good), because this much is known even to the unevangelized. And certainly not the distinctive activity in which such fulfillment lies, which a sound philosophy of human nature figures out (according to Aristotle), because this is known to the learned in non-theological sciences. Rather, this happiness can only be the ultimate purpose *assigned* to that creature in the total world-plan in which God is creating it (along with everything else). It is not an end-of-nature, in short, but an end-of-Providence. In our case, the end of nature is merely that we should contemplate the deepest reasons. Only Providence determines what shall be *there* to have a reason! Only free divine decision determines what depth of love, out of the infinite depth hidden in God, shall express itself in created or redemptive effects and so be “there” to be seen and wondered at by the creature; so only the same decision determines the ultimate object of the created intellect's natural wonder. *I.e.,* a free divine decision determines the level of seeing what-God-is on which the creature will be seeing the explanation of *those* very effects.

Now, wonder about the cause is “natural” when it is triggered by an effect that is *seen,* whereas a wonder-about-the-cause that sprang to mind from no seen effect would be either irrational (unnatural to an intellect) or miraculous. So Cajetan's fundamental reason for introducing

the two considerations was to show how a wonder about what God-the-Trinity is in Himself could be called a "natural" desire of a created intellect. His point was that a desire for **that** Knowable could only be called "natural" if triggered by effects known to require it for their explanation; and no effects could be known to require it except in a science that profits from revealed information. Well, that science is sacred theology, the science that alone knows the enormously high *felicitas* to which we have been called, and thanks to which such effects are here and are revealed to be here.[70]

In sum, the contrast between the two ways of considering rational creatures was between considering only what was natural for them as having such ends as are known in lower sciences, and considering what was natural for them as having an end knowable only in the highest science, *sacra doctrina*.

One might object to this division of "considerations" on a number of grounds. If one is a deist with Aristotelian leanings, one will think that the First Cause produces things in each nature, for no further purpose than that they should flourish within the lines of that nature, and hence for no further purpose than what an Aristotelian science (in our case, anthropology) can figure out. On such a view, Cajetan's second "consideration" would have nothing to add. If one takes a non-cognitivist view of religious statements, one will think that Cajetan's second "consideration" supplies an emotionally satisfying way to talk about us but yields no new information about what is in fact "natural." If one is a pious believer but a deep skeptic about reason and the alleged sciences based on it, one will think that all reliable knowledge comes from revelation, so that there is really nothing worth saying in Cajetan's first "consideration." If one thinks that the whole idea

[70] Here are two idle questions. Given all the world-plans God could have chosen to create, would every possible *felicitas* have been this high? Might human beings have been called to a lower one? Cajetan did not ask these questions. But he did make a point relevant to anyone who does, namely, that, in every possible world-plan in which humans existed at all, they would exist for *some* end-of-Providence, and if they had any reason to believe this *raison d'être* went beyond their end-of-nature, they would naturally desire to understand it, and it would be unknowable in sciences that consider people only "in independent terms," *i.e.* independently of the happiness Providence intended for them.

of “nature” is suspect when applied to an intellectual creature, so that man only *seems* to be a natural kind knowable in lower sciences, while the truth is that man is grossly misconceived apart from revelation, then one will think that Cajetan's first “consideration” is not only idle but mischievous.

I set these grounds of objection aside, because they come from perspectives too alien to the thought of Aquinas to jeopardize Cajetan's status as an exponent of it. I turn rather to an objection that might be raised from Thomist quarters.

Cajetan's two considerations, taken more or less exactly as explained above, make sense only on the supposition that man is ordered to one end (known in theology) by divine choice and is ordered to another end (known in natural sciences) by his own nature. But that supposition turns mankind into a species with a *variable* ultimate end — a monstrosity alien to Thomas's thought. For Aquinas, there was just one end of man, the Beatific Vision revealed in the Gospel; and therefore, as a Christian thinker, the whole effort of his research was to discover, even in the philosophers, *evidence* that human nature was ordered to just that end. That is why he prized Aristotle's remarks about wonder in *Metaphysics I* and about fulfillment's lying in the intellect's highest operation, the contemplation of “divine things,” in *Ethics X*. Those texts were evidence that human nature, philosophically scrutinized, **showed what man was for** even to someone who did not know where or how man could reach what he was for. Hence Aquinas's philosophical defense of Christianity in book 3 of the *Summa contra gentiles* went through over 26 chapters to **prove** that human nature could have no end, no fulfillment, but the One promised in the Gospel. It is obvious, therefore, that in Aquinas's mind there was simply no way to bracket off man's nature from that End — no legitimate way to isolate our nature in some “independent consideration.” Hence Cajetan's move to do just that was breathtakingly illegitimate — inexplicable, really, unless perhaps it was a return to Aristotle's closed view of nature, or a harbinger of modern naturalism and secularism.

This is a powerful and many-faceted objection, launched by Dominico Soto in very compact form but expanded into its full explicitness by later Thomists.[71] To its many facets, we shall have to return in later chapters. But for the moment, a few points must be said in answer to it.

First and most obviously, Cajetan's considerations cannot be quite so "illegitimate" as the objection alleges, because they are lifted bodily from Aquinas, from a text presented in Chapter One. In *De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2, Aquinas bundled human nature with its connatural *finis, appetitus,* and *operatio* into an initial consideration, and then, in a second consideration, took account of the higher end to which God is in fact calling us, so as to consider what further *appetitus* and *operatio* we need, as thus called. The result was presented in a two-column chart in Chapter One; and all that Cajetan has done, really, has been to put his own labels on the two columns. Looked at as the one column presents us, we are being considered "independently" of the *felicitas* to which we have been called according to the information known in theology; and looked at as the other column presents us, we are being considered *ut ordinati ad illam felicitatem.*

Second, according to the same text, the end connatural to human beings is such contemplation of divine things as we can manage by our natural powers (in short: philosophic contem-

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[71] In the 20th century, Henri de Lubac took the strongest possible exception to Cajetan's scheme of "considerations" (*Mystery of the Supernatural,* chapters 4 and 8). He did not believe that the ordination of rational creatures to their supernatural destiny could be separated even in thought from what these creatures are in themselves "absolutely." He believed that it was "of the nature" of such creatures that they desire and tend toward an end "above their nature" (*ibid.* pp. 41-42, 200). Such a conception was, for Lubac, the high attainment of Christian metaphysics, and to those would-be scholastics and neo-scholastics who fell short of it he would pose a dilemma. Was it not good scholastic doctrine that the last end of any species is the form of flourishing to which it is inclined by its very nature? Was it not good doctrine, then, that a kind's last end is intrinsic to it, not accidental, not adventitious? And was it not Christian doctrine that the supernatural Vision is the last end of human beings? Then our ordination to that Vision cannot be an adventitious relation (*ibid.*, p. 88). It cannot be "considered" separately from our nature, because the very bent of our nature is towards it (*ibid.*, pp. 71-72). Here then is the dilemma. **Either** the supernatural Vision is the end to which we tend by our very nature, **or else** the scholastic philosophy of last ends is false. With that dilemma, Lubac thought he had demolished Cajetan's flimsy pair of "considerations." (And with it, Lubac thought he had dealt a body blow to neo-scholastic "extrinsicism." And with that, he thought he had dealt a just blow to the neo-scholastic persecutors of Maurice Blondel.)

The essential core of Lubac's case was endorsed by perhaps the most famous of all 20th Century Thomists, Étienne Gilson. See Henri de Lubac, *Letters of Étienne Gilson to Henri de Lubac*, transl. Mary Emily Hamilton (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988).

plation), and the higher happiness to which we are called is the Beatific Vision. Aquinas himself compared the two in 2/1 *ST* q. 3, aa. 2 and 6. He did not say that the Vision was where our *other* fulfillment lay; he said it was where our *complete* fulfillment lay. So the two differ as *incomplete* delivery of fulfillment differs from *complete* delivery. Further, he said that the philosophic contemplation of divine things is called a fulfillment insofar as it contains a likeness of the Vision.[72] Thus the two levels of fulfillment are distinct but related. They both have to do with the same attractive good, the good of knowing what the First and Deepest of causes is. Well, attractiveness as a good is what makes anything willable as an end in the first place. So, here, that which makes the philosophic contemplation an "end" is also what makes the Vision an "end." These points already show that the two are "in a way" one end, so that the charge of variable teleology is already looking dubious. But there is more, and it comes out in a third point.

Third and most importantly, the objection makes a false semantic assumption. "One word, one usage." Here the word is `end'. It occurs in the following three sentences, all familiar from Aquinas.

> Happiness is the end of human beings.
>
> The best exercise of their intellect is the end of human beings.
>
> The Beatific Vision is the end of human beings.

The objection assumes that `end' is being used in one way, the same way, in all three sentences. And so, to keep humanity's end unique, the objection posits a flat identity between happiness, best exercise, and the Vision. This is a thoroughly implausible idea,[73] and so one is relieved to

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[72] [S]icut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis beatitudo: una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem: beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non attingit, sed **participat quandam particularem beatitudinis similitudinem.** 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6, first paragraph of the *corpus*. See also the end of the *corpus* and the answer *ad* 1. The natural *appetitus* that Aquinas posited in *De Veritate* now becomes intelligible. It strives for the merely human contemplation because of that likeness, *i.e.* not insofar as such contemplation disappoints but insofar as it approaches what cannot disappoint.

[73] Think of the cartoon claim, `Happiness is a warm puppy'. It is logically deviant, if taken as a flat identity. But no one takes it that way. We take the claim to mean that (in the dog-lover's opinion) a warm

find that there is no such flat identity in Aquinas. There are significant differences. Happiness is naturally known, according to Aquinas, and the Vision is not.[74] Happiness is necessarily willed, according to Aquinas, and the Vision is not.[75] Aquinas even had distinct vocabulary for the two. Happiness was *beatitudo,* but the Vision was *id in quo beatitudo consistit,* that is, the state of affairs in which happiness is found.[76]

This is not the right place to ponder these differences in full detail. They will be looked at below in Chapter Three, where *beatitudo* will be the focus. But one can already say here that an objection which cannot tell the difference between happiness, understanding deepest causes, and the Vision, tramples down distinctions which Aquinas himself had erected with care.[77]

When the distinctions are respected, it becomes clear enough that the philosophic contemplation of divine things is not a different ideal from happiness, nor a different activity from understanding; it is just a different level of achievement from the Vision. It differs from the Vision not as the delivery of one good differs from the delivery of *another* good (that would be dyoteleology), but as incomplete delivery differs from complete delivery of the *same* good (which is monoteleology).

Since the fulfillment sought by us naturally and its supernatural delivery were distinguished

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puppy makes happy the one holding it. Happiness itself is an internal condition of enjoying benefits; an external condition like holding a puppy is the sort of thing that *relates* to happiness as "delivering it" or as being a situation "where happiness is found." In much the same way, `happiness is God' or `happiness is seeing God' is logically deviant if taken as an identity but is readily intelligible as a delivery relation, asserting that God (or the Vision) is where happiness is found.

[74] Happiness is a naturally known ideal, according to 1 *ST* q. 2, a. 1 *ad* 1, and many other places. The Beatific Vision is not naturally known, according to 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1.

[75] 2/1 *ST* q. 1, aa. 7-8; 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8; 2/1 *ST* q. 10, a. 1 and a. 2 *ad* 3.

[76] 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8. This is important evidence that Aquinas escaped the logical deviancy discussed in footnote 73.

[77] Admittedly, these distinctions are not so familiar as the one that turns up in every manual, between *finis quo* and *finis quod,* and they were not mentioned every time the end of anything needed to be discussed. They came up just when the end of the intellectual creature, man, needed to be discussed in detail.

by Aquinas, it was not secularism but Thomism to bundle the fulfillment together with our nature in one consideration and to put our ordination to the supernatural delivery *in quo beatitudo consistit* into another consideration.

As for the mischief of Aristotle's "closed" view of nature — that a natural desire implies natural organs competent to satisfy it — we shall see that Cajetan was not introducing it into theology; he was keeping it out.

4. Which consideration was St. Thomas using?

Cajetan's answer was: the one proper to theology, which considers all creatures as ordered to God and hence considers intellectual creatures as ordered to the grace-given end which God has prepared for them.

It is important to be clear that this answer was about the article as a whole, not the part introduced by "The opinion is also unreasonable *[praeter rationem]*." That part consisted of premises from Aristotle, and reached only the conclusion that the natural desire for a non-revealed object, "the first cause of things *[ad primam rerum causam]*," was satisfiable. There was no question but that this part was a philosophical artifact, not appealing to any point of faith. But philosophical artifacts were not always being used in philosophical projects. They were also taken up and used in theological projects,[78] and Cajetan was taking 12/1 as a whole as a theological project. In that he was certainly correct. For the overall conclusion was that the *beati* see "God's essence," which Cajetan took to be a revealed object for the reason stated above, and this conclusion was drawn from the combination of the explicitly theological conjunction-to-Source argument and the philosophical natural-desire argument (NDA).

It was precisely this contextualization, *i.e.* this use of the philosophical argument to support a

[78] Cajetan has a short discussion of this in section vii of his commentary on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 5 (having to do with the answer *ad* 2) and a lengthy discussion in sections iv-ix of his commentary on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 8.

theological conclusion, that prompted Cajetan to pose his two *dubia* in section ix. For if the NDA was to support the overall conclusion, the desire must still be *natural* when it has the revealed object, *i.e.* when it is a wonder about what God is *as God, as the Trinity*. Thus the *dubia* were (1) a doubt about calling the desire "natural" when it has *that object*, and (2) a doubt about reaching *that object* from the premisses of the philosophical argument. So taken, the *dubia* posed interesting questions, to whose answers we now turn.

5. Given the above solution, what was Cajetan's response to the second *dubium*?

The objection said that, even granting all of St. Thomas's premises, his argument didn't prove as much as he was trying to prove. It only proved that (since the natural desire is not to be in vain) "therefore the first cause is seen." It didn't prove "therefore God is seen as He is in Himself." Cajetan's response was as follows. This objection would not arise, if Aquinas were considering the intellectual creature independently (since, so considered, the natural desire of the intellectual creature extends no farther than to know what-God-is-as-creator [first cause], and so the argument would not be trying to prove any more than that the first cause is seen).

Notice that this is *all* Cajetan says. He says nothing about how far our natural desire *would have reached*, if we had been created in the "state of pure nature" (about which later theology speculated). He does not say that natural desire is bounded by natural ability in any "state" we might have had. He says only that natural desire is so bounded *when considered in a certain way*, which he has explained as the perspective of sciences lower than theology. When the intellectual creature is considered "independently," he is not being stripped down to *pura naturalia* in a theological analysis. He is just being looked at as the natural sciences look at him. Such sciences study the composition and interaction of naturally knowable things. Theologically speaking, such sciences know creatures as they flow out from God; they know nothing of the special return of rational creatures to God, because they do not make use of revealed information; they leave that

privilege to Sacred Theology as to their queen.[79]

But since Aquinas is considering the intellectual creature as ordered to its happiness (the Vision), the objection does arise, **and it fails**. For as so ordered, man encounters effects which spring from God's substance as it is in Himself (the Trinity); and so man naturally desires an explanation which reaches all the way to what God is in Himself. Hence man as so ordered naturally desires "to see God" in a sense which only the Beatific Vision satisfies. Therefore the premise that this desire cannot be in vain yields the conclusion that God can be seen for what-He-is in Himself.

6. Given the above, what was Cajetan's response to the first *dubium*?

This objection said that a desire to see God is not a *natural* desire. For nature would hardly implant a desire it is incapable of fulfilling. But seeing God is beyond any creature's natural ability. We (and even the angels) have no equipment for such seeing. So our desire for it is not natural. Aquinas should have recognized this, since he himself said (as Cajetan read him) that man is not ordered by natural potency to the Vision but only by obediential potency.

Cajetan's response does not seem significantly different from his answer to the other *dubium*. Again, he says, this objection would not arise, if Aquinas were considering the intellectual creature independently (since, so considered, the natural desire of the intellectual creature extends no further than its ability). But since Aquinas is considering the intellectual creature as ordered to its happiness (the Vision), the objection does arise, **and it fails**. For the intellectual creature's natural desire works through an intensional/cognitive component whereby what is desired depends on

[79] For in order to speak of creatures making their return — "as ordered to their happiness" — one must ascend to theological discourse based on the revelation of *id in quo beatitudo consistit.* It follows that, unless theology is to be the enemy of the natural sciences (with the queen being a clericalist reactionary, who forbids every attempt to understand the creature unless it be done with a Bible in hand, or a tract by St. Augustine), theology cannot be hostile to the "independent consideration" of human beings; she can only instruct people not to take it as the last word about us.

what is known. Hence the intellectual creature is peculiar in that its natural desire can be extended by revelation; when that happens, the result is a natural desire for a level of insight which no natural power can secure. Hence the major premise of the objection (that if a desire is natural, nature has the power to fulfill it) has a counter-example. The Christian mystery falsifies it, and so it fails.

From both responses, it is clear that Cajetan did not accept as a universal truth the implication: natural desire implies natural potency. He accepted the implication as holding only insofar as one considers the universe of creatures independently, that is, *as a system closed epistemically* (limited to the naturally known, supported by God as first cause, of course, but closed to revelation). When the universe of creatures is considered as an open system epistemically, in which God freely reveals that He intervenes and ordains some to supernatural happiness, the implication fails. In an epistemically open universe, there can be and there is a natural desire for an object to which there is no natural potency. Sacred theology properly considers the universe as an open system in this respect; therefore the implication which served as the major premise of the first *dubium* is most particularly **false** in theology. For in theology, the "natural desire" of an intellectual creature is discovered to be elastic, in a way that its natural ability *(facultas)* is not: the desire expands with the informational richness of the environment. If the environment is enriched with effects knowable only by revelation (*i.e.* explainable only on the basis of what God is in Himself as Trinity), the natural desire *while remaining natural* expands far beyond the creature's natural ability, and we naturally desire to know what we cannot know by our natural powers.

D. Concluding evaluation

One comes away from this commentary impressed by many points but not by all. The following points are surely impressive.

(1) For Cajetan, theology works with so much more information than the other sciences that it can rightly use even key words like `natural' in ways that they cannot justify. Theology can

and does say that the desire in man to see what God is in Himself is a *natural* desire. No lower science would be able to make such a claim.

(2) Therefore theology knows man, for Cajetan, to a depth that other sciences cannot attain.

(3) And therefore the definitions and usages of the lower sciences are not automatically to be admitted into theology. Perhaps biology uses `natural desire' in such a way that it cannot be affirmed where there is no natural active ability to fulfill it, but theology will not use the expression that way.

(4) Cajetan's distinction between intensional objects and things is obviously an important one and sets a standard of analytical rigor to which other commentators should be held. If they understand the distinction but reject its relevance to the natural-desire difficulty, they are at least up to Cajetan's standard. If they do not notice or understand it, they are beneath his standard.

(5) He has an impressive account of "natural desire." He has not said explicitly that this item is a pure *inclinatio vel ordo* of the intellect, but all of his remarks seem to take it for granted that this identification is correct.[80] In that case, the *desiderium naturae* for Cajetan really is *wonder* and not some volition. It is the intellect's *inclinatio* to a broad object class, but that very *inclinatio* is focused by seen effects onto precise intensional objects. This account may or may not be correct, but it sets a standard of plausibility that rival accounts will have to match.

Yet for all its acuteness, one does come away from C12/1 with an unsatisfied mind on one key point. Take the natural desire with its ultimate object as naturally described, the what-it-is of the First Cause. Cajetan has said very little about this, in order to focus on the natural desire with its ultimate object as described in revealed terms. What he has had to say about this latter may be

[80] He will make this explicit in his commentary on 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8; the subject having the *desiderium naturale* is precisely the *intellectus;* see below, Chapter Three.

very good, indeed; but he made a remark in passing that seems to bear upon the former. It was a remark about human beings "independently considered." He said that *in this consideration* natural desire did not go beyond natural ability.

Why not? Did he think that, in the independent consideration, the "natural desire" in the intellect had just the same scope as the natural *appetitus* posited in *De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2, a scope bounded, as we saw in Chapter One, by our nature's weak active abilities? Did he think the intellect's desire went beyond the *appetitus* only when the intellect was stimulated by the faith?[81] If so, he cannot have been right. Here is why.

Suppose the anthropologists have found you on a remote Pacific island. You have never heard of a revealed religion, but you have native philosophical talent, thanks to which you have thought that there has to be a primordial cause of this visible world, and now you are wondering what sort of a Thing it is. To satisfy your wonder about even this *naturally knowable topic* goes beyond your natural ability. I have stressed that humanity "independently considered" is not the hypothetical humanity of some state of pure nature but actual humanity as natural science sees us. Well, cultural anthropology is a natural science, and surely it will certify that human beings do wonder about the cause of the universe; and surely some combination of epistemology and philosophy of science (both natural disciplines) will certify that human curiosity has no experimental access to the inner nature of that Cause. It would certainly seem, therefore, that natural disciplines are able to confirm that at least one natural desire of ours — our curiosity to know — does extend beyond our natural abilities. It is therefore hard to imagine what to make of Cajetan's remark in section x — that if a rational creature is considered independently, "then indeed natural desire does not extend beyond natural ability." It looks like a flat mistake, and so it looks as though Cajetan missed a crucial point in C12/1. In his haste to deal with the problem of a supernaturally described object (let us call it the SO-problem), he brushed past a prior and more urgent

[81] This is precisely how Soto would read him in 1549, as we shall see in Chapter Five.

problem arising already with naturally described objects. Some of them “exceed” our natural faculties. Let us call this the E-problem (`E' for excess of object over faculty). And please note that the two problems cannot be identified. If the desire is for a supernatural object, its satisfaction automatically exceeds a creature's natural faculties; but the converse does not hold. The mere fact that a desire's satisfaction exceeds the faculties of the desirer's nature does not imply that the desire's object is supernatural in the sense of being described in terms known by revelation alone. It therefore looks as though Cajetan handled both his *dubia* in a way appropriate to the SO-problem, whereas the first *dubium* really raises (or really also raises) the E-problem.

It will be prudent to reserve judgment, however, until we see what he had to say in his commentary on the *Prima Secundae,* on the very text we looked at in Chapter One to pose the complication.

Chapter 3

Beatitudo and Cajetan's Second Account of the Desire

This chapter will look at three articles in the second part of Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*. They are 2/1 ST q. 3, articles 6, 7, and 8 . Aquinas put into them the final form of what he had determined about how much understanding people need for complete fulfillment. Cajetan commented on these articles in such a way that some of his most important remarks bear on all three.[1] In his mind, the articles formed a unit. Accordingly, we shall have to look at them together. Before starting, it will be useful to summarize what Cajetan expected his readers to know already about the topic of *beatitudo,* as many key points had been introduced in earlier articles or were general background knowledge at the time.

A. A short primer on *beatitudo*

(1) The sense of *'beatitudo'*.

The first job is to determine what *'beatitudo'* meant simply as a matter of ordinary language, reserving til later the question of its learned definitions *(rationes)*. There are three options: happiness, well-being, and fulfillment. To see which is best, one needs to consider the following.

(a) In current English, to say that Jones is happy at the time *t* just means that Jones is satisfied at *t* with his state at *t*. Satisfaction implies the belief that one's state is good, but satisfaction is quite compatible, alas, with the circumstance that this belief is false. Thus 'Jones is happy' implies 'Jones believes his state is good' or 'Jones accepts his state as good'. But 'Jones is hap-

[1] As a general matter, Cajetan's commentaries on the *Secunda Pars* (published in 1517, when he was 50) are sketchier than his commentaries on the *Prima Pars* (1507) and do not occur after every article. Frequently he would let several articles go by, and then comment on a few points relevant to each. Moreover, he abandoned the task of summarizing the argumentation in each article before posing difficulties or further clarifications.

py' does not imply `Jones's state is in fact good' nor 'Jones is warranted in thinking his state good.' Jones may be living under illusions. Thus happiness in current usage carries subjective implications but no objective ones.

(b) Quite the opposite is 'well-being' and the corresponding adjective, 'well-off'. To say that Jones is well-off at *t* just means that Jones's state is good at *t.* This is an evaluative description of a state, but it is quite compatible, alas, with the circumstance that the person in that state does not share the evaluation. Thus 'Jones is well-off' implies 'Jones's state is good', but it does not imply 'Jones is happy', 'Jones believes his state is good', or anything of the kind. Jones may be wretchedly discontented in circumstances which (the rest of us can see) ought to satisfy him. Well-being warrants satisfaction, one may say, but does not impose it. Thus well-being carries objective implications but no subjective ones.[2]

(c) A combination word, carrying implications of both kinds, is 'fulfillment'. To say that Jones is fulfilled at *t* is plausibly taken to mean that Jones's state is good at *t* and he knows it. A fulfilled person is aware of being so, delighted in being so, *etc*. To be fulfilled is to be consciously well-off. Therefore, 'Jones is fulfilled' implies 'Jones's state is good' and 'Jones knows that his state is good' and hence 'Jones warrantedly believes that his state is good' plus 'Jones is satisfied with his state' and hence 'Jones is happy'.

There is really no doubt that *beatitudo* and its Aristotelian ancestor, *eudaimonia*, were meant to carry implications of both kinds.[3] Therefore, one's best option in current English is to translate *'beatitudo'* with 'fulfillment'.

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[2] This difference between happiness and well-being is recognized by Richard B. Brandt, "Happiness," in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 414.

[3] 1 *ST* q. 26, aa. 1-2; 2/2 *ST* q. 118, a. 7. For *eudaimonia,* see *Nicomachean Ethics I*, c. 7 (1097a 15-1098b9). J. Léonard, *Le Bonheur chez Aristote* (Brussels, 1948). A. Mansion, *L'eudémonisme aristotélicien et la morale thomiste* (Rome, 1925).

To confirm this conclusion, one compares happiness, well-being, and fulfillment in their status as objects of pursuit. It is uncontroversial that everyone seeks happiness, because everyone does seek to be satisfied with his or her state. It is tricky to say that everyone seeks well-being, because it is false that everyone seeks what is in fact well-being, but true that everyone seeks what he thinks is well-being. It is tricky in the same way to say that everyone seeks fulfillment. For it is true that everyone seeks what he thinks fulfills, but not everyone seeks what really does. In 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8, Aquinas said that it is tricky in just this way to say whether everyone seeks *beatitudo*. Therefore *'beatitudo'* either meant what we mean by 'well-being' or else meant what we mean by 'fulfillment'. But since *beatitudo* carried subjective implications (apprehension of well-being, satisfaction and delight of the will), it did not mean what we mean by well-being. Therefore it meant fulfillment.

People use the words just discussed to characterize their hopes and to state in a general way what life is "all about." It is a job of philosophy to clarify what is meant by such talk, and the result will be an explanatory definition or *ratio.* For Aquinas there were two levels of definition in this case, the general and the more special, to which we now turn.

(2) The *ratio beatitudinis* on the general level.

Since everybody knows that being fulfilled includes being happy and thus being satisfied, everybody agrees that, when you are fulfilled, your desires are satisfied, you "have all you want," etc. And since everybody knows that being fulfilled includes being in a good state, everybody agrees that, when you are fulfilled, you are in a state where you have the genuine goods (whatever they are), *etc*. Hence everybody, wise or foolish, can agree about fulfillment on a general level: it is "the state made perfect by compresence of all the goods" (Boethius' definition)[4] or it is

[4] *The Consolation of Philosophy,* book III, prosa 2; *PL* 63, column 724.

"having all you want and wanting nothing amiss" (one of Augustine's definitions).[5] Aquinas considered these definitions substantially equivalent and called them the *ratio communis* (general definition) of *beatitudo.*[6] Interestingly, he called them *beatitudo* itself under its general *ratio,* because they *are* fulfillment itself *as an object universally known and intended,* hence *as the conscious ideal which, in every life, motivates practical endeavor.* As Cajetan pointed out, this general ideal serves in consciousness as the purpose ("final cause") of each human being's self-directed projects.[7]

Of course, each human being pursues this ideal under the influence of his or her belief about the content it conveys — *e.g.* a belief that the list of goods spelling out 'compresence of all the goods' or 'all I want' is long life, leisure, and friendships. The job of a general *ratio* is to make people focus on the word 'all'. Are these goods really *all* you want? Don't you also want integrity? Don't you also want insight?

At the same time, each person pursues the ideal of fulfillment under the influence of beliefs about a realizable situation which will deliver it, and to which the word 'fulfillment' refers in his or her belief (*e.g.* a belief that it refers to my landing that contract, or to my getting published, or

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[5] *De Trinitate XIII,* c. 5; *PL* 42, column 1020.

[6] 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8.

[7] See the second paragraph of his commentary on 2/1 q. 3, a. 2, where he was talking about the answer *ad* 2. The text of that answer appears below, in footnote 15. Here is Cajetan's comment:

> Second, in the answer *ad* (2), the statement that "fulfillment is the state made complete by compresence of all the goods" is not a case of essential predication but of causal predication. The meaning is that fulfillment as a cause is that sort of state as an effect [to be achieved]. For the very essence of fulfillment is that through which such a state is [achieved], as the text says.
>
> Secundum, in responsione ad secundum, scilicet quod cum dicitur, *Beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus,* non est praedicatio essentialis, sed causalis. Ita quod intelligatur, *beatitudo ut causa, est status talis ut effectus:* quoniam ipsa beatitudinis essentia est per quam est talis status, ut in littera dicitur. (Leonine VI, p. 30.)

In other words, Boethius' definition says what fulfillment is as a cause. Well, fulfillment as a cause is fulfillment as an ideal attracting the will.

to Joan's accepting my proposal of marriage, or to my overcoming these character flaws, etc.).

Since different people have different beliefs about these matters, and since what concretely motivates endeavor in a given life is the general ideal **plus** these beliefs, different people are pursuing different ideas of where happiness is to be found.[8] Aquinas spoke of these as beliefs about *id in quo beatitudo consistit.*[9] The great problem of life, of course, is to know which of these ideas — which concrete goals — to pursue.

(3) Transition: the job of further *rationes.*

Since human desire is manifold and confusing, the pursuit of fulfillment invites a further and crucial distinction: enlightened pursuit *vs.* unenlightened.[10] Everybody past childhood has some experience of the fact that pursuing fulfillment carries dangers of illusion and disillusionment. Some people turn this experience to good account (and thus become more enlightened pursuers of fulfillment), while others do not.

- An enlightened pursuit will be guided by (or will at least include the pursuit of) the right standards of evaluation, so that one will be clear about "well-being," so that one will know what to seek as deserving that evaluation, so that if and when one is well-off, one will recognize that one is, duly appreciate why, take appropriate satisfaction in what is making one well-off, etc. An enlightened pursuer of fulfillment is open and ready, in short, to *be* satisfied by genuine goods.

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[8] 1 *ST* q. 2, a. 1 *ad* 1; 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8.

[9] See the titles to the articles in 2/1 *ST* q. 2. These titles are commonly translated as 'Does happiness consist in riches?', 'Does it consist in fame?', etc., as though Aquinas were going through a series of theories about what happiness *is.* In fact, these translations are misleading. For in Aquinas's Latin '*consistit in'* meant 'lie in' or 'be found in'; it did not mean 'consist in' as that expression is used in current English. For example, in 2/1 *ST* q. 52, a. 3, Aquinas said that the use of the habits *consistit in voluntate.* To translate this as 'the use of the habits consists in the will' would be senseless. Aquinas meant that the use of the habits is found in the will, since each use of a habit is an act of the will. So the articles in 2/1 *ST* q. 2 are going through a series of theories about *where* happiness is *concretely to be found.*

[10] 1 *ST* q. 63, a. 1 *ad* 4; a. 3 *corpus;* 2/1 *ST* q. 2, aa. 1-6.

• An unenlightened pursuit of fulfillment is guided by one or more incorrect standards and overlooks the need for correct ones. An unenlightened pursuer of fulfillment is not open, or at least not ready, to be satisfied by genuine goods. She is looking for satisfaction in some of the wrong places. Her pursuit is thereby doomed to failure. She may attain what she always thought was a good state, only to be surprised by unhappiness.

But what is it that the enlightened know? What is the correct standard of evaluation? The matter is controversial, of course, because people tend to over-rate material or sensual goods at the expense of the goods of intellect and character, or they think that the goods of social approval substitute for those of character, or they take an eccentric view of what the goods of character are, etc., etc. When people thus disagree about what counts as "a good state," they disagree *a fortiori* about what will deliver it or "where it will be found." The series of issues handled in 2/1 *ST* q. 2 was intended to shed light on these mistakes.

Moreover, so long as the fulfillment under discussion is the sort one can have in this life, "the" right answer is not quite unique. For there are two good standards of evaluation, one justifiable by natural reason, the other knowable by revelation alone. The first leads to a philosopher's account of where fulfillment is found and has to do with an intellectually serious form of life; the second leads to a theologian's account and has to do with the form of life called "being in Christ." Aquinas was at great pains to make the latter an improved version of the former, rather than a wholesale overturning of it.[11]

In our present life, there is yet another reason why there cannot be just one "right" concrete goal. I am referring to the fact that fulfillment can be found in an enormous variety of careers and

[11] Part of the reason for this has been explained in Chapter One, p. 3.

conditions of life.[12] In fact, this variety poses a problem as to whether there is anything further that *can* be defined about fulfillment. Perhaps there is nothing but variety, beyond the general ideal. Aquinas thought otherwise. He thought that the requirements of excellence *(virtus)* and the distinctives of human nature would combine to assure that every fulfilling way of life would resemble every other one in certain core features. If all fulfilling lives had even one feature in common, a *ratio* could capture what it is. Isolating such a common core was the task of a *ratio specialis* of *beatitudo.* It captured an essential feature (but not the whole) of *id in quo beatitudo consistit.*[13]

(4). The *rationes beatitudinis* on the special level.

(a) Under the natural standard of evaluation, Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that fulfillment is "activity in accord with complete [intellectual and moral] virtue," whose core is *doing the noblest understanding* one can do in this life (consistent with one's duties in other areas). [14] It is

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[12] Aquinas paid little attention to the variety of fulfilling ways of life in the *Summa* (except to tout the advantages of the contemplative religious life over the active life: 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 2 *ad* 4; 2/2 *ST* q. 182), but he showed more understanding of the excellence of active careers elsewhere, especially in *De Regno I,* c. 9.

[13] The distinction between *x* under its general *ratio* and *x* under the special *ratio* of wherein it *consistit* makes sense for many desiderata. Take "a party." Everybody knows that a party is people having a good time together (the general *ratio).* But many a would-be host clueless about the real conditions under which people do have a good time together. The special *ratio* of wherein a party *consistit* is missing.

[14] This matter comes up in many places, but perhaps the most profitable to read is 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 2. There the question was whether fulfillment was an activity *(operatio),* and Aquinas was forced to choose between Boethius' definition, which made fulfillment a state, and Aristotle's. Aquinas sided with Aristotle but left room for Boethius, as follows, in the answer *ad* 2:

> when Boethius defined fulfillment, he was thinking of its general definition. For the general account of "fulfillment" is that it is broad, all-around good. And this is what he indicated when he said it is the state made perfect by compresence of all the goods, by which he meant to convey nothing more than the fact that a fulfilled man is in a state of all-around good. Aristotle, however, was expressing the very essence of fulfillment by pointing to the factor through which a man is in such a state, since a man is in it through an activity. In *Ethics I* he, too, showed that fulfillment is "all-around good."

This answer *ad* 2 is a nodal point in Aquinas's treatment of *beatitudo,* for it is here that he combined his inheritances. Boethius' definition rings true; fulfillment is a *state,* rendered ideal by the fact that it contains all that naturally attracts one's desire. But Aquinas thought Aristotle's definition got more informatively to the heart of the matter, and so he insisted on making room for it, too. Aristotle thought of being

not hard to see that fulfilling activity must be activity in which understanding is alert and successful. But the further selection of a particular topic of understanding as essential to any fulfilled life — that is a very long step. For Aquinas, the reason to take it came from his account of wisdom. If human fulfillment must be reached in self-directed activity, and such activity cannot be fulfilling unless it is wise, but being wise is a matter of taking into account *first* causes and *ultimate* purposes (3 *CG* cc. 37, 44; 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 6), then a grasp of those things must be the very key to fulfillment and the heart of it.

(b) Under the revealed standard of evaluation, he agreed with Augustine that the essential core of fulfillment is union with uncreated Good, which, in this life, is persevering in faith in the state of grace, and which, in the next life, is the glorious Vision of God.[15]

Needless to say, these *rationes* are not universally known or accepted; they define not what everyone seeks but wherein what everyone seeks is really to be found.

The word that best expresses what is common to these two *rationes speciales* is 'wisdom'. An activity of understanding which is both intellectually and morally rewarding is an exercise of wisdom. It orders one's life (sets one's priorities) by looking at first causes and ultimate purposes. A philosopher who turns his knowledge of these things to good moral account is a wise man by the natural standard. A Christian who turns his revealed knowledge of the first cause and last

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happy as "flourishing," and it does make sense to think of flourishing as doing something, as being engaged in fulfilling activity, and in doing it all-around well ("in accord with complete *virtus*"). But why should one insert the definition of flourishing into one's account of the *state* which is fulfillment? Why did Aquinas combine ideas that could simply have been distinguished? One answer is: to accommodate Augustinian theology, in which *beatitudo* had to be an *operatio* because it had to be seeing God. A better answer, I suggest, is that if one does not put a doing into the state of fulfillment, one's account will foster the illusion that fulfillment is a state into which one can be *put passively* — as though happiness were a bowl of cherries into which one can be dropped. Many people have this idea, and it is a source of much wretchedness. "Fulfillment" really is a state which a person has to *find actively, in doing* (with whatever help it takes) *the right things*. And the more I come to think of my true goods as interior ones, the more I will think of the right doing as the essential core of my fulfillment, not a mere preliminary to it.

[15] 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a.3, a. 8, and many other places.

end to the good account called "living the faith" is a wise man by the revealed standard. Under either standard, a wisely lived life is an enlightened pursuit of fulfillment. They differ in whether the light that makes them enlightened is human or divine, a thing of this world (this world at its best) or a thing of Eternity.

(5) This life and the next.

As was mentioned in passing in Chapter Two, Aquinas contrasted the fulfillment one can have in this life with the fulfillment one can have hereafter, calling the former incomplete *(imperfecta)* and the latter complete or "last" *(perfecta, ultima).* These fell under the general and special definitions as follows. Fulfillment in the next life properly satisfied the general definition ("complete good"), while fulfillment in this life fell short of it, capturing only a resemblance to it.[16] As for special definitions, the incomplete and the complete fulfillments fell under different ones. Incomplete fulfillment got either the naturally-known special definition (Aristotle's) or the revealed one (conjunction to Uncreated Good through grace). Complete fulfillment had no special definition but the revealed one (the Beatific Vision). As a theologian, Aquinas's interest was overwhelmingly focused on this last.

(6) Concrete ideal *vs.* what one settles for.

Cutting across the distinction between this life and the next is another distinction which one must draw, between the concrete fulfillment one seeks and the concrete fulfillment one settles for. Jones seeks, perhaps, to be a great medical doctor, amply rewarded and widely consulted. In the end, she will settle for being a country practitioner. Smith seeks to be a priest and a great missionary. In the end, he will settle for being a dutiful Catholic husband and father. Precisely be-

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[16] 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6, at the beginning of the *corpus.* Notice that *'beatitudo'* was used analogously, then, as between the two. The definition of *'beatitudo'* as applied to the next life's fulfillment really was "complete good," while the definition of *'beatitudo'* as applied to this life's fulfillment was "resembles complete good." The situation where the same word was used with different *rationes,* but the one *ratio* expressed a relation to what was mentioned in the other, was said to characterize analogous use in 1 *ST* q. 13, a. 6.

cause all humans do seek what is nowadays called happiness, everyone seeks to be satisfied with his state; and when factors beyond one's control set limits to the state one can achieve, so that it falls short of being the state one had desired, one seeks to be satisfied with it *as is*.

If one poses this issue as I have just done, as a practical matter in particular lives, it is fair to say that Aquinas did not deal with it, and his failure to do so is hardly surprising. Whether this "settling for less" is a good thing in a given life cannot be answered without seeing what is going on in that life. One man settles for less in a pattern of compromise. Another man opens his eyes to the mediocrity of his gifts and settles for less in a pattern of humility. To discern which is which is the work of a guidance counsellor, not a theologian. But if one poses this issue in its broadest general features, one will see that Aquinas did deal with it. He dealt with it both as a moral problem and as a theoretical problem.

(a) Morally, the problem of whether to settle for less is the same as the problem of what is really important, and it is solved by isolating the *essentia beatitudinis*. Settling for less can be praiseworthy, provided that the state one is settling for includes the *essentia beatitudinis*. Aristotle saw this even under the natural standard of evaluation: a man hammered by cruel misfortunes can still act according to complete virtue and, if he does, should still be called "fulfilled."[17] *A fortiori* the hammered man will be fulfilled if his life retains the *essentia beatitudinis* under the supernatural standard; for then when he has nothing left but the integrity of his soul, he still has the indwelling Trinity, which is Uncreated Good not as a distant Other but as an available Friend, and a man can settle for that gladly, not just stoically. For one who judges by the supernatural standard can see that he has the *unum necessarium,* remaining conjoined to God through grace, even when stripped and tortured.

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[17] *Nicomachean Ethics I,* c. 10; 1100b10-32.

(b) As a theoretical matter, the question of whether to settle for less brings to the surface a further and critical difference between the two standards of evaluation, natural and revealed. A man not reached by revelation has the natural standard *and no other*. As Aristotle pursued that one standard, it led not just to an answer about whom to call happy but also to a sigh of resignation. Even if the virtuously acting man's circumstances are fortunate, he said, they are not invulnerably so, and his virtue itself is not irrefragable. These are not worries incidental to this or that career but structural shortcomings of human life itself. The core of fulfillment, as rationally isolated by Aristotle, therefore pointed to an incomplete and fragile thing; yet poor as it was, it was the *only* thing visible to him under that standard. Those who have that thing, he said, *are* what we call happy "as human beings." [18] In other words, settling for less than one naturally desires was inevitable under the naturally knowable standard, as Aristotle used it, because the fulfillment discoverable under that standard was inherently incomplete in his opinion. One should not misconstrue this result as purely a conclusion about *this life*. For even if Aristotle thought he could prove by reason that the soul was immortal (as he did not, though Aquinas read him otherwise), so that there would be a next life, where the separated soul would enjoy certain cognitive advantages, there was still no way to prove by reason that the next life would be so much better as to deliver all the good that man naturally desires. If "complete fulfillment" meant satisfaction of all natural desire, then reason provided to Aristotle neither proof nor even solid ground of conjecture that complete fulfillment was available to man *in any life* (*cf.* 3 *CG* c. 48).

Needless to say, matters look different when one judges by the revealed standard, as any Christian thinker is in a position to do. By that standard, one knows that complete fulfillment is available in the next life; what is more, one knows how it is to be reached, so that one can *intend*

[18] *Ibid.*, 1101a20.

such fulfillment and not just dream about it or "hope" to tumble into it. By the revealed standard, in short, resignation to incomplete fulfillment is not only unnecessary; it is a deadly mistake.

The point that requires notice here, however, is a different one. When one adopts the revealed standard by faith, one does not lose one's reason. One has *both* standards under which to judge of fulfillment, and therefore one has a theological problem. How are the two standards to be compared? More precisely, were Aristotle's conclusions mistaken? Did he use his human reason well or ill? Many Christian thinkers would say that he erred, that he overlooked signs discernible even to reason that man is fitted to higher things than human virtue and human understanding; some even of the pagans, such as Plotinus, saw further than Aristotle. *But Aquinas was not of their number*. He never accused Aristotle of mistake. He would qualify the Stagirite's conclusions as belonging to a limited perspective, but he never said that Aristotle reasoned mistakenly within that perspective. For Aquinas, Aristotle set the *standard* of natural reason; and so he held that settling for incomplete happiness was inevitable *and correct* apart from the faith. The proof of this last was in front of our eyes in *De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2, where Aquinas himself, Christian though he was, said that man's *natural end* was such contemplation as Aristotle stipulated. This point carries in turn a noteworthy corollary, namely, that Aquinas could distinguish the following two propositions:

(∀) apart from revelation, man is ultimately unknown to man

(∃) apart from revelation, man's nature is unknown to man.

Every Christian thinker will affirm (∀); some will affirm (∃), and many will fail to distinguish (∀) from (∃). But Aquinas was in the camp that affirms (∀) and denies (∃). For him our nature *is* known apart from revelation, having been known already to Aristotle. According to Aquinas, then, if we are considered according to our nature alone, we must settle for an incomplete fulfill-

ment because there is *nothing better for us.*

These remarks should suffice for a general orientation. The texts which are about to come up have to do with making room for the revealed answer as to wherein complete fulfillment lies, given Aristotle's rational answer. For if Aristotle's answer was not just unaided reason's word but also the last word, man's complete fulfillment should lie in such contemplation of "divine things" as we enjoy in the human theoretical sciences.

B. 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6; Aquinas' text.

The issue is whether man's happiness lies in understanding things as one does in the theoretical sciences *[in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum]*. The objections and the *sed contra* will not require comment. Here is the corpus.

I answer: human fulfillment has two levels, as I said above: complete and incomplete.[19] The complete level must verify the account of 'fulfillment', while the incomplete partially verifies it, showing a certain resemblance to fulfillment. Similarly, complete prudence is found in people, in whom there is reasoning about what to do, while incomplete prudence is found in brute animals with instincts for doing some things resembling deeds of prudence.[20]

As to complete fulfillment, it cannot lie essentially in understanding things as we do in the theoretical sciences. To see this, one must ponder the fact that, in a theoretical science, our acquired knowledge does not extend beyond the fertility of the starting points of that science, because the whole science is virtually contained in its starting points.[21] But the starting points of the theoretical sciences are gotten through the senses, as Aristotle makes clear at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*[22] and at the end of the *Posterior Analytics.*[23] So all the penetration achieved in theoretical science can go no further than the knowledge of sense-objects can lead it. But our ultimate fulfillment/ com-pleteness cannot lie in a knowledge of sense-objects. For no being is brought to completeness by something lower than itself, unless insofar as the lower thing has in it some sharing in a higher thing. Well, the form of a stone (or of any other sense-object) is lower than man, obviously. So human understanding is not brought to completeness through the form of a stone insofar as it is such a form, but only insofar as it shares in some resemblance to a thing that is higher than human understanding, such as intelligible light itself, or something of the sort.[24] Now everything that is thus-and-such [*e.g.* higher

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[19] The earlier passage was 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 2 *ad* 4.

[20] Note this illustration. If *beatitudo imperfecta* really differs from *beatitudo perfecta* as animal wariness differs from human prudence, then the word '*beatitudo'* is being streched very analogously indeed to cover the two cases.

[21] On the "virtual containment" of a science in its starting points, see Cajetan's commentary on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 7, nn. viii-xi.

[22] *Metaphysics I*, c. 1; 980a23ff.

[23] Book II, c. 15; 99b15-100b15.

[24] In its natural being, the form of a stone was lower than the human intellect; but in its intensional being as an object known, the same form participated in the immateriality belonging to the agent intellect and the angels, *i.e.* to things higher than human understanding in their natural being. ("Agent intellect" or *lumen intelligibile* was a theoretical entity posited to explain how the conscious mind or "possible intellect" was put into the act-state of understanding this or that object. Agent intellect was supposed to illuminate sense-objects and render them abstract.) So a stone became an understandable only because it "got a share of" agent intellect. Only "through another," then, were such objects higher than (and perfective of) human understanding. And that share, as Aquinas argued in this article, made these objects only partial completers of our intellect. The latter could come to full completion only by coming to understand the WHAT-IT-IS of

> than human understanding] through [sharing in] another depends on *[reducitur ad]* what is thus-and-such through itself. Therefore man's ultimate completeness must arise through knowing something that is higher than human understanding [through itself].[25] Well, it has been shown elsewhere that a knowledge of the substances that are higher than human understanding — the substances separate from matter — cannot be reached through sense-objects.[26] The only thing left to say, therefore, is that man's last fulfillment cannot lie in the penetration of reality achieved in the theoretical sciences. — Nevertheless, to the extent some partial resemblance to higher substances is shown in the forms of sense-objects, to that extent a partial sharing in true and complete fulfillment is found in understanding things after the fashion of the theoretical sciences.[27]

Needless to say, Aquinas's argument is a dead letter in the current intellectual climate, where

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the agent intellect itself or some other such trans-empirical entity.

[25] To bring human understanding to "completeness," the object understood must satisfy the mind's quest for explanation. Suppose the problem is why *x* is N. If *x* is N through another, *y*, its being-N depends on *y;* if *y* is N through still another, *z,* its being-N depends on *z, etc.;* so the trail of causes ends only with an item that is N of itself. Man's full completeness includes that of his understanding; so it can be achieved only with understanding an object that is N of itself. The argument presented in the text is an application of this general point, in which N = higher than human understanding.

[26] The allusion is to 1 *ST* q. 88, a. 2.

[27] Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem intelligere perfectam beatitudinem quae attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem; beatitudinem autem imperfectam quae non attingit sed participat quamdam particularem beatitidinis similitudinem; sicut invenitur perfecta prudentia in homine, apud quem est ratio rerum agibilium; imperfecta autem prudentia est in quibusdam animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares instinctus ad quaedam opera similia operibus prudentiae.

Perfecta igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae; quia in principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta, ut patet per Philosophum in princ. *Metaph.* et in fine *Poster.* Unde tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In cognitione autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo, quae est ultima ejus perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua participatio superioris. Manifestum est autem quod forma lapidis, vel cujuslibet rei sensibilis, est inferior homine; unde per formam lapidis non perficitur intellectus, inquantum est talis forma, sed inquantum in ea participatur aliquid simile quod est supra intellectum humanum, sciliect lumen intelligibile, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Omne autem quod est per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per cognitionem alicujus rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum. Ostensum est autem quod per sensibilia non potest deveniri in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quae sunt supra intellectum humanum. Unde relinquitur quod hominis ultima beatitudo non possit esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. — Sed sicut in formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo substantiarum superiorum; ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.

nothing higher than humanity is conceded to exist, and we ourselves are no "higher" than the physical world. Physicalism reduces the mind to electro-chemical processes, and Darwinism makes the human race a product of "blind" nature. In this climate, there is nothing more fulfilling for people to know than the discoveries of the exact and behavioral sciences (with enough philosophy and morality to construe the discoveries properly and use them well). But Aquinas's argument springs back to life if one loses faith in physicalism and (even more so) if one replaces Darwinism with design-theory at any point (such as the first emergence of DNA). For then the theoretical sciences detect the "handiwork," but cannot plumb the intent, of an intelligence behind nature, and what would really be fulfilling for a scientist would be to know the "mind" of that intelligence. Then, since our sciences cannot get at that object, what it would really be fulfilling to know lies beyond the understanding attained in the human theoretical sciences.

C. Cajetan's commentary on article 6

In the first section of his commentary, Cajetan takes up Aquinas' remarkable statement about the limited reach of the "starting points" of science.

> In article 6 of this same Inquiry 3, pay attention to a point about starting points (like the one that says of anything you please that it "is or is not"). Although such principles, given the scope of their terms, apply to absolutely everything, nevertheless in us — *i.e.* in our cognition — they apply only as far as sense-objects can lead them. For they are gotten from the senses, and they depend on the senses as to species and use. This is why they can cause us to "know" only where the species of sense-objects conduct us.[28]

The paragraph sounds Kantian, but it does not mean what Kant would have meant by similarly worded sentences. Cajetan does not say that the principles of logic and metaphysics "break

[28] In articulo sexto eiusdem quaestionis tertiae, nota quare prima principia (scilicet, *De quolibet dicitur esse vel non esse,* etc.), licet secundum ambitum terminorum extendant se ad omnia simpliciter; in nobis, idest in nostra cognitione, non se extendunt ultra id quo ducere possunt sensibilia: quia scilicet sunt accepta a sensibus, et ab eis dependent quoad species et usum. Ex hoc enim provenit quod nisi quo sensibilium species ducunt, cognoscere nos facere possunt. (Leonine VI, p. 33.)

down" or "lead to antinomies" when applied to non-empirical entities; he is only saying that we know of no entities to which to apply them, beyond those which the senses observe or which the human sciences posit (such as a first mover) to explain what is observed. While the first principles of logic and metaphysics apply to non-empirical entities, they do not advance us towards the "knowing" we really seek, *i.e.* learning the "species" or natures of such entities.[29]

In section *ii*, he poses and solves a *dubium* about the claim that nothing can be brought to completion by a thing lower than itself.

> *ii.* In this same article, doubt arises about the proposition to the effect that
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> > Nothing is brought to completeness by anything lower than itself, except insofar as the lower thing has in it some share of a higher thing.
>
> The text uses this as a fully general premise, but it has obvious counterexamples. A man is completed by a fire, so long as it is warming him up. More tellingly, a sense-power is completed by an outside sense-object agreed to be of lower order, since it belongs to the class of inanimate objects, while the sense-power itself belongs to the order of things set by the sensitive soul.
> *iii.* To clear this up, the thing to say is that the proposition in question is indeed to be taken as a fully general truth, but it is to be construed as talking about *unqualified* completeness, not completeness in some limited respect. The sense, then, is that
>
> > Nothing is unqualifiedly brought to completeness by something lower than itself, except ...
>
> Thus all counterexamples based on accidental lines of completion are excluded; for along such lines, a subject is only completed in some limited respect.[30]

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[29] When applied to a non-empirical entity, the first principles merely set constraints on what its quiddity can be like. They do not portray positively what it is. This is why the metaphysical determinations made by Aquinas in the first eleven questions of the *Prima Pars* — determinations about the existence, simplicity, completeness, unlimitedness, and uniqueness of God — do nothing to reveal what that nature that we call *deitas* is in itself. Ditto for the natures of the angels. Ditto for the nature of the agent intellect.

[30] II. In eodem articulo dubium occurit circa illam propositionem: *Nihil perficitur ab aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua participatio superioris.* Haec, quam quasi maximam littera assumit, habet manifestas instantias: ut cum homo perficitur ab igne, dum calefit; et, quod magis urget, cum sensus perficitur ab extraneo sensibili, quod constat esse inferioris ordinis, cum sit in genere inanimatorum, sensus autem in ordine animae sensitivae.

III. Ad evidentiam huius, dicendum est quod propositio illa pro maxima habenda est, sed non est intelligenda de perfectione secundum quid, sed simpliciter; ita quod sensus est: *Nihil perficitur simpliciter per aliquid inferius, nisi* etc. Et per hoc excluditur omnis instantia de perfectionibus accidentalibus: subiectum enim secundum quid tantum perficitur ab huiusmodi perfectivis.

The rest of section *iii* and all of section *iv* continue this answer.

In the final sections of the commentary *(v-vii),* Cajetan came to the matter that concerns this study. He raised a doubt about whether Aquinas's reasoning in this article had been too ambitious in a crucial respect, namely, whether it had determined something about *intellect's* complete fulfillment and had then tried to makes this serve as a determination about *human* complete fulfillment, despite the fact that ours is the lowest in the class of intellects. Here is the statement of the new difficulty.

> *v.* On the same article 6, a doubt arises that extends to articles 7 and 8 as well. It is a doubt about the reasoning process in the text. Aquinas seems to slip from *unqualifiedly* complete fulfillment to *man's* complete fulfillment. Suppose that "complete fulfillment" with no limiting qualification does indeed lie in supreme conjunction to what is unqualifiedly the highest; it might still be the case that, for a low-grade thing like man, "complete fulfillment" lies in some lesser conjunction to the highest, proportionate to a low-grade thing. In that case, one would say that man's fulfillment lies in such knowledge of God as man can get from sense objects, because that is what is proportionate to him. And it is not true that whatever is thus-and-such (say, fulfilling) through another has to depend on what is thus-and-such of itself *in the same subject;* it is quite enough if, over the whole range of fulfillments, what fulfills through another should depend on what fulfills of itself. It is not required that what fulfills *man* through another depend on something fulfilling *man* of itself, because man is such a low-level case [of an intellectual being].[31]

Before studying the content of this *dubium,* one should note that it presents a mode of argument unfamiliar to modern readers.

We are used to reasoning with terms held to a constant sense, degree, or scientific definition

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[31] V. In eodem sexto articulo dubium occurit commune sexto, septimo et octavo articulo, circa processum litterae: quoniam digredi videtur a perfecta beatitudine simpliciter, ad perfectam beatitudinem hominis. Licet enim perfecta beatitudo simpliciter consistat in suprema conjunctione ad summum simpliciter; perfecta tamen beatitudo talis rei infimae qualis est homo, consistit in conjunctione qualicumque, idest sibi proportionata, ad summum. Et sic diceretur quod beatitudo hominis consistit in illa cognitione Dei quam ex sensibilibus habere potest, quia ista est sibi proportionata. Nec oportet quod omne per aliud reducatur ad id quod est per se in eodem; sed sufficit quod in tota latitudine illa, puta beatitudinis, ut scilicet beans per aliud reducatur ad beans per se. Sed non oportet quod beans per aliud hominem, reducatur ad beans per se hominem, quia homo est talis gradus infimi. (Leonine VI, p. 34.)

(univocal terms). If 'intellectual nature' and 'fulfills' are used univocally, then what fulfills intellectual nature obviously fulfills any species or case of such nature, and the *dubium* makes no sense. But the medievals were used to reasoning with terms covering at once a range of senses, degrees, or definitions (analogous terms), and such was the case here. 'Intellectual nature' did not name a genuine genus but a class held together by analogy; some of its members were only "intellectual" in a qualified sense; so, what "fulfilled" its members could not be expected to be constant. What fulfilled low-level analogates might not suffice for the high-level ones that were "intellectual" without qualification, and what fulfilled the high analogates might be utterly beyond the reach of those lower ones that were only "qualifiedly" intellectual. So the *dubium* does make sense. There could be some object that fulfills-of-itself intellectual nature, without there being any object that fulfills-of-itself human beings, the lowest case of such a nature.

To see how this is possible, suppose that for each intellectual nature N_i there is some understanding U_i of God, such that, if a being with the nature N_i is conjoined to God by understanding U_i, the being is "fulfilled" to the extent proportional to it. Take a definite such nature, the human one, and suppose that having U_{man} fulfills us "through another," *i.e.* that the things known in U_{man} perfect us thanks to their participating in the agent intellect, whose strength and actuality depend on God's nature. But suppose His nature itself would only be knowable at a deeper level of understanding U_g; and suppose that U_g is fullfilling "of itself" to anything that knows God that way. Then the fulfilling character of U_{man} depends upon the of-itself fulfilling character of U_g. Yet it could well be the case that U_g is simply not available to man. Perhaps only some higher intellectual natures have it; perhaps only God Himself. Avicenna and Averroes had thought that a scenario like this was consistent with Aristotle. But now Aquinas was bringing forward premisses from the same Aristotle to argue otherwise. Hence, Cajetan brought the matter forward as a *dubium*. To see how the *dubium* affects the argument of article 6, let U_{man} = the knowledge of God that people acquire in theoretical sciences (including the point that the explanation of empir-

ical things requires the existence of a First Cause, which is one, good, pure act, *etc*).[32] Then man's fulfillment *will* lie in "understanding things as the theoretical sciences do," and Aquinas's argument to the contrary will be going wrong by shifting illicitly from "fulfilling *unqualifiedly* intellectual nature" to "fulfilling *human* intellectual nature."[33]

Moreover, if, as the *dubium* says, the knowledge of God that man acquires in his theoretical sciences could count as the conjunction-by-understanding to God that is proportionate to man, we see again the problem with the conjunction-to-Source argument that I raised in Chapter Two under the banner of Palamism. No doubt, the vision of things in Tabor-light that Gregory Palamas had in mind was supposed to be rather different from the vision of things in Aristotelian theoretical science, but the essential problem posed is the same: we could be fulfillingly conjoined-by-understanding to God (terminus of the conjunction) without understanding God's very essence but some lesser object (as terminus of the act of understanding). If the force and interest of the *dubium* are now clear, let us read on.

> *vi.* The answer to this is that we can speak of man in two ways:
>
> (1) according to what he is born to acquire from his own nature. And by this standard, beyond doubt, the thing to say would be that it is enough for us to be fulfilled *as men,* without being fulfilled unqualifiedly, as it says in *Ethics I,*[34] and that our fulfillment as men lies in the knowledge of God that we can acquire naturally here in this life and hereafter in the separated soul.
>
> (2) according to that for which man was established by God. By this standard, [the thing to say is that] because man was made in order to understand the highest good, *etc.*, man is ordered to unqualifiedly complete fulfillment.

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[32] Equivalently, one could say that U_{man} is the ultimate scientific knowledge of empirical things, namely, that they depend ultimately upon a First Cause which is one, good, pure-act, *etc.*

[33] With a little thought, the reader can see that this *dubium* covers substantially the same ground as a *distinguo* which I introduced in Chapter Two, on p. 29.

[34] *Nicomachean Ethics I,* c. 10; 1101a14-20. See Aquinas' comment *In I Ethicorum,* at the very end of *lectio* 16.

> Since a theologian considers man in this second way (because a theologian considers all things in their relation to the revealed God), the reasoning in the text does not slip or shift at all.[35]

There is one more sentence coming in this section, and it is an important one. But before we see it, let us pause to digest just this much of the answer-section.

First, this part shows that Cajetan considered Aquinas' argument sound and valid when taken for what it was — a theological argument enjoying the revealed information that man was created for a knowledge of God beyond human ability (*i.e.* beyond the proportion of human nature). For once we know by revelation that man's ultimate happiness is not to be limited by his feeble natural abilities, it is certain that this happiness will lie in an object of-itself higher than human understanding and thus of-itself fulfilling to it.[36]

Second, the two ways to speak of man presented here are obviously the same as the two considerations invoked by Cajetan in C12/1. The labels are a bit different, but we have before us exactly the same distinction that was drawn in 1507. So the present text is fully usable to shed light on the earlier one.

Thirdly, Cajetan said that the current *dubium* applied also to articles seven and eight, and

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[35] VI. Ad hoc dicitur quod de homine dupliciter possumus loqui. Primo, secundum id quod ex natura sua natus est acquirere. Et sic procul dubio dicendum esset quod sufficit nos esse beatos *ut homines*, non simpliciter, ut dicitur *I Ethic.;* quod consistit in cognitione Dei quam hic, et illa quam in anima separata naturaliter habere possumus. Alio modo, secundum id ad quod homo est divinitus institutus. Et sic, quia factus est ut summum bonum intelligeret, etc., ordinatus est ad beatitudinem perfectam simpliciter. Et quia sic considerat hominem theologus, quia in ordine ad Deum revelatum considerat omnia, ideo nulla digressio est in littera. (Leonine VI, p. 34.)

[36] It was left as an unsolved puzzle in the last chapter what to make of the conjunction-to-Source argument. Agreeing that it made appeal to the dogma of our direct creation by God, I thought it was still vulnerable to Palamite objection. Cajetan has now made it plain why he thought such an objection would not succeed. For even on the Eastern Fathers' exegesis, the scriptural texts about our seeing God face-to-face reveal that man's happiness in Heaven is not to be limited to what man's own powers can secure. Therefore it is certain (by the argument in this article) that man's conjunction-by-understanding to God will be one in which man understands something *per se* higher than his own intellect and *per se* perfective of it. Even Palamas maintained that we shall see God's uncreated *energeiai.* The tenability of his position thereby reduces to nothing better than the tenability of Palamas's distinction between God's essence and those *energeiai.*

that presumably meant that his solution applied to those articles as well. In that case, his statement here (that when humanity is spoken of according to what we can acquire by our nature, a very limited happiness is sufficient for us) was meant to be consistent with Aquinas' claim in article 8 that we have a natural desire for a level of knowledge beyond what we can acquire by our nature. These points are consistent, just in case

(a) the naturally acquirable happiness is *not all we can desire,* and

(b) our intellect's natural desire for more is *satisfied in another intellect.*

This is precisely what the *dubium* said. As to (a), our naturally acquirable happiness is *incomplete.* It is just *the best we can get.* This is exactly how Aristotle spoke in *Ethics I* , c. 10, when he determined what it is for us to be happy *as human beings;* and what licensed Cajetan to say that this less than optimal fulfillment would "suffice" was the fact that Aquinas never said that Aristotle was wrong. Aquinas believed that Aristotle knew human nature exactly as it was naturally knowable. Well, if the nature was known, so were man's natural desires, tendencies, and strivings. Hence Aquinas never said that the Stagirite overlooked the natural desire of the intellect and so, by dint of that oversight, was mistaken about what it took to be happy "as a human being." In that case, this natural desire, however high it reached, did not offset Aristotle's crushing conclusion: people must settle for an incomplete fulfillment because there is *nothing better for them.*

But what about the point that a natural desire cannot be "in vain"? Well, that brings us to point (b). A natural desire of intellect as such has to be satisfiable *in some intellect;* nothing says it has to be satisfiable in the *human* intellect. Such was the force of the *dubium,* and Cajetan's remarks about man "talked of in the first way" were conceding, in effect, that if Aquinas' argument in this article were taken as a purely philosophical one, it would not go through. It would be missing a premise — the one saying that this desire is to be satisfied in the *human* intellect.

Ah, but would Aquinas have agreed that, if his argument were taken as a purely philosophical argument, it would fail for lack of that premise? Would he have agreed with Cajetan, in short, that the *dubium* we have been examining had so much force?

One cannot say for certain, but there is a very good ground for saying that he would have agreed. Namely, the force of the *dubium* came directly from Aquinas's own commentary on *Metaphysics V, lectio* 26. Aristotle was talking at that point about the ways in which privations (like blindness and other forms of being "deprived") are asserted. The second way arises when a thing naturally apt *in its kind* to have a certain completive trait *(perfectio)* does not have it (1022b25-26). Aquinas commented as follows.

> The second mode arises according to the aptitude of the subject. For in this mode, a thing is only called "deprived" of something it naturally has *[natum habere]* either because of itself or because of its genus — because of itself, as a blind man is called deprived of sight, which he naturally has because of himself. A mole, however, is called deprived of sight, not because it naturally has sight because of itself, but because its genus, animal, naturally has sight. For there are many traits from which a thing is not blocked because of its genus but because of its [specific] difference. Thus man is not blocked from having wings by reason of his genus but by reason of his difference.[37]

The reader will recall that the "natural desire" of a faculty is just its *ordo* or *inclinatio* to something suitable to it (above, Chapter One, p. 7). Anything to which a faculty is ordered or inclined will be something it is naturally apt *[natum aptum]* to have. Well, now we are told that a thing can be naturally apt to have something merely because of its genus. In this way a mole is, because of its animality, naturally apt to see — and so is ordered in some sense, because of its animality, to have sight — but because its specific difference puts it very low in that genus, the mole

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[37] Secundus modus attenditur secundum aptitudinem subjecti. Hoc enim modo dicitur privari hoc solum quod natum est illud habere, aut secundum se, aut secundum genus suum : secundum se, sicut homo caecus dicitur privari visu, quem natus est habere secundum se. Talpa autem dicitur privari visu, non quia ipsa secundum se sit nata habere visum; sed quia genus eius, scilicet animal, natum est habere visum. Multa enim sunt a quibus aliquid non impeditur ratione generis, sed ratione differentiae; sicut homo non impeditur quin habeat alas ratione generis, sed ratione differentiae. *Opera Omnia* vol. 24 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 575.

is blocked from seeing because of what it is in its whole self *[secundum se]*. Exactly the same situation could hold for intellect and man's very low sort of intellect. The human intellect could be ordered, because of its class ("intellect" without further remark), to understanding the essence of the First Cause and yet be blocked from having that understanding by virtue of its exceedingly low defining trait (intellect apt to be joined to a body). There is the exact force of the *dubium.* For Aquinas' argument in this article to go through, it needs the premise that the fulfillment coming to man's intellect is not to be limited by the specific (and low) character of that intellect. This premise the faith supplies, and Aristotle lacked. Aquinas always said that Aristotle was right *within his perspective*. Cajetan has simply put a label on that perspective. Meanwhile, there is an important point still to see in the present text.

> And Aquinas' argument that the [fulfilling] through another has to depend on the [fulfilling] through itself is an effective argument even as applied to man, because man is within the range of things open *[capax]* to an object that fulfills of-itself and completely.[38]

This part of the response shows that Cajetan did not just consider the *dubium* to be defeated when one talked of human beings theologically. It shows that he also considered it **indecisive** when one talked of us in philosophy. For in order to be decisive, the argument in the *dubium* would need a premise saying that man, as such a low-grade intellectual creature, is *not open to receive* more information than his natural powers can acquire. But this premise the philosophers cannot support with any decisive grounds, and the Christian revelation teaches that it is false. Aquinas's NDA shows that he thought such a premise implausible already on philosophical grounds. The fact that we humans can understand questions we cannot answer (and desire answers we cannot get) *shows* that we are open, at least, to receive information that we cannot acquire for ourselves — information from a Higher Source, if the Higher Source chooses to bestow it. The sentence

[38] Et ratio efficax est quod *per aliud* reducendum est ad *per se*, etiam respectu hominis: quia homo est infra latitudinem capacium beatitudinis per se et perfectae. (Leonine VI, p. 34.)

we have just read from the end of section *vi* means that Cajetan agreed with Aquinas on this crucial point. Again, we shall have to watch carefully what emerges over the next two articles.

It would be imprudent, however, to hasten ahead without savoring the seventh and final section of this commentary, devoted to the exposing the poverty of natural knowledge.

> *vii.* In this same sixth article, note that the difference between an object [known and fulfilling to us] of itself and an object [known and fulfilling to us] through another is so great that — even though God and the substances separate from matter, as known by us through sense-objects, are such that Aristotle located our happiness in contemplating them, nevertheless, because in this life they are only objects for us through another, and are only understood by us through another (*i.e.* through the intelligible species of sense-objects) — the text of this article draws two conclusions. They are
>
> (a) humanly acquirable knowledge [of them] does not transcend the bounds of sensibles, and
>
> (b) humanly acquirable knowledge [of them] cannot provide the happiness that lies in contemplating something higher, as an object [fulfilling] of itself.
>
> And (b) clearly follows from (a). It follows because whatever we know of the things higher [than human understanding], we know as they are presented through things knowable by the senses, *i.e.* we know them by way of judgments stating
>
> - a dependency [of the sense-objects upon the higher things], or
> - an [analogical] likeness [of the sense-objects to the higher things], or
> - a denial [that a sense-object predicate attaches to the higher things] or contrast [between sense-objects and higher things],
>
> or the like. And such judgments are exactly "knowing completely" the things that are knowable by the senses and perfective of our understanding. For such [perfective] knowables are present in our objects [of sensation and understanding] as *effects* are in causes-of-knowing for us. Wisely reached, then, is the judgment of those writers who say that we, through study, can never know anything of the higher things except *that they exist.* For our knowledge of them is from their effects and attains them as remote.[39]

[39] VII. In eodem sexto articulo, nota quod tanta est differentia inter objectum per se et per aliud, quod, licet Deus et substantiae separatae per sensibilia sic a nobis intelligantur ut in huiusmodi contemplatione felictas ab Aristotele fuit posita; quia tamen non sunt objecta nec intellecta a nobis hic nisi per aliud, scilicet per species sensibilium, ideo duo in littera concluduntur: et quod cognitio nostra non transcendit metas sensibilium; et quod non potest esse felicitas, quae consistit in contemplatione alicuius superioris, scilicet ut per se objecti. Et hoc manifeste sequitur ad primum. Quod ideo verum est, quia quidquid cognoscimus de superioribus, cognoscimus inquantum per sensibilia praesentantur per viam dependentiae, vel similitudinis, vel negationis seu oppositionis, et huiusmodi: quod nihil aliud est quam perfecte cognoscere sensibilia perfectiva nostri intellectus. Sunt enim huiusmodi cognoscibilia in nostris objectis, velut effectus in causis in cognoscendo, apud nos. Propter quod sapienter censent qui dicunt nos per studium nunquam cognoscere de

The causes of human knowing are sense-objects together with the first principles of language-use and inference. A science is a body of inferences built up from (and today we would add: tested against) these "causes." They are "causes" in the order of discovery. But in the inferences we make from them, causes in the order of being are inferred, *i.e.* things and factors which, in the real, contribute to producing the objects we perceive. As reached-by-inference or "discovered," these causes-in-being are "effects" in the order of discovery. All explanatory causes-in-the-real hold, then, a double status: as beings and as knowables. For all that they may be "prior" as beings, they are "posterior" as knowables. These two inverse statuses attach most decidedly to any First Cause in being. For all that It may be in act "of itself" as a being, It is only in act through another as a knowable to us, that is, it is actually known only through the sensory evidence from which Its actuality is inferred. So: be It ever so "immediate" as a being, It is a remote inference as a knowable, and be It ever so "clear cut" as a being, It is obscure and tenuous as a knowable. And so: be It ever so "fulfilling" as a being, It is pretty thin consolation as a knowable. Ergo, since the First Cause fulfills human understanding *as a knowable,* It can do very little for us so long as It remains an object of a theoretical science humanly acquirable — and these latter include metaphysics itself. Only a mode of knowing beyond our nature in this life offers hope of anything better. Only revelation received in faith in this life offers a foretaste of anything better.

This passage should put to rest any suspicion that Cajetan was a closet humanist, claiming that, if we were to be spoken of solely in terms of what we can acquire by our nature, fulfillment through theoretical science would suffice for us, *because metaphysical understanding is really very grand.* Nothing of the kind. Metaphysical understanding is faint, distant, exiguous. Such a fulfillment is really a lacklustre affair, and it would just "have to do" because humanity is a pitia-

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superioribus nisi *quia est:* cognitio namque ab effectu, et remotorum est.

ble species.

D. 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 7. Aquinas' text.

The issue is whether mankind's complete fulfillment might lie in knowing the substances separate from matter, *e.g.*, the angels. Once again, the objections and the *sed contra* bring out no issues demanding attention, and we proceed directly to the corpus.

> I answer: as I said already [in article 6], man's ultimate fulfillment does not lie in an object that only perfects his understanding because it shares in something else but lies rather in an object that perfects his understanding through its own essence. Now it is clear enough that, for any faculty, an item *x* perfects that faculty just insofar as *x* has what it takes to be the distinctive object of that faculty. A distinctive object of intellect is a true or real thing *[verum]*.[40] Therefore anything that has trueness or reality only because it shares in something else fails, when contemplated, to perfect intellect up to its ultimate completion. And since things stand "in being" as they stand in "being true or real" (as it says in *Metaphysics II*),[41] anything that is a being only because it shares in something else is a "true or real thing" only because it shares in something else. Well, the angels have being only because they share in something else, since God alone is such that His being is His very essence, as was shown in the First Part.[42] There is no getting around the fact, therefore, that God alone is "being true or being real" through His own essence, and that contemplating Him is what makes [intellect] completely fulfilled.
>
> Of course, nothing prevents a certain incomplete fulfillment from being gained in contemplating the angels, and even it would be higher than the fulfillment gained in mastering the theoretical sciences.[43]

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[40] The Latin adjective '*verus*' applied both to beliefs ('true') and to things ('real', 'genuine', 'true-to-form'). Hence '*veritas*' meant both a trait of beliefs and a trait of things. With the possible exception of 'factual' and 'factuality', nothing in current English has this ambiguity. 'True' no longer applies to *things* except in special contexts (a true gentleman; a true Bordeaux). 'Real' and 'genuine' cannot be used to call beliefs (and claims and propositions, etc.) true. But since Aquinas's Latin authorities used '*verus*' and '*veritas*' with both meanings at once, the translator is often forced to provide both meanings, as here.

[41] Chapter 1; 993b30.

[42] 1 *ST* q. 3, a. 4; q. 7, a. 2; q. 44, a. 1.

[43] Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta hominis beatitudo non consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale. Manfestum est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius potentiae inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii objecti illius potentiae. Proprium autem objectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem eadem sit dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, ut dicitur in *II Meta.*, quaecumque sunt entia per participationem sunt vera per participationem. Angeli autem habent esse participatum: quia solius Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in *Primo* ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius con-

E. Cajetan's commentary on article 7.

The commentary is quite short and makes just two main points, the first of which will be fairly obvious, but the second of which will be highly important.

> In this seventh article, pay attention to two things. The first is the title. The phrase 'knowing the substances separated from matter' includes in its meaning knowing what can be known about God *by knowing* those substances. Just as in the previous article the talk of knowing sense objects included in its meaning knowing what can be known of God and the separate substances by knowing the sense objects, so here, in like proportion, the further meaning is to be understood.
>
> Secondly, a doubt can arise here about "ultimate perfection of intellect," parallel to the doubt that arose in the previous article about "fulfillment" [namely, that Aquinas's argument shifts illicitly from "ultimate perfection" of *unqualified* understanding to "ultimate perfection" of *human* understanding]. Perhaps the ultimate completer of intellect *as such* does indeed have to be what is true or real by its own essence; nevertheless, it might still be the case that the ultimate completer of such-and-such an intellect, say, man's, need only be what is true or real in such-and-such a way.
>
> By a parallel solution, the thing to say is that, if the talk here were about the ultimate perfection to which the human intellect could attain *by effort of nature*, it would not have to reach the true-or-real-by-essence except as the latter is participated in such-and-such true or real things, distinctive to and *per se* completive of such-and-such an intellect, and those would be things true or real in such-and-such a way. But since the talk here is about the ultimate perfection for which our intellect is posited to have been *made*, its openness to receive *[capacitas]* has to be satisfied through the true-or-real-by-essence, not through any other mediating object.[44]

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templatio faciat perfecte beatum.

Aliqualem autem beatitudinem imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione angelorum; et etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum.

[44] In hoc articulo septimo nota duo. Primo, titulum: quod appellatione cognitionis substantiarum separatarum, cointelligitur etiam cognitio quae habetur de Deo, cognoscendo substantias separatas. Sicut enim in praecedenti articulo in cognitione sensibilium cointelligebatur cognitio Dei et substantiarum separatarum per sensibilia, ita proportionaliter hic intelligendum est.

Secundo, quod simile accidere potest dubium de perfectione ultima intellectus, dubio praecedenti de beatitudine. Nam licet perfectio ultima intellectus ut sic, oportet quod sit verum per essentiam; perfectio tamen intellectus talis, puta hominis, sufficit quod sit verum tale. — Et simili solutione dicendum est quod, si esset sermo de ultima perfectione ad quam naturae studio veniri potest, non oportet ad verum per essentiam pervenire, nisi participatum in tali per se perfectivo proprio intellectus talis, quod esset verum tale. Sed quia est sermo de ultima perfectione ad quam intellectus noster institutus supponitur, ideo oportet capacitatem eius per verum per essentiam perfici, non per aliud medium obiectum. (Leonine VI, p. 35.)

Let us pause there in mid-paragraph to gather the sense of the solution so far.

Faced with a *dubium* exactly parallel to the one raised on article 6, Cajetan once again acquits Aquinas's argument of fallacy by construing it as a theological argument, enjoying the support of the revealed premise that humanity is called to a fulfillment in which the object we understand will not be limited to what our own feeble powers could attain on their own. Revelation removes the natural ceiling, so to speak, and provides a reason to believe that human understanding will rise as high as anything's understanding can go, namely, up to the true-or-real-by-essence. Now let us see how the paragraph ends.

> This is how you should understand the claim in this article that understanding is brought to its completion through the true-by-essence, leaving for discussion in the next article and elsewhere[45] whether such completion is a seeing of the divine essence, and whether it takes place through an intellectual likeness *[species]* or without such a likeness.[46]

This parting remark may puzzle many readers. If it is settled by this article's argument (theologically taken) that the final perfecting of human intellect will be through the true-or-real-by-essence, and God alone "is real" and "is true" by essence, how can it be left to further discussion in the next article whether this final perfecting will be a "seeing of the divine essence"?

The answer is to be culled from the distinctions seen in the last chapter. God can be known in WHAT-HE-IS on a level too shallow to count as knowing WHAT-HE-IS *in His divinity, i.e. as God.* He might merely be known in WHAT-HE-IS in having what it takes to satisfy naturally knowable descriptions, such as 'Being Itself' and 'Self-subsistent Being'. He is already true-by-essence in satisfying these descriptions, while He is not just true-by-essence but also "divine" in

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[45] The elsewhere is 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 2.

[46] Sic enim intelligere debes perfectionem intellectus per ipsum verum per essentiam, in hoc loco, relinquendo discussioni sequentis articuli et alibi an talis perfectio sit visio divinae essentiae, et per speciem aut sine specie. (Leonine VI, p. 35.)

having what it takes to satisfy descriptions not naturally knowable at all, like 'Trinity of Persons'. Once again, the reader must shed the habit of thinking that the deepest descriptions of God in *metaphysics* are deep descriptions of God in *theology*. Nothing could be further from the truth. The least article of creed or catechism is deeper than anything metaphysics can prove. This is why the greater "love" that prepares one soul to see more of God in the Beatific Vision than another (1 *ST* q. 12, a. 6) is not metaphysical *eros* but the simple believer's *caritas.*

F. 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8. Aquinas' text.

At last the issue is whether human fulfillment is found in seeing the divine essence itself. We have seen a portion of the text already in Chapter One. This time let us see the whole of it, including the objections, the answers to them, etc.

> It seems that man's fulfillment does not lie in seeing the divine essence itself.
>
> (1) Dionysius says that man, through the highest of understanding, is united to God as to a complete Unknown.[47] Well, what is seen through its essence is not a complete unknown. Ergo the ultimate completion of understanding (fulfillment) does not arise in God's being seen through His essence.
>
> (2) Besides, a higher nature has a higher state of completeness. But seeing His essence is the completeness proper to God's intellect alone. Ergo the human intellect's ultimate completeness does not reach so high but is realized in something lower.
>
> On the other hand, there is what it says in I John [3:2], "When He shall appear, we shall be like Him, and we shall see Him as he is."
>
> I answer: ultimate and complete fulfillment can lie only in seeing God's essence. To see why, two points need to be considered. (1) A man is not completely fulfilled so long as there remains something for him to long for and pursue. (2) Completion comes to any faculty along the lines of what it takes to be its object. An object of intellect is a WHAT-IT-IS, *i.e.,* an essence of a thing, as one reads in *De Anima III.*[48] So the extent to which one's understanding of something is complete is the extent to which one knows the essence of it. So then: if an intellect comes to know the essence of some effect *e,* through which it cannot come to know the essence of the cause-of-*e, i.e.* cannot get to know the WHAT-IT-IS of that cause, we do not say unqualifiedly that the intellect "reaches" the cause, even though it can come to know

[47] Dionysius Pseudo-Areopageta, *De mystica theologia*, chapter 1. *PG* 3, column 1001.

[48] Chapter 6; 430 b 27.

through *e* that a cause-of-*e* exists. And so, once a man knows an effect and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in him a desire to know also the WHAT-IT-IS of that cause. This desire is wonder, and it gives rise to questioning, as one reads near the beginning of the *Metaphysics*.[49] For example, suppose a person who notices a solar eclipse is thinking about the cause from which it proceeds. Because he does not know what it is, he wonders about it. In wondering, he raises questions, and his questioning will not rest satisfied, until he gets to know what that cause is.

Suppose, then, that human understanding knows the essence of some created effect but does not know any more about God than that He exists. In that case, our intellect is not yet so complete as to attain the First Cause unqualifiedly; there still remains in it a natural desire to ask after the cause. So human understanding is not yet completely fulfilled. What is required for complete fulfillment, therefore, is that understanding should reach the very essence of the First Cause. And so man's understanding will have its completeness through being united to God as to the object wherein alone man's fulfillment lies, as I said above.[50]

To meet the objections — *ad* (1): Dionysius is talking about the cognitive state of those who are still in pilgrimage in this life, heading towards fulfillment.

ad (2): as was remarked above,[51] a purpose/goal can be taken two ways. (a) It can be taken as the very thing longed for; and so taken, the purpose/goal of a higher nature is the same as that of a lower — indeed, all things have the same purpose/goal, as said above.[52] (b) It can be taken as the reaching of this thing; and so taken, the purpose/goal of a higher nature is different from that of a lower, thanks to their different ways of relating to the thing longed for. Thus God's own fulfillment in comprehending His essence with His intellect is higher than the fulfillment of a man or an angel seeing Him and not comprehending.[53]

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[49] *Metaphysics I,* c. 2; 982 b 12; 983 a 12

[50] 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 1; a. 7.

[51] 2/1 *ST* q. 1, a. 8.

[52] 2/1 *ST* q. 1, a. 8. Here the issue is God the extra-mental Thing, *res.* Everything was created in order that it might be related in some way to that Thing (resembling God, enjoying Him, whatever). Thus everything exists in order to be related in some way to the same Thing.

[53] Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione ipsius divinae essentiae.

(1) Dicit enim Dionysius, quod per id quod est supremum intellectus homo Deo conjungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam videtur.

(2) Praeterea, altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio divini intellectus propria ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra subsistit.

Sed contra est quod dicitur I Joan., Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est.

Responsio: Dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essen-

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The second half of this answer *ad* 2 is about attaining God *intentionaliter*. Only things of an intellectual nature can relate to God through an intensional object, by which they know and love Him. Among things of an intellectual nature, those of a higher such nature are to know and love Him on a deeper basis than those of a lower such nature. And if God calls intellectual creatures to know and love Him on a revealed basis, by grace, their purpose/goal will be a still deeper knowledge and love than anything matching their nature alone. There are numberless depths at which God can be "seen through His essence," even by grace (1 *ST* q. 12, aa. 6-7). The reason for this is the fact that God is "infinite in essence" (1 *ST* q. 7, a. 2) No finite definition, and no finite set of definitions, can exhaust what He is. There is simply no bottom to WHAT-HE-IS.

G. Cajetan's commentary on article 8.

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tiae. Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus quandiu restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est, quod uniuscujusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui objecti. Objectum autem intellectus est *quod quid est*, idest essentia rei, ut dicitur in III *De Anima.* Unde intantum procedit perfectio intellectus inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicujus rei.

Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicujus effectus per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur de causa *quid est;* non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa *an sit.* Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa *quid est.* Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio *Metaphys.* Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit, quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae.

Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi *an est;* nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad objectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in via, tendentes ad beatitudinem.

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam quae desideratur: et hoc modo idem est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, immo omnium rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem hujus rei: et sic diversus est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis quam hominis vel angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis

This commentary will have two sections. Cajetan will begin the first section with a quick referral of the reader to Aquinas' much more extensive discussion in the third book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*. Then he will devote the rest of the first section to the problem of how to take this "natural" desire.

> Concerning these articles 6, 7, and 8, see 3 *CG*, where fulfillment is debated at length through many chapters. And notice here in article 8 the words of the text to the effect that, when no more of the First Cause is known than that He exists, the human intellect has a natural desire to know the First Cause for WHAT-IT-IS, *etc.* These words are not without a doubtful quality *[ambiguitas]* — on the ground that a "natural" desire does not exceed the strength of the nature in question, and does not extend to an operation that would be above not just that nature but every created intellect's nature.[54]

The modern reader is likely to take *'ambiguitas'* as 'ambiguity' and then think these last remarks — a natural desire does not exceed, etc. — are declarations of fact on Cajetan's part. That is not the case. *'Ambiguus'* meant 'doubtful', and *'ambiguitas'* appeared here to signal that the following remarks were *dubia.* This interpretation is confirmed by the very next sentence (*'Sed haec citius solvuntur . . .'*), which we shall read in a moment.

Since the *dubia* were thus introduced informally and stated very tersely, let us take the time to appreciate what they are. They are two.

- The first is about a given nature (any one you please): it doubts that a natural desire thereof would extend to an object beyond that nature's strength. The reader will recall that the claim, "a natural desire does not exceed a nature's strength," was encountered in the first *dubium* in C12/1. So the first *dubium* here is the same as first one there.

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[54] Circa articulos eosdem, videlicet sextum, septimum et octavum, vide III *Contra Gent.*, ubi de felicitate diffuse per multa capitula disputatur. Et adverte in octavo articulo quod illa verba litterae, quod intellectus humanus, non cognita prima causa nisi *an est*, habet naturale desiderium ad cognoscendam primam causam *quid est*, etc., non carent ambiguitatem; propterea quia naturale desiderium non excedit vim naturae, nec est ad supernaturalem operationem, non solum ipsius, sed omnis intellectus creati. (Leonine VI, p. 36.)

- The second is about further extension of 'natural': it doubts that a *natural* desire of any created nature would extend to an object beyond the natural strength of every such nature.

The reader needs to realize that this second *dubium* is new. It is raising an issue which Cajetan has not yet addressed. It is not about the problem of revealed topics (as was the second *dubium* in C12/1). No, it is about an object of wonder — the what-it-is of the First Cause — which (a) is knowably "there" as a question without revealed information, yet (b) cannot be answered by any created intellect using its natural strengths. So this time, we are going to see how Cajetan handles the problem which we have called the E-problem and which (as we complained at the very end of Chapter Two) he brushed past in the earlier commentary. We shall see him handle *desiderium naturale* without mixing-in supernatural objects. Here is his text.

> But these points are quickly solved, if 'natural desire' is distinguished according to the remarks made above, at the beginning of 1 *ST* [*i.e.* section *x* of Cajetan's remarks on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1].[55] For a desire can be called "natural"
> – merely after 'nature' as naming its residence (and in this sense we "naturally" desire the vision of God) and
> – after 'nature' as naming its residence and mode (and this is how the objections take it).
> But this takes nothing away from the effectiveness of the argument here, because complete fulfillment does not leave "natural" desire incomplete in either sense.[56]

Notice that this paragraph addresses both *dubia* at once. It makes no appeal to the higher perspectives and usages of sacred doctrine. It stays within the perspective of lower sciences, but it distinguishes two senses of 'natural'.

(1) The first and weaker is called *'naturalis' a natura ut subjecto.* In this sense, a desire is

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[55] These remarks are reproduced below, in Chapter Four.

[56] Sed haec citius solvuntur, si desiderium naturale distinguitur iuxta praedicta in I libro in principio. Desiderium namque potest dici naturale a natura ut subjecto tantum: et sic naturaliter desideramus visionem Dei. Et a natura ut subjecto et modo: et sic procedunt objectiones. Nec propterea aliquid adimitur efficaciae hujus rationis: quoniam perfecta beatitudo neutrum hujusmodi desiderium imperfectum relinquit. (Leonine VI, p. 36.)

called "natural" simply because it resides in a species' nature (and hence can be attributed to the entire membership of the species). In this sense, all dogs, because they are social animals, desire "naturally" to please the head of their pack. By contrast, only some dogs desire to retrieve; they were specially *bred* to have this "desire," and it resides not in their species but in whatever special genetic make-up their breeding has given them.

(2) The second and stronger sense, called *'naturalis' a natura ut subjecto et modo,* is Aristotle's sense, as we shall see in Chapter Four. In this sense, a desire is called "natural" not only because it resides in the nature of the species but also because "by its nature" is *how* the species satisfies it. All the members of the species satisfy it with the abilities their nature gives them — and so they are observed to satisfy it regularly in normal circumstances. The tendencies of dogs to eat meat, mark territory, live in packs, and breed in season are, in this strong sense, "natural desires" of their species.

Cajetan says that the two *dubia* take Aquinas' talk of natural desire in this second sense and thereby misinterpret him. For he meant that the desire-to-see was *in* our nature, not that it was satisfiable *by* our nature. Fair enough.

To see the significance of this difference, consider the odd case of a desire *D* which is "natural" in the weak sense but not in the second and stronger sense. To continue with canine examples, such a *D* must arise out of what it takes just to be a dog (so as to reside in canine nature, whatever the breed) and yet must not be something that all dogs are observed to satisfy in circumstances favorable to their species. If one is an animal ethologist limiting one's attention to wild dogs (like Aristotle the biologist), it is impossible to imagine such a case. But if one broadens one's attention to include dogs in domestication, examples come to mind. In domestication, the head of the dog's pack is not a dog but a human being, and so the dog's nature-resident desire to please the head of its pack becomes the "natural desire" to please a human master. This is not a desire that all dogs are observed to satisfy in circumstances favorable to their species (since wild

dogs do not satisfy it). Hence the desire to please a human master is "natural" in the weak sense but not in the strong sense.

If this example is looked at more closely, it is seen to arise because a dog's natural openness *(capacitas)* to have a leader is wider than its ability *(facultas)* to acquire one. A dog is by nature open to have a human master but is not able by its nature to give itself such a master. And once a dog has a human pack-leader, it has a "natural desire" to please which it cannot satisfy by following its natural instincts; it must acquire habits from human training.

Cajetan thinks that our intellect's "natural desire" to grasp the essence of the First Cause is a parallel case. Our intellect's nature-resident openness to receive information is wider than its natural ability to acquire it. As a dog's "natural desire" to please its pack-leader goes beyond its natural ability to do so, in the special case where the pack-leader is a human being, so also the human intellect's "natural desire" to understand the cause of perceived effects goes beyond its natural ability to do so in the special case where the cause in question is the First Cause.

The two *dubia* said that such a case of natural desire cannot arise, and Cajetan responds that it can, when the desire is "natural" in the weak sense only.

We now have the real solution, please note, to the problem acknowledged at the end of Chapter Two, about how Cajetan could have said that, independently considered, man is such that his natural desire does not extend beyond his natural ability. The "independent" consideration is the natural-science consideration. It uses the language of natural science. In that language, the standard use of 'natural' is to mean natural in subject *and mode*. *Such* natural desires do not go beyond the strength of the nature in which they are located. This is all that Cajetan meant to say, and his point will come out extensively in Chapter Four, where we shall see him battling to prevent Scotus from introducing *that language* into the theological discussion of man's relation to his God-given end.

To conclude, then: the natural desires of the human intellect include not only those that are

residence-and-mode natural, such as its desires to know the quiddities of empirical effects and empirical causes, but also those that are natural in residence only. But a "complete" fulfillment leaves no natural desire unsatisfied. And so Cajetan can complete this paragraph by saying that complete fulfillment satisfies the weakly natural desires as well, so that the existence of the two senses of 'natural' does nothing to compromise the validity of Aquinas' argument.

Let us now return to Cajetan's text, where a new paragraph is about to bring up a new perspective.

> One could also say that the author is discussing man here as a theologian would do — and the theologian's job (as he says in 2 *CG* c. 4) is to consider creatures not according to their own natures but as they are related to God. On this approach, while such a natural desire is not present in man taken independently, it is nevertheless natural to him as ordered by divine providence to that Homeland, etc.[57]

In this paragraph, we are back to the familiar "considerations" of C12/1. Cajetan distinguishes the horizon of natural science from the horizon of sacred theology and introduces a sense of 'natural' belonging to the latter alone. In the new sense, it is "natural" to a species to do or desire what God (the author of the species) created it to do. Since God created man for a fellowship with Himself whose core is seeing Him at a supernatural depth of WHAT-HE-IS, it is "natural" in theology's sense for man to do so and to desire to do so.[58]

To take an analogy from human creativity: it may be natural under the laws of physics for a certain container to "leak," but one would not call it *natural* under those laws for the container to "tell time"; yet, when one redescribes the container as a water-clock, so that one knows what it was made to do, one can say truly enough that a water-clock "naturally" tells time. A machine

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[57] Posset quoque dici quod Auctor tractat de homine ut theologus, cuius, ut in II *Contra Gent.* cap. iv, dicitur, est considerare creaturas non secundum proprias naturas, sed ut ad Deum sunt relatae. Et sic, licet homini absolute non insit naturale hujusmodi desiderium, est tamen naturale homini ordinato a divina providentia in illam patriam, etc. (Leonine VI, p. 36.)

[58] "To see you was I conceived; and I have yet to do that for which I was conceived (*Ad te videndum factus sum; et nondum feci propter quod factus sum*)." Saint Anselm, *Proslogion*, 1: *PL* 158, 226.

correctly built to do *X* naturally does *X*. In much the same way, sacred theology possesses from revelation a description of man that tells what man was "built to do." This description supports a sense of 'natural' in which man's desire to see _____ can be called a "natural desire" even when the blank is filled with a supernatural description of the First Cause. This is a key point at which the theological sense of 'natural desire' differs from those belonging to the natural sciences. In those senses, man's desire to see _____ can be called a "natural desire" only so long as the blank is filled with a naturally knowable description. For an object of human desire is a thing under a description; a natural science attains things only under naturally knowable descriptions, and humanity taken "independently" is humanity taken in the natural science horizon. In humanity so taken, then, no desire is found for a supernatural object. But in theology the talk is different.

Thus, to fully grasp the force of Cajetan's last paragraph, one needs to realize that the situation where a desire *D*, resident in a nature *N*, goes beyond the strengths of *N* to satisfy it is one problem, and the situation where the same desire *D* has a supernatural object is another. I have called the former the *E*-problem ('E' for excess of desire over strength) and the latter the *SO*-problem ('SO' for supernaturally described object). In C12/1, Cajetan took Aquinas's talk of a "natural desire to see God" as positing a properly supernatural object (to see God *as God, i.e.* to know the WHAT-HE-IS of God as salvific Trinity). He entertained the objection that no science can confront the *SO*-problem, and he answered it by distinguishing the natural-science horizon from the theological one. He did not discuss the question of whether the *E*-problem can arise in a natural science (as I complained at the end of Chapter Two). But here he has discussed this. He has taken Aquinas' talk of a "natural desire to know the essence of the First Cause" as bearing upon the thing desired under a naturally knowable description. Aquinas' claim that people naturally desire to know the WHAT-IT-IS of the First Cause (so that their complete fulfillment will include knowing this) has been taken this time as a truth of philosophical anthropology, a natural science of man; and the point that people's natural cognitive abilities cannot reach the WHAT-IT-IS

of that Cause has also been taken now as a truth of anthropology; so this natural science is confronted by the *E*-problem in Aquinas's opinion, as Cajetan has now read him. So the commentator has entertained the objection that no natural science can confront the *E*-problem, and he has defeated it by distinguishing the strong natural-science sense of 'natural desire' from a weaker sense. He has held that for a nature-resident desire, the *E*-problem can and does arise in a natural science. One will misread Cajetan drastically, if one fails to keep these senses straight, and if one fails to distinguish the *E*-and *SO*-problems.

Of course, Cajetan understands the evangelized part of mankind to be in both situations at once. The anthropological discovery of the excess wideness of man's desire and *capacitas* to receive knowledge over his *facultas* to acquire it is explained by the revelation that man was made to "see God as God."

With these crucial points in mind, we can read how Cajetan concludes this first section.

> These two answers cover all such material. But coming down to the specifics addressed in this article, one can say that a human intellect, knowing that God exists and has certain common traits, naturally desires to know WHAT-GOD-IS insofar as He is among the causes, but not insofar as He exists independently [of producing effects], except by some consequence or other. And this is true, because it is naturally in us that, when an effect has been seen, we desire to know what the cause is, whatever it may be.[59]

Here the point is as follows. As a natural object of desire in the anthropological horizon, what-the-First-Cause-is is not limited to what He is under the explicitly relational description 'First Cause' but also includes what He is in Himself as a naturally knowable consequence of being the First Cause. As emerged in 1 *ST* q. 3, reason can show that an absolutely "first" cause is not a body but a pure "form" so wholly clean of potency that its essence is not even in potency to

[59] Et hae duae responsiones sunt generales ad omnem hujusmodi materiam. Specialiter tamen ad hanc hujus articuli materiam descendendo, dici potest quod intellectus humanus sciens *an est* de Deo et communia, desiderat naturaliter scire de Deo *quid est*, inquantum sub numero causarum comprehenditur: et non absolute, nisi per quandam consequentiam. Et hoc est verum: quia inditum est naturaliter ut, viso effectu, desideremus nosse quid est causa, quidquid sit illa. (Leonine VI, p. 36.)

existence. Hence, by way of consequence, a First Cause is a Pure Act and is a case of Existence itself subsisting. Man's natural desire to know the WHAT-IT-IS of the First Cause becomes thus, by way of consequence, a natural desire to know the WHAT-IT-IS of Pure Act and of Subsistent Being. Yet despite the metaphysical depth of these desiderata, they are not supernatural objects, for Cajetan. 'Pure Act' and 'Subsistent Being' are naturally knowable descriptions of God, shallow to the point of triviality, compared to the descriptions in which God reveals His interior mystery. These come up when God is revealed as Father and Savior, which are again relational descriptions. So graced man's natural desire to know what God is as Father and Savior becomes again, by way of consequence, a desire to know what He is in Himself as Trinity.

Let us turn now to the brief second section of this commentary.

> *ii.* Pay attention to two points here, beginner. (1) To know the WHAT-HE-IS of God is the same as to see God through His essence. You have this explicitly in the support for this last article.
>
> (2) Complete fulfillment arises from the quidditative knowing of God. So the [specific] difference that turns the knowing into *quidditative* knowing of God turns the knowing into *seeing God* and turns the ultimate fulfillment into *complete* fulfillment. Hence, as "seeing God" covers a range of cases, so does "complete fulfillment." [60]

At the end of the *corpus* in 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 6, Aquinas was explicit that both "seeing God" and "being fulfilled thereby" cover a range of cases, based on degrees of supernatural love. One saint outshines another in glory, he said, because the one having more love is prepared to receive more "light of glory" with which to see WHAT-GOD-IS more clearly and more deeply. As a result, the term 'Beatific Vision' did not name a unique level of knowledge/fulfillment but a spectrum of levels.

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[60] II. Adverte hinc, novitie, duo. Primo, quod idem est cognoscere *quod quid est* Dei, et videre Deum per essentiam: hoc enim manifeste in probationi ultimi hujus articuli habes.

Secundo, quod perfecta beatitudo constituitur ex quidditativa cognitione Dei. Ita quod differentia constitutiva cognitionis in hoc quod sit cognitio quidditativa Dei, est constitutiva in hoc quod est Dei visio: et est constitutiva beatitudinis ultimae, in hoc quod sit perfecta. Et consequenter, sicut datur latitudo in visione Dei, ita in beatitudine perfecta. (Leonine VI, p. 36.)

H. Concluding evaluation.

One comes away from these commentaries much more satisfied than previously.

(1) First, the problem brushed over in C12/1 has been faced and resolved.

(2) The resolution has brought out the importance of *language* considerations. Cajetan was a man who spoke two technical languages — the SD-language of *sacra doctrina* and the NS-language of Aristotelian natural science. He spoke both, because his scholasticism was not just the servant of his theology but also the servant of his natural science, the instrument for articulating the relations between revealed faith and natural science correctly. This job could not be done if one confused the NS-language meanings of 'natural' with the SD-meaning. Confusing or blending these meanings will lead one to think that an NS conclusion,

> A thing does not naturally desire objects beyond its natural ability,

dictates a negative answer to the SD question,

> Does our mind naturally desire to know what the Trinity is?

Cajetan posed *dubia* that illustrated precisely this mistake, so as to show that when the meanings of 'natural' are unconfused, the NS conclusion does not dictate the negative answer in *sacra doctrina*.

(3) Cajetan's account of the intellect's *desiderium naturale* has become much clearer. What is residence-natural in intellect as such (the whole analogous class) is wonder as such, the *inclinatio* to grasp the causes of seen effects, irrespective of what those causes and effects are, right up to the first and highest. What is residence-and-mode-natural in a given intellect is such-and-such wonder, the desire to grasp such causes of seen effects as that intellect has the ability to grasp. One now sees how people "naturally can" pose with cognitive understanding questions they cannot answer. They "naturally can" do this because of the absolutely open-ended wonder that is residence-natural in the human intellect. And one also sees why people often drop such

questions, despair of them, and even turn against them in postures of positivist, pragmatist, or Kantian self-limitation. Those questions exceed our mode-natural wonder and ability. We do raise them, but apart from grace and a genuinely Christian culture, we raise them uncomfortably, diffidently, in fear that we may be going beyond what is "meaningfully asked."

(4) It has become clear what Cajetan would have thought of man in "pure nature," if he had entertained the speculation. He conceded no "natural happiness" for man but the fragile one to which Aristotle was resigned.

Still, some important issues remain. If our sole *beatitudo perfecta* is the supernatural one, but our intellect contains a natural desire by which, even apart from revelation, it tends towards the core of *beatitudo perfecta,* are we naturally *capax* of that *beatitudo?* Are we in natural potency to it? Are these questions also different, depending on whether we are speaking SD language or NS language? These matters are coming up in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Cajetan on Man's Potency to Supernatural Gifts

It has turned out that, according to Cajetan, the complicating *desiderium naturae* is natural to man in three senses. First, in a sense standard for the natural sciences, it is natural in residence-and-mode up to a point; second, it is natural in residence only beyond that point (the point set by the active power of the human intellect).[1] Third, even when its object is re-described in revealed terms, the *desiderium* is "natural" to man in a sense proper to sacred theology. For man was made by God to know God, and a thing naturally tends to do what it was made to do. Given these points, it might seem obvious that, in one or another of these senses, the human intellect would be in natural potency to receive this desire's object. But it turns out that 'natural potency' was a special, technical term.[2]

Let us take a moment to put the term into its philosophical context. A potency was a property whose description required the talk of possibility ('can').[3] To define a given potency *P* belonging to a thing *x*, one specified some "how" which was how *x* could be "in act." Let A_N be a way of being in act. Then a defined potency *P* of *x* was the property whereby *x* can be A_N. If *x* was not currently A_N, it was currently some other way, $\}_N$, considered an opposite to being A_N;

[1] Thus even when the object of the desire is a quiddity beyond the active ability of the human intellect to abstract, such as what the First Cause is, the wonder about that object remains "natural" to us by remaining a wonder that *any* human being can have.

[2] For plain English examples of how an adjective, when put in front of a noun, can suddenly yield a technical term with an unexpectedly narrow meaning, think of 'political party', 'gothic novel', or 'cold shoulder'.

[3] Potency was contrasted with act both on the transcendental level, where essence was compared to existence as potency to act, and on the categorial level, where an existing thing might be sometimes in potency and sometimes in act with respect to one or another trait or operation. With the transcendental talk of potency we have nothing further to do. In what follows, the word 'potency' will refer to a real or categorial property whose description requires a use of the modal 'can'.

either way, the potency *P* was said to have been "reduced to an act."

To define a potency more exactly, one had to take into account different species or degrees of A_N. Let these be the forms A_a, A_b, A_c ..., and let the set of them be A_i. Then any potency found to be a potency-to-A_i (the genus) was automatically a potency to the species. By contrast, a potency only to A_a (one species) need not admit of being actualized by A_c (another species); for $\}_a$ might be A_b, not A_c. Thus the definition of a potency established its extent.[4]

Once defined, potencies were further classified along various lines.

— Some were based on individual features of *x*, but others were based on *x*'s nature, *i.e.* on features which the individual shared with all members of its natural kind. This was the issue of the potency's residence or "subject."

— Some were active potencies, and others were passive or receptive. This division depended on whether the potency's defining act-type A_N was a case of operation (like flying) or a case of receiving-a-form (like being heated up). In the former case, the can-be-A_N was a type of can-do; in the latter, a type of can-be-made. The former was often called a *facultas;* the latter, a *receptio* or *receptivitas.*[5]

In the case of passive or receptive potencies, the phrase 'ways to be made A_N' came up, and it was ambiguous. Besides suggesting various species or degrees of the act-state A_N itself, it could be taken two other ways.

— On one construal, it suggested different causes (as a pot of water can be made hot by a fire, an electric coil, or a nuclear reaction). This was the issue of how a potency compared to the agent communicating actualization to it.

— On another, it suggested different adverbs — in Latin, *modi* — the most important of

[4] Cf. *De Potentia Dei* q. 2, a. 6 *ad* 2.

[5] This is a point on which Aquinas found it necessary to correct Peter of Tarantasia, who thought potency was only active. See q. 81 of Aquinas's *Explanatio dubiorum ex dictis cuiusdam edita*. *Opera Omnia*, vol. 27 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), pp. 243-244.

which were 'naturally' and 'forcedly', as water seemed to become cool naturally but seemed to require force to make it hot. As the example showed, a potency could be reduced to one act-type naturally and to another, its "opposite," forcedly.[6] In some cases, the opposites were qualitatively different (contradictory opposites), and in other cases they differed only in degree (contrary opposites). A receptive potency might be natural to one contrary and forced to the other (as with water's to be cool/hot), or might be natural to one contradictory and forced to another. This business of natural *vs.* forced was the issue of the potency's "mode."

To see more fully what 'natural' meant as a mode of potency, one must go back to the sources of Aquinas's thought on nature and naturalness.

A. Nature, art, and the supernatural

The place to begin is with Aquinas' commentary on book II of Aristotle's *Physics, lectio* 1, where the topic was what it is to be "by nature."

> The first thing Aristotle says, then, is that, among all entities, we say that certain ones are [as they are] by nature, others by other causes, such as by art or by chance. We say that any and all animals are [as they are] by nature, as are their parts, like flesh and bones, as are plants and simple bodies like the elements which do not break down into other, prior bodies — earth, fire, air, and water. These and the like we say "are by nature." And these all differ from the things that are not by nature because they are all seen to have within themselves a source of some change or stability *[principium alicuius motus et status]* — be it change of place (as with heavy things, light things, and the heavenly bodies), or change in growing or shrinking (as with animals and plants), or internal alteration (as with the simple bodies and everything composed of them). By contrast, things that are not [as they are] by nature, such as a bed, a coat, and the like, and which are so classified by virtue of being by art, do not have within themselves the source of any change, unless it be by accident, of course, in that the matter and substance of the artificial bodies are natural things. Thus insofar as the artificial things happen to be of iron or stone, they have some source of change within themselves, but not insofar as they are artificial. A knife has within itself a source of downward motion, not insofar as

[6] As Aquinas put it in 2/1 *ST* 8, 1 *ad* 1, eadem potentia est oppositorum, sed non eodem modo se habet ad utrumque. In modern science, we should say that water tends naturally to the mean environmental temperature and requires "force" to be kept hotter or colder than that.

it is a knife, but insofar as it is made of iron.[7]

From these general remarks paraphrasing Aristotle's text, Aquinas turned at once to a point not explicit in the text. He sought to head off a false generalization.

> It seems, however, that the following proposition
>
> > for all changes of natural things, a source of change is in that which undergoes the change
>
> is not true. For in the alteration and generation of simple bodies, the whole source of the change seems to be from an outside agent. *E.g.,* when water warms up, or air is turned into fire, the source of the change is in the outside agent.[8]

There is no source of the warming-up, in other words, in the water; it is entirely in the outside heat-source. And no source of the air's conversion into fire is within the air itself, but lies in the fire acting upon the air.

Now, in the medieval ranking of elements, fire was of higher nature than air, and so the point just made could be applied to cases of supernatural influence. Thus it is highly significant that, just a year or two earlier, Aquinas had used this example in the *Prima Pars,* in connection with the *lumen gloriae* and the Vision of God (1 *ST* q. 12, a. 5). He had said that whenever a thing was to be raised to something beyond its nature, it had to be disposed thereto by a prepara-

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[7] Dicit ergo primo quod inter omnia entia, quaedam esse dicimus a natura : quaedam vero ab aliis causis, outa ab arte vel a casu. Dicimus autem esse a natura quaelibet animalia, et partes ipsorum, sicut carnem et ossa, et etiam plantas, et corpora simplicia, sicut elementa, quae non resolvuntur in aliqua corpora priora, ut sunt terra, ignis, aer et aqua ; haec enim omnia et similia a natura esse dicuntur. Et differunt haec omnia ab his quae non sunt a natura : quia omnia huiusmodi videntur habere in se principium alicuius motus et status : quaedam quidem secundum locum, sicut gravia et levia, et etiam corpora coelestia; quaedam vero secundum augmentum et decrementum, ut animalia et plantae: quaedam vero secundum alterationem, ut corpora simplicia, et omnia quae componuntur ex eis. Sed ea quae non sunt a natura, sicut lectus et indumentum et similia, quae accipiunt huiusmodi praedicationem secundum quod sunt ab arte, nullius mutationis principium habent in seipsis nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet materia et substantia corporum artificiatorum sunt res naturales. Sic igitur inquantum artificialibus accidit esse ferrea vel lapidea, habent aliquod principium motus in seipsis, sed non inquantum sunt artificiata : cultellus enim habet in se principium motus deorsum, non inquantum est cultellus, sed inquantum est ferreus. *Opera Omnia*, vol. 22 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 339, columns 1-2.

[8] Sed videtur hoc non esse verum quod secundum quamlibet mutationem rerum naturalium principium motus sit in eo quod movetur. In alteratione enim et generatione simplicium corporum, totum principium motus videtur esse ab extrinseco agente; puta cum aqua calefit, vel aer in ignem convertitur, principium mutationis est ab exteriori agente. (*Ibid.,* p. 339, column 2)

tion *[dispositio]* above its nature. "For example, if air had to take on the form of fire, it would need to be made ready for that form by some disposition." Presumably, he meant an intense heatedness, coming from something already having the higher, fiery form. In like manner, he argued, when a created intellect sees God through His essence, God's very essence becomes that intellect's *forma intelligibilis,* and so the created intellect needs a supernatural disposition (the *lumen gloriae)* to be added to it, if it is to receive so sublime a form.[9] Shortly, we shall watch Cajetan defend this doctrine against Scotus. Meanwhile, we return to the commentary on the *Physics,* where Aquinas was about to prove his claim that, in such cases, the source of the change is in the outside agent.

> Some say in response that even in such cases there is a partial active source of the change in the thing changed, not complete, but incomplete, which abets the action of the outside agent. They say that within matter itself there is a sort of start towards form *[inchoatio formae]*, which they say is a wanting *[privatio]*, and which is a third source of nature [alongside matter itself and form itself]. And thanks to this intrinsic source, all generations and alterations of simple bodies get to be called "natural." But this cannot be the case. For since nothing acts except insofar as it is in act, the alleged start-towards-form cannot be an active source [abetting the change], since it is not an act-state but an "aptitude" to act-state. Besides, even if the alleged start were a complete form, it would not act upon its own subject, altering it, because a form does not "act"; a composite acts, and a composite cannot alter itself unless it comes in two parts, the one altering the other.[10]

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[9] Respondeo dicendum quod omne quod elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione quae sit supra suam naturam: sicut, si aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit forma intelligibilis intellectus. Undo oportet quod aliqua dispositio supernaturalis ei superaddatur, ad hoc quod elevetur in tantam sublimitatem. (Leonine IV, p. 123.)

[10] Dicunt ergo quidam, quod etiam in huiusmodi mutationibus principium activum motus est in eo quod movetur, non quidem perfectum, sed imperfectum, quod adjuvat actionem exterioris agentis. Dicunt enim, quod in materia est quaedam inchoatio formae, quam dicunt esse privationem, quae est tertium principium naturae. Et ab hoc principio intrinseco, generationes et alterationes corporum simplicium naturales dicuntur. Sed hoc non potest esse : quia, cum nihil agat nisi secundum quod est in actu, praedicta inchoatio formae, cum non sit actus, sed aptitudo quaedam ad actum, non potest esse principium activum. Et praeterea, etiam si esset forma completa, non ageret in suum subjectum alterando ipsum : quia forma non agit, sed compositum, quod non potest seipsum alterare nisi sint in eo duae partes, quarum una sit alterans e alia alterata. (*Opera omnia*, vol. 22, p. 339, column 2.)

What Aquinas has rejected, then, is just an active *principium* (complete or incomplete) wherewith water, which tends to be cold, would cooperate actively in its being heated up by something else, or wherewith air, which is of lower nature than fire, would cooperate actively in its being turned into fire. (Analogously in theology, he would deny that man cooperates actively in securing prevenient graces, or merits his justification, or the like.) If we think of this active *principium* as active potency *(facultas),* we can say that Aquinas rejected a generalization that would give all natural things active potencies to all the act-states they reach by natural changes. In certain odd cases dealing with the elements themselves, even a *natural* process of change takes place without any active potency for it in the thing changed. Passive potency, however, is another story, as we are about to see.

> The thing to say, then, is that the way in which the source of a change is within natural things is the way in which the change belongs to them. If inducing the change belongs to them, an active source of the change is within them; if undergoing the change belongs to them, a passive source is within them, which is matter. This source, insofar as it has **natural potency** to such-and-such form and change, is what makes the change "natural." [11]

Here we have what most concerns this chapter: the introduction of the term 'natural potency'. It was introduced by Aquinas into his general criterion for calling change-processes natural. It was introduced as a gloss and refinement on Aristotle's basic claim that being-by-nature is having an internal source of change/rest. Aquinas has conceded this claim, distinguished the internal source into active and passive, and then introduced the talk of natural potency to yield the following explication:

> for any thing *x* and any act-state N: *x* induces or undergoes change to N naturally if, and only if, *x* has an internal factor *P* such that *P* is or has natural po-

[11] Et ideo dicendum est, quod in rebus naturalibus eo modo est principium motus, quo eis motus convenit. Quibus ergo convenit movere, est in eis principium activum motus; quibus autem competit moveri, est in eis principium passivum, quod est materia. Quod quidem principium, inquantum habet potentiam naturalem ad talem formam et motum, facit esse motum naturalem. (*Ibid.,* p. 339, column 2.)

> tency to N.[12]

Having stated this criterion, Aquinas then applied it to a range of cases to show that it worked in explaining, in each case, why the change counted as natural. He did not need to apply it to the growth of plants and animals, because those cases were obviously natural by his criterion. He needed to apply it to the odd cases, and those included the following:

- the place-changes of the heavenly bodies: even though those changes were caused actively by an immaterial mover (an angel), they counted as natural changes because there was natural potency to be moved (passive potency to be located) within a heavenly body itself;[13]

- the place-changes of the heavy and light elements: their downward or upward movements counted as natural changes because they had within them a form (a *gravitas* or *levitas)* which was a formal source of those motions — even though that source could not be called an active potency to move thus but only a passive potency to-be-moved thus.[14] Within the simple bodies, in other

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[12] This explication was a preliminary move towards the overall aim of this first *lectio,* which was to explicate what it was for a thing to be a "natural thing." As we shall not be quoting the entire text of the *lectio* here, but the reader may wish to know how the preliminary move contributed to the upshot, I offer the following summary of what it was (for Aquinas) to be a natural thing:

> For any *x* and for any classification *K* such that *x* is a *K*-thing: *x qua K* is a natural thing, if and only if, there is at least one act-state N such that *x qua K* induces or undergoes change to N naturally.

Thus a definition of 'natural process' was needed on the way to defining 'natural thing.' A natural thing was one that, in its capacity as some kind of thing, played a role in a natural process. Given that playing a role in a natural process required having an internal factor in natural potency to the process's outcome (being-N), one had the basic point that Aristotle wanted: for *x qua K* to be a natural thing, there must be at least one factor *P* intrinsic to being a *K*-thing such that *P* is or has natural potency to N. This is only a rough summary, because a fuller explication would take us needlessly out of our way by explaining intrinsicality as opposed to mere interiority, which gets into explaining what it was to be thus-and-such "*per se et primo.*"

[13] Et sic etiam motus localis corporum coelestium est naturalis, licet sit a motore separato, inquantum in ipso corpori coeli est potentia naturalis ad talem motum. (*Ibid., p. 339,* column 2.)

[14] In corporibus vero gravibus et levibus est principium formale sui motus; sed huiusmodi principium formale non potest dici potentia activa, ad quam pertinet motus iste, sed comprehenditur sub potentia passiva. Gravitas enim in terra non est principium ut moveat, sed magis ut moveatur : quia sicut alia accidentia consequuntur formam substantialem, ita et locus; et per consequens moveri ad locum; non tamen ita, quod forma naturalis sit motor, sed motor est generans, quod dat talem formam, ad quam talis motus consequitur. (*Ibid.*, p. 339-340).

words, which were too primitive to have organs of locomotion, there was no active power to move; yet their being-moved remained "natural change" because of the passive potency within them. Natural passive potency alone could suffice to naturalize a change/motion.[15]

• Aquinas did not return, alas, to the alterations of elements, such as the warming of water or the turning of air into fire, to show us how his criterion applied to them. But it is easy to see that the *inducing* whereby fire warmed or ignited was "natural change" because of the natural active potency in fire (despite the lack of any comparable active potency in the water or the air), and that the *undergoing* whereby water was warmed or air ignited was not "natural change" unless the *passive* potency in the water or the air was natural potency to these act-states. Their passive potency can only have been the sheer matter in them (considered as potency to be structured otherwise). Cajetan had the same theory, as will emerge below.

• But Aquinas did compare his criterion with the processes in which artificial things come to be, so as to show why 'natural process' did **not** apply to them:

> And thus the productive acts *[factiones]* in which artificial things are made are not natural; for while a material source [of change] lies within the thing produced, **it does not have natural potency to such a form** [*i.e.* one imposed by art].[16]

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[15] But one could not generalize this beyond the elements; one could not affirm generally that natural passive potency might exist in the absence of a corresponding natural active potency. Take the case of the fixed stars. Precisely because Aristotle did not think that the stars were simple, elemental bodies, he argued that if their nature had intended them to move, their nature would have equipped them with *organs* of locomotion (*De Caelo II*, c. 8; 290a30-35) supplying a natural active ability *(facultas)* to move. Man, too, is a non-elemental being; so in him, too, a natural passive potency without a corresponding active *facultas* is not to be posited. This was the force of the first objection that Cajetan faced in commenting on the natural-desire argument in 12/1, and we saw at the end of Chapter Three the full story of how he solved it. Man has a natural active potency to understand *(intellectus agens)*, and the passive potency in man's *intellectus possibilis* is natural passive potency (in residence and mode) just so far as the agent intellect's *facultas* corresponds to it but is natural only in a weaker sense (in resendence only) beyond that point. This matter will come up again below, in *quaestio* 2 of *De potentia neutra.*

[16] Et propter hoc factiones rerum artificialium non sunt naturales: quia licet principium materiale sit in eo quod fit, non tamen habet potentiam naturalem ad talem formam. *Opera Omnia*, vol. 22 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 339, column 2, near the bottom.

Notice that the artificial product is admitted to contain matter, which was identified above as a source of passive potency. So the claim that the matter has no natural potency to the artificial form cannot mean merely that the raw materials have no natural active potency to produce the artificial form; it must mean that the raw materials have no *natural passive* potency to receive such a form.[17]

It is of the highest importance, therefore, that Aquinas used the example of artificial things to explain what kind of potency man had to the Vision of God.

Let us read with attention two chapters from the *Compendium theologiae* (which used to be dated after the *Physics* commentary, but is dated a few years earlier by some scholars, including Chenu).[18] Aquinas began *CT* c. 103 by telling how all creatures seek to achieve a resemblance to God in some way or other. Sub-rational things seek to do so by at least preserving their being or communicating it. Rational ones seek to do the same but also seek to do more.

> But a rational creature, through its operation, tends to resemble God in a unique way, beyond all others, just as such a creature has a nobler being *[nobilius esse]* than the others. For the being of other creatures is constricted by matter and therefore limited — limited in such a way that neither in act nor in potency is it unlimited. But every rational nature has an unlimitedness either in act or in potency, insofar as the intellect contains in itself what it can understand. In our case, then, the intellectual nature, when considered in its first state of being, is in potency to the things it can understand; and since these are limitless, it has a certain unlimitedness in potency. (This is why intellect is the species of species: it does not have just a species tied down to one thing, as a stone does, but a species open *[capax]* to all species.) By contrast, intellectual nature in God is unlimited in act, possessing in itself and in advance

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[17] Note the subtlety of the modal doctrine here. The raw materials of a bed *do* receive that form, and so they obviously *can* receive it. But they do not receive it *naturally*, and so this obvious 'can' is not *natural* passive potency. If we indicate the latter with 'can$_n$' but leave the obvious 'can' unmarked, we shall have the resources to affirm

these timbers can become a bed (with 1 *ST* q. 7, a. 2)

and to deny

these timbers can$_n$ become a bed (with this commentary).

Things will become very interesting, and very clear, if it turns out that we may identify the unmarked 'can' with *capacitas.*

[18] James A. Weisheipl, O.P. *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 387-388.

> the total perfection of being as a whole (as shown above). Other intellectual creatures [angels] hold a middle position as between potency and act. So: an intellectual creature, through its operation, tends to resemble God not only by preserving itself in being or by multiplying its being somehow by communication but also by possessing in itself in act what, by nature, it possesses only in potency. The purpose, therefore, of an intellectual creature, which it achieves through its operation, is that its intellect should be totally put into act with respect to possessing everything it is in potency to understand; for in achieving this it will resemble God to its utmost.[19]

This purpose of an intellectual creature as intellectual is stated more circumspectly by Aquinas elsewhere (1 *ST* q. 12, a. 8 *ad* 4), but the differences need not detain us. What matters is this business of being "in potency to understand," which is coming up immediately in chapter 104.

> But a thing is in potency in two ways: (1) naturally, *i.e*. with respect to things which can be reduced to act by a natural agent; (2) otherwise, with respect to things which cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent but by some other agent. One sees this in bodily things. It is a matter of natural potency for a man to come from a boy, or an animal from semen; but it is not a matter of natural potency for a stool to come from a piece of wood, nor for a blind man to become sighted. The same applies also to our intellect. For it is in natural potency to some of the things we can understand, namely, those which can be reduced to act by the agent intellect, which is the inborn principle through which we are to be made cognizant in act. But it is impossible for us to achieve our ultimate purpose through our intellect's being reduced to act in this way. For the contribution of the agent intellect is to render actually understandable the phantasms, which are potentially understandable, as was made clear above. Phantasms are gotten through the senses. So, through the agent intellect, our understanding is reduced to act only as regards those understandable things of which we can be informed through sensible things. But it is impossible for man's ultimate end to be delivered in such cognition. For

[19] Sed creatura rationalis per suam operationem tendit in divinam similitudinem singulari quodam modo prae ceteris, sicut et prae ceteris creaturis nobilius esse habet: esse enim creaturarum ceterarum, cum sit per materiam constrictum, est finitum, ut infinitatem non habeat nec actu, nec potentia. Omnis vero natura rationalis infinitatem habet vel actu vel potentia, secundum quod intellectus continet in se intelligibilia. In nobis igitur intellectualis natura in suo primo esse considerata est in potentia ad sua intelligibilia, quae cum sint infinita, infinitatem quamdam habent [*sic; read* habet] in potentia. Unde intellectus est species specierum; quia non habet tantum speciem determinatam ad unum, ut lapis, sed speciem omnium specierum capacem. Natura vero intellectualis in Deo infinita est in actu, utpote in se praehabens totius entis perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Creaturae vero aliae intellectuales medio modo se habent inter potentiam et actum. Tendit igitur intellectualis creatura per suam operationem in divinam similitudinem non in hoc solum quod se in esse conservet, vel suum esse quodammodo communicando multiplicet, sed ut in se habeat actu quod per naturam in potentia habet. Est igitur finis intellectualis creaturae quem per suam operationem consequitur ut intellectus eius totaliter efficiatur in actu secundum omnia intelligibilia quae in potentia habet: secundum in hoc enim maxime Deo similis erit. *Opera Omnia,* vol.27 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 40, column 2.

> when the ultimate end is possessed, natural desire is quieted. Yet no matter how far a person might advance in understanding in the manner just discussed, whereby we acquire knowledge from sense, there still remains a natural desire to know other things; for there are many things beyond the reach of our senses, about which we can get but scant information through sensibles; we might know, for example, *that* there are such things but not *what* they are, since the what-they-are of immaterial substances differ in kind from the what-they-are of sensible things and transcend them immeasurably, as it were. Even things which do fall under the senses — there are many points about them for which we cannot grasp the reason with certainty; for some we have no certainty; for others, little. Hence the natural desire for a more perfect knowledge always remains. But it is impossible for a natural desire to be in vain. Therefore, we achieve our ultimate purpose by having our understanding put into act by a higher agent than the one connatural to us — a higher agent which satisfies the desire to know which is naturally in us. Now, in us, the desire to know is such that, when we know an effect, we desire to know the cause; and in each and every case, when we know any of a thing's circumstantial aspects, our desire does not come to rest until we know its essence. Therefore, the natural desire to know does not come to rest in us until we know the first cause — and until we know it not in just any way, but through its essence. Well, the first cause is God, as established above. Therefore the ultimate end of an intellectual creature is to see God through His essence.[20]

[20] Est autem aliquid in potentia dupliciter: uno modo naturaliter, respectu eorum scilicet quae per agens naturale possunt reduci in actum; alio modo respectu eorum quae reduci non possunt in actum per agens naturale, sed per aliquod aliud agens; quod quidem in rebus corporalibus apparet. Quod enim ex puero fiat vir est in potentia naturali, vel quod ex semine fiat animal; sed quod ex ligno fiat scamnum, vel ex caeco fiat videns, non est in potentia naturali. Sic autem et circa intellectum nostrum accidit. Est enim intellectus noster in potentia naturali respectu quorumdam intelligibilium, quae scilicet reduci possunt in actum per intellectum agentem, qui est principium innatum nobis, ut per ipsum efficiamur intelligentes in actu. Est autem impossibile nos ultimum finem consequi per hoc quod intellectus noster sic reducatur in actum: nam virtus intellectus agentis est ut phantasmata, quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia, faciat intelligibilia in actu, ut ex superioribus patet. Phantasmata autem sunt accepta per sensum. Per intellectum igitur agentem intellectus noster in actum reducitur respectu horum intelligibilium tantum in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire. Impossibile est autem in tali cognitione ultimum hominis finem consistere. Nam ultimo fine adepto, desiderium naturale quiescit. Quantumcumque autem aliquis proficiat intelligendo secundum praedictum modum cognitionis quo a sensu scientiam percipimus, adhuc remanet naturale desiderium ad alia cognoscenda; multa enim sunt ad quae sensus pertingere non potest, de quibus per sensibilia non nisi modicam notitiam accipere possumus, ut forte sciamus de eis quod sint, non autem quid sint, eo quod substantiarum immaterialium quidditates alterius generis sunt a quidditatibus rerum sensibilium, et eas quasi improportionabiliter transcendentes. Circa ea etiam quae sub sensum cadunt, multa sunt quorum rationem cognoscere per certitudinem non possumus: sed quorumdam quidem nullo, quorumdam vero debiliter. Unde semper remanet naturale desiderium respectu perfectioris cognitionis. Impossibile est autem naturale desiderium esse vanum. Consequimur igitur ultimum finem in hoc quod intellectus noster fiat in actu aliquo sublimiori agente quam sit agens nobis connaturale, quod quiescere faciat desiderium quod nobis inest naturaliter ad sciendum. Tale est autem in nobis sciendi desiderium, ut cognoscentes effectum, desiderimus cognoscere causam; et in quacumque re, cognitis quibuscumque eius circumstantiis, non quiescit nostrum desiderium quousque eius essentiam cognoscamus. Non igitur naturale desiderium sciendi potest quietari in nobis quousque primam causam cognoscamus, non quocumque modo, sed per eius essentiam. Prima autem causa Deus est, ut ex superioribus patet. Est igitur finis ultimus intellectualis creaturae, Deum per essentiam videre. (*Ibid.*, p. 41.)

I have quoted the whole of the chapter, so that the reader could see that it covered all the material we have been examining: man's intellective nature, its natural desire, what it can achieve in human theoretical sciences, and wherein its complete fulfillment must lie. But this time a new factor has been present. Aquinas introduced this comprehensive exposition with a division between natural and non-natural potency. His examples of natural potency were biological growth and generation. His examples of non-natural potency were (a) wood with respect to an artificial form and (b) a blind man with respect to a miraculous cure. He then applied this division to the human intellect. Our intellect is

— in natural potency to those understandable items *(intelligibilia)* which can be rendered actually understood (stripped of material particularity, etc.) by our own active power-to-understand (the *intellectus agens)* and thereby so impressed upon our possible intellect that we are actually understanding them

— and is in non-natural potency to those *intelligibilia* which only a higher agent *(sublimior agens)* can render actually understood for us, *i.e.* so introduce into our possible intellect that we are actually understanding them.

The subject (residence) of the two sorts of potency, then, is not the agent intellect, nor the soul in general, but the "possible intellect," the faculty that receives *formae intelligibiles.* **It** is in natural potency to the *formae* that our agent intellect can abstract and impress upon it, and **it** is in non-natural potency to the *formae* that a higher agent can introduce within it. These include, of course, the essence of the First Cause (whether as such or as God). So if the potency of man's possible intellect to the essence of God is like the potency of wood to the artificial form of a stool, as Aquinas claims, then three consequences of capital importance follow.

(1) Aquinas's "point of insertion" for the supernatural is not natural desire but art — the divine Artist can introduce new forms into intellective nature, as a human artist does

into material natures.[21]

(2) Man's possible intellect lacks **natural passive potency** to the *intelligibile* which is what-God-is (whether as First Cause or as God).[22]

(3) Yet the natural desire in man's possible intellect extends beyond its natural passive potency, to objects such that, an act of understanding those objects is an act to which our possible intellect is in non-natural passive potency.[23]

There is a fourth as well. Before Aquinas introduced the division of potencies in *CT* c. 104, he had already made a remark about the nature of intellect as such in c. 103, namely, that it is *capax omnium specierum.* Well, the essence of God takes the place of a *species* in the Vision of Him. A science that knows this therefore knows that a faculty which is by its nature *capax omnium specierum* is by its nature *capax Dei.* Such a science was *sacra doctrina.* Therefore Aquinas could contrast *'capacitas'* with the natural-science term *'potentia passiva':*

(4) A created intellect has natural *capacitas* for God's essence without being in natural potency to be made cognizant of God's essence.

Cajetan would not be departing an iota from Aquinas's thought, therefore, if he affirmed the natu-

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[21] This is the heart of St. Thomas' theism. His God does not leak being, like a porous membrane, nor radiate it like a fire. He designs by intelligence and creates by will, and that is true on two levels. On the first level, there is nothing at all to "receive" His creativity; His art posits the total artifact. On the second level, intellectual creatures are there to receive His creativity. And while the new forms God gives them work like a higher nature (a super-nature, as we said in Chapter One), still, the communicating of those forms is not like spreading more nature around; it is like beautifying the natures already there with a new and divine Beauty.

[22] In plain language: man is not in natural potency to receive God. If it is safe to generalize this point to the forms preparatory to our receiving God-in-Vision (the forms of grace, charity, the other infused virtues and gifts, and the light of glory), then one can see why, across the board, the communication of divine Beauty to intellectual creatures is a case of *artistic handling:* these creatures have no natural potency, active *or* passive, to those forms of Beauty.

Cajetan was no pioneer of theological aesthetics, alas, but he did learn the basic lesson from *CT* c. 104: he learned to deny that man's potency to supernatural act-states is *natural* passive potency. He took Aquinas's denial here to be a denial of "natural potency" in its strong and normal natural-science sense (as in the *Physics* commentary) — a denial of mode-natural passive potency (can_{n}), as we shall see at length in *De potentia neutra,* below.

[23] And thus the natural desire resident in our intellect cannot be identified with its mode-natural passive potency. Cajetan has cleared room for this by distinguishing residence-naturality from mode-naturality.

ral *capacitas* while denying the natural passive potency. As to denying the latter, we shall see what he said soon; as to affirming the former, we can look at what he said now, so that the issue need not trouble us again:

> the breadth *[amplitudo]* of an immaterial faculty is so great that, without qualification, it is open *[capax]* to everything.[24]

This Cajetan said about even the lowest of such faculties, man's intellect and man's will, in a comment on Aquinas's answer to the third objection in 2/1 *ST* q. 10, a. 1.[25]

There is yet a fifth point to retain from these texts. Aquinas called the agent intellect's operation "connatural" to man. *'Connaturalis'* was a one-word substitute for Aristotle's '6∀ϑ NβΦ4<'. In the same first *lectio* of the commentary on *II Physics*, where we were reading before, Aquinas explained it as follows:

> Then . . . Aristotle expounds what is "according to nature." He says that the items said to be according to nature are both (a) subjects whose being [as they are] is by nature and (b) the accidents in those subjects that are caused to be there by such a source — thus moving upwards is not itself a nature, nor a thing having a nature, but is caused by a nature.[26]

The "connatural subjects," of course, are substances which are natural entities. The "connatural accidents" are those caused to be in such substances by their natures. This is why the present writer prefers to translate *'connaturalis'* with 'nature-set': these are the accidents which a substance is set-to-have by its nature. In short,

(5) the connatural traits of a thing are those that "flow from" its nature.

It follows that an accident present in a substance *x* not because it flows from *x*'s nature but be-

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[24] . . . tanta est amplitudo immaterialis potentiae, ut universi simpliciter capax sit. (Leonine VI, p. 85)

[25] It comes at the end of section *vii* in Cajetan's commentary on that article.

[26] Deinde . . . exponit quid sit secundum naturam. Et dicit quod secundum naturam esse dicuntur tam subjecta quorum esse est a natura: quam etiam accidentia quae in eis insunt causata ab hujusmodi principio: sicut ferri sursum non est ipsa natura, neque habens naturam, sed est causatum a natura. *Opera Omnia*, vol. 22 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 340, column 2, bottom.

cause it has been put into *x* by the influence of another agent, *y*, is not connatural to *x*.

What should one say, then, of the accidents that are grace-given to man by the artistic agent who is God? Will they be connatural to man? Will they be connatural to any creature? That question was handled powerfully by Aquinas in his discussion of the *lumen gloriae,* on which Cajetan found it necessary to comment at length, because Scotus had launched an important dissent.

B. Connatural vs. supernatural in 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 5 and in Cajetan's commentary thereon.

Aquinas claimed that a human intellect, in order to understand God's essence, needs a created "light of glory." A key portion of his text read thus:

> I answer: anything raised to a state beyond its nature has to be made ready for it by some preparation *[dispositio]* that is above its nature; thus, if air must get the form of fire, it needs to be made ready by some preparation for that form. Well, when a created intellect sees God through His essence, God's very essence becomes that intellect's intensional form *[forma intelligibilis]*. Hence it has to be the case that some supernatural preparation is added to the intellect, in order for it to be raised to such a height.[27]

Scotus used his remarks on *III Sent.* d. 14, q. 1, and on *IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 2, to attack this case for a created "light of glory." Aquinas had posited such a thing, Scotus said, because of his conviction that a creature could not see God "naturally." Scotus undertook to show that this conviction was false. So, when Cajetan commented on 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 5, he was obliged to defend his master's doctrine. In that effort, he summarized one of Scotus' arguments as follows:

> (2) If the light of glory were introduced as a form by which an intellect becomes and is adequate to see God, it would be possible to see God *naturally* through some created form. The reason this follows is because [the following comparison holds good:] as a blind man miraculously illuminated sees [what he now sees] *naturally*, so also a blessed man supernaturally illuminated sees God *naturally;* after all, the light of glory, like any other completive trait put into the intellect, completes it naturally, even if it is put there supernaturally.[28]

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[27] Leonine IV, p. 123. The Latin has already been exhibited in footnote 9, above.

[28] *Secundo,* si lumen gloriae ponitur ut forma qua intellectus fiat et sit sufficiens ad videndum Deum, ergo per aliquam formam creatam possibile esset naturaliter videre Deum. Probatur sequela: quia sicut caecus miraculose illuminatus, naturaliter videt, ita beatus supernaturaliter illuminatus, naturaliter

To see Scotus' point, one need only ask some obvious questions. How does whiteness enhance a shirt, once it is in it? Answer: according to its nature. It whitens it. How does life enhance a body, once it is in the body? Answer: according to its nature. It enlivens it. So if one asks in general, "How does a completive form enhance the subject having it?" the answer is always "according to its nature" — *naturaliter*. From this piece of evidence, Scotus concluded that the adverb *'supernaturaliter'* **had no application** to the issue of how an act-state affects its subject; the adverb could only apply to how the act-state came to be there in the first place: it could have been put there by a divine intervention, and that would be *supernaturaliter*. In his attack on the Thomist *lumen gloriae*, Scotus was applying the same argument to the alleged form which would be a created light of glory. He was saying that, if there were such a form, it would enhance the blessed intellect "according to its nature," so that the said intellect would see *naturaliter*, even though it acquired this form by a divine intervention. So, one cannot avoid saying that God can be seen by a creature "naturally." To answer this, Cajetan wrote as follows.

> — *ad* (2): here we have occasion to obey the maxim, "Keep the thought, but correct the language." Simply speaking, there is nothing awkward about admitting that, through a created form . . . a created intellect sees God "naturally." After all, every habilitation and every form is the source of its distinctive act "out of its own nature." A person who has charity, taken *as* having it, "naturally" loves God and loves Him meritoriously, etc., because charity is every bit as effective at inclining [its subject] towards its distinctive act as the other habilitations are [at inclining their subjects towards their acts]. The sign of this "naturalness" is delight: we experience that we do with delight all the acts for which we have the relevant habilitations, be they natural habilitations or supernatural ones. Nevertheless, if people are not to find our language misleading, a distinction needs to be drawn. The phrase
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> 'see God *naturally* through a created form'
>
> can be taken in two senses. One would mean
>
> through a created form that *is* natural or nature-set;
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> the other would mean
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> through a created form that *is* supernatural (and not just supernaturally created).
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> The first sense is something impossible and has been refuted here [by Aquinas

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videt Deum; lumen enim gloriae, sicut quaelibet perfectio posita in intellectu, perficit intellectum naturaliter, quamvis supernaturaliter ponatur. (Leonine IV, p. 124.)

> in 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 5]. The second sense is the only possibility. And such is the light of glory [namely, it *is* supernatural and not just supernaturally given]. Once one is illuminated by it, one sees God perfectly naturally; indeed, it is impossible not to see Him with that light present. — Thus it is clear that the case of the blind man illuminated is not similar to the case of the [blessed] intellect illuminated. In the blind man's case, the strength-to-see that is given *is* natural, even though it is supernaturally given; in the latter case, the strength given is both supernaturally given and *is* a supernatural strength.[29]

To put the point in different terms, the blind man is being handled by the divine Artist, if you like, but is being given only a human beauty, while the glory-filled *beatus* is being given a divine Beauty; and therein the two cases differ.

To reach this result, Cajetan conceded Scotus' piece of evidence — that how a completive form enhances its subject is always *naturaliter* — but denied the conclusion Scotus drew from it. The adverb *'supernaturaliter'* **remained applicable** to this issue because it could be taken in another sense. Suppose *x* has the form *F;* the statement that *x* acts *F*-wise *naturaliter* need not mean that *x* acts *F*-wise with (or according to) the nature of *F;* it could also mean that *x* acts *F*-wise with a form of a type that flows from *x*'s own nature; and in this sense the statement is not always true. It is false every time *F* is above *x*'s nature — as when air burns with the strong heat present in it from the higher nature of fire — and it is most especially false when *x* acts *F*-wise with a form of a type that flows only from God's nature. In such cases, it is correct to say that *x* acts *F*-wise *supernaturaliter,* and the use of the opposite adverb would be highly misleading.

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[29] Ad *secundum* dicitur, quod hic est servandum illud: *sententiam tene, sed linguam cohibe.* Simpliciter quidem nullum inconveniens est concedere quod per aliquam formam creatam, non tamen ut speciem, intellectus creatus naturaliter videt Deum. Quoniam quilibet habitus, et omnis forma, est ex propria natura principium proprii actus. Habens enim caritatem, ut sic, naturaliter diligit Deum meritorie, etc.: non enim minus caritas inclinat ad actum proprium, quam ceteri habitus. Signum autem naturalitatis est dilectatio: experimur enim nos delectabiliter omnia operari quorum habitus habemus, sive naturales, sive supernaturales. Veruntamen, ne errandi occasio sumatur, distinguendum est, quod videre Deum naturaliter per aliquam formam creatam potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, per formam creatam *et naturalem* seu connaturalem; alio modo, per formam creatam *supernaturalem,* et non solum supernaturaliter: et quod primo modo est impossibile, ac refutatum; secundo vero modo est necessarium. Et tale est lumen gloriae. Illuminatus quidem illo, naturalissime videt Deum, adea ut impossibile sit non videre illum, stante lumine. — Unde patet quod non est simile de caeco illuminato, et de intellectu illuminato: quid ibi vis data est naturalis, licet supernaturaliter data; hic vero vis data est et supernaturaliter data, et est supernaturalis. (Leonine IV, pp. 124-125.)

Cajetan was certainly right about one thing: the adverb 'naturally' is multiply ambiguous because it can be formed to abbreviate virtually any prepositional phrase in which the noun 'nature' appears. Hence it can appear in more than one sense as an alternative to 'supernaturally'.

But what exactly did it mean to say that a certain form was, in itself, "above" something's nature? Cajetan had explained that matter in an earlier part (section *ii*) of the same commentary on 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 5.

> . . . note that '*A* is above *B*'s nature' can be true in two ways. One is in terms of **dignity**: *A* is above the level of essence on which *B*'s nature lies, as fire is above air. The other way is in terms of **power** or **efficacy**: *A* goes beyond the ability of *B*, as light is beyond [what] air [can produce within itself], even though air is a substance, and light is an accident.[30] In the case at hand [where the light of glory is said to be above man's nature], 'above' is taken the second way. If 'above his nature' is taken the first way, then what is unqualifiedly supernatural is God alone. But if 'above his nature' is taken the second way, charity, grace, the light of glory, and other such things are supernatural. For both actively and passively they go beyond the ability *[facultas]* of any natures that have been or could have been created. They go beyond any such natures actively, because they can yield effects that no such natures can yield; they go beyond them passively, because they cannot be brought into being or reproduced by any such natures. And this is how [the phrase] 'supernatural preparation' is being used here.[31]

The main lines of this paragraph are clear enough. When a form like grace, charity, or the light of glory is called supernatural to man, it is not being said that the accidental form is of higher essential grade than a substantial form like that of man. Where *gradus essentiae* is the issue, a

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[30] Essences were so graded that an accident's essence always lay on a lower level than a substance's essence. Light was thought to be an accident of the element air (as if it were "lightedness") and hence to have an essence of lower level than air's. Yet air could not make itself lighted, and in that sense the accident was "above" it.

[31] . . . nota quod aliquid esse supra naturam alicuius contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, *dignitate:* quod scilicet est supra gradum essentialem naturae alterius, ut ignis respectu aeris. Alio modo, *potestate* seu *efficacia*, quia scilicet est supra posse alterius, ut lumen respectu aeris, quamvis aer sit substantia, et lumen sit accidens. In proposito sumiter secundo modo. Et propterea supernaturale simpliciter, si primo modo sumitur, Deus tantum est. Secundo autem modo, caritas, gratia, lumen gloriae, et alia huiusmodi supernaturalia sunt: quia superant facultatem omnis naturae creatae et creabilis, tam active quam passive; active quidem, quia possunt in effectus quos non potest natura aliqua; passive vero, quia non possunt fieri aut pullulare a quacumque natura. Et sic sumiter hic supernaturalis dispositio. (Leonine IV, p. 124.)

substantial form outranks any accidental one and is itself outranked only by a higher substance or by God. Rather, what is being said is that

(a) grace, charity, or the light yields an effect which man's nature cannot yield (such as being a child of God by adoption, loving God meritoriously, or seeing God face-to-face);[32]

(b) neither man's nature nor any operation natural to him yields, causes, produces, or communicates grace, etc.[33]

But Cajetan went further. He did not just compare these things to man but to any creatable nature at all. He said that no such nature could cause these forms or yield their effects. On what basis did he make so sweeping a claim? The answer lies in the text of 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 5 itself, or to be more precise, in Aquinas' highly interesting answer to the third objection. Here is the objection.

> (3) Moreover, [the hypothesis that every creature needs an extra light to see God leads to its own contradictory; for] any created item could conceivably be natural to some creature; nothing precludes this possibility. So, if God's essence is seen through a created light, that light could be natural to some creature. But then that creature will not need any other light to see God, which is impossible [because the hypothesis contradicts it]. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature require an additional light to see God's essence.[34]

The objection was certainly fundamental. It struck at the heart of the idea that there could be created forms that are unqualifiedly supernatural (divine Beauty) in themselves. For if any created

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[32] In this respect, grace is in the soul as lightedness is in the air: it yields an effect which the soul cannot produce of itself. Light makes color visible, and air cannot.

[33] In this respect, it is true in part that grace is in the soul as lightedness is in the air: neither flows from the nature of its subject. Air cannot make itself lighted but depends, moment by moment, upon the sun's causality to be so. Analogously, the soul cannot make itself graced but depends, moment by moment, upon God's causality to be so. But here there is also another part, where the analogy fails. By its natural diaphaneity, the air diffuses/communicates light; but the soul cannot communicate grace.

[34] 3. Praeterea, illud quod est creatum, nihil prohibet alicui creaturae esse naturale. Si ergo per aliquod lumen creatum Dei essentia videtur, poterit illud lumen esse naturale alicui creaturae. Et ita illa creatura non indigebit aliquo alio lumine ad videndum Deum: quod est impossibile. Non est ergo necessarium quod omnis creatura ad videndum Dei essentiam lumen superadditum requirat. (Leonine IV, p. 123.)

form, precisely because it is created, could be natural equipment in some creature, all supernaturality must be relative, including the supernaturality of seeing God through His essence. For if the light of glory were natural equipment in some creature, seeing God *per essentiam* would be natural activity to that creature, though supernatural to one lacking it as natural equipment, like man. The objection had to be met, then, and here is how Aquinas saw fit to do so.

> *ad* (3): a disposition to the form of fire cannot be natural to anything but what has the form of fire. So, too, the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless it, the creature, has the divine nature — which is impossible. For by this light a rational creature is made deiform, as was just said.[35]

The reader may reasonably feel that that this answer needs some unpacking. That was Cajetan's feeling, too. So he chose to comment on it at length.

> *xi.* In the answer to the third objection, a very subtle teaching is being given. So pay attention to two topics: (1) what it means for N to **be** nature-set *[con-naturalis]* for *x* and what it means for N to **become** nature-set for *x;* (2) what the relation *[proportio]* is between the light of glory and the divine substance.
>
> [As to topic (1):] 'N **is** nature-set for *x*' means that N originates or spreads from sources intrinsic to *x*'s nature.[36] One reads as much in *Physics II*, and one sees examples in the movements of the elements.[37] But 'N **becomes** nature-set for *x*' means that what does not flow from the sources belonging to *x* comes to flow from sources belonging to *x*. This cannot be imagined in any way, unless [one thing's] nature is transferred to [another thing's] nature. Only thus can sources from which N flows be made sources belonging to *x*, from

[35] Ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae: quod est impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis, ut dictum est. (Leonine IV, p. 123.)

[36] 'Intrinsic' was not a vague term in Cajetan's vocabulary. It had a precise, technical meaning. What was intrinsic to *x* was not just "inside" *x* (as opposed to outside it, in something else) but was something entering into the essence or definition of *x* (or following with formal necessity from its defining traits). Thus a thing's genus and specific difference (and in a material thing, its matter) were intrinsic to it, together with whatever flowed with formal necessity from these. But existence was not intrinsic to any created thing. For even though calling it "a being" was *per se* predication (*contra* Avicenna), and even though the act of being was *magis intimum*, the most "interior act" within it, existence was neither part of its essence nor an entailment of its definition. See *Posterior Analytics II* c. 7 (92b8-11); Aquinas on *Metaphysics IV, lectio* 2; 1 *ST* q. 4, a. 1 *ad* 3; q. 8, a. 1; Cajetan, *In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria*, ed. M.-H. Laurent, O.P. (Turin: Marietti, 1934), p. 28.

[37] The reference is to *Physics II*, c. 1; 192b12-35, on which we read Aquinas's commentary above.

whom N does not flow.[38]

Before going on to topic (2), let us pause to understand this comment on topic (1). Cajetan divided the talk of connaturality into two sorts — the timeless talk of what is or is not *connaturale* to a thing *x* and the dynamic talk of what becomes so — because Aquinas used the word *'natura'* in a way that made the derived word *'connaturale'* applicable when used timelessly, inapplicable when used dynamically. Perhaps the best way to explain the matter is as follows.

What is nature-set for a thing *x* is no more immutable than the nature of *x*. How immutable, then, was a thing's nature understood to be? That depended on whether the word 'nature' was being used in the popular way, to mean what the thing was born with (birth-endowment, "nature" *vs.* nurture), or whether it was being used in the Aristotelian-scientific way, to mean the thing's essence (the defining traits of its kind).[39]

Nature as birth-endowment (for short, nature_b) was not entirely immutable. One could say that Adam had a different nature_b from his fallen descendents, because their nature_b was a mere wreckage of Adam's.[40] It was possible for a human being to live through a change of his nature_b ,

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[38] XI. In responsione ad tertium, quoniam subtilis valde doctrina traditur, adverte duo. *Primo,* quid est tam esse quam fieri connaturale alicui. *Secundo,* quae sit proportio inter lumen gloriae et divinam substantiam.

Esse connaturale est oriri, seu pullulare, ex intrinsecis illius naturae; ut ex *II Physic.* patet, et in motu elementorum apparet. *Fieri* vero *connaturale* est fieri quod id quod non fluit ex principiis alicuius, fluat ex principiis eius. Hoc autem imaginari nullo modo potest, nisi natura transferatur in naturam: sic enim solummodo principia a quibus aliquid fluit, effici possunt principia eius a quo non fluit. (Leonine IV, p. 125.)

[39] Aristotle was aware of this double use, and so was Aquinas. In 3 *ST* q. 2, a. 12 he wrote: ". . . secundum Philosophum in *V Metaph.,* text. 7, natura uno modo dicitur ipsa nativitas, alio modo essentia rei. Unde naturale potest aliquid dici dupliciter: uno modo quod est tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, sicut igni naturale est sursum ferri; alio modo dicitur esse homini naturale quod ab ipsa nativitate habet . . ." Cf. 3 *ST* q. 34, a. 3 *ad* 2; *In II Sent.* d. 19, a. 4.

[40] This conception was central to Baius's contention that righteousness had been natural to Adam but was a matter of grace to us. Baius insisted that birth-endowment was the sole correct concept of nature. This source of the conflict between him and the Holy See (where essence was the accepted concept) has been well highlighted by M.-R. Gagnebet, "L'Enseignement du magistère et le problème du surnaturel," *Revue thomiste* 51 (1951), 5-27, especially pp. 12-16.

because one could say that Adam's descendents acquired a new nature_b at baptism, which was a new birth; thus acts like loving God and seeing God, which were not *connaturales* to them as children of wrath *become connaturales* to them as children of light. In other words, so long as *'natura'* meant nature_b, *'connaturale'* was meaningful in both timeless and dynamic talk (it meant 'arises from the thing's nature_b'), and in the dynamic talk the nature_b was looked at as changing.

Matters were quite different when one entered Aristotelian science (as Aquinas did) and used *'natura'* to mean essence (for short, nature_e).[41] Adam had just the same essence as his descendents (otherwise he and we would belong to different species). It is impossible for an individual to live through the loss of his essence or the acquisition of a new one.[42] So one could not say that we acquire a new nature_e at baptism. In short, nature_e could not be looked at as changing. So when 'N is *connaturale* to *x*' meant that N arises from *x*'s essence (as it did for Aquinas), 'N **becomes** *connaturale* to *x*' could not mean that N didn't used to arise from *x*'s essence but now does. (That would require *x*'s essence to change.) It could only mean the unimaginable state of affairs that something else's essence was being transferred to *x*'s essence. The situation could not just be that the individual *x* was receiving from another nature_e (not its own) a source from which N would flow (which is what really happens in cases of supernatural endowment), *because*

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[41] Natura cuiuscumque rei est essentia eius: 1 *ST* q. 60, a. 1. This *natura* was what was natural to us *all*, not what is natural to an individual. For the distinction, see 2/1 *ST* q. 51, a. 1. Man's common nature abstracted from all possible modifications because it included only what belonged in the definition of the species: 1 *ST* q. 3, a. 3.

The abstraction did not leave out, however, the fact that man is open to malfunction and thus vulnerable to failure even with respect to traits or accomplishments which man is nature-set or naturally inclined to have. For all possible humans can fail to notice, fail to understand, fail to choose wisely, fail to act justly, etc. This is what Aquinas meant by "natura humana mutabilis est" (2/2 *ST* q. 57, a. 2 *ad* 1), as the context of that remark makes evident. He did not mean that human nature changes historically, so as to have one content in ancient man and another content in modern man, as the historicists, along with certain existentialists and proponents of the proportionalist "ethic" have tried to make out; he meant that man is essentially fallible.

[42] Unless one takes the individual to be an essence-less "self," as in Hindu metempsychosis.

that would not make the source connaturale to x. No, *x* would have to be receiving that source in such a way as to make it *x*'s own nature$_e$.

So, to return to the answer *ad* (3): to say that the vision of God **becomes** connatural to a creature would mean that this creature was receiving by transfer and as its own essence the principle in God's essence from which the Vision of Him flows. This would posit a kind of creature whose created essence contained the divine essence, which is impossible.[43] If that much is now clear, we can proceed to the other topic.

> [As to topic (2):] The relation between the light of glory and the divine essence (not in its natural being but in intensional being) is the proportion of a connatural distinctive trait to the nature from which it flows. This is proved from points already said as follows. The light of glory is nothing other than a strength *[vis],* taken as a distinctive disposition, to unite [to the intellect] the divine essence (taken as an intensional form) and to bring about the divine Vision; these are the purposes for which the light of glory is posited, as is obvious from what has been said. But to possess the divine essence as an intensional form and likewise to see God are connatural to God alone. Therefore the light of glory is connatural to the divine nature alone. And hence it follows that the divine essence and the light of glory belong to the same order, in the same way that [for any form *F]* an ultimate disposition to *F* and *F* itself belong to the same order,[44] *i.e.* each is connatural to the other, because if the one is natural to something, so is the other; and if one of them is not natural to something, neither are. This is why the text of the article says that the light of glory cannot be connatural to anything, unless that thing be transferred into the divine nature.
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> *xii.* From these points, one comes to see the falsehood of the opinion that Scotus advanced (in q. 1 of his prologue to *I Sent.*), to the effect that 'natural' and 'supernatural' do not divide *things* but *relations to agent causes.* The light of glory, charity, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and anything else of this kind — these things are all supernatural *entities.* They are not just supernatural because they can only be caused by an agent acting [outside the course of nature, *i.e.*] supernaturally; rather, they are supernatural because they cannot be connatural to any creature that has been or could have been made. This is

[43] It is impossible, of course, because God's indivisible essence is to "be" precisely what no creature can be, infinite in act as self-subsisting Existence. Cf. 1 *ST* q. 7, a. 2 *ad* 1.

[44] Two items are "of the same order" with respect to a relation *R,* when they bear that relation to one another on the same basis. There is an interesting explanation in section *xvi* of Cajetan's commentary on 1 *ST* q. 13, a. 7. Here the relation is 'connatural to'. If the disposition *D* is connatural to the form *F,* then conversely *F* is connatural to *D,* and the relation of each to the other is based on (explained by) the same factor: the nature from which *F* flows.

> why they are called entities "of the supernatural order" — indeed, "of the divine order."[45]

At this point, Cajetan has not only finished unpacking Aquinas's answer *ad* 3 but has also shown the incompatibility of that answer with an important contention of Scotus's. For if grace, charity, the light of glory, etc., flow from the divine nature alone, and this entails that no possible creature could have them as flowing from its own created nature, then grace, charity, etc., must be supernatural in themselves; and in that case, when they are received in a creature, they must stand to the potency receiving them as **supernatural acts *vis-à-vis* that potency**. And in that case, supernaturality does arise in the direct comparison of a potency to its act. This is the main point of interest, for the present study, in this section.

Yet it would be unwise to leave the important text we are now examining without seeing the two objections that Cajetan posed to his own position as just stated.

> And if an objection is made to all this, based on the infinite distance between God and the light of glory — or based on the claim that what is light-of-glory by its essence is one topic, and what is light-of-glory by participation is another, and so even if the former is unique to God, the latter is not, but only the latter (the light by participation) is under discussion here — one can answer it quite easily. Thus:
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> • The "infinite distance" implies nothing except the fact that, between God and any created light of glory, there are infinitely many degrees. There is maximal "distance," after all, between a proper disposition and a substantial form — far more "distance" than there is between any two substances — and

[45] *Proportio inter lumen gloriae et divinam essentiam*, non in esse naturae, sed in esse intelligibili, est proportio proprii connaturalis ad naturam a qua fluit. Quod sic ex dictis probatur. Lumen gloriae nihil aliud est quam vis, ut propria dispositio, unitiva divinae essentiae ut formae intelligibilis, atque factiva visionis divinae: ad haec enim duo lumen gloriae poni, patet ex dictis. Sed habere divinam essentiam ut formam intelligibilem, et similiter videre Deum, soli Deo est connaturale. Ergo lumen gloriae soli divinae naturae connaturale est. Et hinc sequitur divinam essentiam et lumen gloriae esse eiusdem ordinis, eo modo quo dispositio ultima et forma sunt eiusdem ordinis, scilicet quoad connaturalitatem: quia scilicet cuicumque naturale est unum, et reliquum, et cui non unum, neutrum. Et propterea in littera dicitur quod lumen gloriae non potest esse connaturale alicui, nisi illa res transferretur in divinam naturam.

XII. Ex his autem patet falsitas opinionis Scoti, in 1 quaest. prol. Primi *Sent.*, volentis quod naturale et supernaturale non distinguant res, sed habitudines ad causas activas. Lumen siquidem gloriae, et caritas, et dona Spiritus Sancti, et si qua sunt huiusmodi, omnia sunt supernaturalia entia, non solum quia a solo agente supernaturali causari possunt; sed quia nulli creaturae factae aut factibili connaturalia esse possunt; propter quod dicuntur entia supernaturalis, imo divini ordinis.

yet the form and the disposition to it belong to the same order as regards being connatural [to one another], while the two substances are not, even if they match better in nature (they could even be of the same species, like Socrates and Plato), *etc.* More or less "distance" is therefore irrelevant. And so "infinite distance" is irrelevant.[46]

• And we are not deceived [as to the difference between that which is by essence the light of glory and that which is such by participation], as the other objection alleges. For **just as** the whole range of "seeing God's essence" is connatural for God alone, but different degrees within the range are connatural for Him alone in different ways — *at its highest degree*, seeing God's essence is connatural for God alone in a way that is incommunicable to any being outside God; *short of the highest*, it is connatural for Him in such a way as to be communicable to infinitely many extents, more and less — **so it is also** with the whole range of light-of-glory, the whole range of charity, *etc.* Likewise the whole range of "having the divine essence as one's intensional form" is connatural for God alone, but incommunicably so at its highest degree while, at any limited degree, it is communicated to another without becoming connatural for that other. In much the same way, if being lighted is taken as a quality unique to the sun, then the whole range of "being lighted" is connatural for the sun alone, incommunicably so at light's highest degree, but communicably so at any degree short of the highest — not so as to become connatural for other things, because light does not come to be theirs as flowing from them (assuming the stars are assigned a nature foreign to the sun's), but so as to be theirs from diffusion of sunlight.[47,48]

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[46] The "distance" in question is metaphysical distance, which is extent of diversity in genus. Since no genus appears in more than one category, items in different categories share no common genus at all and hence are maximally "distant." Since any two substances share at least the genus substance, a substance (or its form) is inevitably more "distant" from an accident (or its form) than any two substances (or their forms) are from each other. Cajetan's point is that such maximum metaphysical "distance" poses no obstacle to things' being ordered to one another by their nature, as an accident *A* that terminally disposes its subject to the substantial form *S* is ordered by its very nature to *S*, and as *S* is required by its very nature to have *A* as its preparation. Thus metaphysical distance is irrelevant to the intimacy of nature-set correlations.

[47] The obsolete astronomy is simply providing a comparison. The medievals did not know to what extent the sun and the fixed stars were similar in nature. They identified light with the quality of being-lighted, which they knew to be accidental to the air, the moon, *etc.*, but which flowed distinctively, they thought, from the very essence of the sun. On that view, anything else's being lighted would be its having a trait *nature-set* for the sun alone, and anything else's being lighted would be its having to a lesser degree a trait whose highest degree could be found in the sun alone. Hence the present comparison. If one seeks to replace it with something still tenable in science, one might appeal to radioactivity. It is nature-set only for a handful of naturally occurring elements, and anything else found to be radioactive has (to lesser degree) a trait nature-set for them alone.

[48] XIII. Et si contra hoc obiiciatur de distantia infinita inter Deum et lumen gloriae; aut quod aliud est loqui de lumine gloriae per essentiam, et aliud de eo per participationem; et quod, licet lumen gloriae per essentiam sit proprium Deo, non tamen per participationem, de quo tamen loquimur: facile responderi potest, quod distantia infinita nihil aliud infert, nisi quod inter quodcumque lumen gloriae creatum et Deum sunt infiniti medii gradus. Inter dispositionem namque propriam et formam substantialem est maxima dis-

This last is helpful in showing how Cajetan kept the communicability issue straight from the connaturality issue. The highest mode of seeing God, comprehension, is incommunicable to any creature. Any lesser mode of seeing Him, apprehension, is communicable to some (real or possible) intellectual creature. But no mode of seeing Him is connatural to any creature.

Now it should be obvious that, if act-states connatural to God alone are supernatural in themselves and to any created potency receiving them, and the Vision of God's essence is connatural to Him alone, then the Vision of God is supernatural in itself and to the human intellect receiving it. In that case, it would seem correct to say that the Vision is the supernatural "last end" of man. Yet this inference has been disputed. Some have wished to say that the Vision of God, supernatural as it must be in itself, is the natural end of man. For man's very nature is such that he can have no complete fulfillment but a supernatural state. Hence such a state is his "natural" end.

As we saw in his commentary on 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8, Cajetan admitted a sense of 'natural' in which he would agree with this. It was a sense proper to the language of *sacra doctrina*, the science in which we know what man was made for. Man was made to see God, and so that seeing is what he naturally has as his end. It is man's natural end *in the SD sense of 'natural'*.[49]

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tantia, et longe major quam inter duas substantias; et tamen illae sunt eiusdem ordinis quoad connaturalitatem, et istae non; quamvis istae magis conveniant in natura, quia forte sunt eiusdem speciei, ut Socrates et Plato, etc. Major ergo vel minor distantia nihil facit ad propositum. Igitur non infinita. — Nec decipimur, ut secunda objectio proponit. Quoniam, sicut tota latitudo visionis divinae essentiae soli Deo est connaturalis; diversimode tamen, quia *in summo* incommunicabiliter ad extra, *citra summum* vero communicabiliter plus et minus, in infinitum: sic tota latitudo luminis gloriae et caritatis, etc., similiter tota latitudo habendi divinam essentiam ut formam intelligibilem, soli Deo est connaturalis; sed *in summo* incommunicabiliter, *limitate* autem communicatur, non tamen connaturale fit, alteri. Sicut si lux acceptetur propria qualitas solis, tota latitudo lucis est connaturalis soli tantum; sed in summo incommunicabiliter, citra summum vero communicabilis; non ita ut sit connaturale aliis, quia non ut fluat ab illis (si astra ponantur extraneae naturae a solis natura), sed ut sit eorum ex diffusione a luce solari. (Leonine IV, p. 125.)

[49] We can now see Cajetan's two considerations of humankind in another light. If one is speaking the SD language *and no other*, then, indeed, one cannot put man's nature into one consideration and his God-ordained happiness into another. For man's SD "nature" is just precisely what God made him to be and do, and that was to see His face. The nature and the end are catechetically inseparable. But if one is speaking two languages, one of sacred doctrine and one of natural science, there have to be two considerations, because God's revealed purpose for humanity is not discovered in natural science and cannot be de-

But Cajetan did not speak the SD idiom alone. He thought that *sacra doctrina* was open to receive the language of natural science and to profit from it, so long as one kept the NS sense of 'natural' straight from the SD sense. He thought he saw Aquinas doing exactly that throughout his works. In order to use NS language on the very topic of *our* nature-and-end within *sacra doctrina,* Aquinas first of all avoided ever calling the Vision or eternal life our natural end. To do so would be too confusing. The second thing he did was to bifurcate the talk of man's last end. He would describe the philosophers' contemplation in NS language as "the end to which we are proportioned *secundum naturam*" (*i.e.* 6∀ϑ NβΦ4<), while describing eternal life as the end that exceeds the proportion of our nature (*De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2, as we saw in Chapter One; q. 14, a. 2; 1 *ST* q. 23, a. 1); or he would describe the one as *proportionatus humanae facultati* and describe the other as exceeding *facultatem naturae* (*In II Sent.* d. 41, a. 1, a. 1); or he would describe the one end as *connaturalis,* and the other as *altior* (2/1 *ST* q. 109, a. 5 *ad* 3). But he would also describe eternal life as man's *bonum supernaturale* (*De Veritate* q. 27, a. 1 *corpus* and *ad* 11), and that was Cajetan's ticket to do the same.

But other medieval masters, especially Scotus, sought to assimilate the NS language along other lines. And later interpreters of Aquinas, less careful (I shall argue) of the two-languages problem, have seized upon the *desiderium naturae* as though it were the decisive clue to how to speak about man's end. Their thought has been: if we have a natural desire to see what God is, then the Vision is natural to us *qua* end.

We shall see Cajetan's response to Scotus (and, by implication, to these later Thomists) in his commentary on the first article in the *Prima Pars.* By way of background to that text, we need to look at what Aquinas said about the "hiddenness" of our higher end, *i.e.* its invisibilty to natural science.

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scribed as "natural to us" in the sense of 'natural' that such science uses.

C. The hidden end in Aquinas' texts

Early in his teaching career, when he commented on the Second Book of the *Sentences*, Aquinas confronted the question whether fulfillment is the end which all upright wills desire in common.[50] Among the objections he faced, the second ran as follows:

> Nothing can be an end which is not desired, and a thing which is hidden cannot be desired. Therefore, since fulfillment is hidden — as Isaiah 64:4 says, "The eye doth not see, O God, apart from thee, what thou hast prepared for them that wait upon thee" — it seems that fulfillment cannot be the end of upright wills.[51]

Here was his reply:

> In reply to the second, one should say that although fulfillment is hidden as to its substance, nevertheless a definition of fulfillment *[ratio beatitudinis]* is known. For all men understand by fulfillment some most perfect state. But where that most perfect state may lie *[in quo consistat]*, whether in this life or afterwards, whether in bodily goods or spiritual ones, and in which spiritual ones, is hidden.[52]

Notice first what the reply conceded. To be "an end" is to be desired in the conscious sense of being willed, intended; and hence an end must be known. This was the objector's starting point, and Aquinas did not challenge it. Notice second what the reply distinguished. Using the term *'substantia'* to contrast with *'ratio'*, the reply distinguished the delivery of fulfillment (the extra-propositional realization of happiness) from a correct definition of the words for fulfillment. The reply then affirmed that the latter is known to all, even though the former is hidden.

Notice, then, thirdly, how radical this reply is. Aquinas did not try to meet the objection by

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[50] *In II Sent.* d. 38, a. 2.

[51] Praeterea, nihil potest esse finis quod non est desideratum, nec potest aliquid desideratum esse quod occultum est. Cum igitur beatitudo occulta est, quia Isaiae LXIV, 4, dicitur: *Oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te, quae praeparasti expectantibus te,* videtur quod beatitudo non possit esse finis rectarum voluntatum. *Opera Omnia,* vol 8 (Paris: Vivès, 1873), p. 506.

[52] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis beatitudo sit occulta quantum ad substantiam, tamen ratio beatitudinis nota est; omnes enim per beatitudinem intelligunt quemdam perfectissimum statum: sed in quo consistat ille status perfectus, utrum in vita, vel post vitam, vel in bonis corporalibus vel spiritualibus, et in quibus spiritualibus, occultum est. (*Ibid.,* p. 507.)

softening the hiddenness of the *substantia*. He did not appeal to implicit knowledge, for example. He did not use the idea that the substance or realization of fulfillment, though unknown in explicit terms, is known implicitly in our common knowledge of something else (say, in our common knowledge of the *ratio* of fulfillment) and so is "implicitly desired" somehow or other.[53] He did not claim that implicit knowledge of a goal suffices for it to be desired as one's end.

In the *Summa contra Gentiles* Aquinas divided the truths which Catholics profess about God into two over-all kinds: those which lie beyond what human reason can prove (such as that God is triune) and those which natural reason can prove (such as that God exists and is one).[54] He added that the truths of the latter kind had been proved by the philosophers in a demonstrative way.[55] Next, after arguing that the demonstrated matters were also appropriate objects for God to reveal, because not everybody understood the demonstrations,[56] Aquinas turned back to the truths which lie beyond what reason can prove. He gave several reasons why some such matters were appropriate objects for God to reveal and were also needed information among human beings. The first of his reasons went as follows.

> No one moves towards anything with longing and energetic effort unless it is already known. Therefore, because men are ordered by divine providence to a higher good than frail humanity can experience in this life . . . it was necessary that man's mind be summoned up to something higher than our reason can reach in this life, so that man might thereby learn to long for and move with energy towards something which lies beyond the whole condition of the present life.[57]

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[53] Cf. 1 *ST* q. 2, a. 1 *ad* 1.

[54] 1 *CG* c. 3.

[55] *Ibid*.

[56] 1 *CG* c. 4.

[57] 1 *CG* c. 5: Nullus enim desiderio et studio in aliquid tendit, nisi sit praecognitum. Quia ergo ad altius bonum quam experiri in praesenti vita possit humana fragilitas homines per divinam providentiam ordinantur, ut in sequentibus investigabitur, opportuit mentem evocari in aliquid altius quam ratio nostra in praesenti possit pertingere, ut sic disceret aliquid desiderare et studio tendere in aliquid quod totum statum praesentis vitae excedit. *Opera Omnia* vol. 12 (Paris: Vivès, 1874), p. 6.

Notice that this higher and other-worldly good was presented here as an end of Providence, not an end of nature. It emerged in the subsequent chapters of *CG* that this end was a direct Vision of God.[58] This Vision, then, is something one should *learn* to desire *(disceret desiderare)*, not something one automatically or spontaneously desires.

But did Aquinas think that we learn to seek it *naturally*, by the progress of philosophy making more and better demonstrations? The negative answer is given near the end of 3 *CG* c. 63, where Aquinas contrasted the direct Vision with what the philosophers could learn:

> Nothing in this life is more similar to this perfect and ultimate happiness [the Vision] than the career of those who contemplate truth in the manner possible in this life. Hence the philosophers, who were not able to have a full knowledge of the ultimate happiness, located man's ultimate happiness in the contemplation which is possible in this life (*Ethics X*, c. 8).[59]

As the reference to Aristotle makes clear, the "philosophers" in question were those who did the best that could be done, in Aquinas' opinion, with the natural light of reason. They were not able to prove in a demonstrative way what our ultimate realization of happiness was to be. They could conclude only to a this-worldly likeness of it. They could reason, in other words, from the very nature of our rational powers, to what our flourishing and our most perfect operation would be, but they could not deduce either (a) whether there existed a state or manner in which these were complete, or (b) what the nature of such a state or manner might be.

This is why Aquinas began his second *Summa*, the *Summa Theologiae*, by asking whether people needed to know something beyond what the natural sciences and philosophical disciplines could tell them. He answered in the affirmative for two reasons, the first of which concerns us.

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[58] 3 *CG* cc. 51-63.

[59] Huius autem perfectae et ultimae felicitatis in hac vita nihil est adeo simile sicut vita contemplantium veritatem secundum quod est possibile in hac vita. Et ideo philosophi, qui de illa felicitate ultima plenam notitiam habere non potuerunt, in contemplatione quae est possibilis in hac vita ultimam felicitatem hominis posuerunt (*Ethica X*, c. 8). *Opera Omnia*, vol. 12 (Paris: Vivès, 1874) p. 332. The Aristotle reference is to book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1178a20-1178b30.

> The first reason for this is because man is ordered to God as to an end beyond our rational comprehension, as it says in Isaiah 64: "the eye doth not see, O God, apart from thee, what thou hast prepared for them that love thee." An end has to be understood in advance by the people who are supposed to direct their intentions and actions towards reaching it. Hence it was necessary for man's salvation that certain points going beyond human reason should be made known to mankind by divine revelation.[60]

In this second *Summa*, too, then, Aquinas said that the revealed Vision, towards which people must bend their efforts consciously and energetically if they are to be saved, lies beyond what they can know by philosophical inquiry.

Let us be clear as to what exactly Aquinas has said was beyond reason's grasp. It was the very existence of any such vision, not just how to reach it. If one wonders how that can be so, given the *philosophical case* that man has a natural desire to know what the First Cause is, so that knowing this must be possible, an answer emerged from Cajetan in Chapter Three: the case **proves** that what the First Cause is can be known somehow by some intellect; it does **not prove** that it can be known by ours. *A fortiori*, it does not prove that knowing the First Cause *per essentiam* is an end we have been called to reach. This answer may or may not be correct, but at least it is fully compatible with the direct evidence Aquinas provided. The direct evidence is what Aquinas himself said could **not** be demonstrated. According to both his explicit texts, *In II Sent.* d. 38, a. 2, and 3 *CG* c. 63, it could not be demonstrated whether our *beatitudo* was to be realized in the conditions of this life or in conditions beyond this life. According to the text from *In II Sent.*, it could not be demonstrated whether our happiness was to be delivered in a bodily state (in which bodily goods would be at least among the basic ones delivered) or in a spiritual state (in which spiritual goods would be the basic and perhaps the only ones delivered). We have direct textual evidence, therefore, that Aquinas considered his own arguments about human fulfillment

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[60] 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1: Primo quidem, quia homo ordinatur ad Deum sicut ad quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit, secundum illud Isaiae LXIV: oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus te. Finem autem oportet esse praecognitum hominibus, qui suas intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem. Unde necessarium fuit homini ad salutem, quod ei nota fierent quaedam per revelationem divinam, quae rationem humanam excedunt. (Leonine IV, p. 6.)

and intellectual desire to be either theological arguments (as Cajetan thought) or philosophical arguments of the non-demonstrative, dialectical kind. Apart from revelation, they would not serve to bring our relation to the Vision of God out of its hiding.

D. Cajetan's explanation of the hiddenness in his commentary on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1.

With that point clear, we turn to the relevant portion of Cajetan's commentary on the first article in the *Prima Pars.* It concerns a difference with Scotus over why — not whether, but why — this end is so hidden as to need revealing.

> *vii.* As to this part of the article, Scotus (Prologue to *I Sent.*, q. 1) does not disagree with its conclusion [that revelation is needed for us to reach our end], nor with the reason given for it [because the end is otherwise unknown to us]; he disagrees only with our explanation of why the end in question is naturally hidden to man. For we Thomists take that end to be naturally hidden to us because it is an end supernatural to our soul, so that no matter how perfectly the nature of our soul became known to us in its natural aspects, we would still not know an account *[ratio]* of our soul whereby it would be ordered to such an end; both the end itself and that way of knowing our soul fall outside the scope of natural things.[61] But Scotus takes the end in question to be *natural* to our soul (though he admits it can only be reached supernaturally), and yet he says that this end is *naturally unknown* to us, because our soul itself, in that distinctive and special account whereby it is ordered to this end, is not naturally known to us, at least in our present state.[62]

For Thomists and Scotists alike, there were two tests for naturalness as opposed to supernaturality. One was an ontological test: the natural belonged to some creature, while the supernatural belonged to God alone. The other was an epistemological test: the natural was known in some

[61] Given Aquinas' claim that the Vision of God stands to our intellect as the form of a stool stands to wood, it is obvious why knowledge of the Vision would not emerge in a natural science of our soul. A knowledge of furniture-forms does not emerge in the chemical study of wood, nor in the botany of trees.

[62] VII. Circa hanc partem, est advertendum quod Scotus, in I qu. Prologi *Primi Sententiarum*, nec a conclusione nec a ratione discordat: sed a causa quare finis ille est nobis naturaliter occultus. Nos enim dicimus quod ideo finis ille est nobis naturaliter occultus, quia est supernaturalis finis animae nostrae; et propterea, quantumcumque perfecte nota esset nobis natura nostrae animae quoad naturalia, numquam cognosceretur sub ratione qua ordinatur in talem finem; quia extra naturalium latitudinem est tam finis quam illa animae ratio. Ipse vero tenet illum finem esse naturalem nostrae animae, quamvis supernaturaliter adipiscendum. Et tamen esse naturaliter incognitum: quia anima nostra non nobis naturaliter est nota, saltem pro statu isto, sub illa propria et speciali ratione, qua ordinatur ad illum finem. (Leonine IV, p. 7.)

natural *scientia,* while the supernatural was knowable by revelation alone. For Thomism, as Cajetan understood it, the two tests were equivalent, whether applied to ends, inclinations, potencies, or acts, because whatever was nature-set for some creature was known in some natural *scientia.*[63] Hence Cajetan could use the epistemological test — whether the Vision is naturally discoverable — in determining whether the Vision is natural to man. An end known only from revelation was, *eo ipso,* not natural to man but supernatural (except, of course, in the special SD sense of 'natural', which did not contrast with 'supernatural'). In Scotism, the two tests were not equivalent in all applications, the epistemological test was not so widely usable, and a different criterion for calling ends, potencies, *etc.*, natural was introduced. The main lines of the Scotist criterion are about to be explained in the next paragraph of Cajetan's commentary.

> *viii.* To justify taking the end in question as natural, Scotus argues in three ways. First, from the authority of St. Augustine (writing in *De praedestinatione sanctorum* [c. 5]): "the potential to have the faith (like the potential to have charity) belongs **to the nature** of human beings; but actually having it belongs to the grace of believers."
>
> Second, he argues from inclination: towards the end that you call supernatural, he says, man inclines naturally; hence it is natural to him.
>
> Third, he argues from the basis for calling potencies "natural." When a potency is compared to the very act it receives, Scotus affirms (a) that it is either a natural potency to that act, a forced one, or a neutral one, and he denies (b) that there is any room to speak of its being supernatural to that act. From these two points, he concludes that the intellect or soul is naturally ordered to the Vision or enjoyment of God. To establish point (a), he says that a potency is either inclined to such-and-such an act or else inclined away from it, or else stands neutrally towards it; in the first case, the potency is a natural potency to that act; in the second case, forced; in the third case, neutral. To establish point (b), he says the difference between naturalness and supernaturalness arises only when a potency is compared to the agent-cause which communicates the act to the potency [and in so doing communicates] either naturally or supernaturally; but when the potency is compared directly to the act itself, there is no supernaturalness.[64]

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[63] Whatever was nature-set for a creature above man would be known in an angel's natural knowledge; what was nature-set for man or a creature below him could be known in a human theoretical science.

[64] VIII. Quod autem finis ille sit naturalis, probat tripliciter. Primo auctoritate Augustini (in libro *de Praesdestinatione Sanctorum):* Proinde posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum; habere autem gratiae est fidelium. — Secundo ex appetitu. Homo naturaliter appetit illum finem quem dicis supernaturalem: ergo est ei naturalis. — Tertio ex ratione naturalitatis. Potentia, compar-

This point (b), of course, is the same contention Scotus advanced in the quarrel over the *lumen gloriae*. Cajetan concluded his summary of Scotus' third argument thus.

> To justify drawing the conclusion that therefore man's soul is "naturally" ordered to the enjoyment of God, Scotus argues from the fact that the soul is inclined to its every perfection, and especially to its highest perfection, which is just what the act of enjoying God is, etc.[65]

In sum, Scotus' three arguments worked together like this. The soul is naturally inclined to whatever perfects it. The Vision of God perfects the soul. So the soul is naturally inclined to that Vision. But whenever a potency *inclines* to an act, it is a natural potency to that act.[66] So our soul is in natural potency to the Vision of God. This is why Augustine said that our *posse* to have Christian faith, *etc.*, belongs to our nature.

When one sees the whole scope of Scotus' argument, it becomes clear that, in calling the Vision our natural end, Scotus was not arguing as a mere theological conservative, insisting on the special SD usage of 'natural' to the exclusion of any other. He, too, proposed to speak the NS language of Aristotle, but he proposed to speak it differently. He proposed to *extend* Aristotle's usage of 'natural' to cover revealed cases by giving a new account of the NS term 'natural potency'.

In the next two sections of his commentary, Cajetan offered his response to Scotus' proposal. In section *ix* he gave a positive overview of the Thomist position as he understood it: how Thomists classify potencies and compare them to supernatural activations like the Vision. Then

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ata ad actum, aut est naturalis, aut violenta, aut neutra; nec est ibi aliqua supernaturalitas: ergo intellectus, seu anima, naturaliter ordinatur ad visionem Dei, seu fruitionem. Antecedens quoad partem affirmativam, declaratur: quia potentia aut inclinatur ad talem actum, aut repugnat tali actui, aut neutraliter se habet: si primo modo, est naturalis; si secundo, violenta; si tertio, neutra. Quoad partem vero negativam, declaratur. Differentia naturalitatis a supernaturalitate attenditur penes comparationem potentiae ad agens naturaliter vel suprnaturaliter impressivum in talem potentiam: igitur comparando potentiam ad actum, nulla est supernaturalitas. (Leonine IV, p. 8.)

[65] Consequentia vero probatur ex eo quod anima inclinatur in omnem suam, et praecipue summam perfectionem, qualis est actus fruitionis Dei, etc. (Leonine IV, p. 8.)

[66] This is the premise that requires all of the elaborate theory about how potencies are classified.

in section *x* he rebutted Scotus, dealing first with his appeal to the authority of St. Augustine and then responding summarily to his other two arguments, drawn from reason. The positive overview went as follows.

> *ix.* To clear up this muddle, the reader should be aware that, for Thomists, a potency is either natural, forced, or *obediential*, no matter whether it is compared to its act or to the agent communicating the act; and in the world of nature, at least (setting aside artificial things), there is no "neutral potency." This will be taken up in a separate discussion *On Neutral Potency*, to be raised in connection with this article.[67] 'Obediential potency' is the term applied to a thing's openness to have done in it whatever God ordains to be done. It is according to this kind of potency that our soul is said

[67] Cajetan was promising his readers a forthcoming supplement. He made good by publishing in 1511 the *De Potentia Neutra.* It discussed (1) whether in natural things there is found a neutral potency, and (2) whether a potency receptive to supernatural acts is a natural potency to those acts. The whole of this *opusculum* will be studied below.

> to be in "potency" to the happiness God has promised, in "potency" to our supernatural end, and to other such things.[68, 69]

Next came the rebuttal.

> *x.* So to answer Scotus' first line of argument: Augustine did not say that man's potency to have the faith is *natural potency* but that it *belongs to the nature* of human beings. For it is one thing for a potency to belong to our nature, and it is quite another for it to be a natural potency. The former expresses where the potency *resides*, while the latter expresses its *mode*. And so the former is true in this case, while the latter is false. The obediential potency to faith and charity does reside "in the nature" of human beings, since ours is an intellective nature, and does not reside in the nature of lions, since it conflicts with their nature. And this is what Augustine had in mind.[70]

Let us pause to savor this bit of the rebuttal, because it brings up the distinction between the residence-natural and the mode-and-residence natural which emerged in the last chapter. I illustrated this difference with a somewhat complex example about dogs and pack-leaders in the last chapter. Now it will be useful to illustrate the difference with a simpler example that also illustrates "forced potency." Some diseases are caught by persons of one race only, like sickle-

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[68] This is a fair summary of *CT* c. 104, as we saw above, except that Aquinas did not use the label 'obediential' in that context. He spoke of our potency to the Vision as "otherwise" than natural, *i.e.* non-natural. But that is the main point at issue here with Scotus — whether our potency to the Vision is natural or non-natural. For Aquinas' definition of obediential potency, see the Disputed Questions *de Potentia Dei* q. 6, a. 1 *ad* 18; *In III Sent.* d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qua. 2, *ad* 2 and *ad* 3. In Peter of Bergamo's *Tabula Aurea*, the following texts are selected as worth consulting on the topic of obediential potency: 1 *ST* 115, 2 *ad* 4; 3 *ST* 1, 3 *ad* 3; 3 *ST* 11, 1; *In I Sent.* d. 42, q. 2, a. 2 *ad* 4; *In II Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, a. 2; a. 3 *ad* 2; d. 18, q. 1, a. 2; *In III Sent.* d. 1, q. 1, a. 3 *ad* 4; d. 2, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, a. 2, qua. 3 *ad* 3; d. 3, q. 2, a. 1 *ad* 1; *In IV Sent.* d. 8, q. 2, a. 3 *ad* 4; *De Veritate* q. 8, a. 4 *ad* 13; a. 12 *ad* 4; q. 12, a. 3 *ad* 18; q. 29, a. 3 *ad* 3; *De Potentia Dei* q. 1, a. 3 *ad* 1; q. 6, a. 1 *ad* 18; *De Virtutibus* q. 1, a. 10 *ad* 13.

[69] IX. Ad evidentiam huius difficultatis, scito quod apud nos potentia aut est naturalis, aut violenta, aut obedientialis: et hoc tam in comparatione ad actum quam ad agens: nec aliqua est in rerum natura potentia neutra, omissis artificalibus, ut in quaestione *de Potentia Neutra* iuxta hunc articulum, dicetur. Vocatur autem potentia obedientialis, aptitudo rei ad hoc ut in ea fiat quidquid faciendum ordinaverit Deus. Et secundum talem potentiam, anima nostra dicitur in potentiam ad beatitudinem pollicitam, et finem supernaturalem, et alia huiusmodi. (Leonine IV, p. 8.)

[70] X. Unde ad primum Scoti dicitur, quod Augustinus non dixit quod posse habere fidem sit naturale homini, sed quod sit naturae hominum. Aliud est enim potentiam esse naturae, et aliud esse naturalem: primum enim significat subjectum potentiae, secundum autem modum potentiae. Et ideo primum est verum in proposito: secundum vero falsum. Potentia siquidem illa obedientialis ad fidem et caritatem est in natura hominum, quia intellectiva est: non autem in natura leonina, quoniam sibi repugnat. Et hoc intendebat Augustinus. (Leonine IV, p. 8.)

cell anemia, while others are caught by humans of every race, like colds. Potency to the latter type resides in human nature. But its *mode* is a purely Aristotelian issue, which arises as follows. No potency of our nature is properly defined as our catch-a-cold system. Rather, the potency which is reduced to disease-act when one gets a cold is more properly defined as potency to some healthy sort of act or operation, like breathing, and it is a *natural* potency to that healthy act; hence it would have been called a *forced* potency to the disease by Aristotle.[71] Thus the *posse* to catch cold belongs to human nature and yet is not a mode-natural potency. Augustine was saying that *every* human being *can* have the faith; Scotus was using him to say that this 'can' is a natural potency in Aristotle's sense — natural in mode — a far more technical claim.

This rebuttal is of the highest interest, both for Cajetan's historical hermeneutics and for his evaluation of Scotus' strategy for integrating the SD and NS languages. As a matter of hermeneutics, it is illegitimate — anachronistic, eisegetic — to read Aristotelian distinctions into a text of Augustine's. This is what Cajetan saw Scotus doing, and he rebutted it. Ah, but didn't his rebuttal commit the same mistake? Didn't he read 'residence-natural' into Augustine's phrase 'posse . . . naturae est hominum'? Yes, he would have said, but the effect was not a parallel mistake. If you wanted to say, "Look, Augustine just meant that thanks to human nature every man *can*, in a sense of 'can' that neither includes nor excludes technical issues of mode," and you had to say this in the scholastic vocabulary at Cajetan's disposal, the quickest way to say it would be: "he meant 'can' in just the nature-resident sense." For such was the whole force of calling a potency nature-resident only: you could predicate the *posse* of anything having the nature, without asserting anything further about that *posse.* Thus the slot marked 'residence-natural' was Cajetan's slot into which to put everyday, non-technical remarks. Can just anybody become a Christian? Can anybody catch a cold? "Certainly," says the man in the street, without a thought of whether the 'can' is natural or forced potency!

[71] *Physics V,* c. 6; especially 230a19-230b20

This point provides a decisive basis for comparing and evaluating the Thomist and Scotist strategies for combining the NS and SD languages. Following the clue that God does nothing by violence, Scotus wanted to stretch Aristotle's mode-natural potency to cover revealed cases of 'can' (man can receive the Gospel with faith, can be brought to see God, etc.). But this meant reading mode-naturality into basic catechetical statements in the SD language. Such eisegesis Cajetan's strategy would avoid. For him, 'natural potency' remained a technical, NS term. It would be denied of such revealed cases. If he wanted to talk about those cases technically, he could call them obediential potencies. But he need not talk about them technically at all. He could just say that those potencies were true of all human beings as such (nature-resident), and taking *'potentia'* that way made it a synonym of the everyday word *'capacitas'*. Every man was *capax fidei* and *capax Dei;* and if one added *'naturaliter',* it did not matter in the least whether the addition brought up NS nature and meant nature-resident or brought up SD nature and meant what-God-made-us-for. Thus for Cajetan, his own strategy had the resources to keep the language of Sacred Doctrine non-technical *vis-à-vis* the jargon of Aristotle, and the Scotist strategy did not.

If that much is clear, we can pass on to the remainder of the rebuttal, where Scotus' two arguments from reason were handled.

> As to Scotus' second line of argument, we deny its premise [that man inclines naturally to the end called supernatural].
>
> As to his third line, we deny what it assumes both as to the third kind of potency he affirms [in (a), above] and as to what he denies [point (b) above]. Supernaturalness *does* arise when a potency is compared directly to the act it receives; there are acts that are downright supernatural in what they *are*, like grace, glory, and others. This will come out in the other discussion [*i.e.*, in the promised supplement, *De potentia neutra*].[72]

[72] — Ad secundum, negatur antecedens. — Ad tertium vero, negatur assumptum, et quoad tertium membrum partis affirmativae, et quoad partem negativam. Supernaturalitas siquidem attenditur etiam conferendo potentiam ad actum: quoniam sunt quidam actus qui ex genere suo sunt simpliciter super-naturales, ut gratia, gloria, et alia huiusmodi, ut in alia quaestione patebit. (Leonine IV, p. 8.)

These were obviously not whole answers to these arguments but sketches of how they would be answered in the supplement. To it we turn immediately.

E. *Quaestio 1* of *De Potentia Neutra*.

The text will be taken from the first printed edition in Thomae de Vio Caietani *Opuscula aurea de diversis ac curiosissimis materiis tam practicis quam speculativis* (Paris: Jehan Petit, 1511).[73] To keep the Latin on a page close to the translation for the reader's convenience, I shall put it into a footnote after each paragraph.

The occasion for the work was Cajetan's desire to finish his criticism of Scotus concerning the sort of potency people have towards receiving the Vision of God. This was an intra-mural debate among Christian Aristotelians. Given their faith that man is open in his nature (*capax*) to receive the Vision, and that God alone has the active power to cause it, the adversaries had but a single point in contention between them: should our receptive potency to the Vision be called a "natural potency" in Aristotle's sense? Cajetan had dealt with Scotus' argument from authority in 1507 but not with his two arguments from reason. These were an argument about inclination:

(1) everything inclines naturally to its own highest completion;

(2) Beatific Vision is the highest completion of the human soul;

(3) so our soul inclines naturally to the Beatific Vision;

and an argument about natural potency which included the premises:

(4) No potency is supernatural to its act but either natural, forced, or neutral; and

(5) if anything inclines naturally to an act, its potency to that act is a natural potency.

Since the final conclusion sought by Scotus was

[73] An *incipit* in this edition explains as follows the presence of the two questions *De Potentia Neutra* in this book of odds and ends: Hae duae questiones quamvis impertinentes sint huic operi sed ad Primam Partem Summae Sancti Thomae pertineant, attamen eas propter earum pulchritudinem in fine horum opusculorum imprimere volui, ne tempore quo earum sorores fiunt illarum fructu studiosi priventur.

(6) the soul's potency to the Vision is a natural potency,

it was obvious that the two arguments were needed together. In taking them up, Cajetan divided *De Potentia Neutra* into two inquiries, in the first of which he attacked (4) and (5), and in the second of which he attacked (1), (3), and (6).

Q. 1. Is neutral potency found in natural things?

> In my commentary on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1, it was left as unfinished business to treat the topic of neutral potency; so the question is whether there is neutral potency to be found in natural things. In dealing with this difficulty, four jobs need to be done. (1) The sense of the title question will be clarified. (2) The opinion of Scotus will be stated. (3) The opposite opinion will be supported. (4) The points on Scotus' side will be answered.[74]
>
> (1) 'Natural thing' is taken here in the sense opposed to artificial things. 'To be found in natural things' is taken for real occurrence in individual, natural things, without qualification (as opposed to things said in the abstract, as happens with the formal properties of quantities and the like, which are not actually found in the real).[75] 'Potency' in this context is taken to mean receptive potency.[76]

Here the reader may be well advised to break away from the text for a moment, to review the technicalities of 'potency' on the opening pages of this Chapter. The present question concerns whether "neutral" is a mode, and settling it requires determining the criterion by which a receptive potency is to be judged "natural" in mode to a given act. As we return to the text, Cajetan is about to define 'neutral potency'.

> 'Neutral' denies a natural inclination to such-and-such act *and* to its opposite (not just anywhere but) in a potency receptive to both. I say this because

[74] Quaestio prima: utrum in rebus naturalibus detur potentia neutra.
Iuxta primum articulum primae quaestionis remansit tractanda quaestio de potentia neutra, unde quaeritur utrum in rebus naturalibus detur potentia neutra. Circa quam difficultatem quattuor agenda sunt. Primo declarabitur titulus quaestionis. Secundo ponetur opinio Scoti. Tertio probabitur opposita opinio. Quarto respondebitur objectis.

[75] If I have three dogs, oddness is a formal property of the number three, as is being prime, but those formal properties are not found in the real, in the dogs.

[76] Quoad primum. Res naturalis sumitur hic ut distinguitur contra artificiales. Inveniri vero in rebus naturalibus sumitur pro inventione reali in singularibus naturalibus simpliciter, et hoc ad differentiam eorum quae dicuntur in abstractione, sicut contingit de proprietatibus quantitatis ut sic et aliis similibus quae tamen in rerum natura actualiter non inveniuntur. Potentia in proposito sumitur pro potentia receptiva.

> "neutral potency" might be imagined in two ways. One is by negating the very potentiality to both: a potency-to-be-colored is not a potency to high-pitched sound, nor to low-pitched. This situation is not called neutral potency, however, but "no potency." A potency-to-be-colored is just not receptive to sounds. The other way to imagine it is by negating inclination in a potency receptive to both, as when we posit a certain surface receptive to being-white and to being-black and yet inclined to neither. This is what is properly meant by 'neutral potency.' So the question amounts to this: is there found in natural things an individual potency receptive to some act and yet not inclined either to it or to its opposite? [77]
>
> (2) Scotus holds — in remarks on *I Sent., Prolog.*, q. 1; *II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 6 — that there is such a thing as neutral potency. *Vis-à-vis* its act, he says, a receptive potency is either natural, forced, or neutral.
>
> - It is natural in case it (the potency) is naturally inclined to that act;
> - forced, in case the act is against its natural inclination;
> - neutral, in case it is not inclined to the form it is receiving nor inclined to the opposite form.
>
> An example of the first is the downward motion of a stone; of the second, the upward motion of a stone; of the third, a surface *vis-à-vis* whiteness and blackness.[78] Scotus also holds that this neutral sort of potency is found quite clearly in the angels, since the passive potency in the angel to be located in a place is neutral. He proves this on two grounds: (a) this passive potency is not inclined naturally to this form [location] nor to its opposite, and (b) if the angel were naturally in one place, it would be in any other place by force. He proves this latter by appeal to Avicenna (*IX Metaphysics*), who wants to say that if the motion of a heavenly body were natural, it would terminate at a natural rest, and motion from there would be forced motion.

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[77] Neutralitas inclinationem naturalem respectu utriusque actus (scilicet huius et oppositi) negat — non simpliciter sed in potentia receptiva utriusque. Dico autem hoc cum dupliciter contingit imaginari potentiam aliquam neutram. Primo per negationem potentialitatis ad utrumque, quemadmodum colorabile nec ad gra-vem nec ad acutum sonum est in potentia; et sic non vocatur potentia neutra sed potentia nulla. Colorabile enim non est receptivum sonorum. Alio modo per negationem inclinationis in potentia receptiva utriusque, sicut si poneremus aliquam superficiem receptivam albi et nigri et tamen ad neutrum inclinatam; et haec proprie vocatur potentia neutra. Est ergo sensus quaestionis: an inveniatur aliqua singularis potentia in rebus naturalibus receptiva alicuius actus et tamen nec ad illum nec ad oppositum inclinetur. Haec de primo.

[78] Since an undefined potency could hardly be compared to anything, Scotus must have assumed that an already defined potency was to be called natural or forced by looking at the inclination in it. Inclination to the act A_N would suffice to make the potency-to-A_N a natural potency thereto, while inclination to some opposite $\}_N$ would suffice to make the potency-to-A_N a forced potency to A_N. Given these assumptions, it seemed to Scotus that Aristotle's doctrine offered another possibility (*cf. De Caelo II* c. 13; 295a25ff). The potency might be receptive to A_N and to $\}_N$ without inclining to either.

It will be convenient to express the mode of a receptive potency with a subscripted 'n', 'f', or 'i' attached to the modal verb 'can'. If *x* has a natural potency to A_N, let us say that *x* can_n be made A_N and *x* can_f be made $\}_N$. If *x* can be made A_N but neither '*x* can_n be made A_N' nor '*x* can_n be made $\}_N$' is true, then *x* can_i be made A_N and can_i be made $\}_N$. This last is neutral potency ('i' for 'indifferently').

> Other arguments for this opinion can be multiplied; but since they will all be dissolved by establishing the opposite opinion, the above points suffice.[79]

Having laid out Scotus' case, Cajetan now turns to his third order of business: to prove the opposite from sources that were authoritative for Scotists as well as Thomists.

> (3) First I set down a proposition and a distinction, by which the point I intend will be supported.
>
> • The proposition is this: every potency of a natural thing (a) concerns some act *per se primo* and (b) concerns that act naturally.[80] Part (a) is supported by *Metaphysics IX*, text 13, where it says that potency is defined through act.[81] Beyond doubt, the act defining such-and-such a potency is the one it concerns *per se primo*, since the potency would not correspond to an act it only concerns accidentally, and since an act which it concerned *per se secundo* would not match the potency fully.[82] Part (b) is supported from *Physics II*, text 78, where it says that each thing comes about as it is naturally apt to come about, and *vice-versa*.[83] But potency comes about from nature and is for the sake of an act, as is clear in *Metaphysics IX*, texts 15 and 16.[84]

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[79] Quoad secundum. Scotus (in *Prologo I Sent*. q. 1, et in *II Sent*. d. 2, q. 6) tenet dari potentiam neutram, ponens quod potentia receptiva relata ad actum aut est naturalis aut violenta aut neutra. Naturalis quidem si naturaliter inclinetur in illum; violenta vero si ille sit contra eius inclinationem naturalem; neutra vero si neque inclinatur ad istam formam quam recipit neque ad oppositam. Exemplum primi ut motus deorsum lapidis; exemplum secundi motus sursum eiusdem; exemplum tertii superficies respectu albedinis et nigredinis. Et tenet manifeste inveniri in angelis talem potentiam eo quod potentia passiva quae est in angelo ad essendum in loco neutra est. Quod probat dupliciter: tum quia talem passum [*sic; read:* talis passiva?] non inclinatur naturaliter ad istam formam vel oppositam, tum quia si esset in aliquo loco naturaliter esset in alio loco violenter. Et probatur sequela per Avicennam (*IX Metaphys*.) volentem quod si motus caeli esset naturalis, terminaretur ad quietem naturalem, et motus ab illa esset violentus.

Posset quoque multipliciter argui pro hac opinione; sed cum stabiliendo oppositam habebitur solutio omnium, ideo haec sufficiant de secundo.

[80] '*Per se primo*' meant 'of itself in the first sense of "of itself"'. Four senses of 'of itself' were recognized. In the first sense, a thing was related of itself to whatever appeared in its scientific definition. Thus a potency *P* would "of itself" concern the type of act mentioned in the definition of *P*.

[81] The reference is to chapter 8 in *Metaphysics IX:* 1049b5-15.

[82] '*Per se secundo*' meant 'of itself in the second sense of "of itself"'. In the second sense, a thing was related of itself to anything in whose definition it appeared. For example, lines were curved or straight "of themselves" in the second sense, because 'line' appeared in the definition of 'curved' and in the definition of 'straight.' Notice that 'line' appeared in those definitions as the genus, while curved and straight were species of line. Thus a defined potency *P* would "of itself" in the second sense concern any act-species falling under the type of act by which *P* was defined; for *P*'s defining act-type would appear as the genus in the definition of each such species.

[83] *Physics II*, chapter 8; 198b35-199b33.

[84] Chapter 8, 1050a5-30.

> So a potency comes to be naturally and is for the sake of an act. Therefore it is for the sake of the act which it concerns *per se primo*. And thus every potency concerns its *per se primo* act naturally. The reasoning here is clear from the texts cited and the points made in *Physics II* to the effect that nature acts for an end, thanks to which the things which come about by nature are naturally inclined to the end, etc.[85]

Cajetan is holding that the proximate basis for calling a potency *P* natural or forced is the scientific definition of *P* itself. This picks out the act-type to which it is reduced unless impeded. Any relevant statistical evidence about how a thing tends to be (inclination) would therefore have been taken into account in making that definition. Once *P* has been defined as a potency-to-A_N, then, there is no more room for asking about the inclination in it; there is nothing left to do but compare *P* to the act which is supposed to be received in it on a given occasion. Let us refer to this received act as A_r.

Having secured his proposition, Cajetan is about to draw the distinction he needs.

> • The distinction is this: a receptive potency can be compared to acts in four ways. For example, the potency-to-be-colored can be compared
> (a) to color,
> (b) to a species of color,
> (c) to the contrary of color [*i.e.* colorless], and
> (d) to disparate things, such as sounds.
> If it is compared to color, it is compared naturally and *per se primo;* if to a species of color, it is compared naturally but not *per se primo;* if to the contrary, forcedly *[violenter];* if to disparate things, in no way *[nulliter],* unless perhaps incidentally *[per accidens]*. These points need no proof, since they are self-evident by the terms in which they are stated.[86] Some one might

[85] Quoad tertium. Praepono unam propositionem et unam distinctionem, ex quibus probabitur intentum. Propositio igitur est haec: Omnis potentia rei naturae respicit per se primo et naturaliter aliquem actum. Probatur, quoad primam partem, quia ut dicitur *IX Meta*. textu 13, potentia diffinitur per actum. Actus namque diffiniens talem potentiam procul dubio est per se primo respectus ab illa, cum neque actui per accidens neque actus per se secundo illi equivalet. Quoad secundam autem partem, scilicet, naturaliter: probatur quia ex *II Phys*. tex. 78, unumquodque sicut agitur ita aptum natum est agi et econtra. Sed potentia fit a natura et est propter actum, ut patet *IX Meta*. textibus 15 et 16. Ergo potentia naturaliter fit et est propter actum; ergo propter actum quem per se primo respicit. Et sic omnis potentia naturaliter respicit suum per se primo actum. Totus processus clarus est ex allegatis et traditis in *II Phys*. quoniam [?] natura agit propter finem et quo pacto ea quae a natura aguntur propter finem naturaliter inclinantur in finem, etc.

[86] He means: thanks to the definitions of 'natural' and *'per se primo'*, if A_r is identically A_N or a species of A_N, then it is analytic that a potency defined as potency-to-A_N is a natural potency to A_r. And if A_r is some sort of opposite to A_N, it is again analytic that a potency defined as potency-to-A_N is a forced potency to A_r. Thus, if some receptive potency of *x* is defined as a potency-to-A_i, a genus of act-states,

raise the problem of acts to which a potency stands obedientially; but since the next question is about this, and since Scotus does not put such cases under neutral potency, they are no obstacle to the present discussion.

Now, from these preliminaries, the opposite opinion is readily deduced, namely, that every potency in the real, in relation to an act receivable in it, is either natural or else forced, so that none is neutral (leaving aside for the moment obediential potency, as not bearing on the present topic).[87] The conclusion is proved as follows. *[Major:]* Every potency receptive to an act either concerns that act *per se primo* or concerns it *per se secundo* or concerns a contrary to these; *[minor:]* but it concerns naturally both the act it concerns *per se primo* and the one it concerns *per se secundo*, while it concerns forcedly the contrary to them.[88] Therefore every potency receptive to an act is either natural to that act or else forced to it. The minor is self-evident, and the major is supported as follows. If there were a fourth kind of acts receivable in a potency, it would be an act disparate from what the potency concerns *per se;* but this is not possible; therefore a potency cannot receive any [kind of] act but the three enumerated.[89]

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then *x* can$_n$ be made A_i and thus can$_n$ be made A_a, A_b, *etc.*; and if it is receptive at all to an act which would count as $\}_i$, say B_a, then it is forced to B_a (*i.e. x* can$_f$ be made B_a). If some receptive potency of *x* is defined only as a potency-to-A_a, a specific act-state, then *x* can$_n$ be made A_a; and if it is receptive at all to an act which would count as $\}_a$, such as A_b, it is forced to A_b (*x* can$_f$ be made A_b).

[87] Beyond the modes *natural* and *forced*, Cajetan now moves to prove that there is no other. He will make appeal to the well-known Aristotelian points that opposites are in the same genus, and that a potency and its act cannot be in different genera.

[88] This is the solution to the problem about the passive potency in water with respect to temperature: given the observed tendency of water to be cool, this potency is defined as potency to be cooled, hence is a natural potency to be cooled, a forced potency to be made warm. The warming, then is more of a violent process than a natural process *as far as the water is concerned,* but it is a perfectly natural process as far as the heat-source is concerned, as Aquinas maintained.

[89] Distinctio vero est: quod potentia receptiva potest comparari quattuor modis ad actus. Potest enim colorabile verbi gratia comparari ad colorem, ad species coloris, ad contrarium coloris, et ad disparata, scilicet sonos. Si comparetur ad colorem, sic comparatur naturaliter et per se primo; si ad speciem eius, naturaliter quidem sed non per se primo; si ad contrarium, violenter; si ad disparata, nulliter (nisi forte per accidens). Nec haec egent probatione, cum per se sunt nota ex terminis, nisi quis objiciat actus ad quos potentia se habet obedientialiter. Sed cum de hoc erit sequens quaestio, nec ii locantur a Scoto sub potentia neutra, ideo nihil proposito obstant.

Ex his autem deducitur opposita opinio, scilicet, quod omnis potentia in rerum natura relata ad actum receptibilem in ea aut est naturalis aut est violenta, ita quod nulla est neutra (obmissa pro nunc potentia obedientiali, utpote non spectante ad praesens propositum). Probatur autem haec conclusio sic. Omnis potentia receptiva alicuius actus aut respicit illum per se primo aut per se secundo aut contrarium his; sed tam actum per se primo respectum quam per se secundo respicit naturaliter, et contrarium eis respicit violenter; ergo omnis potentia receptiva alicuius actus aut est naturalis aut violenta. Minor est per se nota, et major probatur sic. Si daretur quartum genus actuum receptibilium in aliqua potentia, illud esset actus disparatus ab eo quem per se respicit illa potentia; sed hoc esse non potest; ergo potentia non potest recipere nisi illa tria enumerata.

The proof has gone as follows. If there is to be another mode, the receivable act A_r must be neither the act by which *P* is defined, nor any species of it, nor any opposite to it; in that case, A_r must not share a common genus with *P*. But then since a potency and its act cannot fail to share a genus, it follows that *P* is no potency at all to A_r, since that act is not receivable in it. Hence there is no other possible mode, and hence there is no third, "neutral" type of receptive potency. Cajetan now finishes this job and undertakes his fourth.

> The impossibility just mentioned stands up inductively: the potency-to-be-colored has no potency to sounds, and the potency-to-be-heated has none to colors, and so on for the rest. It also stands to reason: a potency of one class is not a potency to an act of another class, as is clear in *Metaphysics XII*, in the treatise on the principles of the categories.[90] And since this view stands to reason, we embrace it.[91]
>
> (4) The tripartite division made by Scotus is thus arbitrary as to its third member. What he adds about a surface does not help. For it is one thing to talk about surface in utter generality, and quite another to talk about such-and-such a physical surface found in the real. For "surface" taken in utter generality abstracts not only from white and black but from every sense property. There is even a surface which is repugnant to any color, such as the surface of a heavenly sphere. When one speaks of such-and-such a surface then, *i.e.* one open to color, it as such is not said to be indifferent to white and black through exclusion of natural inclination but through exclusion of **more** such inclination to one than to the other. Such a surface looks naturally to color and to all its species — but to color *per se primo*, and to a species *per se secundo*. The case is similar with prime matter and the several substantial forms; it looks *per se primo* to form acquirable through change in any manner, while *per se secundo* it looks to this and that form. And thus it is naturally inclined to them all, or to many of them, not by exclusion of natural inclination to them, but by exclusion of more inclination to one form than to another.[92, 93]

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[90] Chapter 4, 1070a33ff.

[91] Quia autem hoc sit impossibile patet inductive. Colorabile enim nullam habet potentiam ad sonos, nec calefactibile ad colores, et sic de aliis. Et probatur ratione: quia potentia unius generis non est ad actus alterius, ut patet *XII Meta*. in tractatu de principiis praedicamentorum. Et cum ratione haec consonant, ideo hanc sequamur viam. Et haec de tertio.

[92] What is Cajetan's theory, then, about the passive potency in air to become fire? Is the matter in air in potency to the whole genus of natural forms, hence to any species, hence to the form of fire, so that, since the passive potency is natural, the conversion of air into fire will count as a natural process? Or is the matter in air a potency just to many natural forms but not that of fire except forcedly or obedientially?

[93] Quoad quartum. Respondetur quod distinctio illa trimembris est voluntaria quoad tertium mem-

> As to what Scotus says about an angel's potency to be located, it rests on a false presupposition — namely, than an angel has a passive potency with respect to place. For as was said in the treatise on angels, an angel's being in a place is not a case of the angel's receiving or "undergoing" [location] but a case of its acting, touching the place through its power *[virtualiter]*. So there is nothing to concern us here but the angel's active potency, which is natural to be sure, but freely exercised. Furthermore, the remarks Scotus makes to prove his point about angels are not cogent because this inference of his,
>
> if *x* is naturally in one place, *x* is forcedly in any other,
>
> is invalid when construed formally.[94] This is clear from the several parts of the orb of the moon: each is naturally in the west and likewise in the east, but nowhere forcedly. And yet it changes place in itself *[in subjecto]* as well as in our account of it. The confirming argument from Avicenna also fails to convince, since what he says is only true of purely natural motion.[95] The motion of the heavens is indeed very natural as far as their potency to be located *[principium passivum]* is concerned (and this naturalness is the reason why there is no "work" in it for the mover, as one sees from *De Caelo II*, text 3), but its active principle is animate. So the matter appears to be rather against Scotus' intent: [if the angel's motion were like the heavenly body's] the angel's motion would be natural as to its potency to be located, but nothing unsuitable to my position would follow, as we have said about the motion of the heavens.[96]

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brum. Nec id quod addicatur de superficie juvat: cum aliud est loqui de superficie absolute, et aliud de superficie physica tali in rerum natura inventa. Superficies enim absoluta non solum abstrahit ab albo et nigro sed etiam ab omni sensibili; et rursus aliqua superficies est quae repugnat colori omni, ut patet de superficie caeli; itaque loquendo de superficie tali, idest colorabili, dicitur quod ut sic non est indifferens ad album et nigrum per exclusionem inclinationis naturalis sed per exclusionem majoris ad unum quam ad alium, cum huiusmodi superficies respicit naturaliter colorem et omnes species eius — sed colorem per se primo, speciem vero per se secundo. Et simile est de materia prima respectu diversarum formarum substantialium: ipsa quidem per se primo respicit formam per motum aut mutationem acquisibilem quovismodo; per se autem secundo respicit hanc et illam formam. Et sic [?] naturaliter inclinatur in omnes, et indifferens est ad omnes aut multas, non per exclusionem inclinationis naturalis ad eas sed per exclusionem majoris inclinationis ad unam quam ad aliam.

[94] It is invalid because any place a thing can occupy at all differs at most in species from any other place it can occupy; so if *x* has potency to a genus of places, it will be "naturally" in any place in that genus, "forcedly" in none of them.

[95] Here the contrast is between motion which is determined entirely by necessity of nature ("purely natural motion") and motion which is living or animate. The reader will recall that Aquinas, in the commentary on *Physics II, lectio* 1, treated the place-changes of the heavenly bodies as one of his odd cases, because those bodies had an animate (angelic) mover; but he said that the bodies' being-moved was natural change because the bodies had *natural* passive potency (not neutral) to all the locations to which the angels moved them — and that is the point here.

[96] Ad id vero quod adducitur de potentia locabili in angelo, dicitur quod falsum supponit, scilicet, in angelo esse potentiam passivam respectu ipsius ubi. Ut enim in tractatu de angelis dictum est, angelum esse in loco non est ipsum recipere aut pati sed operari seu virtualiter tangere locum. Unde non oportet sollicitari nisi de activa potentia angeli quam constat esse naturalem, libere tamen exercitam. Quamvis ea

The first *quaestio* is now finished. It has had an announced purpose and a larger purpose. The announced purpose, of course, was to explode the idea of neutral potency. But the only reason that was worth doing was to achieve the larger purpose, which was to explode Scotus' explanation of what makes a potency mode-natural. For the right account of that matter is crucial to Cajetan's case in the commentary on the *Prima Pars.* As we prepare to move on, the reader will need to retain the following points for use in the next *quaestio.*

First, since obediential potency has not been under discussion yet, "obediential" must not be a *mode* of potency.

Second, it does not follow that an obediential potency is either natural or forced. As we shall see, mode is a division of the potencies discoverable in a natural science; it has no application to those known only by revelation. Why not? Because potencies are not overt. Things have to be seen *in act* in various circumstances, and then potencies can be defined from the observed act-states. Since supernatural act-states are not naturally observable, things cannot be seen to tend toward them or be impeded from them in natural science.

Third, if a supernatural act-type, *e.g.* the Beatific Vision, is a *species* of a naturally known genus, *e.g.* acts of understanding, then if man has natural potency to the genus, he has natural potency to the Vision *per se secundo.* Ergo, if our potency to the Vision is not natural, then either the Vision is not a species in that genus (and in that case, supernatural Vision is only analogous to an act of understanding), or else man does not have natural potency to the whole genus. We have

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quae adducuntur a Scoto ad probandum suum intentum de angelo non cogant, cum haec consequentia formaliter non valet: "A est naturaliter in uno loco, ergo est violenter in aliquo alio," ut patet de singulis partibus orbis lunae; quilibet enim est naturaliter in occidente et similiter in oriente, attamen nullibi violenter; et mutat locum subjecto et ratione. Nec confirmatio ex Avicenna convincit, cum non nisi de motu mere naturali verificatur dictum eius. Motus enim caeli naturalissimus est ex parte principii passivi, ita quod ex hac naturalitate redditur ratio quare in eo nullus est labor moventi, ut patet in *II De Caelo*, textu 3, quamvis ex parte activi est animalis. Unde hoc magis ad oppositum intenti Scoti videtur, cum sic motus angeli esset naturalis ex parte principii passivi absque sequela inconvenientium, sicut de motu caeli dicimus. Haec de quarto et de tota quaestione.

seen that both these consequences are true for Aquinas. From 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6, man's incomplete fulfillment (which lies essentially in a human act of understanding) is only analogous to the complete fulfillment (which lies essentially in sharing God's act of understanding). From *CT* c. 104, the potency in our possible intellect to be made-to-understand is natural potency only to those acts for which our agent intellect is able to supply the *formae intelligibiles*.

F. *Quaestio 2* of *De Potentia Neutra*.

Christianity proclaims possibilities which are not seen, or at least are not explained, in the natural sciences: a man can be cured instantly by God, can be raised from the dead, can be made to "see" God. If Christianity is true, each such 'can' bespeaks a real potency. How should theologians add them to the kinds of potency discovered in natural science? That is the fundamental question on which Cajetan debated Scotus in this second *quaestio.* In order to follow the debate in an impartial way, we shall need two more subscripts for the modal word 'can'. Let any potency explained in the natural sciences, be it natural, forced, or (as Scotus wanted in some cases) neutral, now be designated with the capital-N subscript in 'can_N'. Let any potency believed in on the strength of God revealing be designated with the capital-S subscript in 'can_S'. With these aids, we can introduce the debate as follows.

Aquinas called the revealed potencies "obediential" and put them outside the natural-science classes, because they were potencies to miracles or to act-states connatural to God alone, not explainable without revelation, while the natural and forced potencies were to act-states connatural to creatures (can_N), explainable by natural science. His scheme looked like this.

Thomist Scheme

passive potency ——< can_N = can receive an NS-explainable act ——{ natural (can_n) / forced (can_f)

can_S = can receive an SD-explainable act —— obe-

diential

Scotus proceeded differently. He introduced a new division — natural *vs.* supernatural potencies — distinguished not by the character of their acts but by what kind of cause it took to reduce them to act. If the potency *P* could be reduced to A_N by a natural cause (by which he meant a finite cause communicating by a necessity of nature), then the potency was "natural" to A_N (can $_N$); but if it could only be reduced to A_N by God, who communicated *ad extra* by no necessity of nature but only by choice (so that He was the Free Cause), then the potency was "supernatural" to A_N (can $_S$). In this new, cause-wise division, Scotus put all the revealed potencies into the supernatural member; but in the pre-existing Aristotelian division into natural *vs.* forced (to which he had added neutral), Scotus put the revealed potencies into the pigeonhole of natural, on the ground that God does nothing by force.

Scotist Scheme



Notice, then, that *'potentia naturalis'* could mean either can $_n$ or can $_N$ in the Scotist idiom. This would not have been so bad if can $_n$ implied can $_N$, as it did in Cajetan's Thomism; but in the Scotist school no such implication held: man could naturally see God (can $_n$) but couldn't see Him naturally (can $_N$) but only supernaturally (can $_S$)!

Without further preliminaries, let us proceed to the text.

Q. 2: Is a potency receptive to supernatural acts a natural potency to them?

In connexion with the same article [1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1], an inquiry had to be

made about whether a potency receptive to supernatural acts would be a natural potency to them. Four jobs need to be done. (1) The question will be clarified. (2) Scotus' opinion will be stated. (3) That opinion will be examined. (4) The question will be answered.[97]

(1) 'Receptive potency' is taken here formally, so that we are asking about the potency *as receptive* of its act, irrespective of how it may be as elicitive of its act.[98] By a "supernatural" act is meant one which cannot be acquired according to the course of nature, such as grace, charity, the Vision of God, and the like. A potency is being called "natural" not in the residential sense [not by reason of the subject it is in], *i.e.* as the potency of a nature, but in the formal sense, *i.e.* as potency naturally inclined. So the sense of the question is this: are the potencies found in natural things and in which supernatural acts are received naturally inclined to those acts? [99]

(2) Scotus (on *I Sent., Prolog.*, q. 1, and on *IV Sent.*, d. 49) takes the affirmative side. For he thinks that a potency can be compared both to the act it will receive and to the agent impressing that act. In the first comparison, he thinks there is no supernaturality; rather, a potency is natural, forced, or neutral. Only in the second comparison does he think the difference between naturalness and supernaturality arises, since *vis-à-vis* an agent naturally impressing a certain act there is naturalness, and *vis-à-vis* one not naturally impressing it there is supernaturality. Scotus confirms his position by the points that a potency receptive to supernatural actuation is

(a) of itself capable of it (receptively), and is
(b) naturally completed by that actuation when it has it, and
(c) naturally seeks it.

From these points it follows that the potency is therefore naturally inclined to that act and so is a "natural potency" in respect to that act. He offers proof for each point assumed. As to (a), a potency of the soul needs no intermediate [disposition] in order to receive the act of charity, and likewise the intellect needs none in order to receive the light of glory, etc. As to (b), a potency is naturally completed by an act which is its own completion [and the Vision of

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[97] Quaestio secunda: utrum potentia receptiva actuum supernaturalium sit potentia naturalis. Iuxta eundem articulum, quaerendum erat utrum potentia receptiva actuum supernaturalium sit potentia naturalis. In qua questione quattuor agenda sunt. Primo declarabitur titulus. Secundo recitabitur opinio Scoti. Tertio examinabitur. Quarto respondebitur quaesito.

[98] The possible intellect was a receptive potency as regards taking in an impressed species but was active as regards eliciting its operation (an *intellectio, i. e.*, an act of understanding).

[99] Quoad primum. Potentia receptiva hic sumitur formaliter ut receptiva est, quicquid sit de ipsa ut elicitiva actus. Actus supernaturalis dicitur quem non potest secundum naturae cursum adipisci, ut gratia, charitas, visio Dei et reliqua huiusmodi. Potentia naturalis vocatur non subjective, id est, potentia naturae, sed formaliter: id est, potentia naturaliter inclinata, ita quod sensus quaestionis est, Utrum potentiae in rebus naturalibus inventae in quibus recipiuntur actus supernaturales naturaliter inclinentur ad illos. Haec de primo. — The reader will note that the definitions given here are not distinctively Thomist definitions but ones which the Scotists could accept as well. This is especially evident with the definition of 'natural potency' formally taken.

> God is the completion of man's intellectual potency; ergo]. As to (c), each thing naturally seeks its own completion but most strongly seeks its greatest completion, by a principle of metaphysics; but a supernatural act such as the Vision of God is the greatest completion; ergo, etc. According to these statements, then, we are in natural potency to supernatural completions, even though we cannot acquire them in any way but supernaturally, because their acquisition has to be caused by the supernatural agent, who is God all glorious.[100]

Having laid out Scotus' case, Cajetan proceeded to two further jobs, best described as follows. In section (3), Cajetan sought to rebut Scotus' case for the affirmative; in section (4) he sought to present his own case for the negative.

> (3) Three things seem to be not very well said in Scotus' case, namely, the main conclusion, the support for it, and the use of terms. To begin with [this last], he uses the term 'supernatural' badly. He calls every action of God *ad extra* supernatural, because God is a free agent rather than a natural one. But the use of 'natural' as an opposite of 'supernatural' is different from its use as an opposite of 'free'. In the first use, a person's soul is produced "naturally," while in the second use it is not. So unless we wish to abuse words at the arbitrary pleasure of each speaker, we should use 'supernatural' to denote that in things which is above and beyond the reach of the order due to creatures. For in ordinary usage we all distinguish natural things from supernatural on the basis that the one arises according to the due order of nature, while the other arises above and beyond that order.[101]

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[100] Quoad secundum. Scotus (in *I Sent. Prolog.*, q. 1 et in *IV Sent.* d. 49 in pluribus locis) tenet affirmativam partem questionis. Putat namque quod potentia comparari potest ad actum recipiendum et agens impressivum actus, et quod in prima comparatione nulla est supernaturalitas, sed potentia est vel naturalis vel violenta vel neutra; in secunda autem comparatione est differentia naturalitatis a supernaturalitate, cum si comparatur ad agens naturaliter impressivum est naturalitas; si non naturaliter impressivum, est supernaturalitas. Confirmatque positionem suam ex hoc quod potentia receptiva actus supernaturalis se ipsa est receptive capax illius, et naturaliter preficitur per illum cum habet, et naturaliter appetit illum. Ex his manifeste sequitur ergo naturaliter inclinatur in illum, et ergo est potentia naturalis respectu illius. Singula autem assumpta probantur. Primum quidem nullo eget potentia animae medio ad recipiendum charitatem, et similiter intellectus respectu luminis gloriae, etc. Secundum vero quia potentia naturaliter perficitur per actum qui est eius perfectio. Tertium autem quia unumquodque appetit naturaliter suam perfectionem, sed maxime naturaliter appetit maximam perfectionem, ex principio metaphysicae. Sed actus supernaturalis ut visio Dei, etc., est maxima perfectio; ergo, etc. Sumus igitur secundum haec in naturali potentia ad supernaturales perfectiones; non possumus tamen acquirere eas nisi supernaturaliter, quia oportet acquisitionem hanc ab agente supernaturali scilicet Deo glorioso causari. Haec de secundo.

[101] Quoad tertium. Tria minus bene dicta in praefata videntur, scilicet, principalis conclusio, et eius probatio, et usus vocabulorum. Male imprimis utitur ly `supernaturale', dum omnem actionem Dei ab [sic] extra supernaturalem vocat, quia Deus est agens non naturale sed liberum. Constat namque quod alia est distinctio naturalis contra supernaturalis, et alia naturalis contra liberum. Primo namque modo anima Sortis producitur naturaliter, secundo autem non. Unde nisi vocabulis abuti velimus ad placitum cuiusque, supernaturale est quod supra facultatem ordinis creaturis debiti in eis est. Omnes enim naturalia a supernaturali-

We must pause to consider this first piece of the rebuttal. The conflict between Scotist usage and ordinary language will be explored more deeply by Cajetan below, in his case for the negative. Here in the rebuttal, Cajetan is content to point out a glaring example. It was standard doctrine that the matter involved in human generation can receive the rational soul, but only God reduces this potency to act. Scotus' definitions of can $_N$ and of can $_S$ yielded the awkward result that human gametes, even upon uniting, do not naturally become human beings. Scotus tried to evade by saying that human germinal matter "disposes" to the soul and that anything to which a creature disposes is cause-wise natural (can $_N$). Cajetan paid no attention to this move, because despite any disposition the matter contributes, infusing the soul remains God's free act, and so the reception should be a can $_S$, by Scotus' own rule. Besides, the soul "disposes" itself in some sense by its natural power of free will to justifying grace, charity, and the other infused gifts.[102] So if Scotus took his own evasion seriously, he would have taken these infusions as cases of can $_N$ as well. (Of course, he didn't.)

Cajetan thought that Scotus fell into this muddle by failing to think through clearly the meaning of 'natural' in the everyday use in which it contrasts with the SD term 'supernatural'. When one looks at this contrast, one sees that its ordinary employment in Christian discourse requires the following account. What pertains to the creation-and-interaction-of-creatures is *the ordered set of naturally knowable causes and their effects* — and this is what is "natural." The NS language of Aristotle concurs: everything connatural to creatures and/or "due" to them is within that set.[103] By contrast, what God effects beyond that set (like the salvation of creatures) plus what He is in Himself is "above" creatures, connatural to God alone, and knowable by reve-

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bus distinguimus frequenti usu per hoc quod aliquid fit secundum debitum naturae ordinem, et aliquid fit supra illum.

[102] See section *iii* of Cajetan's commentary on 2/1 *ST* q. 113, a. 10.

[103] On the notion of what is "due" to creatures, see *De Veritate,* q. 6, a. 2.

lation alone — and this is what is "supernatural." Such is the Christian *public use* of these terms, and any other use is at best a private jargon.[104] Scotus fell into a private jargon, Cajetan thought, by giving every use of 'natural' in his cause-wise division a meaning contrasting with 'free'.[105] The unsatisfactory character of the result is seen in the same example: God's infusion of the human soul is free (since it is not from any necessity of God's nature, not coerced), and yet it is called "natural" in theology as opposed to supernatural, because having a soul acquired at conception pertains to the *creation* of human beings, indeed, to the essential composition of the "nature" in us.

Let us now return to the text and see the second piece of Cajetan's rebuttal.

> Next, Scotus' case either assumes a false [major] premise or else begs the question [in its minor premise]. His major says that a potency is *naturally* completed by its own act and likewise naturally seeks its own completion. Here the phrase 'its own' either means "its own" by form-reception *[informatio]* (whether in act or in potency) or else means "its own" by *natural* proportion or inclination. If it means the first, his major is false; for a heavy thing existing high up is not naturally but forcedly completed by its being high up, and yet being-high-up is "its own" act and completion by form-reception. But if by 'its own' he means the second, his minor premise [that a supernatural act like the Vision is the greatest completion] begs the question. For this is the very point to be proved, namely, that a natural potency has a supernatural act as "its own" completion *in this way* [*i.e*. by natural proportion or inclination].[106]

This is one of the most important passages in the text and needs to be considered careful-

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[104] The reader will recall Cajetan's similar protest against Scotus' usage in the debate over a created *lumen gloriae:* Scotus kept using the adverb *'naturaliter'* even where it was misleading to do so.

[105] *Cf.* Kant's making nature the correlative of freedom: *Critique of Pure Reason* B447.

[106] Ratio deinde assumpta manifeste aut falsa est aut petit principium; cum enim dicit quod potentia naturaliter perficitur per suum actum et similiter appetit suam perfectionem, aut ly `suum' significat suum per informationem actu vel potentia, aut suum per naturalem proportionem seu inclinationem. Si primo modo, falsa est major; grave enim existens sursum non naturaliter sed violenter perficitur per esse sursum; et tamen esse sursum est actus et perfectio eius per informationem. Si vero secundo modo, petitio est principii in minore. Hoc enim est probandum, scilicet, quod potentia naturalis habeat actum supernaturalem ut suum hoc modo.

ly.[107] To dissolve Scotus' support for his all important points that

(b) a potency is naturally completed by the supernatural actuation it receives

and

(c) the potency naturally seeks such an actuation,

Cajetan attacked an ambiguity in the premise that everything naturally seeks (seeks $_n$) its own completion. The ambiguous words are 'its own'. Do they mean that every potency seeks $_n$ the completions receivable in it, especially the greatest? Or do they mean that every potency seeks $_n$ the completions proportionate to it, especially the greatest?[108] On the first reading, the argument became this:

every potency seeks $_n$ the greatest completion receivable in it;

the Beatific Vision is the greatest one receivable in the human soul;

so our soul seeks $_n$ the Beatific Vision.

Cajetan does not deny that this reading yields a logically valid argument. Rather, He shows that

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[107] I say "carefully," because the force and even the drift of this section were missed by Alfaro, "Posición de Cayetano en el problema de lo sobrenatural: su crítica de la theoría de Escoto," *Archivo Teologico Granadino* 12 (1949) 49-160. In the offprint version, the pagination starts at page 1, and the relevant discussion is on pp. 72ff.

[108] These are really the only two options. Between a potency and the act it receives there is a one-to-many relation. For one and the same potency can be reduced to many different acts. Likewise, between a thing and its completion there is a relation . In the case of a "thing" which is just a receptive potency, do these two relations (of potency to act and of thing to completion) coincide, or do they not? This is an exclusive alternative. If they *do coincide*, then the relation of a potency to its completion is one-to-many, any form receivable in it is a completion of it, and the highest form (say, place) receivable in it is the potency's highest completion. If the relations *do not coincide*, then an act A_r must meet some **other criterion**, if it is to be a completion which that potency seeks $_n$. Well, what is this criterion to be? Aquinas had an answer: proportion. Scotus stated no answer except, implicitly, this one: a potency-to-be-made-A_N seeks $_n$ the act A_r just in case A_r is "good" for that potency. Well, it was a tautology for both sides to this dispute that whatever a thing seeks $_n$ is good for it, but the converse proposition that

whatever is good for a thing is something it seeks $_n$,

was precisely what was in dispute. For suppose an artificial or supernatural form A_r is good for a potency open to it, but what such a potency seeks $_n$ is act-states **proportionate to it**, while A_r exceeds its proportion? Now does the potency seek $_n$ to be made A_r anyway — does it incline "naturally" to A_r rather than supernaturally or obedientially? That is precisely what was in dispute. Alfaro missed this point (*ibid*. pp. 73ff.) and thereby lost the thread of the argument.

its first premise is false, according to the cosmology common to both schools. For in that cosmology, high places are greater completions than low places (that is why high places are the natural places of the highest element, fire, and not of the lowest element, earth, of which rock is made); a high place is receivable in a stone's potency-to-be-located, and completes that potency as act always completes potency; but no stone seeks $_n$ such a place; its potency to be there is forced potency (as Scotus admitted along with Aristotle).[109]

On the other reading, the argument became this:

> every potency seeks $_n$ the greatest completion proportionate to it;
>
> the Beatific Vision is the greatest completion of the human soul;
>
> so our soul seeks $_n$ the Beatific Vision.

But now the second premise is useless, unless the Beatific Vision does not exceed the proportion of man's soul, which was the very point that had to be proved. Thus Scotus begged the question.

Behind this begging-of-the-question lie two divergences between the Scotist and Thomist schools: over analogy/univocity, and over proportionate object.

As to analogy/univocity: for Scotus, an act-type could remain generically the same in finite and infinite tokens, so that a name of that act-type could be used univocally of creatures and of God. As a result, if one posed to Scotus the objection that the Beatific Vision was a divine happiness exceeding the proportion of human nature, he could reply calmly that we still incline to it naturally, because the excess just means that the Vision is all the good we seek *and more*. For Aquinas, the situation was very different. An act-token in God had to be diverse in its *ratio* from any act-token in a creature,[110] so that any name applied to both would have to be used analogous-

[109] Cajetan was saying that the highest location will be the stone's potency's "own" highest completion if 'its own' just means that the completion is received in it. Alfaro was irrelevant in pointing out that a "forced completion" would have been a contradiction in terms for Scotus (*ibid.*, p. 74); if that is true, it is all the more indication that the reading of 'its own' which made Scotus' argument valid is unacceptable.

[110] 1 *ST* q. 13, a. 5.

ly and therefore could not serve as the name of a genus. Cajetan thought with Aquinas that "being cognizant" was not a genus (not a univocal class of acts) and that "being fulfilled" was not a genus either. 'Cognizance' and 'fulfillment' and even 'complete good' must not be used univocally when one passes from the talk of man to the talk of God. They must be used analogously.[111] Thus it was in dispute between the schools whether there could be supernatural species of a naturally known genus. For Scotus, there could be (and there were). But for the Thomists, there were not and could not be.[112]

As to proportionate object (which is why the talk of proportion comes up here): Aquinas had a way of correlating what each kind of intellect could know by its natural powers with the manner of being which that intellect enjoyed. The whole scheme was laid out in 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 4, and Scotus disagreed with it radically.[113] It was in dispute, therefore, between the schools whether that which our intellect could know *naturaliter/proportionaliter* was just the quiddities of material things (as Aquinas taught in places we have encountered: 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6, and *CT* c. 104). It was in dispute, therefore, between the schools whether knowing God's essence exceeded the proportion of human nature — as Aquinas taught in *De Veritate* q. 27 a. 2, **with the corollary that our *seeking* after it was not the one that flows from our nature but the one infused as *caritas*** (see again the text in Chapter One, p. 2). And so Scotus' argument about inclination lacks all probative value against Thomism, because it begs the question monumentally. Its weakness is suggested by replacing its second premise with the corresponding Thomist premise:

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[111] This in turn means that, *univocally speaking*, the Beatific Vision is not fulfillment, not knowledge, not insight (recall the *via negativa*). It is merely analogous to these.

[112] This is one of the issues which ties the two questions in *De potentia neutra* together. For according to Cajetan, if man's potency to be made cognizant (or fulfilled) looks naturally to the whole genus of such acts, it looks naturally to any species of that genus. If supernatural cognizance (or fulfillment) were a species of cognizance (or a species of fulfillment), man's potency to the Vision would have to be a natural potency to that act, by Cajetan's own doctrine.

[113] *In I Sent.* d. 3, q. 3; *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 11. The matter was thrashed out at length in Cajetan's commentary on 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 4 (Leonine IV, p. 122).

everything inclines naturally to its own sort of completion;

the Beatific Vision is way beyond the human sort of completion;

so humans incline naturally to it anyway?

Let us now return to the text, where Cajetan is about to rebut Scotus' support for his original point (a), to the effect that a potency in which supernatural acts are received receives them "immediately."

> Also, what he says about immediate reception contributes nothing to his case. With immediacy, bronze receives the figure of [a statue of] Mercury; and yet it does not receive it naturally.[114]

This is the third part of the rebuttal, and it takes us back to a key point in *Physics II*, chapter one. The processes in which artificial forms are introduced into wood or bronze are not natural changes; the natural substances have no internal *principium* causing them to tend towards such forms. That is the sole point of importance, and the fact that it is sometimes the case that the raw substance needs no preparatory disposition to receive the artificial form is irrelevant.[115]

The rebuttal section now closes with a summary and an announcement of the next job to be done.

> At the end, then, Scotus' conclusion is left hanging in thin air, and it will be shown to be unreasonable by proving the opposite conclusion.[116]

The proving of the opposite conclusion will be Cajetan's case for his own position. His case will consist of three distinct arguments, the first of which is an *a fortiori* argument about supernatural acts.

(4) The [correct] conclusion in answer to the question is that a potency to

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[114] Quod quoque dicitur de immediata receptione ad propositum nihil infert. Aes immedietate est receptivum figurae mercurii, et tamen non naturaliter.

[115] The reader will recall that, according to Aquinas, the reason a preparatory disposition is needed is not because the in-coming form is artificial but because it is of a higher nature.

[116] Conclusio demum principalis voluntaria relinquitur, et irrationabilis ostendetur probando oppositam. Haec de tertio.

> supernatural acts is not a "natural" but an obediential one. This is supported in three ways.
>
> The first looks at acts. Supernatural acts come in two kinds — those that are supernatural in themselves, like grace, and those that are supernatural in how they come about, like sight given to a blind man. In itself, sight is a natural act in man, but its being given to a blind person instantly is supernatural. Charity, on the other hand, and such acts are supernatural in themselves, with the result that it would imply a contradiction to say they are nature-set *[connaturales]*, or come about in a nature-set way, for any creature real or possible. Scotus agrees and says the same at *II Sent.* d. 23.[117] So then: *if* there is no natural potency to an act which is supernatural in how it comes about, *a fortiori* there is no natural potency to acts which are supernatural in themselves [*simpliciter*]. Our ordinary use of language, in which we deny a natural potency to miracles, shows clearly that in nature there is no natural potency to those acts. [Ergo there is none to acts supernatural in themselves.] Furthermore, from this it follows that supernaturality does not arise solely in comparing a potency to an agent [as Scotus thought], because of supernatural acquiring of the act, but also arises in comparing a potency [directly] to an act, because of the supernaturality of the act in itself.[118]

This *a fortiori* argument is quite powerful. The public norms of Christian discourse demand two standards of possibility: a natural can $_{N}$, under which miracles are not possible, and a supernatural can $_{S}$, under which they are. For miracles are "beyond nature," they can't "naturally" happen, we are not "naturally" able to be healed this way or raised from the dead, etc.

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[117] Scotus did not deny that act/completions such as grace and the Vision are supernatural on an intrinsic basis. But he would only call *potencies* supernatural on the cause-wise basis explained above. So in the Scotist idiom, 'supernatural' in 'supernatural potency' differed in meaning from the same word in 'supernatural act', because "what the Free Cause alone can bring about" need not be something "connatural to God alone." The infusion of the soul was one example, and an instant cure was another. Created existence would be yet a third: only God can bring it about, but what is connatural to Him alone is the uncreatable self-subsisting existence, not the created sort.

[118] Quoad quartum. Conclusio responsiva quaesito est quod potentia ad actus supernaturales non est naturalis sed obedientialis. Et probatur tripliciter.

Primo ex parte actus sic. Actus supernaturalis dupliciter invenitur, scilicet, secundum se, ut gratia, et secundum talem modum fiendi, ut visus caeco datus. Visus enim secundum se est naturalis actus hominis, sed quod caeco in instanti detur supernaturale est. Charitas vero et talia sunt secundum se actus supernaturales adeo ut implicet contradictionem connaturales esse aut fieri alicui creaturae factae vel factibili, ut etiam ipse Scotus in *II Sent.* d. 23 fatetur. Si ergo in natura nulla est naturalis potentia ad actum supernaturalem ratione modi ut sic, a fortiore nulla est naturalis potentia ad actus [super]naturales simpliciter. Sed in natura nullam esse naturalem potentiam ad illos actus patet ex frequenti usu quo naturalem potentiam ad miracula negamus. Et ex hoc sequitur quod supernaturalitas invenitur non solum comparando potentiam ad agens propter supernaturalem acquisitionem actus sed etiam comparando potentiam ad actum propter supernaturalitatem actus in se.

Cajetan's first proof appeals to this standard. It will be well to approach the proof with a reminder of what he has done to prepare for it. If Scotus' way of using 'natural' and 'supernatural' had been left standing, it would have been uncertain at this point what bearing the natural standard of possibility had upon the talk of natural potency (can $_n$). For Scotus had said that man can $_n$ see God, although he cannot naturally (can $_N$) do so but only supernaturally (can $_S$). He had thus allowed a natural potency to be affirmed in cases where all natural possibility was being denied. Now, however, with Scotus' usage shown to be an arbitrary private jargon (previous section, first flaw), there is nothing to support so counter-intuitive an outcome. The talk of possibilities and potencies is free to resume along sensible, unencumbered lines. Well, along such lines, the reasonable thing to say, surely, is that if it takes a miracle to bring a state of affairs about, its constituents are not in natural potency to it. Allow the subscript N to be replaced by adverbial phrases, such as 'instantly' or 'without medicine'. Then 'A_N' may stand for an act-state like being cured instantly, so that we have before us a typical case of miracle:

(1) if it is only possible $_S$ for *x* to be cured instantly,
then it is not the case that *x* can $_n$ be cured instantly.

Claim (1) conforms to standard Christian discourse. From this conformity, Cajetan launches his *a fortiori* argument. It is a rough form of this:

> If a creature *x* is in non-natural potency to a mere cure which is only adverbially different from an act-state belonging to its nature (to get well gradually), then it is *all the more* true that the creature *x* is in non-natural potency to things like grace, which are intrinsically different from any act-state belonging to its nature.

In a word: if adverbial difference un-naturalizes potency, any greater difference does so. If this is persuasive, then it is correct to go from (1) to the more general claim

(2) if it is only possible $_S$ for *x* to be A_N,
then it is not the case that *x* can $_n$ be made A_N

where the substitution values of 'A_N' need no longer be adverbial but may also be any act-species. But if (2) is correct, so is its transposition

(3) if *x* can $_{n}$ be made A_N ,
it is not only possible $_{S}$ for *x* to be A_N

and all of Scotus' counter-intuitive cases are excluded, along with the cause-wise definitions that generated them.

Now, if the public standards of Christian discourse exclude Scotus' approach, do they impose Aquinas's? To answer this, one needs to grasp the heart of the two approaches. In the Scotist school, the logical relation between the two standards of possibility was an inclusion: whatever was naturally possible was supernaturally possible, because whatever a natural cause could do, the free Cause could do:

if anything is possible $_{N}$, it is possible $_{S}$

but not conversely. In the Thomist school, as Cajetan seems to have understood it, the logical relation between the two standards was an exclusion:

if anything is possible $_{N}$, it is **not** possible $_{S}$

and so, by transposition,

if anything is possible $_{S}$, it is **not** possible $_{N}$.

For if some thing or event were possible under both standards, it would have the contradictory character of being connatural to some creature and connatural to God alone (hence knowable without divine revelation and not knowable without it). Once the heart of the two approaches is clear, one can see that the public standards of Christian discourse impose Aquinas's approach simply by giving the word 'supernatural' the same meaning in 'supernatural potency' as it has in 'supernatural act'. For as soon as 'supernatural potency or possibility' means one connatural to God alone, 'natural potency or possibility' will mean one connatural to some creature, and then no potency or possibility can be both.

Let us now return to the text, where Cajetan is about to make the second argument for his own case.

> The second proof looks at potencies. "To every natural passive potency there corresponds a *proximate* active potency;" therefore [to every natural passive potency] there corresponds a *natural* active potency. The antecedent is the very general major assumed by Aristotle to prove that there exists an agent intellect (*De Anima III*, text 17);[119] it is based on his point that, in every nature, there has to be an agent [*i.e.* active] power where there is a patient [*i.e.* passive/receptive power]; and it is certain that he was talking about a proximate agent, not the [remote] First Agent — otherwise he would not have distributed the term 'nature', saying "in every nature," *etc.* Scotus is thereby precluded from saying that the First Agent suffices [to provide the active power corresponding to a natural passive potency]. [So the antecedent is sound.] The inference [from there to the consequent, that the corresponding active power is natural] is valid, because a supernatural power is not the *proximate* active factor of a natural potency, as is evident from the meanings of the words. For the natural is cognate only to the natural.[120]

Since Aristotle was authority for the Scotists, this second proof appeals to a premise of his. It was about natural passive potencies. In Aristotle, 'natural' was opposed to 'forced potency', and so for Aristotle a "natural passive potency" was not just any vulnerability to be changed. It was development-related. It was a thing's receptivity to change towards a more complete state according to its own line of completion. (*Cf.* Aquinas's definition in 1 *ST* q. 9, a. 2 *corpus*). Since the human specific difference is rationality, Aristotle thought that a human being's development lay along the line of understanding. Thus our receptivity to the means of understanding (the *species intelligibiles*) was a "natural passive potency." Scotus had this very thought in mind, when he argued that the sight of God was the greatest "completion" for our understanding, and that our receptive potency to it was therefore "natural." Having already criticized this move on other grounds, Cajetan now shows that it destroys Aristotle's argument for the existence in man of an active power-to-understand, called the agent intellect. That argument said in a nutshell that

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[119] The reference is to the beginning of chapter 5 in *De Anima III;* 430a10ff.

[120] Secundo ex parte potentiae sic. "Omni potentiae passivae naturali respondet aliqua potentia activa proxima;" ergo respondet potentia activa naturalis. Antecedens est maxima assumpta ab Aristotele (*De Anima III*, txt. 17) ad probandum dari intellectum agentem; fundatur enim super hoc quod in omni natura, ubi est patiens, oportet ponere agens; et certum est quod de proximo, non de primo, agente loquitur — alioquin distributivam non fecisset, dicens "in omni natura," etc. Et per hoc excluditur responsio Scoti dicentis quod sufficit quod detur primum agens. Consequentia autem probatur, quia potentia supernaturalis non est proximum activum naturalis potentiae, ut ex terminis patet: naturale enim soli naturali cognatum est.

> to every natural passive potency *P* in a given nature, there corresponds an active power *PN* in that nature.[121] Thus if we develop by receiving the means to understand *(species intelligibiles)*, we have an active power (agent intellect) to convert our sense data into such means.

For Scotists as well as Thomists, this argument of Aristotle's had to hold water, because it was their defense against the Averroists, who maintained that agent intellect was not a power in human nature but a separated substance (an angel, so to speak), whose world-wide influence put all the human animals into act to understand. Therefore neither school could allow the argument just mentioned to fail. But, says Cajetan, Scotus' move makes it fail. Scotus posits in the human soul a natural passive potency to the Vision with no corresponding active power in the soul (since Scotus agreed that the agent intellect could not put us in act to see God). Therefore, *contra* Scotus, our potency to the Vision must not be natural (not a can_n and hence not a can_N) but obediential (a can_S).

At this point, however, the reader needs to appreciate again the differences between this argument about potency and an earlier argument about intellectual desire (raised by C12/1, in Chapter Two above), with which Lubac and others have mistakenly confused it. First, the issue here is naturalness in mode, not in residence. Second, intellectual desire bears upon intensional objects. Potency may concern intensional act-states, but it does not bear upon intensional objects.[122] Hence Cajetan's argument here, that a creature's natural-in-mode passive *potencies* cannot be to act-states exceeding the scope of its natural active powers, says nothing against his argument above that, when man wonders about the First Cause, his nature-resident *desire* is seen to extend to an *object* which his natural active powers cannot secure for him. For man encounters tantalizing problems both in doing science and in receiving revelation, which provide new intensional objects for knowing and desiring, to which an already nature-resident wonder in man will

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[121] The elements were, of course, an exception, as we saw earlier in this chapter.

[122] *Cf. De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2, *sed contra* 6.

extend without ceasing to be nature-resident. But man's natural-in-mode potencies remain just what they are, no matter what intellectual problems are encountered. Hence Cajetan saw no contradiction in holding that man's potency to see God is obediential, while his intellect's desire (wonder, curiosity) to see Him is residence-natural.

We are ready now for Cajetan's third and last argument in support of his own case.

> The third proof looks at the subject [in which the alleged natural potency to a supernatural act would reside]. Since ideal scientific knowledge of a thing [quidditative knowledge of it] is a sufficient basis for knowing all its properties, and since all difficulties that come up about a thing are solved by appeal to this kind of knowledge, as it says in *Physics IV*,[123] it follows that all of a thing's *natural* potencies can be known if the thing itself is known in the ideally scientific way [quidditatively]. And since knowledge of a potency depends upon knowledge of its act (as it says in *Metaphysics IX*),[124] it follows that the acts to which these natural traits are potencies would be known. And since [some] such acts are supernatural in Scotus' view, it follows from all of the above that [on his view] supernatural things would be known from ideal scientific knowledge of a natural thing — which is transparently false. And here is a confirming argument. We know for sure this major premise: no natural potency is entirely unactualized [*frustra*]. Therefore, suppose we know this minor premise: there is found in some thing (be it matter, or the soul, or whatever) a natural potency to a supernatural act. Then there is no dodging our knowing this conclusion: so it has to be the case that supernatural things exist. And thus we will know the future resurrection of the dead [in a natural science] and sanctifying grace [in such a science], *etc.* Which is ridiculous. And no damage is done to this argument by Scotus' answer that the soul remains unknown under this description [as naturally in potency to supernatural acts]. For ideally scientific knowledge of anything leaves nothing natural to it unknown, since it formally or virtually contains the whole know-ledge of it. Nor can this be evaded by saying that a substance can't be known to us in this life in the properly and ideally scientific way; for whether that is so or not, my argument goes through, *i.e.* that from ideally scientific know-ledge of natural things (whether we may have it in this life or not) one can have knowledge of supernatural things. And thus **revelation** about grace, the blessedness promised to the saints, the resurrection, and so forth — all things to which there is posited a natural receptive potency which is not entirely unactualized — **will not be necessary absolutely** but only in a certain respect, only for our present state of life. And that is transparently false. The end.[125]

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[123] The reference is probably to 211a5-11.

[124] The reference is to chapter 8 in *Metaphysics IX*, 1049b15ff.

[125] Tertio ex parte subjecti. Cum enim quidditativa cognitio alicuius sit sufficiens ratio omnium

The force of this argument comes not just from Aristotle's remarks about the feritility of quidditative knowledge but also from Scotus' own interpretation of those remarks, as Cajetan read him. For Scotus, the whole of a natural science was contained virtually in its "subject," such that every truth knowable in the science was deducible from the starting points stating that subject's quiddity. Scotus even drew from this the odd consequence that no one science could cover two or more things that are quidditatively distinct (not even a genus and its species).[126] Scotus was in no position to deny, therefore, that in an ideal natural science of *x,* one learns every *natural* potency of *x* in the Aristotelian mode-natural sense of 'natural'. Such a natural potency could not be entirely unactualized. So if man has *such* potency to supernatural acts, ideal natural science learns of it and predicts the occurrence of such acts. Does anyone believe that?

No. Not if the topic is "ideal natural science" as we have it in this life. But what about the next life? For the Thomists, it was correct to say that supernatural realities do not become objects

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proprietatum eius, et ex ea solvantur omnes difficultates contingentes rei, ut in *IV Phys.* dicitur, consequens est quod, cognita quidditative re aliqua, cognosci ex ea possint omnes eius naturales potentiae; et cum potentiae cognitio ex actu pendeat (ut dicitur *IX Meta.*), consequens est quod actus ad quos sunt naturales potentiae cognoscantur; et cum huiusmodi actus sint supernaturales apud Scotum, sequitur de primo ad ultimum quod ex cognitione quidditativa alicuius naturalis cognoscuntur supernaturalia — quod est manifeste falsum. Et confirmatur. Quia certe scimus hanc majorem: quod nulla naturalis potentia est frustra. Ergo si scimus hanc minorem: quod in materia vel anima vel quacumque alia re est naturalis potentia ad actum supernaturalem, oportet concedere quod scimus supernaturalia illa debere esse — et sic sciemus resurrectionem mortuorum futuram, et gratiam iustificantem impium, etc., quod est ridiculum. Nec evacuat hanc rationem responsio Scotica, dicens quia anima secundum illam rationem est ignota. Cognitio namque quidditativa alicuius nihil naturale illius incognitum relinquit, cum continet formaliter vel virtualiter omnem illius notitiam. Nec evadetur dicendo quod substantia non potest a nobis pro statu isto quidditative et proprie cognosci; cum quicquid sit de hoc, habetur intentum, scilicet, quod ex quidditativa rerum naturalium cognitione (sive habeatur pro statu isto, sive non) possit scientia haberi de supernaturalibus; et sic revelatio de gratia, beatitudine pollicita, resurrectione, et aliis huiusmodi, ad quas naturalis ponitur potentia receptiva non frustra, erit necessaria secundum quid, scilicet, pro statu isto, et non simpliciter — quod est manifeste falsum. Haec de quarto. Finis.

[126] Scotus, *In I Sent.,* Prologue, q. 3. Aquinas had rejected this odd consequence in 2/1 *ST* q. 54, a. 1 *ad* 3 and in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics, lectio* 41. Cajetan therefore sought to elude it, too, in his commentary on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 7, sections viii-xi. To do so, he had to weaken the formal-deductivist character of natural science, so that new premises could be brought in, not entailed by the original starting points. But Scotus' model of a science was very formalist, indeed. The starting points stating the quiddity of the subject were axioms, and every truth of the science was a theorem provable from them.

of natural science in the next life either, but are still revealed.[127] Faith yields to sight because divine light revealing in obscurity yields place to the divine light revealing with evidentness, not because we get better natural science. To renew a comparison I made before, knowledge of furniture-forms does not emerge from the biological knowlege of trees, even as an angel would possess that biological knowledge. Ergo our soul's potency to such forms as divine Art gives it is non-natural. Cajetan did not think the opposite opinion was heresy, of course. Just obviously wrong.

G. Concluding evaluation.

(1) Cajetan's solution to the many-faceted difficulty presented in Chapter One of this study was nothing if not comprehensive. Every question raised in that chapter has been either resolved by his interpretation or thrown out as based on a false assumption. If there is a "loose end" anywhere, the present writer has missed it.

(2) Cajetan's decision to keep 'natural potency' as a technical term of Aristotelian natural science, meaning mode-natural potency (can $_n$) and having no application to revealed cases such as man's potency to receive a miraculous cure, a grace, charity, the light of glory, or the Vision of God, not only accorded perfectly with Aquinas' decision to make art the "point of insertion" for the supernatural but also paid handsome dividends. It brought NS language into *sacra doctrina* in a way that preserved its integrity as NS language and prevented the confusing, counter-intuitive uses at which Scotus arrived.

(3) Cajetan's decision to construe Augustine's *'posse naturae'* as potency natural in residence only and thus as applicable to revealed cases (and thus as more or less equivalent to *capacitas naturae*) also accorded with Aquinas's texts and paid the dividend of preserving the integ-

[127] See *De malo* q. 2, a. 5; 1 *ST* q. 12, articles 4 and 5; Cajetan's comments on q. 1, a. 2, sections viii and x-xi, and his comments on q. 1, a. 3, sections viii-ix.

rity of SD language as non-Aristotelian language. The marriage within theology of reason's language to faith's language was thus accomplished in such a way that the former did not "convert" the latter.

(4) His parallel decision to construe Aquinas's *desiderium naturae* as wonder resident in the nature of intellect but exceeding, in its ultimate objects, the powers of created intellect, so that Aquinas's description of this *desiderium* was NS talk up to a point but SD talk beyond that point, plausibly provided what Aquinas was after, above and beyond the sheer openness of intellectual nature to divine Art, namely, something in that nature that would accord with the Vision of God, as a good sculptor sees to it that the grain in the marble accords with the shape he is giving it.

(5) Still, there is an ambiguity. The claim that a natural tendency cannot be in vain is a claim of Aristotelian natural science. It is about mode-natural tendencies. Human intellectual wonder is mode-natural up to a point. Let it be the case that this wonder cannot be in vain, up to that point. But what happens beyond it, when the object of wonder is a thing whose nature we *cannot learn* by our natural powers? Cajetan concedes at this point, if I have read him correctly, that the wonder is no longer mode-natural. Is it therefore the case that it can be "in vain" anent that sort of object? If so, Aquinas' argument fetching in the premise that a natural desire cannot be in vain, to make it apply precisely at the point where the object of wonder was *such* an object (since it was the essence of the First Cause), was just a *bad* argument. Was Cajetan really conceding this and covering it up by saying, "Well, you have to see this argument as coming out of the perspective of theology, where it is supported by the additional premise that we *shall* have knowledge beyond our natural powers"? Or is there a different explanation?

I am not sure. But I think an answer may lie in the concept of a residence-natural *desiderium*. Recall that it means one "predicable of an entire species." Cajetan was prepared to admit that asking questions it cannot answer is something every human intellect does (perhaps, indeed, every created intellect). It is a species-wide characteristic in human beings. Therefore it

has status as an item of biological/anthropological interest. (In our day, it is the sort of thing whose evolutionary origin and adaptive value a Stephen Pinker would try to explain.) It was far from obvious, then, as a matter of Aristotelian science, that a species-wide characteristic could be pointless or "in vain." It was far from obvious, therefore, that a species-wide desire for answers could be in vain even anent ultimate questions. In that case, Aquinas's argument was not bad. **It was a plausible stretch of an NS argument.** And to serve in theology, it did not need to be any more. It did not need to be a demonstration, because in theology we already know that supreme insight is in our future, that we shall see face-to-face the One who answers all questions. The NS natural-desire argument simply had to illustrate how this point of Faith could be true, how it might chime-in with what we know from science about even the human intellect, the lowest intellect.

This interpretation accords with all the texts seen above. If it was Cajetan's thinking, then his view of intellectual nature shared a point often emphasized by the late Cardinal de Lubac: by virtue of something in our nature, every human mind desires to know what it cannot mode-naturally learn. It has a dynamism towards epistemological self-transcendence. Such a dynamism would be a fine grain, indeed, for the Sculptor to shape into Vision.

Chapter 5

Dominico Soto: In the Cause of an Augustinian End

Soto did not write extensively on the question that concerns this study, but what he did write was remarkable.[1] In 1549, in the first book of his *De natura et gratia*,[2] he devoted two chapters to the topic of what is left of a human being, if one mentally strips away orginal sin, grace, and any other supernatural gift. The residue was called man's *pura naturalia.* Soto maintained that, even so considered, we have the Vision of God as our natural end — not, to be sure, as our most natural end *(finis naturalissimus)*, but still as a natural end, as opposed to a supernatural one. This surprising claim he defended again in 1556 in his commentary on the Fourth Book of the *Sentences*.[3]

The two chapters from *De natura et gratia* (hereafter *NG*) are not very long, and it would not be wise to excerpt from them just the brief parts that are most controversial for present interests. The reader needs to get a feel for the whole exercise, which was a new kind of writing for a Thomist. It was not the prose of a scientific *disputatio.* The Latin was literary, polished, even breezy. The aim was to make a non-technical presentation of certain key Thomistic points, vital to unraveling the tangles of Luther. Those had begun with a point of medieval Augustinian theology from which Aquinas had dissented, and Soto wanted to lay out common-sensically the advantages of the Thomist position.

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[1] The facts of his life (1495-1560) are in V. Beltrán de Heredia's article, "Soto," in the *DTC.*

[2] Fratris Dominici Soto, Segobiensis, Theologi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, et Caesareae majestatis Caroli quinti Imperatoris a sacris confessionibus, ad sanctum concilium Tridentinum, *De natura et gratia* (Parisiis: apud Ioannem Foucher, 1549), folios 7r-13v.

[3] Dominicus Soto, *In Quartum Librum Sententiarum Commentarium* (Salamanca, 1556). For what this work adds to Soto's case, see below, Chapter Six, footnote 36.

Luther's tangles began with the idea that orginal sin (not as an act in Adam but as a sad inheritance in us) is identically concupiscence , *i.e.* our disorderly desire.[4] If that is true, then since such desire remains present in baptized persons, so does orginal sin.[5] From there, Luther could make his revolution by two simple moves: (a) by claiming that concupiscence is real sin (so that its presence in us puts an offensiveness to God into our every act),[6] and (b) by declaring concupiscence so strong as to render free choice an empty slogan in Adam's descendents.[7] In that case, free choice was lost by the Fall, and our nature has been not just weakened but depraved ever since. In that case, justification will have to be conceived along extrinsic/forensic lines, etc. In a panoramic refutation of Luther's whole account of nature and grace, Soto had to begin by breaking Luther's basic identifications. He had to show that concupiscence and free choice are compatible aspects of the "sheer nature" of man, so that they remain present when the whole business of grace-and-sin is subtracted. With that background, we can begin to read. (I should point out that we shall be reading only the main text; in the margins to it, Soto put occasional words naming an author or topic discussed. These marginalia will not concern us until very near the end.)

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[4] This identification is in Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* (*PL* 176, col. 107), and in Peter Lombard, *Liber II Sententiarum,* d. 30. In the Vivès edition of the *Libri Sententiarum* (Paris: 1892), the passage is on pp. 348-349. I should perhaps clarify that 'disorderly desire' in this context included any motions of one's sense appetites that preceded or resisted the exercise of one's rational self-control. So 'concupiscence' did not just mean unresisted sensual desires (such as passions wallowed in or indulged); it also meant those which were resisted.

[5] Both Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard held that the main difference baptism makes is that the guilt *(reatus)* of concupiscence is no longer imputed. This guilt was a kind of bond *(vinculum)* whereby the soul was held by the Devil and separated from God. But they also admitted a non-juridical effect: the force of concupiscence was somewhat mitigated by the grace of baptism. See Peter Lombard, *Liber II Sententiarum,* d. 32 (Vivès, p. 357). This last, of course, Luther would not accept.

[6] See propositions 2, 3, 31, 32, and 35 in the condemnatory Bull of June, 1520, against Luther, *Exsurge Domine* (*Denz.* ## 1452 ff).

[7] Proposition 36 in Luther's condemnation reads: Liberum arbitrium post peccatum est res de solo titulo; et dum facit quod in se est, peccat mortaliter (*Denz.* # 1486). After Erasmus broke with him on this issue, Luther expatiated upon it in his famous *De servo arbitrio.*

A. *NG I,* c. 3. On man conceived purely in his natural features

> While a man created purely in his natural features and left there, without original sin or grace, never has and (under God's current law) never can exist, still nothing prevents us from conceiving him mentally, for the sake of clearer reasoning.[8] Let us proceed, then, by imagining that a man thus natural has been created by God: a rational animal without original sin, grace, or any other supernatural gift. About a man like that, which was all the philosophers knew, we can ponder three points.[9]

Soto meant that the purely natural aspects of man were the only ones which the ancient philosophers could investigate. If he drew a distinction between man stripped in theology to sheer naturals and man studied in natural science or philosophy, he did not draw it here.

> First, with his nature lying intermediate between angels and lower creatures, and thus consisting of a rational soul as well as a body, he would enjoy two parts and two strengths, *i.e.* sense and reason. After the usage of the philosophers, we denote by 'sense' the whole sensitive part (cognoscitive and appetitive), as we denote by 'reason' the whole rational part (so that we take it to include the will). This is how Aristotle (*Ethics II*) distinguished two parts in man:[10] one that is endowed with reason, the other sensate, brute, devoid of reason, but (as he taught in *Politics I*) subject to reason — not with despotic servitude, as a slave to a master, having no right of its own and thus unable to refuse (only one's bodily members serve the mind that way), but with political obedience, as a citizen with the choice not to submit obeys his prince).[11] From these points it follows that the contest mentioned by Paul in Galatians, of flesh against spirit and spirit against flesh,[12] is congenital to man because of his nature; it arises out of these diverse parts. What 'concupiscence'(which will come up often hereafter) means, then, is to be sought in the natural power of man (or better said: in his natural weakness). At this point the wise reader

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[8] This sort of exercise had been pioneered by Aquinas, *In II Sent.* d. 31, q. 1, a. 2 *ad* 3. Cajetan did the same in his commentary on 2/1 *ST* q. 109, a. 2 (Leonine VII, pp. 292 ff).

[9] *caput 3. De homine in puris naturalibus mente concepto*
Igitur licet numquam fuerit, nec ex lege posita esse possit extra culpam et gratiam in mera sua natura creatus, et relictus homo, concipere illum tamen animo et effingere nihil vetat, clarioris disputationis gratia. Faciamus itaque imaginando, ut homo hunc in modum naturalis a Deo sit creatus: utpote rationale animal, absque culpa et gratia, et quovis supernaturali dono. De homine huiusmodi, qualem penitus philosophi agnoverunt, tria meditari possumus. (f. 7r)

[10] Actually, this distinction of parts is at the end of Book I, c. 13; 1102a5-1103a10.

[11] The reference is to *Politics I,* c. 5; 1254b1-5.

[12] Galatians 5:17

> should begin to see how much help natural philosophy is to understanding the Scriptures and matters of faith.[13]

By the 1540s, a distaste for the kind of theology that scholasticism had always been — theology absorbed with philosophical disputes — was so strong, and the need to refute Luther from the Scriptures was so urgent, that many bishops wished to turn theology wholly to literary, exegetical, and Patristic lines of work, tossing out Thomism, Scotism, and all the rest as obsolete equipment.[14] Such a catastrophe Magister Soto was working hard to prevent. With the Augustinian school still strong and well represented at Trent, Soto could not afford to say that Peter Lombard's Augustinianism had gotten us into this mess. But he could show what a useful weapon *this* point of Aristotle's doctrine had become. He sought to save Aristotelian-scholastic learning by showing that it could serve a new purpose: sound propaedeutic for the renewal of Biblical studies, to stanch the Protestant hemorrhage.

> But although the sensitive part contains both powers (cognoscitive and appetitive), in theological usage the appetite alone is what gets the name `sensuality'. The name comes from sensual motion, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate XII* [c. 12], because sensuality both beckons and pushes man beyond the bounds of reason, towards the things of sense pertaining to the body (as a faculty is named from its act, like 'sight' from seeing). Well, moving [us] pertains more to our appetitive faculty than to the cognoscitive, for a reason that St. Thomas expounded very learnedly in *1 ST* q. 81 [a. 1]: since the apprehensive faculty's operation is completed in receiving an object, while that of the

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[13] Primum quod cum suapte natura inter angelos et inferiores creaturas medius sit, atque adeo ex anima rationali et corpore constans, duabus polleret partibus et virtutibus, sensu scilicet et ratione. Nomine sensus, philosophorum more, partem totam sensilem nuncupamus: id est cognoscitivam et appetitivam: sicuti et rationis vocabulo, partem rationalem: ut intellectum cum voluntate. Ita enim Aris. *2 Ethi.* dissecat in homine partes binas, eam videlicet quae est rationis compos, atque sensilem alteram, brutam utique, atque rationis expertam, quae (ut *1 Politic.* docuit) rationi obedit: non quidem servitio despotico, uti servus domino, qui cum non sit sui iuris, non habet renitendi facultatem (hoc enim pacto sola corporea membra inserviunt animo) sed obsequio politico et regali: uti civis paret principi, utpote in cuius est arbitrio, non illi obtemperare. Ex his palam fit, luctam illam, cuius meminit Apostol. ad Galat. ut caro concupiscat adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem, esse homini a natura ingenitam: sane quae ex his diversariis partibus innascitur. Igitur quid nomen `concupiscentiae' (quod in subsequentibus crebro recurret) significet, ex naturali hominis potentia (nisi rectius dixerim impotentia) venandum est. Ut hic adnotare incipiat sapiens lector, quam sit philosophia naturalis, sacris literis, ac rebus fidei intelligendis adminiculo. (f. 7r-7v)

[14] Hubert Jedin, *Geschichte des Konzils von Trient*, vol. 2, *Die erste Trienter Tagungsperiode 1547/49* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1957) pp. 88f., 98f.

> appetitive faculty is completed in being inclined and borne towards the object, the former is compared to rest, the latter to motion. Now although such appetite is divided by the philosophers into two parts (the concupiscible part, whereby we tend towards things that suit us and away from those unfavorable to us, and the irascible part, whereby we resist obstacles and things that deter us from pursuing the things that suit us), nevertheless, the whole animal appetite is called concupiscence because (I guess) the concupiscible part is the foundation and purpose of the irascible. We never endure harsh conditions, nor undertake hard tasks, but for the sake of the favorable things that delight us — as none of us goes against an enemy in anger unless the latter is interfering with what we want to possess in peace. Concupiscence, then, is a disease endemic to us, a natural evil, quite apart from both Adam's justice and Adam's guilt, as we have examined more fully below in chapter 13. As to whether it has been augmented by sin, we make no determination at present.[15]

Having shown that sensuality or concupiscence is a natural phenomenon, not a matter of grace-and-sin, Soto was ready to turn to free choice.

> The second point we may consider about that man is that, as a rational animal, he would enjoy both reason and free will, as it says in Sirach 15, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." [16] Man was made in God's image in his nature because he enjoys intellect with memory and will. The Fathers see a threefold divine image in man: that of creation through his nature, that of re-creation through grace, and that of glorification through the blessed vision in heaven. Thus Damascene says that 'after His image' means the intellectual part and free will, which is self-dominion. A thing is made to the express image of another when it shows and represents its face (not just its other members); well, God's face and visage is the mind and freedom of the will. So while the vast remainder of creatures,

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[15] Etenim cum pars sensitiva, vim utranque comprehendat, porro cognoscitivam et appetitivam, appetitus tamen solus est, qui inter theologos nomen habet sensualitatis. Sumitur enim hoc nomen a sensuali motu, ut *12 de Tri.* ait Aug. eo quod sensualitas hominem extra rationis metas ad sensibilia, quae ad corpus pertinent, tum pelliceat, tum etiam concitet. Sicuti a suo actu denominatur potentia, ut a visione visus. Movere autem non tam proprie competit cognoscitivae potentiae, quam appetitivae. Cuius rationem perquam docte subiicit S. Tho. q. 81 in *1. p.* Idcirco quod cum operatio apprehensivae perficiatur in receptione objecti, appetitivae vero in eo quod inclinatur et fertur in objectum, illa, quieti, haec vero assimilatur motui. Atqui etsi appetitus huiusmodi in duas a philosophis dissectus sit partes: primam quidem concupiscibilem, qua in ea propendimus, quae conveniunt, eaque renuimus, quae nobis adversantur, alteram vero irascibilem, qua resistimus obsistentibus, et his quae deterrent, ne convenientia prosequamur, totus nihilominus animalis appetitus, nomen habet concupiscentiae. Ex eo, quantum coniicio, quod pars concupiscibilis, fundamentum est et finis irascibilis. Nunquam enim aggredimur tristia et ardua, nisi propter ea quae nos amica delectant. Ut nunquam quis hostem aggeditur ira, nisi quia in eo nocet, quod cupit in pace possidere. Est ergo concupiscentia, seclusa etiam Adae, et iustitia, et culpa, nobis nativus morbus, genuinumque malum, ut cap. 13 infra latius executi sumus. An vero ex peccato aucta fuerit, nihil modo definimus. (f. 7v)

[16] Sirach 15:14

> having just being, or life without mind, are merely a trace of God (like a print in the dust that records the foot, not the face), man is the one (after the angel) who by his nature represents somehow the face of God, as the Psalm says, "The light of thy countenance is signed upon us, O Lord." The same point is explicit in Genesis 1, where God says, "Let us make make man in our image and likeness, and let him have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air." It is as if He had said, "Let us make man to excel, like Us, in judgment and prevail in use of choice, so that, as he has mastery over himself and his own actions, so too he may rule the cattle and the rest lacking reason." Thus St. Thomas says (1 q. 96 [a. 1]) that all animals are naturally subject to man: (1) because lower things are for the sake of higher ones, (2) because the higher are the ones by whom the lower ought to be governed, and (3) because of the universal, all-embracing foresight that thrives in man.[17]

Soto's proof from *these* authorities that free choice belongs to man's purely natural aspects confirms the point that his man-in-*puris-naturalibus* is not a man as natural science sees him but a man as theology sees him, stripped down to certain limited aspects. This helps to explain what is coming as Soto turns to the topic of humanity's natural *raison d'être.*

> Yet hardly very often will the thought occur to someone that the reason God fashioned man out of mind and body was so that he might till the world and rule the rest of the animate and inanimate things. Man was not made for the world, but the world for man, as is broadly obvious. That is how Aristotle and the leading philosophers have long taught, with nature as their teacher; and we have shed more light on it through the splendid text of St. Paul, "The invisible things of God are seen through the things that have been made." For since (as Dionysius wrote in *De div. nom.*) the good is by nature diffusive of

[17] Secundum quod de homine illo consyderare licet, est, quod cum esset animal rationale, polleret utique ratione ac libero arbitrio: secundum illud Ecclesiast. 15. Fecit Deus ab initio hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Est namque homo suapte natura ea ratione ad imaginem Dei factus, quod intellectu pollet, atque memoria et voluntate. Trinam enim S. Patres speculantur in homine divinam imaginem: nempe creationis per naturam, recreationis per gratiam, et glorificationis per beatricem illam visionem patriae. Unde Damas. Quod secundum imaginem (inquit) est, intellectuale significat, et arbitrio liberum, quod est per se potestativum. Haec ille. Est etenim illud ad alius imaginem expressum, quod non solum caetera membra, verum faciem eius exhibet, et repraesentat: facies autem et vultus Dei, mens eius est, et voluntatis libertas. Ob idque cum reliquum creaturarum vulgus, quippe quae esse tantum habeant, aut sine mente vitam, vestigium Dei sit penitus (ut impressio pulveris, quae pedem, non faciem refert) homo post angelum, est, qui suapte natura faciem Dei, utcunque repraesentat: iuxta illud Psal. Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine. Id quod Gene. 1 explicate significatur, ubi ait Deus. Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit piscibus maris, et volatilibus caeli. Acsi dixisset. Hominem faciamus, qui iudicio, ut nos, praestet, et arbitrii usu valeat: atque adeo cum sui, suarumque actionum dominium habeat, pecoribus, caeterisque rebus ratione carentibus perinde dominetur. Unde S. Tho. 1 p. q. 96. omnia, inquit, animalia sunt homini naturaliter subiecta. Primo quia inferiora sunt, propter superiora. Secundo quia superiora sunt a quibus debent inferiora gubernari. Et tertio propter universalem omnium prudentiam, quae viget in homine. Haec ille. (ff. 7v-8r)

> itself,[18] God decided to make two substances open to receive Him *[sui capaces]*, to communicate to them His divine happiness, indeed, to fulfill them with the Love and Sight of Himself with which He Himself is fulfilled. But the incorporeal angel had no need of a corporeal world; only man did, and so that world — its ever-so-many heavens, stars, elements, and the myriad furnishings compounded of these — is man's staff of servants.[19]

Splendid as the prose is, we must notice that we have heard something strange. In a consideration of man "in *puris naturalibus*," we should not expect to hear about the divine decision to make intellectual creatures **so as to fulfill them** with the Love and Vision connatural to God Himself. Considering man in pure naturals, Soto told us, was considering him *absque quovis supernaturali dono*. Are we about to be told that having God's Vision for our end is not a supernatural gift to humanity, but a status we have by our nature? Does the appeal to Dionysius' famous text mean that, for Soto, it was just "in the nature of things" that God would share Himself out **in this way** to such creatures as would be open to it? Let us read on.

> A third point, then, about this natural man *[homo physicus]* of ours would be that he has two ends: one commensurate with his natural strength and ability to achieve (whether of intellect or of will), and one that lies beyond his strength to achieve.[20]

Remarkable, isn't it? Two ends — not one natural and one grace-given, as we read in *De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2 — but two ends that go with our mere nature itself, one within its powers to achieve, one not. It will turn out, of course, that the commensurate end is a this-worldly affair,

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[18] Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagetica, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4 (*PG* 3, col. 700).

[19] Haud tamen subinde cogitatio quempiam subeat, eam fuisse Deo causam condendi hominis ex animo et corpore, ut mundi colonus esset, caeterisque animantibus, et rebus inanimis praeficeretur: quoniam non propter mundum homo, sed mundus propter hominem, quam late patet, fabricatus est. Id quod Aristotel. et principes philosophi, natura magistra, praedocti sunt: et nos inter enarrandum locum illum Pauli, quod invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, conspiciuntur, fusius elucidavimus. Cum enim, authore in de divi. no. Dionysio, bonum suapte natura sui fit ipsius diffusivum, duas Deus substantias sui capaces statuit effingere, cum quibus divinam suam felicitatem communicaret: sane ut eas suiipsius amore et conspectu bearet, quibus est ipse beatus. At propter incorporeum angelum, nullo opus fuerat corporeo mundo, sed solum propter hominem: cuius proinde servitium est, quantacunque est caelorum, astrorum, et elementorum moles, ex hisque mystorum numerosissima supellex. (f. 8r)

[20] Tertia ergo fuerit de nostro isto physico homine consyderatio. Nempe duos esse hominis fines: alterum qui suae commensuratus est naturali virtuti, et facultati, sive qua parte ad intellectum spectat, sive qua pertinet ad voluntatem: alterum vero qui eius virtutem excedit. (f. 8v)

while the higher one is a Vision of God. But before we follow Soto into his descriptions of these ends, it will be well to register two questions crucial to the further interpretation of his text.

The first is about subjunctives. Twice in this chapter so far, Soto has switched from the indicative to the imperfect subjunctive *('polleret')* to tell us what that imagined man "would enjoy." Now we have a perfect subjunctive *('fuerit')* to say what a third consideration of that man "would be." Are these subjunctives to be taken seriously as conveying counter-factual claims, or are they a literary device meant to enliven what would otherwise be an abstract discussion?

The reason this matters is because, if the subjunctives are meant to express serious counter-factuals, we are watching the famous hypothesis of pure nature being born — though hardly with its standard content! The hypothesis of pure nature was the claim that man could have been created with no supernatural endowment in hand or in prospect — could have been created, in other words, with nothing to him or for him but his *pura naturalia*. The hypothesis of pure nature arose by projecting a consideration into a possibility. The consideration itself was nothing but the remainder of a mental subtraction, thinking away certain features from actual humanity (much as *materia prima* was the remainder of a mental subtraction thinking away any and all "form" from actual bodies). Projecting the consideration into a possibility was quite another step. It was making the remainder a possible entity — in this case, a possible man. To say that man in sheer nature is a possible man is to say that God could have created a human race in that condition, which is to say that, among the possible world-plans God could have adopted, there is at least one in which such a human race is planned. Then, to say how that purely natural race *would be* (as opposed to just *might be*) is to make a universal claim about all the possible world-plans in which a human race in that condition is posited. Thus to say that humanity in pure nature *would have* two ends (one of them, a Vision of God), is to say that the human race in pure nature has those ends in every possible world-plan in which it is posited.

This analysis of counterfactual talk will apply here, if what Soto meant by 'nature' was

nature $_e$, the essence that any possible human would have — but not if he meant nature $_b$, the birth-endowment of actual people. This endowment need not follow us into another world-plan, nor attach to our counterparts there (though it would follow us into all the futures consistent with the actual world-plan). Which sense of 'nature', then, did Soto have in mind? Nothing in the text below tells us explicitly. But if Soto was clear-headed about his enterprise, the answer is obvious. In a project to settle what would be left of humanity in pure naturals, appealing to *Aristotle* makes no sense, unless one is after the "naturals" of essence; for humanity in its current birth-endowment is *in original sin*, which had to be subtracted if Soto's *consideratio* was to do its job. We shall find, then, that the nature left in remainder by Soto's theological subtracting was nature $_e$.

In that case, the two ends were tied to the human *essence*, and any world-plan which was possible for God to choose was one in which human beings had those ends *or did not exist.* In short, God could not have created human beings without their having those two ends. Since Soto mentioned the angels, we had better include them, so that this interpretation of Soto's subjunctives leads to a remarkable proposition:

> God could not have created intellectual creatures without their having a Vision of Him as their end.

I put the indefinite article in front of `Vision' to preserve the two further interpretations to which this proposition is susceptible. It could mean that these creatures would have as one of their ends some Vision or other, perhaps one in which God is just seen as First Cause. On that reading, we have

> God could not have created intellectual creatures without their having a Vision or Vision-Lite of Him as an end of theirs.

So read, Soto's subjunctives would make him a pioneer of the rosy hypothesis of pure nature, in which man would have all the comforts of the real world but none of them would be "entitatively" supernatural, not even his everlasting bliss. Such was to be the theory of Pedro

Descoqs, S.J., and his allies.[21]

Or it could mean that these creatures would have as one of their ends just *the* Vision, the same one actual people have been promised in the Gospel. On this other reading we have

> God could not have created intellectual creatures without their having the Beatific Vision as their end.

This proposition seems impossible to separate from one incriminated by Pius XII in his 1950 encyclical, *Humani generis:*

> Others destroy the gratuitous character of the supernatural by suggesting that it would be impossible for God to create rational beings without ordaining them to the beatific Vision and calling them to it.[22]

Such are the results of taking Soto's subjunctives as meant to express genuine counterfactuals, in which the consideration of man in *puris naturalibus* is projected as a possible sort of man. Should the subjunctives be pressed in that direction? It is almost certain that they should not. Almost certainly, they are nothing more than a literary device to stimulate the imagination. Soto meant to talk about no human race but the actual one. He meant to project no possibilities but simply to pursue a genuine subtractive *consideratio.*

What, then, was Soto saying? That brings up the second question that I wished to register at this point. It is about the next life. When he said, "Let us proceed by imagining a man thus natural," did he mean

without any supernatural gift in this life *nor in the next,*

or did he just mean

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[21] Pedro Descoqs, S.J., *Le mystère de notre élévation surnaturelle* (Paris: Beauchesne et ses fils, 1938).

[22] Alii veram 'gratuitatem' ordinis supernaturalis corrumpunt, cum autument Deum entia intellectu praedita condere non posse quin eadem ad beatificam visionem ordinet et vocet: *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 42 (1950), p. 570. Henri de Lubac had been accused of holding this proposition in his *Surnaturel* (1946) by certain Roman theologians such as C. Boyer: *Gregorianum* 28 (1947), pp. 379-395. In fact, Lubac rejected counterfactual claims altogether (as limiting the freedom of God) and held a much more subtle position, as he attempted to make clear in a masterful self-defense, "Le mystère du surnaturel," *Recherche de science religieuse* 36 (1949), pp. 89-121.

without any supernatural gift in this life (leaving the next as it actually is)?

I shall call these two options the strong interpretation and the weak one.

- On the strong interpretation, Soto was saying that actual man, considered theologically, indeed, but only as what is left of him after every supernatural gift has been subtracted from this life *and the next,* still has the Beatific Vision as one of his ends. This can only mean that having that End is not a supernatural gift. It is a ____ of man's nature, the blank standing-in for a word we do not yet know. Should it be 'consequence'? 'need'? 'just requirement'? 'desire'? It matters hugely which word is correct, and later parts of the text will settle the matter. Meanwhile, some readers may feel that this strong interpretation really implies one of the suspect counterfactual claims examined earlier. The implication would be this: if having-the-Vision-as-end is a ____ of man's nature, then folk of that nature would have this end in any world-plan in which folk of that nature existed, and so God could not create human beings without their having it. Again, the implication is sound if "nature" is nature_e .

- On the weak interpretation, Soto was saying that actual man, considered as what is left of him after every supernatural gift has been substracted from this life *only,* still has the Beatific Vision as one of his ends. This claim is obviously correct, if 'has it as an end' just means 'has been assigned it by God'. No one would dispute it. This weak interpretation suits perfectly, moreover, the needs of a refutation of Luther, whose quarrel with the Church was not about the Beatific Vision but about nature-and-grace in this life.

Nevertheless, we shall discover that the strong interpretation is confirmed by the remainder of the text. We shall find that the blank in it is to be filled by 'desire': having-the-Vision-as-end is a <u>natural desire</u> of humankind. And we shall find that the oddity of this position is not the counterfactual that it implies but the meaning of 'having-as-end' that it contains. But let us not race too far ahead of the text. Let us now rejoin Soto as he describes the other end of man, the one commensurate with his natural active abilities.

> [As to the natural ability of intellect,] in this life "a being" is our intellect's natural object either because it is a sense-object or because it is seen by abstracting from sense-objects. Nature readily suggests why: since our soul is the act of a body, our knowing must start in sensation and finish in the intellect. Hence Aristotle's axiom that nothing is in our intellect that wasn't first in our senses. Since the intellect is an immaterial faculty, it is able to lift the mind's eye from the effects presented [to the senses] to contemplate higher and spiritual causes. This has very little relevance to the present work and will probably bore the readers, whose interests lie elsewhere.[23]

This short passage is in good agreement with what Aquinas said about our intellect's proportionate object[24] and is alluding lightly to the *desiderium naturae* that lifts our mind in wonder to causes beyond its proportionate object.

> But as regards [the natural ability of] human willing and free choice (which this work will mention often), the thing to notice is this: since man is a rational animal, his most natural end *[finis eius naturalissimus]* is to act always according to reason, *i.e.* to do everything for an upright good, where and when he ought, going by the rules of prudence laid down by reason. But the purpose of all his duties in this life is peace and a calm state of the public order. For man is a political animal, born to live in association, and hence tending by his nature to conduct himself (towards himself, his family, and then his fellow citizens) in such a way as to preserve public peace, love and goodwill. This end is all that the natural philosophers contemplated. For its sake civil laws have been enacted, ranks and offices created in public life. We are not just saying that acting according to reason is inborn in man, as flying is in birds, swimming in fish, creeping in the beasts of the field. For these doings are not ends, but means, by which they achieve an end (say, food to live on). Rather we are saying that this is the end and goal for which nature has produced us — as a heavy thing's nature is to be moved towards the center, a light thing's to be borne upwards, the sun's to give light, fire's to burn.[25] This proposition

[23] Intellectus naturale obiectum in hac vita est ens, vel quod sensibus obiectum est, vel quatenus per abstractionem a sensibilibus conspicitur. Ratio quam in promptu ipsa suggerit natura, est, quod cum anima nostra sit actus corporis, necesse est nostram cognitionem a sensu inchoari, et intellectu perfici. Unde est axioma illud Arist. Nihil est in intellectu, quin prius fuerit in sensu. Quocirca cum intellectus potnetia sit immaterialis, potens est ex praesentatis effectibus ad supernas, spiritualesque causas contemplandas mentis occulos erigere. Hoc autem et perparum ad praesentem rem pertinet, et erit forte legentibus insuave, aliarum rerum avidis. (f. 8v)

[24] 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 4; 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6, and *CT* c. 104

[25] Soto was speaking loosely. In Aristotelian natural science, the motions of moving down/up were neither the nature nor the end of heavy/light things; the motions were the nature-set ways they got to their ends, which were the low/high places in which they rested. Neither were the operations of giving light and burning the ends for the sake of which the sun/fire acted; they were the distinctive operations in which they achieved whatever it was they acted for (say, to communicate their being).

> does not need supporting arguments; it is a postulate, as dialecticians say, that emerges at once from the definition of man: 'rational animal' implies 'animal born to live by reason'. Yet this task is naturally in-born in us in such a way that sensuality still impedes us from performing what we were born to do. For as we were saying in the first consideration, an "appetite" whose nature it is to be carried forcibly towards its objects, beyond reason's command, either tosses reason aside or gives great trouble to one who resists it.[26]

This is a beautifully written passage, but the reader may have noticed something odd about it. The contemplation of divine things, which the philosophers also put into the end-of-man as best they could figure it out, has gone missing. It was not missing from Aquinas's account of the "end the philosophers knew," as the reader will recall from texts examined above.[27] It was, in fact, the key ingredient; it was the very factor that gave the "end the philosophers knew" its analogical likeness to the end God is in fact preparing for us (2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 6). And surely the employment of reason upon noble topics is not *minus naturale* to a "rational animal" than living sociably. Why, then, does the contemplation of truth about divine things not appear prominently in Soto's account of our *finis naturalissimus?* Let us leave that question hanging and read on. The chapter is close to its end.

Here one may well raise a question. If the nature of sensuality is to act

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[26] At quatenus ad humanam voluntatem, liberumque attinet arbitrium (id cuius frequens futura nobis est mentio) animadvertendum est, quod cum homo sit rationale animal, finis eius naturalissimus est operari semper secundum rationem, id est, omnia agere propter honestum, quando, et ubi oportet, secundum prudentiae regulas, a ratione praescriptas. Suorum autem finis officiorum in hac vita, est, pax, tranquillusque status reipublicae. Est enim homo politicum animal, natum in societate vivere, ob idque suapte natura in hoc propensum, ut ea se ratione gerat, primum respectu sui, mox respectu familiae, ac demum respectu civium, qua ratione pax in republica, charitas, et benevolentia perpetuo constet. Hunc penitus finem philosophi naturales speculati sunt. In hunc positae sunt civiles leges, ordinesque et magistratus in republica constituti. Nec solum astruimus, agere secundum rationem, nativum esse homini: veluti avibus, volare: natare, piscibus: terrestribusque animalibus, gradi. Haec enim non sunt fines, sed opera media, quibus consequuntur finem, puta victum, ut vivant. Sed dicimus, finem esse, et scopum, in quem nos natura produxit. Sicuti natura rei gravis est, moveri ad centrum: levis, sursum ferri: solis, illuminare: ignis, exurere. Nec ista est propositio, quae persuaderi opus habeat, sed postulatio, quam dicunt dialectici, quae ex ipsa diffinitioe hominis statim liquet. Hoc enim ipsum pollet, animal rationale, quod animal in hoc natum, ut ratione vivat. Veruntamen ita est munus hoc nobis innatum a natura, ut tamen sensualitas nobis fit impedimento, ne semper id praestare possimus, ad quod nati sumus. Nam, ut in prima consyderatione dicebamus, appetitus qui suopte ingenio praeter rationis iussum impetu fertur in sua objecta, aut rationem post se praecipitat, aut negotium, molestiamque illi facessit renitenti. (ff. 8v-9r)

[27] *De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2 and 3 *CG* c. 63.

against reason, and sensuality is indeed present in human nature, why don't we say it is "natural" for man to act against reason as well as in keeping with it? The reason is clear and plain. To act in keeping with reason belongs to man because of his form, and from his highest level, whence he gets his species, while acting against reason comes because of his matter and from his lowest level, shared with the beasts (which is being sense-endowed); hence the former is rightly judged "natural" to man without qualification, while the latter is only natural with a qualifier ("as to sensuality") and is "against nature" unqualifiedly. By contrast, the traits of being bodily, mortal, sense-endowed, and the like, though predicated by reason of our matter, are said unqualifiedly of man, since they display nothing against reason. This manner of speaking is found in St. Paul, too, where he says, "If I do what I would not, 'tis no longer I but sin dwelling in me." [28] For the evil we do *willingly* when reason is down "we" are said to "do" without qualification; but the allurement that is in concupiscence even when our will is rejecting it is hardly "our own" but belongs to sensuality.[29] Hence we did not call the latter a "good" of nature above, but its ill, vice, disease, as will emerge more below in c. 13. For the same reason, all virtues (even according to the philosophers, as Augustine says in *De civi. Dei XIV* and Aquinas in 2/1 q. 71) are according to man's nature, while all vices are against his nature. Hence Dionysius says in c. 4 of *De div. nom.*, "Man's good is to be in line with reason; his evil, outside reason." So much for the end of man commensurate with our nature's powers.

We have another, so far surpassing our nature's strength and powers that we cannot even reach it in thought, much less in reality. It lies in laying hold of God, supremely loved, in face-to-face vision. "For this," says Truth itself, "is eternal life, that they should know thee, the true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent" — *i.e.* that by knowing Thee by faith in this life, they might seek Thee in hope, worship Thee with love, and by doing these come at last to lay hold of Thee, the loved One, by sight. For seeing is the reward of believing, according to the text, "Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face," and this last is the laying hold that fulfills hope. "So run," it says, "that you may lay hold." Hence, as the just man in this life lives by faith, *i.e.* doing just deeds in hope of what he is to see, so also in the next life the blessed shall live by vision, satisfied with the sight of the God hoped for and loved. As eternal life begins here in knowing God, so shall it come to completion there in knowing Him. This is not the place to argue over the act in which blessedness lies. It has to involve both intellect and will, which is enough for us at present.[30]

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[28] Romans 7:20.

[29] Soto knew the rules for predication *simpliciter* and predication *secundum quid.* Using them here gave him a chance to give an *apologia* for this now unpopular precision: St. Paul spoke this way, too. The Pauline precedent would serve later in *NG* to rebut Luther's claim that even resisted concupiscence was personal sin.

[30] Sed hic quispiam merito percontetur. Si natura sensualitatis est, contra rationem agere, et sensualitas ipsa in natura inest penitus hominis, cur non dicamus perinde naturale esse homini, agere contra rationem, atque agere secundum rationem? Ratio conspicua est, et manifesta. Nanque cum operari secun-

So ends Soto's chapter 3. Without further remark, we hasten along to his next.

B. *NG I,* c. 4. What duties a man with only his natural features could perform.

Chapter 4 of *NG I* begins with a presentation of what man can do without the help of grace, partly drawn from the doctrines Aquinas presented in 2/1 *ST* q. 109, articles 2-5, and partly from other sources.

> These points pave a way for us to investigate what that man naturally could and could not do, if deprived of the help of grace. Our plan is to discuss that one state of man. It will emerge easily through three conclusions, based on the previous three considerations. (1) Supported by God's general help alone, that man could know the one, first, founding Cause of things and what natural right teaches about man's duties and virtues, and these he could also practice sometimes in deed and custom. At this point, we don't propose to prove this conclusion from all its causes. Since there is nothing written in Scripture or the Fathers about this man we are imagining, it will make better sense to shed light on it below, in c. 20, where we shall be talking about man in original sin and we shall take up the same question more deeply. For now, it will be

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dum rationem competat homini ratione formae, a supremoque eius gradu, unde sortitur speciem: agere autem contra rationem, obtingat ratione materiae, nempe ab infimo gradu, communi sibi cum brutis (quod est sensitivum) merito illud iudicatur esse ei simpliciter naturale, hoc vero naturale secundum quid, id est, secundum sensualitatem, simpliciter autem contra naturam. Tametsi, esse corporeum, mortalem, sensitivum, et talia, licet praedicentur ratione materiae, quia tamen nihil prae se ferunt contra rationem, simpliciter enunciantur de homine. Atqui et in Paulo reperitur etiam genus hoc loquendi: ubi ait. Si autem quod nolo, illud facio, iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Id enim mali, quod succumbente ratione, volentes facimus, dicimur simpliciter nos facere, ea autem illecebra, quae renuente voluntate, est in concupiscentia, haud nostra est propria, sed ipsius sensualitatis. Quam propterea supra non appellavimus bonum naturae, sed malum eius, et vitium, et morbum: ut infra cap. 13. explicatius liquebit. Qua etiam de re, virtutes omnes, etiam secundum philosophos, ut author est Aug.14.de ci.dei, et S. Tho.12.q.71. sunt secundum naturam hominis: vitia vero universa, contra naturam. Unde, 4.cap.de divi.no.Dionysius. Bonum (inquit) hominis est, secundum rationem esse, malum autem, praeter rationem. Et haec de illo fine hominis, qui viribus naturae nostrae commensuratur. Est veruntamen finis nobis alter, virtutem, viresque naturae nostrae longius exuperans, quam ut a nobis possit, vel cognitione, ne dum re ipsa pertingi. Id consistit in Dei summe amati per facialem visionem comprehensione. Haec est enim (inquit veritas ipsa) vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te Deum verum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum. Quod est, ut te in hac vita fide cognoscentes, spe appetant, charitate excolant, quibus te tandem officiis deamatum videndo comprehendant. Est nanque visio, praemium fidei: iuxta illud. Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem: eademque simul est, quae spem terminat, comprehensio. Nam sic currite, inquit, ut comprehendatis. Quare ut iustus hic ex fide vivit, sane dum spe eorum quae visurus est, iusta operatur, ita et beatus visione illic vivet, dum conspectu sperati amatique Dei satiabitur. Atque adeo, ut vita hic aeterna a cognitione Dei exordium sumit, ita et illic cognitione perficitur. Sed non est hic concertandi, vero in actu beatitudo consistat. Est veruntamen uterque intellectus, scilicet, et voluntatis, necessarius: quod satis in praesentia nobis est. (f. 9r-9v)

> enough to submit the matter to natural reason, which deposes as follows regarding [this man's] knowledge. It is the nature of produced things that each should represent its causes, and it is inborn in man (as we were saying before) to uncover causes, for whatever reason they are causes, from sensed effects. So, since God is the first Cause and highest End of all the things we sense, man will be able to advance to knowing Him through these visible things. One must bear in mind, however, that since God does nothing in creatures as Three, but as One (as theologians say, the outward works of the Trinity are undivided), the way one gets to know Him from things is not as Three but as One highest Cause and End, whence all things flow and whither all things tend by seeking, each in its own way and order. This is what the Apostle said in chiding the philosophers. "For what is known of God," *i.e.* knowable of God by natural wit, "is manifest to them. For God hath manifested it unto them." [31] That he is talking about manifesting through the light of nature comes out in what follows. "For the invisible things of Him are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and divinity." For these are the things of God that nature's light displays through creatures: that He is one, eternal in power, wise, good, and whatever else the fabric of this world says about Him by its vastness, order, and beauty. "The heavens are telling the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork." In these the natural philosophers saw God, then, the Best and Greatest. But that is not all. They knew that all things existed and developed for man, and that man was for the First Cause, which is the highest End of all, and so they knew that man owed to the First Cause obedience and worship in the form of good deeds.[32]

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[31] Romans 1:19.

[32] *caput 4. Quaenam officia homo in puris naturalibus praestare posset*

Per haec communita nobis via est, ad investigandum quid homo ille naturaliter posset, quidque minime, si auxilio esset gratiae destitutus. Hoc enim propositum nobis est de singulo hominis statu disserere. Quod per tres hic conclusiones, ex praefatis tribus consyderationibus appendentes, constabit facile. Prima. Posset tunc ille homo solo generali auxilio Dei suffultus, et unam primam rerum conditricem causam nosse, et ea quae naturale ius de officiis, virtutibusque humanis docet, tum pernoscere, tum etiam quandoque usu et more praestare. Neque vero est, ut velimus in praesentia conclusionem hanc ex omnibus suis causis demonstrare. Nam cum de hoc homine, quem fingimus, nihil, vel in sacra pagina, vel apud S. Patres scriptum sit, commodius elucidabitur cap.20. ubi de homine in originali culpa, eadem altius repetenda est nobis quaestio. Modo interim satis fuerit, rationem naturalem subiicere. Quae quantum ad cognitionem, talis est. Natura est effectarum rerum, ut suas quaeque causas repraesentent, ingenitumque est homini (ut paulo ante dicebamus) ex praesensis effectis causas rimari: qua ratione sunt causae. Cum ergo Deus prima sit rerum omnium, quas sentimus, causa, et supremus finis, poterit homo ad eius notitiam per haec visibilia promoveri. Attamen consyderandum est, quod cum Deus nihil agat in rebus, quatenus trinus, sed quatenus unus (quoniam ut dictum est a theologis, opera trinitatis indivisa sunt extra) non cognoscitur ex rebus inquantum trinus, sed inquantum una summa causa, et finis, unde omnia dimanant, et quo omnia, suo quodque modo et ordine, appetitu tendunt. Et hoc est quod ait Apostolus inter obiurgandum philosophos. Quia quod notum est Dei, id est, acumine naturali de Deo est cognoscibile, manifestum est illis. Deus enim illis manifestavit. Et quod loquatur de manifestatione per lumen naturae, plane liquet ex eo quod sequitur. Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque eius virtus et divinitas. Haec enim sunt, quae de Deo per creaturas patefacit naturae radius: nempe, ut sit unus, sempiternae virtutis, sapiens, bonus, et caetera quae haec mundi machina mole sua, ordine, et pulchritudine, con-

This summary of what the philosophers "knew" is breathtaking, not because it is drawn from some *philokalia* rather than serious wrestling with ancient thinkers (much less Averroes!), but because it shows no interest whatsoever in the difference between demonstrations and plausible conjectures. Neither Aquinas nor Cajetan could have written a paragraph like this. For them, the philosophers "knew" what they were able to prove, not what they conjectured as plausible and the Faith happened to confirm. This difference was crucial to Aquinas in his handling of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where it made all the difference in the world what Aristotle could prove about our fulfillment and what he could not. It was crucial, too, at the beginning of *CG* for Aquinas's sorting of points about God into those the philosophers could demonstrate and those that are *known* only by revelation (a sorting which the Church found indispensable at Vatican I).[33] Worst of all, perhaps, a thinker who does not pay attention to the difference between proofs and plausible arguments cannot interpret a thinker who does. As a reader of Aquinas, the careless thinker will continually inflate the arguments he reads into proofs, as though every *ratio* in *CG* were a knock-down argument. As a reader of Cajetan (or Scotus!), such a thinker will be even more at sea.

As we return to the text, we shall see that things improve in this chapter as Soto's topic shifts from speculative to practical knowledge, and as his source shifts to Aquinas.

> By the same natural light, that man could tell good from bad, upright from base, and could see very well the first basics of human life: do to others what you want done to you, don't do what you don't want done to you. He could then know that man is a political animal, so that one person owes to another those duties whereby peace and calm public order may obtain between them.

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fitetur de illo et praedicat. Caeli enim enarrant gloriam Dei, et opera manuum eius annunciat firmamentum. In quibus proinde philosophi naturales Deum opt. maximum speculati sunt. Neque id tantum de Deo agnovere, sed cuncta propter hominem esse, et moveri: hominem vero propter primam causam, quae est summus omnium finis. Et ideo causae illi supernae obedientiam, et rebus bene gestis cultum ab homine deberi. (ff. 9v-10v)

[33] *Denz.* 3005, 3015.

From the first part of conclusion (1), about knowing, the other part follows. The man in pure naturals, cut off from original justice or sin, with God's general concurrence alone, could sometimes do an upright deed, one that would be "morally good." For since practical knowledge by its nature is only for the sake of doing (as Aristotle vouches in *Ethics II),*[34] if man was able to judge an upright good with his mind, he could also pursue it sometimes with his will's love and perform it in practice, at least as far as it is done for an end prescribed by nature. As we were saying a moment ago, man is a rational animal, *i.e*. naturally apt to live according to reason; therefore he can sometimes do so by the strength and powers of his nature. For it is impossible to believe that there are powers in sensuality for overcoming reason, while man gets no strength from his nature for reason to overcome sensuality, even though the latter is perfectly natural to man (as we said) but the former is against his nature. We set this point down in advance against those (Gregory of Rimini is their chief) who attack the idea that man can, without God's special help, either know sufficiently or accomplish a morally good work — on the ground that such a work has to be intended for God, which cannot happen naturally.[35] This is the position of those who fail to distinguish clearly between man's natural end and his **supernatural end**.[36] 'A morally good work' means the same as 'a good work commensurate with the natural end', *i.e.* done just for the sake of an upright end. For unless the upright end is compromised by bad circumstances, it is *virtually* intended for God by its very nature, especially since it can also be intended for Him naturally *in act*, inasmuch as His being the ultimate natural Purpose can be known naturally, from creatures, and that is enough to make an act morally good. It would beggar belief if other things, animate and inanimate, had the natural ability to reach their own ends, but man, the noblest of them all, got no strengths from his nature to ever reach the end prescribed in morals. Paul, on the contrary, made the philosophers "without excuse" for knowing God but failing to glorify Him as God. So they are without excuse for that reason; but if they had done morally good works (as natural law showed and enabled), God would have supported them with more special favor and help, to reconcile them to Himself. But these points will be discussed more fully in c. 20; they should be passed over here, where we are just laying the natural foundations.[37]

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[34] At the beginning of chapter 2, 1103b26-30.

[35] Augustine had advanced the same ground in criticising the alleged virtues of the old Romans. Gregory of Rimini belonged to the order of Hermits of St. Augustine, taught at Paris and at several universities in Italy, and died in 1358 while serving as Superior General of his order. Despite a penchant for nominalism in logic, he was renowned for his rigid Augustinianism in theology.

[36] Emphasis added. Note the term, because Soto will allude back to this later and "correct" his language.

[37] Atque eadem luce naturali discernere homo ille potuit inter bonum, et malum: honestum, et turpe: illaque prima vitae humanae elementa notissima cernere. It facias aliis, quod tibi vis fieri: idque ne facias, quae neque velis tibi. Poteratque demum nosse hominem esse animal politicum, officiaque subinde alios aliis debere, quibus pax, tranquillaque respublica inter eos consisteret. Ex hoc priori membro conclusionis

Still, we add a second conclusion. (2) Man could not, out of his purely natural features, accomplish the whole good of nature, *i.e.* act well morally everywhere he should. The reason turns up at once. Even in his natural features, man would be in a constant duel of sensuality against reason; and so inevitably reason would succumb to its enemy — not always, but often, unless it had supports from God — succumb not only because of sensuality's attack but also because of the body's weakness. Even though the body obeys with slavish obedience, it still gets tired and, when weary, cannot be at reason's beck and call. Hence man could keep one or another precept of nature — not to merit God's friendship (to be discussed shortly) but as to the substance of the act, to avoid sin through a morally good deed. But often enough, he could not even do that, as we shall discuss more fully in c. 22. But we have proof of this by experience among those not in God's grace, and especially among unbelievers, who, deserted by God, rot in every riot of vice.[38]

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de cognitione, consequens et alterum fit. Sane quod valeret homo ille in puris naturalibus, quavis originali, seu iustitia seu culpa semota, solo nutu generali Dei, opus aliquod honestum quandoque efficere, et quod esset (ut aiunt) moraliter bonum. Enimvero cognitio rerum agibilium non est, a natura sua, nisi propter opus, ut 2.Ethic. author est Aristo. ergo si potens erat homo vi intellectus iudicare bonum honestum, poterat etiam et illud per voluntatem nonnunquam amore prosequi, et more praestare: saltem quatenus ordinatur in finem a natura praescriptum. Item homo (ut paulo ante dicebamus) natura sua est animal rationale, id est, aptum natum secundum rationem vivere: ergo potest id quandoque vi, et viribus naturae suae consequi. Est enim persuasu impossibile, vires inesse sensualitati expugnandi rationem, nullam tamen suppetere virtutem a natura homini, ut ratione vicissim superet sensualitatem, cum hoc maxime (ut dicebamus) naturale sit homini, illud autem contra suam naturam. Hanc praemeditationem substernimus adversus illos (quorum caput fuit Gregorius Arimi.) qui inficiantur, posse hominem absque auxilio speciali Dei, vel cognoscere sufficienter, vel efficere bonum opus morale: propterea quod necessarium sit, ut referatur in Deum, quod fieri nequit naturaliter. Hoc est enim hominum haud oculate distinguentium inter finem naturalem, et finem supernaturalem hominis. Idem enim auribus exhibet, opus moraliter bonum, quod opus bonum commensuratum naturali fini, id est, quod fit tantum propter honestum. Nam honestum ipsum, nisi mala circumstantia vestiatur, suapte natura, virtute refertur in Deum. Praesertim quia potest naturaliter actu etiam in ipsum referri, quatenus ex creaturis potest naturaliter cognosci esse ultimus finis naturalis: quod operi moraliter bono satis est. Miraculum enim esset, quod facultas adesset naturalis rebus caeteris tam inanimis, quam animantibus obtinendi suos ipsarum fines, et tamen dignissimo animalium homini non suppeterent a natura sua vires, ut certo in moribus praescripto fine quandoque potiretur. Sane vero Paulus eo facit philosophos inexcusabiles, quod cum Deum cognovissent, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt: igitur propterea fuerunt inexcusabiles: quod si opera moraliter bona (ut ius naturae ostendebat, eiusdemque erat facultas) fecis-sent, Deus tunc specialiori favore et auxilio illis succurrisset, quo illos sibi reconciliaret. Sed sunt nobis haec latius cap. 20 disserenda, et ideo supersedendum est hic, ubi tantum iacimus fundamenta naturalia. (ff. 10v-11r)

[38] Supponimus huic tamen conclusionem secundam. Non quiverat homo ex puris naturalibus, totum naturae bonum perficere, id est, ubicunque opus esset, bene moraliter agere. Atqui huius se ratio protinus profert. Nam cum homo (ut dictum est) etiam in puris naturalibus in continuo esset duello sensualitatis adversus rationem, necesse esst rationem, non quidem semper, sed tamen saepe succumbere hosti, nisi divinitus suppetias haberet. Nec solum propter sensualitatis pugnam, verum et propter imbecillitatem corporis, quod licet obediat obsequio despotico, tamen fatigatur, et lassum non potest ad nutum parere rationi. Quocirca posset homo unum aut alterum praeceptum naturae servare, non quidem ut amicitiam Dei commereretur (de qua re statim dicturi sumus) sed quantum ad substantiam operis, ut per bonum opus morale peccatum evitaret. Sed neque id posset frequenter, ut cap.22. sumus latius expressuri. Atqui experimentum huius latissime patet in iis, qui sunt extra gratiam Dei, et potissimum in infidelibus, qui a numine deserti,

Lastly, the third conclusion and claim about this man of ours is this. (3) Even if sin had never been present, this man could never apprehend with natural sharpness of intellect nor ever reach by his own powers that highest, happiest end for which he was created. This is an easy assertion to support, proved by natural reason.[39] For that end is above and beyond the whole line and order of created nature, in that God is infinite, while every creature, being limited, is infinitely distant from that Abyss of Perfection. So (as far as knowing God is concerned), just as a sense faculty does not stretch to knowing universals and spiritual entities, because it is a material faculty and hence of lower order, so also no created intellect, being a finite faculty, can of itself come to know that measureless Substance for what It is.[40] And (to pass over the angels for the time being) there is an even clearer argument about man. Since he can only rise to a knowledge of the divine through knowing sense objects, and since these sense objects only show us God insofar as he is one, man cannot naturally descry the Trinity in a mental intuition, nor can he see the distinguishing traits of the Persons (it is in knowing these that the supreme happiness lies) — nor can the soul when quit of the body, nor can the incorporeal intelligences, because they are of limited power.[41] A solid witness to this is in Isaiah: "From the beginning of the world they have not heard nor perceived with the ears; the eye doth not see, O God, apart from thee, what thou hast prepared for them that wait for thee." [42] Since all human awareness of things is gotten and settled either by teaching through hearing or else by discovery through seeing, the Prophet has very meaningfully explained how the sight of that divine substance is not within human ability. But lest anyone should fancy that man can contemplate it at least in his soul, the godly Apostle adds, "neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what God hath prepared for them that love Him." [43] (What the Prophet had said with 'wait for' the Apostle expressed with 'love'; for in case God's grace has already been at work, love is what proximately and justly merits eternal happiness.) Then he adds,

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per universa vitiorum praecipitia corruunt. (f. 11v)

[39] Note the term. The following exercise is an example of what Soto thinks a "proof by natural reason" looks like.

[40] This is an extremely inept comparison. If created intellect, because of its finitude, had the same relation to God's substance as an eye has to a universal, then (said Aquinas) created intellect could not be elevated to see God by any means whatsoever: 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 4 *ad* 3.

[41] This sentence confirms that the higher end of man-in-pure-naturals is not just *a* Vision but *the* Vision, that of the Trinity. See how carelessly Soto has drawn revealed matters into what he himself announced to be a "proof from natural reason." Perhaps 'natural reason' meant nothing to him but sound reasoning, regardless of whether the premises from which one reasoned were naturally discovered or revealed. In that case, Soto could not tell the difference between a natural-science proof and a *ratio theologica* (a good argument in theology).

[42] Isaiah 64:4.

[43] 1 Corinthians 2:9.

> "But to us God has revealed this through the Holy Spirit," to drive home the point that what we could not be raised to through our nature comes to us through God. This is why the philosophers, though they graced the heights of genius with long effort and skill, and peered all too daringly into man's highest happiness, still got no further than equating practical fulfillment with use of the virtues and speculative fulfillment with contemplating separated substances.[44] But what that future contemplation might be like, they never even suspected. Hence the Apostle calls Christ "the king of kings and lord of lords, who only hath immortality, and inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen nor can see," *i.e.* naturally.[45] He calls the light inaccessible because only God immortal, and those whom He endows with immortality, penetrate it. But if it is not naturally possible for us to know that unbreached Light, where our end and the goal of our actions lies hidden, and man cannot aim an act or devote a duty to the goal unless he knows it, one can infer by natural reason that man does not have the ability to merit that ineffable reward with any duties met or deeds done.[46] So no matter how many good works a man might naturally do, it would still be no merit of God's friendship or glory.[47]

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[44] Note this tell-tale bifurcation of human fulfillment. Practical fulfillment is one thing, for Soto; speculative fulfillment, another. For Aquinas, as we saw in Chapters One, Three, and Four above, there was no such bifurcation. There was *one* human fulfillment. Only its delivery bifurcated into the incomplete and the complete (a distinction which lay on the level of special *rationes*), and both of them centered on contemplation. Now we know why Soto's description of the "end the philosophers knew" (above, pp. 190-191) did not sound like Aquinas's.

[45] 1 Timothy 6:15-16.

[46] Note the point: man cannot have the Vision *as the end he intends* without revelation and grace (and thus cannot have merit towards the Vision without supernatural gifts). So the manner in which man-in-pure-naturals *has* this Vision *as his end* must be a different manner. What is it? Is it *as a goal allotted, i.e. assigned* by God, as the weak interpretation (above, p. 189) would allow? If not, what other manner is there? We shall see soon enough.

[47] Tertia denique conclusio et assertio de nostro isto homine est haec. Neutiquam poterat, etiam si nulla praecessisset culpa, vel naturali acumine intellectus apprehendere, vel suis viribus assequi summum illum, felicissimumque finem ad quem creatus est. Assertio haec facilis est, quae ratione naturali demonstretur. Finis enim ille extra, supraque omnem lineam est, et ordinem naturae conditae, eo quod Deus infinitus sit, omnis autem creatura, limitata, ab illaque adeo perfectionis abyssu infinitum distans. Unde (quod ad cognitionem attinet) sicuti sensus ad universalium cognitionem et spiritualium non protenditur, eo quod sit potentia materialis, et idcirco inferioris ordinis, ita nullus creatus intellectus, utpote qui finitus sit, immensam illam substantiam potest per se, qualis ipsa est, cognoscere. Et (ut angelum interim mittamus) de homine perspicacior ratio est. Nam cum non possit nisi per sensibilia ad divinam cognitionem conscendere: et sensibilia haec, non nisi quatenus unus est, Deum ipsum nobis ostendant, non potest homo naturaliter Trinitatem, et quae sunt personarum propria (in quibus cognoscendis summa illa felicitas posita est) mentis intuitu cernere. Quinimmo neque anima corpus exuta, neque incorporea intelligentia: eo quod sint limitatae virtutis. Veritatis huius firmum testimonium est in Esaia. A seculo non audierunt, neque auribus perceperunt: oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praeparasti expectantibus te. Cum enim humana omnis notitia rerum, aut disciplina per auditum, aut inventione per visum acquiratur, et comparetur, significantissime explicuit Propheta, quam non sit humanae facultatis, divinae illius substantiae conspectus. Sed ne quis comminisceretur, posse hominem vel animo illam contemplari, adiecit divinus Apostolus, Neque in cor hominis ascenderunt, quae praeparavit dominus iis qui diligunt illum. Quod ille dixerat, expectantibus,

Now we are about to enter the zone of controversy. Soto did refer above to the Vision as our supernatural end. Now he will say: someone might object that this end should rather be called natural. In the margin, there appears a label for the coming section: *An felicitas caelestis sit nobis naturalis* (Whether the heavenly happiness is natural to us). The reader is set up to expect him to defend the term 'supernatural'. But he does not. He launches into a criticism of those, even in the school of St. Thomas, who call the end natural but on so weak a basis as to almost make it supernatural. In the margin at that point, there appears the name, *Cajetanus*. So the target is beyond doubt, but the charge is bizarre, as we shall see.

C. Soto attacks Cajetan on 'natural end'

Recall a point from Chapter Four: act-states connatural to God alone are supernatural in themselves. We saw Cajetan argue against Scotus that if the Vision of God's essence is connatural to Him alone, then the Vision of Him is supernatural to the human intellect receiving it. Given this implication, it would seem correct to say that the Vision is the "supernatural end" of man, as Soto did say a moment ago. Well, now he is about to unsay it.

> Here someone might object that the supreme happiness should be called our "natural end" rather than a supernatural one. For the natural end of anything is that towards which its natural yearning *[appetitus]* tends; our natural

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expressit hic per, diligentibus. Dilectio enim proximum est, iustumque aeternae felicitatis meritum, si modo gratia Dei praeveniatur. Subdit vero, Nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum sanctum. Sane ut admoneret, id, quo per naturam subvehi non valemus, numine nobis obvenire. Porro haec causa philosophis fuit, ut cum summa ingeniorum culmina longissimo usu et arte percoluerint, summamque hominis felicitatem fuerint tam improbe perscrutati: tamen id tamen assecuti sunt, quod practica quidem beatitudo in usu virtutum, speculativa vero in substantiarum contemplatione separatarum collocaretur. At qualisnam esset contemplatio illa futura, neque sunt usquam suspicati. Unde Apostolus de Christo. Rex, inquit, regum est, et dominus dominantium: qui solus habet immortalitatem, et lucem inhabitat inacessibilem, quem nullus hominum vidit, nec videre potest: scilicet naturaliter. Propterea enim appellat illam lucem inacessibilem, quia soli immortali Deo est pervia, et illis, quos ipse immortalitate donaverit. Quod si cognitio illius inaccessae lucis, ubi finis noster actionumque nostrarum scopus abditus est, nequaquam nobis est naturaliter possibilis, et homo, nisi scopum noverit, nullum illuc intendere, referreque potest officium: ratione naturali colligitur, non esse in hominis facultate positum, ut ineffabile illud praemium ullis possit officiis, aut rebus gestis promereri. Quantacunque ergo homo ageret naturaliter bona opera, nullum tamen esset quoquo pacto meritum, vel amicitiae vel gloriae Dei. (ff. 11r-12r)

> yearning is inclined and carried towards that inestimable happiness, because it cannot come to rest anywhere short of it; ergo, it is our natural end.[48]

This passage starts like a *dubium*, but it is not. It is **not** an argument that Soto is going to break. It is one he is going to endorse unqualifiedly. Pause to notice, therefore, that he has given us his definition of 'natural end' *('finis naturalis').* It is this:

x is a natural end of *y* $=_{df}$ *x* has what it takes to satisfy a natural yearning of *y*.

With this definition as its major, plus a minor that is explicit in Aquinas,

> man has a natural yearning that cannot come to full rest short of seeing what-God-is,[49]

the argument gets a conclusion which Soto not only took as his own but also thought needed defending:

> seeing what-God-is is a natural end of man.

Why he thought this needed defending will emerge shortly. But before we go on, we really must savor this definition of 'natural end'. That Soto meant to commit himself to it as the right definition is put beyond all doubt on folio 12v, in a sentence we shall be reading soon:

> I won't define as our natural end the one we can reach naturally, but the one we yearn for *[appetimus]* naturally.[50]

This was not a free stipulation, of course, but it *was* a semantic resolve. The question was how the phrase 'natural end' was to be used in theological discourse. Soto has given us his decision: not to mean 'end we can reach by our natural powers' (as Aquinas often defined it, *e.g.* in 1 *ST* q. 62, a. 1) but to mean 'one we naturally yearn for'. We must take Soto at his word that this *is*

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[48] At vero obviam hic forsan nobis quispiam veniat, quod felicitas illa suprema, finis sit potius noster dicendus naturalis, quam supernaturalis. Finis enim naturalis cuiusque rei est, in quem appetitus naturalis propensus tendit: appetitus autem naturalis noster inclinatur et fertur in illam inestimabilem felicitatem, quia illucusque quiescere non potest: ergo est finis noster naturalis. (f. 12r)

[49] 3 *CG* c. 50; 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8.

[50] Neque definierim finem naturalem esse illum, quem possimus naturaliter assequi, sed illum, quem appetimus naturaliter.

what he meant.

Well, in the usages that Aquinas assimilated from Aristotle, there was a place for the definiens '*x* has what it takes to satisfy a yearning of *y*'. But its place was not to define 'end'. Its place was to define plain, ordinary 'good'. *Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit: ut aliquid sit appetibile.*[51] An *appetibile* was what satisfied an *appetitus*, a yearning; what satisfied such a yearning in *y* was *appetibile* for or by *y*. And so:

x is a good for *y* $=_{df}$ *x* has what it takes to satisfy a yearning of *y*.

If one added 'natural' to the 'yearning' on the one side, one simply added 'genuine' or 'objective' to the 'good' on the other:

x is a genuine good for *y* $=_{df}$ *x* has what it takes to satisfy a natural yearning of *y*.

In the idiom of Aquinas, then, God was a genuine good for any creature you pleased, just in case God had what it took to satisfy a natural yearning in that creature.

This point served as the heart of Aquinas's argument in an important article in the *Prima Pars*. It was 1 *ST* q. 6, a. 1, where the issue was whether the trait of being good applied to God. Given his definition of 'good', Aquinas was facing an obvious objection. What about wicked people and irrational things? God doesn't satisfy *their* yearnings or tendencies, does He? This was objection 2 in the same article. Aquinas answered:

> *ad* (2): all things, by seeking their own completions, seek God Himself, in that the completive traits of all things are likenesses of the divine existence, as came out above [1 *ST* q. 4, a. 3]. And thus, of the things that seek God,
> • some know Him as a distinct object (this is unique to rational creatures);
> • some know certain participations of His goodness (this extends down to sense awareness);
> • and some have natural tendency *[appetitus]* without cognition, as having been inclined to their ends by another who is a higher knower.[52]

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[51] The reason why something is "good" is that it has what it takes to be sought or yearned for; see 1 *ST* q. 5, a. 1; *Nicomachean Ethics I,* c. 1, 1044a3.

[52] Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt ipsum Deum, in quantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae Deum appetunt quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum se ipsum, quod est proprium creaturae

Given the above-mentioned *reason* why something is "good," God was good if and only if He had what it took to be sought. To secure this, Aquinas let '*y* seeks *x*' be true in case *y* seeks a state of completeness of its own, *C*, and *C* is a copy of *x*'s state, which *x* produces. If the copy was good, so was the productive original. This is how Aquinas sustained the doctrine that God is the good of all things: they all seek Him in their own ways, in the pursuit of their own mature, thriving states, because any such state (indeed, any created thing or state at all) is just a remote, analogical copy of the divine Complete State. Cajetan commented on this article, of course, and agreed with it.[53]

Now it was an equally broad truth, for Aquinas, that the kind of cause a thing got to be by meeting the definition of 'good' was a final cause (1 *ST* q. 5, a. 4). A final cause was a purpose or "end" of some kind. So was Aquinas prepared to say that God, on the same basis as He was good for all things, was the end of all things? Of course.[54] But then, in the idiom of Aquinas, all that Soto has succeeded in saying, by his own choice of definition, is that seeing God is a "natural end" of man in a sense so weak that it is our "natural end" whether the Vision is available to us or not!

For suppose it is not. Then a philosophical contemplation of divine things (or, for that matter, a calm public life) is the only flourishing that God has made available to us; but by seeking no more than that, we are objectively seeking a copy of God's own self-knowledge (or intra-Trinitarian harmony); so in ordering ourselves to the end we can achieve by our natural abilities, we are automatically ordered (whether we know it or not) to the Original as to our natural end!

Such is the truism to which Soto's definition of 'natural end' has reduced his claim that

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rationalis; quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur ad cognitionem sensibilem; quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori cognoscente.

[53] Leonine IV, p. 66.

[54] 2/1 *ST* q. 1, a. 8; q. 3, a. 8 *ad* 2; et alibi.

man *in puris naturalibus* has a second natural end — if the idiom of Aquinas is being spoken. Even if man so taken is man considered apart from all gifts of grace in this life *and the next* (the strong interpretation given on p. 188), the second end is so harmless a truism that — if the idiom of Aquinas is being spoken — the implied counterfactuals are utterly innocuous. Here is how. God obviously could not create a creature without ordering it to Himself as this sort of natural end, because He could not create a creature whose natural yearnings He did not have what it takes to satisfy — no matter what those natural yearnings might be. Would any possible rock yearn for a low place, and God is not a place? No problem: whatever there be of perfection in any place is already in God in a higher manner (1 *ST* q. 4, a. 2); ergo God has what it takes, etc. Would any possible intellectual creature yearn to know what the First Cause is, even in a world-plan where God had not chosen to be available for Vision? No problem: whatever there be of perfection in any contemplation those creatures could achieve is already in God's own Self-Insight in a higher manner; ergo God has what it takes to satisfy their natural desire, and so

(1) God could not create intellectual creatures without having what it takes to satisfy completely their natural desire,

is true. And no theologian has ever denied it! In Aquinas's idiom, the proposition just marked (1) is the total meaning of

(2) God could not create intellectual creatures without their having the Vision of God as their natural end,

under Soto's definition of 'natural end'. The result, then, is that (2) says nothing about the *availability* of the Vision to creatures in any world-plan whatever.

In short, in the prescriptive dictionary of Thomism, calling an end natural on the basis that it is one *quem appetimus naturaliter* does not distinguish any end of man from the end of a beast, a tree, or a rock. Calling the seeing of God our natural end on this basis simply designates the divine Self-Insight in its ontological relation (original-to-copy) to any possible understanding man could have or achieve, by nature or by grace!

Soto believed, of course, that he was saying something much more interesting, and the present writer's conviction is that he was trying to. For I conjecture that he was not speaking St. Thomas Aquinas's idiom at all. He was reverting to the idiom of St. Augustine. The reason to think so is as follows.

To say something more interesting in the Thomist idiom, one had to go to *another sense* of 'end', one special to reason-endowed beings and presupposing information (or belief) about achievability.[55] But one did not need to go to another sense of 'end' if one reverted to speaking the idion of Augustine. In St. Augustine's usage, 'end' simply meant 'the good whose possession puts striving and yearning to an end'.[56] In other words, *bonum* was *finis* on the basis of that word-play; one passed from the ontological discussion of *bonum* as end (what in fact has what it takes to end striving) to the moral discussion of *bonum* as end (what effectively attracts the will) without changing definition, and the issue of availability or achievability did not come up. The availability to man of God the *Summum Bonum,* the *Bonum a quo sunt omnia bona,* the *Bonum sine quo nihil est bonum,* etc., was simply taken for granted.[57] (It was, after all, an article of the faith.) If and when theological speculators raised the question of whether the *Summum Bonum* might have chosen otherwise, might not have made Himself available, the strict disciples of St. Augustine were always content with the same basic answer.[58] They said that Supreme Good

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[55] One could go to the SD sense, in which 'natural end of *x*' meant 'what *x* was made to do'; or one could go to the ordinary-language sense in which 'end of *x*' meant 'what *x* wills to achieve by some means', and 'natural end' would have to be explicated along the lines of 'what *x* naturally wills to achieve by some means', etc. Note that all the further Thomist senses in which one could use 'end' presupposed information about achievability. What God made us for is achievable. What one wills to achieve by some means (*i.e.* what one intends) is believed to be achievable. What one *naturally* wills to achieve is certainly achievable.

[56] One sees this repeatedly in the *Confessions,* e.g. book II, chapter 6; book IV, chapter 12; book V, chapter 4; and throughout book X. Also *De moribus ecclesiae I,* cc. 3-9; *De Trinitate XII,* cc. 4-8; *De civitate Dei XIX* throughout. Further citations may be found in Eugène Portalié's classic article, "Augustin (saint)" in the *DTC,* vol. I/2, column 2432.

[57] Portalié, *art.cit.,* column 2433.

[58] Eugène Portalié, "Augustinianisme," *DTC* vol. I/2, column 2487; "Augustinisme (Développement

could not fail to be available, because God's very goodness demands it of Him; God owes it to Himself, to His own self-diffusive generosity, etc.[59] With the availability issue thus off the table and out of sight, saying that only the Vision suffices to quiet man's yearning *is equivalent* to saying that the Vision is our natural end *in the interesting sense of an available to be achieved end,* in the Augustinian idiom. This is what Hugh of St. Victor meant, when he said

> Sola rationalis creatura ita condita est, ut ipsa bonum suum non esset, sed Ille a quo facta est; magna ergo dignitas, ut nullum ei bonum praeter summum sufficeret.[60]

For Soto, I propose, this was how tradition sounded. This was the language of *sacra doctrina;* and Thomist though he was on many points, the crisis of the times required a return to theological basics. The Augustinian understanding of 'natural end' was to be restored. This would require a poke at the famous Cajetan, who had been dead for 15 years, but whose commentaries were still influential in the Dominican order. Let us return to Soto's text.

> In the school of St. Thomas, too, there are those who, in comments on 1 q. 12, distinguish how man "naturally" seeks that end. If man is considered in his natural features, they say, prior to the light of faith, it is false, because it can't naturally be known, and appetite can't be drawn toward the unknown. But if man is considered as suffused with the light of faith pointing out that goal, then it is true that human appetite bends ever naturally thither. But these writers barely avoid saying that this end is supernatural. For if man, out of his

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Historique)," *DTC* vol. I/2, column 2546; A. Michel, "Intuitive (Vision)," *DTC* vol. VII/2, columns 2357-2358.

[59] As a matter of mere logic, this position does yield the incriminated counterfactual mentioned above, unless our natural end is only so named after nature$_b$. When the issue is broadened beyond actual man, Augustinians say that God's freedom is not restricted; He could create intellectual creatures without granting them the Vision, but He would not; the "constraints" set by God's wisdom and generosity are not hobbles on the divine freedom but the perfection of it, etc. Such remarks do not explain, alas, what `freedom' is supposed to mean in this context, and they do not remove the incriminated counterfactual. They give a reason to exonerate it. I discuss the counterfactual issues at some length in chapter 4 of my unpublished STL thesis, "The Last End of Man according to Lubac" (The Pontifical John Paul II Institute: Washington, D.C., 1992), pp. 85ff.

[60] Only the rational creature was so made as to have as its good not its own self but the One who made it; great, then, is that creature's dignity, that no good but the Highest would be "enough" for it! *De dignitate et libertate rationalis creaturae I,* tit. 7; *PL* vol. 177, columns 482-483.

> natural features, cannot be yearning after it unless he already has supernatural knowledge, it is taken as a supernatural end, rather than a natural one.[61]

Beyond doubt, this is an attack on Cajetan's handling of the SO-problem in C12/1, with no distinction drawn between it and the E-problem. The reader will recall that Cajetan did posit two ways of considering man, which are recognizable in Soto's summary. Cajetan's topic was the sense of 'natural' in the argument that man has a "natural" desire generating wonder about God in Himself. Cajetan did defend a sense of 'natural' in which the wonder would be natural (given supernatural effects) even anent that object (without clarifying the E-problem until the commentaries we read in Chapter Three). But the bizarre thing is that Cajetan did not say a single word in C12/1 about how man has an end — any end. There was no discussion of whether or how the object of the wonder was the end of man. None. If the object of the wonder was the supernatural object, what the Trinity is, and our end is knowing what the Trinity is, Cajetan thought his defense of the naturalness of the wonder was perfectly consistent with denying the naturalness of the end, which is what he did in the commentary on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1. It never occurred to Cajetan that *how* one had a wonder (*e.g.* in one's nature) might be *how* one had an end, because it never occurred to him that wondering was having an end. It would not occur to anyone speaking the idiom of Aquinas. For if one speaks as a Thomist, and the topic is intellectual creatures, one does not discuss their end in any interesting sense of 'end' apart from issues of intention, fulfillment, and what can be intended as delivering fulfillment. No, the idea that wondering is having an end (because wonder is a natural yearning towards what it takes to satisfy it, etc.), so that how one has the wonder is how one has the end, is dictated by Soto's reversion to the Augustinian definition of

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[61] Sunt in schola etiam S. Thomae, qui super. q.12. primae partis distinguunt, quo modo finem illum appetat homo naturaliter. Nam si homo, aiunt, consyderetur in suis naturalibus ante lumen fidei, falsum est: quoniam neque potest naturaliter cognosci, neque appetitus ferri in incognitum. Si tamen consyderetur perfusus lumine fidei, scopum illum indicantis, tunc verum est, humanum appetitum continuo illuc naturaliter intendere. Isti veruntamen huc ferme declinant, quod sit finis ille supernaturalis. Etenim si non potest ab homine concupisci ex suis naturalibus, nisi praehabita cognitione supernaturali, potius censetur supernaturalis finis, quam naturalis. (f. 12r)

'end'. He is simply forcing it upon Cajetan's text.

With that much now clear, we can see why Soto picked this fight, if we come to understand how a worry about the objects of natural wonder, *qua* natural, would threaten his argument. What argument? Here it is again.

[major:] *x* is a natural end of *y* $=_{df}$ *x* has what it takes to satisfy a natural yearning of *y*.

[minor:] people have a natural wonder that cannot be satisfied short of seeing what-God-is,

[concl:] seeing what-God-is is a natural end of people.

Cajetan raised *dubia* about the objects, *i.e*. the topics, of the natural wonder. It wasn't clear how the wonder could be natural towards topics beyond man's active power to understand (this was the E-problem, excess of object over faculty, raised in the first *dubium);* it wasn't clear how natural wonder could exist at all towards topics not in man's ken to be wondered about, apart from revelation (this was the SO-problem, supernaturally described object, raised in the second *dubium).* Cajetan said that if you were considering humanity in natural-science perspective *(absolut□),* these problems would not arise.[62] Soto took him to mean: man considered in pure naturals, subtracting revelation and faith, would have in his intellect no tendency toward unattainable topics.[63] Then Cajetan said that if you were considering man as ordered to his happiness (the Vi-

[62] He meant: because no topics would be described supernaturally, and the sense of 'natural' you would be using would be the usual NS sense, mode-natural, and in that sense you would not be calling a wonder about an unattainable quiddity a "natural" wonder in the first place.

[63] See the end of Chapter Two, footnote 81. Soto was not the first nor the last to read Cajetan in this way. John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet and Billuart would all do the same. (A. Michel, "Intuitive (Vision)" in *DTC* VII/2, col. 2358.) They would accuse Cajetan of being in conflict with Sylvestris of Ferrara, who read Aquinas as affirming that the wonder was there in our nature prior to the arrival of supernatural knowledge (Ferrariensis, *In III Summae contra Gentiles,* c. 51). But Cajetan never denied that the *desiderium naturae* was in the very nature of our intellect as an open-ended wonder; and setting aside the SO-problem, Cajetan never denied that this wonder could focus on a naturally unattainable quiddity, without the help of revealed information. He simply denied that the wonder would be mode-natural to such an object. He thought it would be and remain residence-natural, that one could talk about this fact in theology and even apply to it the NS premise that a natural desire cannot be in vain. This is what he thought Aquinas had done. Admittedly, however, one had to read the companion commentaries on 2/1 *ST* q. 3, aa. 6-8, to figure out that the above points were Cajetan's contentions. The matter was not clear from C12/1

sion), these problems would arise but would be defeated.[64] Soto took him to mean: faith in revelation would carry the natural wonder all the way to the topic of what-God-is.

Now Soto was not much interested in the topics of wonder, but he was greatly interested in the stopper of wonder, if I may designate in that handy way the knowledge having what it takes to bring man's natural wonder to complete rest. Cajetan's analysis (as Soto read it) bothered him because, *in making the topics of wonder expandable, it threatened to make the stopper of wonder variable.* If man cut off from the faith or man in pure naturals (never mind which) would not have such high topics of wonder that only seeing-what-God-is could satisfy it, then man cut off from the faith (or in pure naturals) would not have the Vision as his natural end, by the definition of 'natural end' in Soto's major premise. If it took "suffusion with the light of faith" to give the human intellect wonder about topics high enough to make the Vision the wonder's stopper, it would take supernatural gifts to make the Vision man's natural end, by the definition of 'natural end' in Soto's major premise. No wonder Soto thought that such a situation would make the Vision man's natural end on a basis so flimsy as to make it, really, a supernatural end!

Well, to see this "position" as the one posed by Cajetan's text took a lot of doing. It took the eisegetic imposition of a foreign definition of 'natural end', and it took serious misreading of both of Cajetan's "considerations." But now that we have seen how Soto came to think he saw a threat, we are ready to read how he answered it.

> And even so, they don't sap the force of the argument. For even though man can't desire that end with an elicited act (to use school jargon) without prior

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alone.

[64] He meant: a science that knows what man was made for can see even wonder about unattainable objects as residence-natural, and revealed effects would trigger the residence-natural wonder to focus on revealed topics, such as the Trinity. He did not say: it takes faith to see revealed effects (and hence takes faith to wonder about the cause of those effects). Nor should he have; it does not take faith to see a miracle and start wondering about its cause. It does not take faith to see a great change for the better in the life of a person who has just had a conversion experience, and to start wondering about the cause of the improvement.

> knowledge of the faith revealing it, still, if 'yearning' is taken for sheer inclination and natural bent (as a heavy thing seeks the center of the world until it rests), then the natural appetite of everybody, including those not yet illumined by the light of faith, is by its own nature borne towards it. A solid evidence of this is the fact that, however much a man gets of the good he wanted among created things, he is still not at rest (and cannot be) until he enjoys that eternal vision. Thus Augustine came to confess, "Thou hast made us for thyself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it come unto thee." So my judgment is: that end is unqualifiedly natural to us.[65]

In this crucial passage, Soto has addressed the complication with which this study started, the *desiderium naturae*. He has tossed aside Cajetan's analysis of it and advanced a new one of his own. Cajetan's analysis focused on the *objects* of wonder, *i.e.* the topics wondered about. Soto has shifted the focus to the *stopper* of wonder, *i.e.* the item which has what it takes to bring all wonder to rest, whether it is entertained as a topic or not. Soto has disengaged the stopper of wonder from the topics by distinguishing wonder-as-sheer-inclination from wonder-as-an-elicited-act. He has claimed that a wonder about a specific topic has to be an elicited act. If he meant an elicited act of the intellect, then he has implied that a wonder about a specific topic is an *intellectio*. If he meant an elicited act of the will, then he has implied that wonder about a specific topic is a *volitio*.[66] Since neither an *intellectio* nor a *volitio* could have an anonymous object, Soto has admitted that wonder about specific topics depends upon the information available to the person wondering. Thus he has not rejected an interest like Cajetan's in the conscious objects of

[65] Et tamen non enervant efficaciam argumenti. Nam quamvis (ut terminis scholarium utamur) negueat homo actu elicito cupere illum finem, nisi praevia cognitione fidei ipsum revelantis, si tamen appetitio accipiatur pro inclinatione ipsa, et pondere naturali (quemadmodum grave, dum quiescit, appetit centrum mundi) profecto appetitus naturalis omnium hominum, etiam illorum quibus lux fidei nondum illuxit, suapte natura illuc fertur. Cuius firmum testimonium est, quod quantocunque potiatur homo optato bono in rebus conditis, nullibi tamen quietus est, esseve potest, quoad aeterna illa visione fruatur. Unde confessio illa Augustino in mentem venit. Fecisti nos domine ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec perveniat ad te. Profecto ita censeo, quod finis ille simpliciter sit nobis naturalis. (f. 12r-12v)

[66] Fr. Peter Ryan provides texts from Scotus on which Soto may have been relying here. They are from the *Opus Oxoniense IV,* d. 49, q. 10, n. 2. See Peter Ryan, S.J., "Moral Action and the Ultimate End of Man: The Significance of the Debate Between Henri de Lubac and His Critics" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1996), pp. 85ff. But the point that the very bent (*inclinatio*) of a faculty is one thing, and the faculty's elicited act another, is not unique to Scotism. Aquinas distinguished natural *appetitus/inclinatio* from natural operations in *De Veritate* q. 27, a. 2. See also 1 *ST* q. 78, a. 1 *ad* 3.

wonder. But he has dismissed it as irrelevant, because these objects are not the stopper. The stopper is set by wonder-as-a-sheer-inclination, present in the intellect prior to any elicited acts. In much the same way, a stone's potency to be moved has a stopper in Soto's cosmology (the lowest place, the center of the earth), which is set by the stone's natural inclination as a heavy thing and does not vary with the termini of its particular "acts" of falling. Just as the stone falls lower and lower because its inclination is precisely *an inclination to the stopper,* so also we wonder about higher and higher topics because our intellect's inclination is, again, *an inclination to the stopper*.

Soto's alternative analysis is certainly an arresting one. It is too bad that he never put forward a more technical exposition of it. He never made it clear, for example, whether he thought of the stopper as a level of understanding, or as the *ipsa Visio* that delivers that level. More seriously, perhaps, he never disclosed how he proposed to square his analysis with Aquinas's statements in *De Malo* about the special case of the souls in limbo, who do not get the stopper and do not miss it, according to Aquinas. Their case would seem to be evidence in favor of Cajetan's analysis, as we saw in Chapter Two.

Textual issues aside, a decision between these rival analyses of wonder requires grappling with two basic issues. I shall address the first here, because it will be needed for background in Chapter Six, when the study turns to Bañez. The second I shall state here but address elsewhere.

The first issue, then, is Soto's distinction between *wonder* as a pure inclination and *wondering* as an elicited act — did it hold up? Historically speaking, was it defensible within the general scholastic framework? The distinction certainly held up if 'wondering' named an elicited act of the will, an act of *desiring* to know. For then the pure inclination was in the intellect, while the act was in the will. But did it hold up if 'wondering' was supposed to name an elicited act of the intellect?

It is hard to see how it could have. After all, an elicited act of the intellect was an *intellec-*

tio, and an *intellectio* was supposed to be an act of understanding a thing, *i.e*. an act of mentally expressing it. Such an act could yield a concept of the thing, or it could yield a judgment about it. Now take the "act" of wondering what the cause of some effect, *e*, is. Is it a case of understanding something? Surely not. It *presupposes* understanding things (prior points and concepts, like the concept of a cause, the point that *e* is an effect, etc), but the wondering itself is not an act of understanding those things. And wondering *supports* an evaluative judgment (that it would be good to know the cause of *e*), but the wondering itself is some sort of motivation for that judgment, one would think, not the very making of it. In short, no elicited act of the intellect is an obvious candidate for what wondering (the act) would be.

Rather, if a scholastic thinker wanted to keep wonder and wondering firmly within the intellect, the sensible course would have been to avoid any distinction between them. *Admiratio* would have been the intellect's native tendency, and that very tendency would have been conscious sometimes. In other words, wondering is just *conscious wonder*. But this would have opened the way for Cajetan's analysis to return: particular perceived effects bring wonder into consciousness and provide specific objects for the intellect to act upon, *e.g*. by making judgments such as 'I don't know *this*' and 'It would be good to know *that*'.

Does this mean that Soto's analysis is a failure? Not yet. I am arguing that he committed a terminological gaffe, thinking that wonder with a conscious object had to be an "elicited act." But whether he ultimately succeeded or failed in his effort to refute Cajetan's analysis turned upon a second issue, which we are now ready to face.

Soto disengaged the stopper of wonder from the variable objects of wonder precisely in order to make wonder itself an inclination *to the stopper*. Could Aquinas have meant to do the same? This issue is the deeper of the two, because it goes to the heart of what wonder-as-a-sheer-inclination is. Inclinations/tendencies/bents are best defined by what they are inclinations towards. So, then: is the inclination called wonder an inclination **towards** causal explanation in

general (as Aquinas seemed to say and Cajetan certainly thought), or is it an inclination **towards** the one deepest (or what delivers the one deepest) explanation?

I gave a preliminary defense of Cajetan's view in Chapter Two. At this point, I shall not pursue this matter further because, whatever the difference between Cajetan's analysis and Soto's on this point, it matters less to us than the salient difference between the two men, which lies elsewhere. It lies in whether having an inclination with a lofty stopper is having a lofty natural end *in any interesting sense of 'natural end'*.

For Soto it was; his major premise — a definition of 'natural end' taken from Augustinian sources — said so. For Cajetan it was not; his definitions of 'natural end' came from a dictionary that made Soto's sense uninteresting and gave every interesting sense a different definition.[67] This is why the two men took different stands towards the "solid evidence" of the restless heart, to which Soto appealed in the second half of the passage we just read. Soto took the restless heart to confirm that the stopper of wonder is independent of the topics of wonder and thus to confirm that, in his own sense of 'natural end', unevangelized people (or people in pure naturals) have the Vision of God as their *natural* end. Cajetan took the same restless heart to confirm precisely what St. Augustine said, "Thou has made us for thyself, O Lord," which was the right SD definition of 'natural end' and was perfectly consistent with saying that the Vision was not a "natural completion" of us in the NS sense but an artistic enhancement. But let us allow Soto to continue.

> I won't define as our natural end the one we can reach naturally, but the one we yearn for naturally. And even though we cannot naturally figure out that it *is* the supreme good by which we are to be fulfilled and satisfied, the restlessness of the human soul, reposing nowhere but in that state, gives abundant support to the view that it is our natural end. Otherwise there would be no fi-

[67] In Cajetan's dictionary, the NS sense of 'natural end of *x*' was certainly interesting, but its definition was 'end to which *x* has natural passive potency and (apart from elements) natural active potency as well', as we saw from Aquinas's *Physics* commentary and from *CT* c. 104. An end fitting this NS definition was a connatural *(kata physin)* end, and a form introduced by art could not be the connatural end of its recipient. In Cajetan's dictionary, the SD sense of 'natural end of *x*' was also interesting — and so relevant here that we are about to discuss it.

nal end of human yearning, which is absurd.[68]

Here we have the semantic resolve discussed above, to use a certain definition of 'natural end', followed by a new use of the restless-heart evidence: to prove that the unavailability of the Vision would be absurd. Well, what is absurd is the idea of a human yearning for which no stopper could be defined. That would be a yearning insatiable in principle. It would be a yearning that even God did not have what it takes to satisfy. But there is nothing absurd about the idea of a yearning whose well-defined stopper is unavailable. In more Thomistic language: there is nothing absurd about the supposition that the only fulfillment available to man is an incomplete one. At least, there was nothing absurd about it to Aquinas. This we know, because he did not share the Augustinian reaction to the *Nicomachean Ethics.* Aristotle accepted a highly incomplete human fulfillment as all that philosophy could discern. The Augustinians wanted to ban the book from the universities of Europe. Aquinas prized it as philosophically correct. In Aquinas's view or anyone else's, a work which fails to see a fundamental absurdity in its reasoning is not philosophically correct. Ergo Aquinas saw no such absurdity. But Soto did. Now he continues.

> Hence we have in us by nature a striving towards the good in general, as matter has in it a striving towards form — but with this difference. Matter comes to rest under no form without seeking another, while our soul is content with no good except that highest one in which it finally rests. Scotus seems to have been of this opinion in IV *Sent*. d. 49, q. 10, where he says our natural appetite is always and constantly and especially drawn to its highest fulfillment in particular, though it cannot be so in an elicited act without supernatural knowledge.[69]

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[68] Neque definierim finem naturalem esse illum, quem possimus naturaliter assequi, sed illum, quem appetimus naturaliter. Et quamvis non valeamus naturaliter pernoscere, illud esse summum bonum, quo beandi, satiandique sumus, inquietudo tamen ipsa humani animi, nullibi citra illum statum requiescentis, fidem abunde facit, illum esse finem nostrum naturalem. Alias nullus esset ultimus finis appetitus humani: quod esset dictu absurdum. (f. 12v)

[69] Inest ergo nobis a natura appetitus in genere ad bonum, veluti est in materia appetitus ad formam. Attamen differt, quod materia sub nulla quiescit forma, quin aliam appetat: animus vero noster nullo contentus est bono, citra illud summum, in quo tandem requiescit. Huius videtur esse opinionis Scot. in quarto. d. 49.q.10. ubi ait quod appetitus naturalis semper et perpetuo et summe fertur in summam beatitudinem in particulari: licet actu elicito id non possit citra supernaturalem cognitionem. (f. 12v)

At last Soto's argument rejoins the issues discussed in Chapter Four above: the issues surrounding the meaning of 'natural passive potency'. This was an NS term. How it was to be defined, and how it would thereby relate logically or semantically to SD language, was a crucial matter for the construction of a bilingual NS-SD dictionary, without which one could not be a Thomist or a Scotist. Aquinas' strategy, as we saw, was non-fusionist. He would not call our potency to the Vision (nor any other revealed potency) a *natural* passive potency, and hence he would not compare our potency to the Vision to matter's potency for natural forms. Scotus' strategy was fusionist. He took the revealed passive potency of man to the Vision (and to all other supernatural act-states) as *natural* passive potency. He argued a case for doing so in two places (above, p. 161), one of which is cited here by Soto, who even paraphrases a key premise in the case:

> appetitus naturalis semper et perpetuo et summe fertur in summam beatitudinem in particulari

which is recognizably the claim that every potency inclines to its own completion, especially its highest. We saw Cajetan demolish that case above, pp. 162-167, and there is no need to repeat the results here.

Let us just add that Soto's endorsement of Scotus' case puts him in the camp of those who want a unified scholastic vocabulary. 'Natural end' is to have one meaning. It is to be the Augustinian meaning given in Soto's major premise above, and wherever that meaning is applicable, an NS claim is entailed (thanks to Scotus' case for the entailment). In other words, theological writing is now to look like this:

[Soto's major:]	*x* is a natural end of *y* $=_{df}$ *x* has what it takes to satisfy a natural yearning of *y*.
[Thomist minor:]	the human intellect cannot be satisfied short of seeing what-God-is
[1st conclusion:]	seeing what-God-is is a natural end of man's intellect
[Scotist NS:]	every passive potency inclines naturally to what has what it takes to satisfy it
[Scotist NS:]	*P* is a natural passive potency to A if, and only if, *P* inclines naturally

	to A
[standard NS:]	man's possible intellect is a passive potency to what informs it
[2nd conclusion:]	man's intellect inclines naturally to seeing what God is
[3rd conclusion:]	man's intellect is a natural passive potency to what God is.

To some tastes, this is a faith-and-reason synthesis. *Via* a bad account of the NS topic of potency, an NS term bleeds into the Augustinian meaning of 'natural end'. An SD claim made with that sense ('the Vision of God is man's natural end') gets an NS entailment, and 'natural end' becomes an item of unified scholastic vocabulary — that is, the integrity of its meaning depends upon the NS contribution.[70] If that much is now clear, let us allow Magister Soto to continue.

> This, too (if I am not mistaken) is the opinion of St. Thomas in the above-mentioned q. 12, a. 1, where he says there is in man a natural desire to know the cause when an effect is seen, and thence arises wonder in people. With these words he is teaching that, where effects have been seen, our natural desire is stirred up to see the cause *in itself* (he was talking about knowing the cause *through its essence*). And in 3 CG c. 50 he confirms by many arguments that the natural desire would be in vain unless man could see God. I would just add that the desire of our nature that Aristotle acknowledged in the prologue to the *Metaphysics* ("Everyone naturally desires to know") is only going to be satisfied where the glory of God shall appear, as the prophet said [Ps 16:15]. To conclude, then: one can hardly deny that this end is natural to us as to yearning for it but beyond our nature's powers as to reaching it.[71]

Well, Aquinas did have a natural-desire argument, an NS affair, saying that we have in us such-and-such a natural desire, and it cannot be in vain. In 12/1 he used it to support the SD

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[70] Then, as dogmatic relativism claims, scholastic theology will have Aristotelianized the very meaning of Catholic dogma, and so (since the Church allowed this) we in our day are free to dis-Aristotelianize it. We may re-Augustinianize its meaning, or Hegelianize it, or Heideggerize it, or whatever seems advisable *in theologischer Existenz heute.* For a critique of such relativism, see the present writer's "Concept, Judgment, and Dogmatic Relativism," *apud* R. A. Herrera, J. Lehrberger, and M. F. Bradford, eds., *Saints, Sovereigns and Scholars. Studies in Honor of Frederick D. Wilhelmsen* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 231-257.

[71] Et eadem est (ni fallor) sententia S. Thom.eadem.q.12.citata, articulo.1. ubi ait, quod inest homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum: et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. His enim verbis edocet, perspectis effectibus, naturale desiderium nostrum excitari intuendae in se causae. De illa enim cognitione per essentiam erat illic sermo. Et.3.contra gen.cap.50. multis confirmat, inane esse desiderium naturale, nisi Deum homo videre posset. Quin adiecerim ego desiderium illud naturae nostrae, quod in prologo metaphysicae agnovit Arist. ubi ait, Omnis homo naturaliter scire desiderat, illic omnino expletum iri (ut est in propheta) ubi apparuerit gloria Dei. Ut ergo rem concludamus, haud negandum est, finem illum esse nobis naturalem respectu appetitus, sed est nihilominus, si assecutionem eius spectes, supra vires naturae nostrae. (ff. 12v-13r)

claim that a certain epistemic state is possible for a created intellect. In 3 *CG* c. 50 and in 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8, he used it to support the claim that human fulfillment is not complete except in that epistemic state. Nowhere did he use it to support the claim that this epistemic state is a *natural* end — much less our available natural end.

Nor could he have done so. For in Soto's sense, the natural end of man is not just the stopper of his natural desire but also the *available* stopper. To make Aquinas' texts fit Soto's sense, they would have to be read as arguing that the Vision is available to us *because we have a natural desire for it.* Aquinas would then be in the absurd position of making God subject to an Aristotelian law of nature. Having chosen freely to create intellectual creatures, the Almighty would be stuck. He would have to make Himself available for their Vision, because the laws of nature require it! Don't say: no, the reason the Vision is available is because the Supreme Good owes it to His own goodness. No such premise appears in any of Aquinas's texts. If his texts are supporting the claim that the Vision is available, they are supporting it on the grounds they state, not on grounds they omit. Ergo, if Aquinas's texts are supporting the claim that the Vision is available, they are absurd. Ergo again, if they are not absurd, they are not supporting the claim that the Vision is available. In that case, they are not supporting the claim that the Vision is our natural end in Soto's sense.

What was Aquinas really doing in these texts? He was using a borrowed argument, an NS argument, in the way he said such borrowings were to be used in *sacra doctrina* (1 *ST* q. 1, a. 5 *ad* 2). How was that? To clarify or illustrate, not to demonstrate. The NDA was in the text to illustrate a point of faith, namely, the point that the Vision is *possible* and would be *complete fulfillment*. The NDA shows how that point of faith "makes sense," "chimes in with what science knows," etc. Given the revealed fact, one can show from NS considerations how it makes sense.

Soto, meanwhile, having eisegetically imposed an Augustinian meaning of 'natural end' upon Aquinas' texts, to make them support what they had no dream of supporting, turns to face

an objection. It is the same objection raised in Cajetan's first *dubium* in C12/1.

> Still, there is an argument, by no means weak, against this view. Nature has never implanted in anything a desire for an end for which its organs and ability-to-get-things did not also suffice. This is plain to see in the animals: the members of animal are destined for the end and work of each. Thus Aristotle says in *Caeli II*, "If the heavenly spheres had a power to move forward, nature would have given them suitable organs." So since man does not have by nature the strength and power to merit and acquire that fulfillment, it follows that he does not have natural desire for it either. Otherwise, God would have made man more of a cripple than the lower creatures, and done worse by him than by the others.[72]

When we met this argument in Chapter Two, it was in its original form. It was about the fixed stars, not the heavenly spheres. It was an argument from lack of organs, to lack of natural active power, to lack of natural inclination or natural passive potency. Soto has brought in the issue of natural end. In any case, we know how Cajetan met the *dubium.* He said that in a pure NS context, the claim that man has such-and-such a natural inclination would be taken as using 'natural' in a technical sense, mode-natural, and that would imply a corresponding active potency, and so the claimed natural inclination in people would be limited to what their natural powers can secure, etc. Thus the objection would succeed. But Aquinas was using the natural-desire claim (said Cajetan) in a theological context, where 'natural' need not carry that technical sense. In a theological context, 'natural' can be taken to mean just residence-natural, so that Aquinas' claim can be taken as talking only about an inclination that all humans have. An inclination that is natural in that sense is not bounded by the reach of corresponding active powers. So the objection fails. Yet Aquinas' argument remains worth something. That all humans have in their nature (because in their intellect) an inclination to ask questions beyond their natural ability to answer is

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[72] At vero est adversus hanc sententiam argumentum minime debili. Nemini unquam natura ad finem aliquem appetitum ingeneravit, cui non simul sufficeret organa et potiundi facultatem, ut oculate cernere est in animalibus, ubi sua sunt cuique fini et operi destinata membra. Unde Arist. in 2.caeli. Si haberent, inquit, caelestes orbes vim progressivam, natura dedisset eis organa opportuna. Cum ergo homo a natura non habeat virtutem, et potestatem promerendae, adipiscendaeque illius beatitudinis, consequens fit, ut neque habeat naturalem appetitum. Alias hominem fecisset prae inferioribus creaturis truncum et mancum atque adeo peius cum eo egisset Deus, quam cum caeteris. (f. 13r)

itself a striking fact. It makes sense that it, too, should not be quite in vain.

In a nutshell, Cajetan's response was: the objection comes from the sense of 'natural' worked out in the *Physics;* the present exercise is not a commentary on the *Physics;* ergo that sense of 'natural' is not germane.

If Soto understood these moves at all, he could neither make them nor allow them. His debt to Scotus prohibited them. Thanks to that debt, even theological talk of the natural carried the entailment of an NS potency: natural passive potency. Let us see, then, how Soto chose to proceed.

> The answer to this is easy: the loftiness of man's nature is all the clearer if, while no created nature can be in proportion to acquire that happiness (it goes beyond every sense), angelic and human nature, created to the image of God, still had it as their ultimate end, and where our nature fell short, God would be there for us, ready to help unless we ourselves refused. If Aristotle is right in *Ethics III* that "what we can do through our friends, we can, in a way, do," [73] there is no reason not to say also that *we can* enter into friendship with God and enjoy the Vision of Him, if indeed God is ready to help us through Christ our Savior.[74]

In short: in loftier natures, naturally unattainable ends are *still natural ends* because such natures *can be brought* to such ends with a natural passive potency corresponding to the active power of God (a divine friend). Again, Soto's response is Scotus' response, and we need make no other rejoinder to it than the one Cajetan made to Scotus (above, pp. 171-173), namely, that if this response is acceptable, Averroes' argument that the active power to understand is not in man but in a Separate Substance (an angelic friend) goes through.

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[73] Chapter 3; 1112b25-30.

[74] Ad hoc autem facile respondetur, magis exinde effulgere celsitudinem humanae naturae: quod cum nulla possit esse natura creata, quae ulla sit proportione ad assequendam felicitatem illam, quae exuperat omnem sensum: nihilo secius angelica et humana ad imaginem Dei conditae, illum haberet pro fine ultimo: et ubi natura nostra deficiebat, illic praesto esset nobis Deus, paratissimus subvenire, nisi nosipsi renuerimus. Porro si verum est dictum Arist.3.Ethic.quod ea quae per amicos possumus, per nos quodammodo possumus, non est cur non dicamus, nos etiam posse et amicitiam cum Deo inire, et eius perfrui conspectu: siquidem tam nobis Deus promptus est, per Christum servatorem nostrum suppetias ire. (f. 13r)

Cajetan's rejection of the Scotus/Soto response is sometimes questioned by pointing out that Aquinas, too, said that a nature which *could* be brought to a higher end by grace was a loftier nature than one that *could not* be brought to such an end by any means (2/1 *ST* q. 109, a. 5 *ad* 2). But he was not using this point to prove that the loftier nature had the higher end *as its natural end*. Quite the opposite. He said that where the talk is of natural end in the sense set by the *Physics* (*i.e.* connatural end), a natural thing does have the natural active powers to achieve its end. Nothing in Aquinas, therefore, tends to suggest that in loftier natures there is a natural passive potency unaccompanied by corresponding active potency.

What, then, did Aquinas make of the 'can' that expresses the fact that a loftier nature can be brought to an end beyond its own powers? He was explicit in *CT* c. 104 that it is not natural potency. He said it was a case of 'can *otherwise* be brought', *i.e.* non-naturally, *i.e.* not-mode-naturally, as wood can be brought to the form of a stool. No doubt, the wood that can be brought to that form by art is of a loftier nature than air, which cannot be brought to that form by any means. But it hardly follows that being-a-stool is a natural end of pieces of wood (where 'natural' means connatural).

But what about the text from *Ethics III?* If what we can do through our (divine) friends, we can (in a way) do, does it follow that what we can be made through our (divine) friends we can (in a way) be made, so that the point applies to passive potency as well and restores its naturalness? Are we (by the text from *Ethics III)* in natural passive potency to be made as divine help can actively make us? Of course not. The text from *Ethics III* is a piece of ordinary-language philosophizing about human agency. It has nothing to do with the physical/biological topic of natural passive potency. Imagine mistaking social ethics for natural science! Imagine trying to convince a botanist that the redwood trees whose growth he has been studying are *biologically able* to become stools and chairs — because the help of their human friends can make them such!

Soto's response to the *dubium,* then, is preposterous. But let us allow him to finish.

> And Aristotle's point in *De Caelo* does not go against us, first, because he doesn't say, "If the heavenly spheres had inclination, they would have organs," but "if they had power"; we don't have much power towards that fulfillment, but we have inclination; second, because he didn't know anything about the supernatural mysteries of the faith.[75]

Suffice it to say that Thomists and Scotists read the *De Caelo* text differently; Soto read it here in the Scotist fashion, and the objection to doing so is the same: it opens the door to Averroes.

> So, to make an end to the discussion: a person who wants to look into the cause of original justice, investigate the bereavement of man's fall and powerlessness, and the need for grace in its root, should put before his eyes these three claims about man in his purely natural features — namely, (1) that it is a power of man's bare nature, apart from any guilt and grace, to do some good in the line of natural morals through general help, because he is a rational animal; (2) yet man cannot long persist in such good without falling often, because of sensuality's attack and the body's weakness; yet (3) there is nothing man can do, or will, or think, that would merit God's friendship or glory, because of His infinite excellence. Now although we tried above to ground the basic point (3) on this natural argument, it has higher certitude than any natural argument. So whatever the argument's weight may be, this point is fixed and firm among Christians, as a matter of Catholic faith, namely, that no one enters into fellowship with God but by the goodness of His grace, as the Scripture says, "No one can come to me, except my Father draw him";[76] and "By grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God";[77] and many similar texts, which we have clarified together and more fully in the last chapter of Book II.[78]

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[75] Neque illud Arist.in lib. de caelo, contra nos facit: tum quia non dicit, quod si orbes caelestes haberent inclinationem ambulandi, haberent organa. Sed si haberent vim: in nobis autem non est abunde vis ad beatitudinem illam, sed inclinatio: tum etiam quia ipse nihil de mysteriis fidei supernaturalibus novit. (f. 13r)

[76] John 6:44.

[77] Ephesians 2:8.

[78] Igitur ut dictorum epilogum faciamus, qui causam originalis iustitiae inspicere optat, qui hominis lapsi orbitatem, et impotentiam, qui gratiae denique necessitatem in sua radice perpendere, haec tria asserta de homine in puris naturalibus ante oculos constituat. Nempe quod nudae naturae hominis potestas est, quavis semota culpa et gratia, per generale auxilium bonum aliquod in genere morum naturale facere: quoniam animal est rationale: non tamen valet diu in eiusmodi bono durare, quin saepe cadat, propter pugnam sensualitatis, et corporis imbecillitatem. Nihil tamen prorsus potest, vel facere, vel velle, vel cogitare, quod sit meritum amicitiae aut gloriae Dei, propter infinitam eius excellentiam. Quin vero tertium hoc fundamentum, quamquam ratione hac naturali supra nixi sumus fulcire, maioris tamen est certitudinis quam ratio ulla naturalis. Obidque cuiuscunque sit ratio ponderis, hoc tamen fixum est Christianis et firmum,

D. Concluding remarks.

(1) As a debater against Cajetan, Soto can only be called bizarre. In Chapter Three, we saw Cajetan admit a sense of 'natural' in which he could say that seeing God is our natural end. It was a sense proper to the language of *sacra doctrina*, in which we know what the human race was made to do. It was made to see God. This sense came out in the commentary on 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8. But Soto did not attack this sense, nor did he attack this commentary. He gave no sign of having read it. In Chapter Four, we saw Cajetan argue against Scotus that if seeing God's essence is connatural to God alone, then the Vision of Him is supernatural to the human intellect receiving it. Given this implication, it seems correct to say that the Vision is the "supernatural end" of man, and this is what Cajetan did say in the commentary in 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1. But Soto did not attack Cajetan for anything he did in this commentary either. Again, he gave no sign of having read it. Rather, Soto fought for his own sense of 'natural end' against C12/1, the commentary we read in Chapter Two. What is truly bizarre is that the relevant part of C12/1 was about the intellect's *desiderium naturale* — so that the only basis Cajetan put forward there for calling anything "natural" was a basis for calling a certain *wonder about God* natural. Soto thought this basis too weak. Clearly, then, Soto attacked Cajetan for something he never did in any commentary, namely: call an end "natural" on the basis on which he called that wonder natural.

(2) There is only one way to explain this massive misunderstanding. Soto could not break free of his own conviction about how to define 'natural end'. His mind was set with utter firmness in the following pattern.

> A natural end of *x* is whatever has what it takes to satisfy a natural inclination of *x*. To wonder about God is an inclination of ours, and seeing God has what

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tanquam fides catholica. Puta quod in divinum consortium nemo, nisi gratuita eius bonitate, admittitur: iuxta illud: Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi pater meus traxerit eum. Et gratia estis salvati per fidem, et hoc non ex vobis: Dei enim donum est. Et id genus plurima, quae cap.ult.2.lib. copiosius congesta dilucidavimus. (f. 13r-13v)

> it takes to satisfy it. So if this inclination is *natural*, seeing God is our natural end. *Ergo the basis on which the wonder is natural is the basis on which the end is natural.*

Everything Soto said in criticism of Cajetan followed from the bit I just italicized. It never occurred to him that a genuine end-of-*x* had to meet a further test. It had to be available to *x*. The relation between a natural inclination-in-*x* and its satisfier sufficed to make the satisfier a genuine good-for-*x* but did not suffice to make the satisfier available. Therefore the basis for being an end had to be partly different, at least, from the basis for being a satisfier. Indeed, a natural end-of-*x* had to be naturally available to *x*. Well, the Vision of God is not available to humanity thanks to our natural active powers, nor is it available (*pace* Augustine) thanks to the sheer nature of God, nor is it available (*pace* Soto) thanks to the naturalness of our wonder. It is only available because it has been allotted to us by a free divine decision.

(3) An evaluation of Soto as an interpretor of Aquinas is pointless, after what has been said about his foreign sense of the key term 'natural end'. Still, it is worth pointing out that the influence of this non-Thomist sense did not begin in the final controversy section, where we first noticed it, but much further back.

As Soto's text showed early on, he took a distinction of rational powers, apprehensive vs. appetitive, and used it to split humanity's end into two. By virtue of our rational apprehensive power, we are after the WHAT-IT-IS of the First Cause (so only the Beatific Vision can satisfy us).[79] By virtue of our rational appetitive power (and the sense-appetites subject to it), we are after life-in-line-with-reason (so a calm public order can satisfy us). Thus humanity has two natural ends, one achievable and sought by the powers of appetition, one unachievable (without divine help) and sought by the power of apprehension.

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[79] Prominent in his mind was the text in 3 *CG* c. 50, to the effect that no *desiderium* within us reaches so high as the *desiderium intelligendae veritatis*, which alone does not come to rest short of what-God-is. The text appeared above in Chapter One, note 17.

Soto got from Aquinas the class of objects to assign to the respective powers. To *intellectus*, one assigns the true/real or the what-it-is.[80] To *voluntas* one assigns the good, especially the *bonum rationis*.[81] Then, amazingly and without further ado, Soto converted these object-classes into **natural ends of man**. One began to wonder what he meant by 'end'. Then he told us. He just meant 'that which has what it takes to satisfy a natural yearning'. When man is bifurcated into man *qua* intellectual and man *qua* volitional, each with its natural yearning, the Vision becomes the natural end of the former (having what it takes to satisfy the mind), and the calm public order becomes the natural end of the latter (having what it takes to satisfy the will).

Was it wrong, according to Aquinas, to do this? Of course. Being an end was a **way of being willed** for Aquinas, and this was true whether one meant 'end' under its general *ratio* or under one of its special ones.[82] Having what it takes to satisfy was just being potentially willed, and thus potentially an end.

Moreover, if 'end' meant *finis/beatitudo* under its general *ratio*, (I treat them together because the general *ratio* of both was "completeness or complete good"),[83] a conversion of faculty-objects into **components** of an end was correct. For under its general definition, last end/fulfillment was compresence of all the goods, and if one was puzzling about what the goods were, one found out by looking at the objects of our several faculties, which Aquinas himself sometimes called the goods thereof. (Truth or quiddity was the *bonum intellectus*, etc.[84]) All such faculty

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[80] 1 *ST* q. 16, a. 1; 2/1 *ST* q. 10, a. 1.

[81] Disputed Questions *De virtutibus in communi* q. 1, a. 5 *corpus* and answers to the first two objections.

[82] *De Veritate* q. 21, a. 2 says that it belongs to the definition of an end that it be sought, desired, or delighted in. If it were not the case that, in an intellectual nature, this seeking, desiring or delighting is a matter of willing, Aquinas proof in 1 *ST* q. 19, a. 1, that there there is will in God, would collapse.

[83] Compare 2/1 *ST* q. 1, a. 7 with 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8.

[84] This is the correct route, within Aquinas, to something like the Grisez-Finnis list of "basic goods." For Aquinas's start toward such a list, see 2/1 *ST* q. 94, aa. 2-3. For Finnis's presentation of the list, see John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), pp. 64-69; 81-97. For an early

object-classes were naturally known to be good (2/1 *ST* q. 94, a. 2) and to be achievable in some part, and so they were naturally willed by the will, along with its own object-class (2/1 *ST* q. 10, a. 1), and so they naturally had the status of being willed as components within "complete good." They naturally composed a "last end" because they were willed — not because they had what it took to satisfy, whether they were willed or not. **And one could not bifurcate this set of components,** as though the bonum intellectus were above it, rather than in it, or as though there were not one but two *rationes communi* of end/fulfillment. There was no trace of that idea in Aquinas!

No, all of the bifurcations in Aquinas, such as

"end the philosophers knew" *vs.* "end for which God is preparing us," or

"end proportioned to our nature" *vs.* "end exceeding that proportion,"

arose on the level of special *rationes,* and on this level the question was what concretely to pursue. Given everything one's faculties strove and yearned for (which one pursued inevitably), what achievable state of affairs should one aim at? On this level, the meaning of 'end' was not 'what is willed inevitably' but 'what is intended to be reached as delivering all that is willed', *i.e.* 'what is pursued as *id in quo beatitudo consistit'*. Therefore on this level, the bifurcation was between

what is known by reason as the state of affairs delivering fulfillment

vs.

what is known by revelation as the state of affairs delivering it.

On any fair reading, this is how the discussion of 'end' and the ends is organized by Aquinas. Soto's Augustinian import is incompatible with Thomas's organization, from the beginning.

Grisez presentation, see Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, *Beyond the New Morality* (Notre Dame, 1974), chapter 7. For a list of the same kind generated from empirical psychology and anthropology, see Thomas F. Davitt, "The Basic Values in Law: A Study of the Ethico-legal Implications of Psychology and Anthropology," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 58 (1968), especially pp. 1-14 and 70-74.

Chapter 6

Dominic Bañez: Triumph of a Scholastic Nature

Over the course of his life (1528-1604), Bañez had occasion to lecture upon the entire *Summa,* and in the last 20 years of his life he wrote commentaries on it. He dealt with the issues relevant to the present study in two places: in a published commentary on the *Prima Pars* [1] and in an unpublished commentary on the *Prima Secundae*.[2] The latter seldom departed from Cajetan's views about the articles in question, except to repeat arguments and conclusions which Bañez had already put to paper in the commentary on the *Prima Pars.* It was there, in other words, that Bañez broke his new ground and made his contribution. We shall focus our attention almost entirely, therefore, upon the treatment of 12/1 in that earlier commentary. It will save many words if I may refer to his text as B12/1.

'Commentary', in any case, is no longer the right word for it. 'Occasion for disputation' would be more like it. Bañez extracts from the text of Aquinas just its conclusions (the bottom line, as we say), with the briefest possible summary of the reason for each. Then he collects arguments against one of the conclusions and answers them in *disputatio* form. Let us look at the initial extract of conclusions.

> q. 12, a. 1. Can a created intellect see God through His essence?
> First conclusion: God in Himself is supremely knowable. The reason is:

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[1] Domingo Bañez, *Scholastica Commentaria in Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris Divi Thomae* (Venice, 1587). The first edition appeared in Salamanca three years earlier. I shall be citing below the Venice edition, where the commentary on 12/1 covers columns 439-454. The pages were two-column pages, and each column had its own number. In the white space between the columns, the letters A, B, C etc. were spaced evenly down the length of the page. The reader can locate the passages I quote by taking advantage of this convenient arrangement; I shall cite by column number and letter.

[2] Domingo Bañez, O.P., *Comentarios ineditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomás,* ed. Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, O.P. Tomo I, *De fine ultimo et de actibus humanis (qq. 1-18)* (Madrid, 1942), pp. 115-132. This publication will be cited hereafter as *Comentarios ineditos I.*

> because God is supremely a being in act, since He *is* act.
>
> Second conclusion: God is not supremely knowable to us. The reason is: because He is an object not proportioned [to us], thanks to the falling short *[defectus]* of our intellect.
>
> Third conclusion: A created intellect can see God through His essence. The reason is: because otherwise man could never achieve fulfillment, or else man's fulfillment would lie in something other than God — which is foreign to the faith and unreasonable.[3]

If one reviews Chapter Two, one will see that Cajetan read Aquinas as presenting two distinct arguments for the proposition that a certain level of understanding, call it U±, is possible.[4] One was the conjunction-to-Source argument, which purported to show that the negative judgment, 'U± is not possible', implied a point contrary to the faith. The other was the natural-desire argument (NDA), which purported to show that 'U± is not possible' is unsupported by natural science. Notice something extraordinary, then, about "the reason" for third conclusion according to Bañez. The NDA is no longer a distinct natural-science argument. Rather, the NDA now shows the reasonableness of a point appearing in the conjunction-to-Source argument (the point which Bañez states as 'either man has no fulfillment or it lies elsewhere than in God').[5]

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[3] Articulus I. Utrum intellectus creatus possit videre Deum per essentiam? Prima conclusio. Deus secundum se est maxime cognoscibilis. Ratio est: quia Deus est maxime ens in actu, cum sit actus. Secunda conclusio. Deus quoad nos non est maxime cognoscibilis. Ratio est: quia est objectum improportionatum propter defectum nostri intellectus. Tertia conclusio. Intellectus creatus potest videre Deum per essentiam. Ratio est. Quia alias nunquam homo beatitudinem obtineret, vel in alio eius beatitudo consisteret, quam in Deo; quod est alienum a fide et praeter rationem. (col. 439 A, B)

[4] The symbol '∀' is used to indicate that I am abstracting from the annoying supernatural-object problem, *i.e.* the problem of whether the level of understanding in question should be expressed with a naturally-known description of its object (so that the level is "seeing the what-it-is of the First Cause" or the like) or should be expressed with a revealed description of its object (so that the level is "seeing the Trinity" or the like). When this difference is under explicit discussion, we can indicate the epistemic state with U or with U+ respectively.

[5] Here is a reminder of how the conjunction-to-Source argument went (not in uncompacted form, as laid out in Chapter Two, but just in its compacted form). (1) The fulfillment of anything lies in conjunction to its source. (2) The fulfillment of any intellectual creature lies in understanding. (3) So the fulfillment of any intellectual creature lies in conjunction-by-undestanding to its source. (4) If U± is not possible for a creature, then either an intellectual creature has no fulfillment or its fulfillment lies in conjunction-by-

This move confuses the function of the NDA in 12/1, with its function in 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8. In the latter it does support the reasonableness of the doctrine that complete fulfillment is found in the Vision delivering U±. But confusing its roles in the two places drags the whole debate about fulfillment — and thus, as we saw in Soto, the debate about natural end — into the interpretation of an article that did not focus upon either. That is how 12/1 became an occasion for wide-ranging disputation. Bañez admitted, as we shall see, that the right place for the fulfillment disputes was in the *Prima Secundae*. But the custom of his time, it seems, had gravitated towards raising the issue prematurely, and Bañez acquiesced in doing the same. My point is that the origin of that custom is quite understandable, if the *corpus* of the article was being read as Bañez indicated.

With the extract finished, Bañez turned to another preliminary job, which showed a healthy sensitivity to semantic issues.

> Concerning this article, one needs to note that 'seeing God' is taken several ways in the Scriptures:
>
> (1) to mean the seeing by which God is seen in some likeness (this is how God was very often seen by the fathers of the Old Testament);
>
> (2) to mean the seeing by which God is seen in a creature which is His image or trace (this is how Paul speaks in 1 Cor. 13 [v. 12], "Now we see through a glass darkly . . ." and in Romans 1 [v. 20], "The invisible things of God have been seen from the creation of the world, having been understood through the things that have been made," *etc.*);
>
> (3) to mean the seeing by which God is seen in His assumed nature (this is how John 1 speaks, "We have seen His glory," *etc.*);
>
> (4) to mean the seeing by which God is seen through His essence and intuitively and yet is not comprehended (this is what St. Thomas discusses in this *quaestio*).[6]

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understanding to its source but this source □ God. (5) It is not the case that any intellectual creature has no fulfillment. (6) It is not the case that the source of any intellectual creature □ God. (7) So any intellectual creature has a fulfillment **and** it lies in conjunction-by-understanding to God. (8) So the consequent of (4) is false. (9) Ergo (by *modus tollens)* the antecedent of (4) is false. The point in which Bañez is interested is the consequent of (4). He thinks that the NDA shows that the consequent of (4) is unreasonable.

[6] Circa istum articulum est notandum, quod visio Dei in sacris litteris multipliciter accipitur. Primo, pro visione, qua Deus videtur in aliqua similitudine. Et isto modo Deus saepissime visus est a patribus

After these preliminaries, the text of B12/1 divides into two disputations. The first is about St. Thomas' overall conclusion. Is it true? Can a created intellect in fact see God? Six arguments to the contrary are faced. The last of them generates a second disputation.

A. First Disputation — Is it true that a created intellect can see God clearly?

There is no reason to try the reader's patience with arguments and counter-arguments irrelevant to the interests of the present study. The procedure in this section, therefore, will be to list the six objections that Bañez faced, then quote and comment upon the ones that matter. They will turn out to be the second and the sixth. With the reader's convenience in mind, when I come to these, I shall depart from the order of presentation in B12/1 by giving the text of Bañez' answer immediately after the text of the objection itself.

The objections faced, then, were the following six.

(1) An argument from distance: there is more distance between a created mind and God than there is between an eye and an angel; but an eye can't see an angel; ergo.

(2) An argument from what it takes to be an object of created intellect: what-God-is lies beyond the scope of such objects and so cannot be an object of created intellect.

(3) An argument from proportion: there must be a proportion between the knower and the known; between a finite knower and an infinite known there is no proportion; ergo.[7]

(4) An argument from Scripture: "No man hath seen God at any time" (Jn 1:18); "the king of

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veteris testamenti. Secundo modo accipitur pro visione, qua Deus videtur in aliqua creatura, quae est imago vel vestigium Dei. Et isto modo dicit Paulus 1.Cor.13 Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. Et in Ro 1. Invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, etc. Tertio modo accipitur pro visione, qua Deus videtur in natura assumpta. Et isto modo dicitur Ioan.1. Vidimus gloriam eius, etc. Quarto modo accipitur pro visione, qua Deus videtur per essentiam et intuitive, non tamen comprehenditur. Et de hac disputat D.Tho. in praesenti q. (439 C, D)

[7] This was an argument refined by Durandus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2.

ages, immortal, invisible" (1 Tm 1:17) "inhabiteth light inaccessible" (1 Tm 6:16).

(5) An argument against Aquinas' conjunction-to-Source argument: it assumes that fulfillment lies in understanding, but in fact it lies in love, an act of the will.[8]

(6) An argument against Aquinas' natural-desire argument: if it proved anything, it would prove that the Vision is our natural end; but it is impossible for a supernatural affair to be our natural end; ergo his NDA proves nothing.

After stating the objections, Bañez gave a quick enumeration of the *haeretici* who denied that God could be known *clar et intuitiv* (col. 441 C). Then he wrote a paragraph declaring that, despite the dissenters and objections, St. Thomas' conclusion is *certa secundum fidem,* citing the authority of Augustine and several confirmations from Scripture.[9]

Of these arguments-in-objection, the sixth is obviously important for our purposes, but it turns out that we also need to see Bañez' answer to the second. For this objection goes to the heart of an important Thomist/Scotist difference, and Bañez will make a tell-tale mistake in trying to answer it.

1. The second objection and Bañez' response.

Here is the text of the second objection itself.

> (2) *[Antecedent:]* God-clearly-seen is not within the range of objects *[latitudo objecti]* for a created intellect; *[inference:]* ergo He cannot be seen by a created intellect. — Drawing this inference is supported as follows. The power of sight cannot see an angel, because the latter is not within the range of its objects; ergo, if God-clearly-seen is not within a created intellect's range

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[8] This was Scotus' contention, *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 4; if one consults the numbered premisses in footnote 5, one will see that Scotus was denying premise (2).

[9] Nihilominus conclusio D.Tho. est certa secundum fidem. Ita dicit et probat D.Aug. epist. 111 et 112. ubi adducit multi testimonia sacrae scripturae et sanctorum. Et probatur manifeste. Nam 1.Ioan.3. dicitur: Videbimus Deum sicuti est. Et 1.Cor.13. Videbimus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Et Mat.5. Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et c.18. Angeli eorum semper vident faciem patris mei, qui in caelis est. Ratio vero D.Th. optima est, quae postea explicabitur. (col. 441 D)

> of objects, it will not be able to see God through His essence. — The ante-cedent is supported by the following argument.
>
> *[Conditional:]* If God-clearly-seen were within the range of objects for a created intellect, a created intellect would incline to it naturally as a beatifying and supernatural object. But this last is impossible. [Ergo, God-clearly-seen is not within the range, *etc*.] This conditional is supported: if God-clearly-seen as He pertains to the supernatural order[10] were contained within what it specifically takes to be an object *[intra rationem specificam objecti]* of a created intellect, then, since any potency is naturally inclined to its object, it would follow that a created intellect naturally inclines to the supernatural Vision.[11]

The objection is not finished. A confirming argument is coming up (in fact, two). But before we look at them, the reader needs to realize that the conditional used to support the antecedent was making a Scotist claim when it said that any potency/faculty was naturally inclined to "its object." The reader will recall that Cajetan debated such a claim in *De potentia neutra*, rejected it, and replaced it with two clearer ones. Any potency, he said, is naturally inclined to an object proportionate to it, yes, but it need not be inclined naturally to any object receivable in it.

Potencies or faculties "had" objects indirectly, of course. A potency/faculty was naturally inclined to the act-type by which it was defined; but if acts of that type were intensional acts, then those acts had objects. Such was the case with the potencies called intellect and will. Thereupon,

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[10] The phrase, 'God-clearly-seen as He pertains to the supernatural order', certainly seems to mean God as the object of U+ (as opposed to God as the object of U). So the objection seems to be focusing tightly on the SO-problem.

[11] Arguitur secundo. Deus clare visus non continetur intra latitudinem obiecti intellectus creati, ergo non potest videri ab intellectu creato. Consequentia probatur. Potentia visiva non potest videre angelum, quoniam non continetur intra latitudinem sui objecti, ergo si Deus clare visus non continetur intra latitudinem obiecti intellectus creati non poterit videre Deum per essentiam. Antecedens vero probatur. Quia si Deus clare visus contineretur intra latitudinem obiecti intellectus creati, ergo intellectus creatus inclinaretur ad illud naturaliter, ut est obiectum beatificum et supernaturale, quod est impossibile. Sequela probatur. Quia si Deus clare visus ut pertinet ad ordinem supernaturalem contineretur intra rationem specificam obiecti intellectus creati : cum quaelibet potentia naturaliter inclinetur ad suum obiectum, sequitur, quod intellectus creatus naturaliter inclinaretur ad visionem supernaturalem. (col. 439 last line through col. 440 A, B)

indirectly, a general description of those objects as a class, such as ‘quiddities of material things’, was assigned to that potency/faculty as its “object” (meaning: object-class). The difference between the proportionate objects for a faculty *F* and its merely receivable objects was expressed by distinguishing *objectum proportionatum* from *objectum adaequatum* (equivalent object). Here is what these terms meant.

For a given faculty *F*, the equivalent object was the class of objects defined by the condition *C* such that

o is an object for *F* / *o* meets condition *C.*

In other words, an object had to meet condition *C* in order to be an object of *F* **at all**. The proportionate object was the smaller class defined by the condition *C N* such that

o is an object of *F* by the natural strength of *F* / *o* meets condition *C N.*

In other words, an object had to meet condition *CN* in order to be an object of *F* **in a certain way**, such as easily, comfortably, proportionately.

When the objection we are reading uses ‘scope of an object for created intellect’, it is correctly taken as talking about the equivalent object (as Bañez will do). That way, the objection’s Scotist premise says that any created intellect inclines *naturally* to anything within its equivalent object — *i.e.* inclines *naturally* to any object it can receive at all (no matter with how much supernatural help). It then follows that any created intellect inclines naturally to God as the object of the Beatific Vision, which is precisely what Scotus, of course, did conclude, as did Soto. Well, Bañez knew (whether by reading Cajetan on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1, or otherwise) that one was supposed to reject this conclusion. So the objection says that this conclusion is impossible, with the result that, by *modus tollens*, God as the object of the Beatific Vision (God grasped at the level of U+) is in no way receivable in a created intellect. If that much is clear, we can hear the

confirming arguments. They buttress the claim that a created intellect inclines naturally to anything within its equivalent object-class.

> This is confirmed and explained. (a) Exactly the same formal makeup explaining what-it-takes [to be an object] *[ratio formalis]* is found in God-clearly-seen as a supernatural object and in any other, natural thing.[12] But a created intellect naturally inclines towards knowing a natural thing; ergo, it is just as naturally inclined towards knowing God-clearly-seen as a supernatural object. The inference is obvious; for the same formal makeup explaining what-it-takes is in both.
>
> (b) The power of eyesight is naturally inclined to every case of what-it-takes to be colored, wherever it may be found, because to be colored is the sole formal makeup in what-it-takes to be an object of eyesight. Well, there is just one formal makeup in what-it-takes to be an object of created intellect; ergo a created intellect is inclined to it, wherever it may be found. Well, in God-clearly-seen as a supernatural object there is found the formal makeup in what-it-takes to be an object of created intellect; ergo, a created intellect is naturally inclined to it [in God].[13]

We now have the entire objection in sight and are ready to proceed to Bañez' response. It is a lengthy one, because he considers several alternative approaches to meeting the objection

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[12] This is again Scotism. For Scotus, the *ratio formalis* explaining what it takes to be N is the same for anything (God or creature) having what it takes to be N (where N is any trait you please). This is the basis for Scotus' univocity-of-terms doctrine, which he developed against Aquinas' analogy-of-terms doctrine. For a Thomist, there was no trait N such that God was N under the same *ratio* as a creature: 1 *ST* q. 13, a. 5. (Never mind '*ratio formalis';* the Thomists used the term differently.) The disagreement between the Schools on this point was just the same when the value of N was an intensional trait such as being-an-object-of-created-intellect. For Scotus, the *ratio formalis* explaining what it took for God to be such an object was the same as the one explaining what it took for anything else to be such an object. (And if all it took was being "a being," fine; 'being' was a univocal term for Scotus, and so the *ratio formalis* would stay the same across the board.) But for the Thomists, there was no intensional-object-status such that God was an object-knowable under the same formal *ratio* as a creature. At least, Thomists were supposed to understand that.

[13] Confirmatur hoc et explicatur. Eadem omnino ratio formalis reperitur in Deo clare viso, ut est obiectum supernaturale, atque reperitur in qualibet alia re naturali : sed intellectus creatus naturaliter inclinatur ad cognoscendam rem naturalem, ergo naturaliter etiam inclinatur ad cognoscendum Deum clare visum, ut est obiectum supernaturale. Conseq. patet. Nam eadem ratio formalis est in utroque.

Confirmatur secundo. Potentia visiva naturaliter inclinatur ad omnem rationem colorati ubicumque sit, quoniam est unica ratio formalis obiecti visus: sed obiectum intellectus creati habet unicam rationem formalem, ergo ad illam inclinatur naturaliter ubicumque sit: sed in Deo clare viso, ut est obiectum supernaturale, reperitur ratio formalis obiecti intellectus creati, ergo intellectus ad illam inclinatur

before presenting his own.

> *ad* (2) Before giving the solution, one should note that 'object of intellect' is twofold. One is the equivalent *[objectum adaequatum]* of what the faculty can extend itself to. The other is the proportioned object, which has proportion with the intellect. Thus "quiddity of a material thing" is the proportional object of our intellect, while the equivalent object is "a being insofar as it is a being." [14]
>
> With this foundation in place, the **first solution** is that God-clearly-seen, as something supernatural, is contained within the equivalent object of a created intellect and yet far exceeds [its proportioned object]. Hence the intellect is not inclined to it. Just as the sun is supremely visible (and is visible for the same reason as other visible things) and yet the bat's eyesight cannot attain to it, since the sun so far exceeds it; so they say in the case at hand that God-clearly-seen is contained under the definition of what-it-specifically-takes to be an object of created intellect, and yet a created intellect cannot attain to that Object, since it so far exceeds such an intellect.[15]

This "first solution" was probably meant to be Cajetan's and is in fact his, if one corrects a few flaws in Bañez' statement of it. First, one does not need the words 'as something super-natural'. Whether at level U or at level U+, God-seen is beyond the proportionate object of a created intellect but within its equivalent object.[16] Next, one has to insert the word 'naturally' in many places (with the meaning of mode-naturally). Rather than detail all these places, let me just repeat part of the paragraph with the corrections in italic.

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naturaliter. (col. 440 C, D)

[14] Ad secundum argumentum respondetur. Et prius pro eius solutione notandum est, quod obiectum intellectus est duplex. Aliud est adaequatum ad quod se potest extendere potentia. Aliud vero proportionatum, quod habet proportionem cum ipso intellectu. Sicut quidditas rei materialis est obiectum proportionatum nostri intellectus : adaequatum vero est ens in quantum ens. (col. 442 D)

[15] Hoc supposito fundamento est prima solutio, quod Deus clare visus ut est quid supernaturale continetur intra obiectum adaequatum intellectus creati, est tamen valde excedens. Et ideo intellectus non inclinatur ad illud. Sicut sol maxime visibilis est, et eiusdem rationis cum alijs visibilibus, et tamen potentia visiva noctuae non potest ad illum pertingere, quoniam multum excedit. Ita dicunt in proposito, quod Deus clare visus continetur in ratione specifica obiecti intellectus creati, tamen intellectus creatus non potest ad illum pertingere, quoniam valde excedit intellectum. (col. 442 E)

[16] This point comes out explicitly in Cajetan's commentary on 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 4 (Leonine IV, pp. 122-123)

> Hence the intellect is not *naturally* inclined to it. Just as the sun is supremely visible (and is visible for the same reason as other visible things) and yet the bat's eyesight cannot *naturally* attain to it, since the sun so far exceeds it; so they say in the case at hand that God-clearly-seen is contained under the definition of what-it-specifically-takes to be an object of created intellect, and yet a created intellect cannot *naturally* attain to that Object, since it so far exceeds such an intellect.

Now let us hear Bañez's response.

> But this solution amounts to nothing. For it follows from it that the created intellect has a natural inclination to know God intuitively, as a supernatural object, although attaining it comes about supernaturally because of the falling-short of the faculty. For eyesight naturally inclines to every visible thing, even though some power-to-see cannot reach every visible thing naturally.[17]

So far as the present writer can see, there is only one way to explain this response. Bañez has assumed that an apprehensive faculty *inclines* to any object it can have at all. So insofar as such a faculty is a passive potency to-be-informed, he assumed that the passive potency is a natural potency to any act it can receive. He must have assumed this so thoroughly that he could not imagine denying it.[18] And since he could not imagine denying it, he could not imagine that this first solution denied it. As applied to the intellect, he had to think that this solution left intact the alleged inclination within the possible intellect (as a passive potency to objects) and merely denied any active ability on the part of the agent intellect. But this was to miss the whole point! The central claim in Cajetan's solution was that, to an object not attainable by the agent intellect, the possible intellect had no natural passive potency, and so the inclination within it as a passive potency did not reach to that object. This is why the possible intellect was in non-natural potency

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[17] Haec tamen solutio nulla est. Nam ex ea sequitur quod intellectus creatus habeat inclinationem ad cognoscendum Deum intuitive, ut est obiectum supernaturale, quamvis assequutio sit supernaturalis propter defectum potentiae. Nam potentia visiva naturaliter inclinatur ad omne visibile, quamvis aliqua potentia non possit consequi omne visibile naturaliter. (col. 442 last 2 lines — col. 443 A)

[18] Bañez had abundant opportunity to absorb this conviction from Master Soto. The Scotizing Soto was prior of the Dominican community which Bañez entered in 1547 and was regent over the younger man

to the Vision (as Aquinas himself said in *CT* c. 104). Having missed the obvious, Bañez says

> eyesight naturally inclines to every visible thing, even though some power-to-see cannot reach every visible thing naturally.

So eyesight, like intellect, is "naturally inclined" to everything it can possibly be made to see, even if only with divine help! This carries the preposterous entailment that, even if a bat's eye avoids the sun like the plague, this eye is "naturally inclined" to see it! No one who retained a clue as to what the talk of natural tendency/inclination was originally about in Aristotle's science could have made such a claim.

If the first solution to the objection and Bañez's dismissal of it are now clear, let us pass on to the second solution and see how he fares with it.

> The **second solution** is that God-clearly-seen, as something supernatural, is not within the range of objects-of-created-intellect, whose equivalent object is *natural* being. Even so, a created intellect can know a supernatural being thanks to its order-relation to natural being. In much the same way, the object of our intellect is real being, and yet we can know thought-produced being *[ens rationis]* through its order-relation to real being. This solution does not please me. In Heaven, the blessed know God intuitively, through Himself immediately, without order to natural being. Therefore a created intellect can know God intuitively without order-relation to natural being.[19]

One is glad to see Bañez reject this whimsical theory. But notice that he only rejects its limitation of created intellect's equivalent object to natural being. He does not quarrel with the theory's division of being itself into natural and supernatural. We are about to see why, as we pass on to the third solution, which Bañez will accept.

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in his early teaching posts.

[19] Secunda solutio est quod Deus clare visus, ut est aliquid supernaturale, non continetur intra latitudinem obiecti intellectus creati, sed obiectum adaequatum est ens naturale. Nihilominus intellectus creatus potest cognoscere ens supernaturale per ordinem ad ens naturale. Sicut obiectum nostri intellectus est ens reale, nihilominus possumus cognoscere ens rationis per ordinem ad ens reale. Haec solutio mihi non placet. Quoniam in patria beati cognoscunt Deum intuitive sine ordine ad ens naturale per ipsum immediate, ergo intellectus creatus potest cognoscere Deum intuitive sine ordine ad ens naturale. (col. 443 B)

> The [third and] **last solution** is that the equivalent object of our intellect is "a being" vaguely taken *[in confuso],* as it abstracts from natural being and from supernatural being.[20]

One regrets to interrupt Bañez' presentation of his solution so soon, but it is imperative to notice his acceptance of this division. Since when is natural *vs.* supernatural a *division of being?* For Aquinas, the relevant "division of being" was the division of 'a being' into its prime analogate (the being which is self-subsisting *esse,* God) and its secondary analogates (the beings that are such through received *esse* and lie within one or another of the categories, starting with substance). Natural *vs.* supernatural was a division of how the completive traits flowing out from God relate to Him, *i.e*. a division into those that flow out as forming another nature and those that flow out as communicating His own nature distinctively; thereupon it was a division between God as source of the one kind of gift and God as source of the other;[21] thereupon it was a division of *creatures' relations to God* into two orders of dependency, *i.e.,* the relations whereby creatures really depend on God for goods connatural to themselves *vs.* the relations whereby rational creatures depend on God for goods connatural to Him alone; finally, it was a division of knowledge in relation to its source, *i.e.* into that which can be acquired by a study of creatures as they are in themselves (having all that is connatural to them) *vs.* that which can be acquired from divine revelation alone.[22] So: natural *vs.* supernatural was either a division of relations or a division of relata (with a consequent division of information). At no point was it a division of absolute (non-relational) beings.

The importance of this point makes it worth taking a moment to trace it to its source. Will

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[20] Ultima solutio est, quod obiectum nostri intellectus adaequatum est ens in confuso, ut abstrahit ab ente naturali et supernaturali. (col. 443 C)

[21] Here is where a basis first emerges for distinguishing the SO-problem from the E-problem.

the reader agree that if 'natural' cannot be an absolute description, neither can 'supernatural'?

Then hear Aquinas on *Physics II, lectio* 1:

> In his definition of nature, Aristotle puts as its genus, so to speak, *source*, and not something absolute, because the word 'nature' implies the relation of a source [to what is from it] . . . so the source of a coming-to-be or of a change is called a nature. Laughable, therefore, are those who want to correct Aristotle's definition by trying to define nature through something absolute.[23]

If 'nature' was not an absolute term, the division between natural and supernatural was not a division between absolute items. Nor was it a division of absolute from relative items. In no way, then, was it a primary division of being! Either Bañez himself or a teacher who influenced him must be seen, therefore, as a pioneer, moving the Thomist school towards a new concept of nature — a scholastic nature set off against a scholastic supernature in a sweeping, air-tight, "first division" of everything. Let us read on.

> But afterwards, when we divide being into natural and supernatural, we unfold two explanations *[rationes]* first-off diverse not only of what it takes to be a being but also of what it takes to be a knowable. For the distinctive *[proprius]* object of the divine intellect is supernatural being.[24] Thus a created intellect can come to a knowledge of supernatural being through a certain participation, since it becomes a participant in the divine intellect. And so natural being is known by a natural faculty; supernatural being, by a supernatural faculty, keeping a proportion between the object and the intellect. Thus God-clearly-seen is called the "extensive object" of a created intellect, because the latter can be extended to it by participation. Now, what it takes for this extension [to occur] is threefold: (∀) on the part of the faculty: the fact that it is a spiritual faculty and so is open *[capax]* to spiritual

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[22] Which is where an actual distinction emerges between the SO-problem and the E-problem.

[23] Ponitur autem in definitione naturae principium, quasi genus, et non aliquid absolutum : quia nomen naturae importat habitudinem principii . . . ideo principium generationis vel motus natura nominatur. Unde deridendi sunt qui volentes definitionem Aristotelis corrigere, naturam per aliquod absolutum definire conati sunt. *Opera Omnia*, vol. 22 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 340.

[24] Aquinas would have said: the distinctive object of the divine intellect is the divine essence. Notice that when "being" in all its breadth is *first* divided into supernatural *vs.* natural, the divine essence becomes identically "supernatural being," whereupon the E-problem simply disappears as an issue; it is folded into the SO-problem.

> completion and can be a sharer in divine knowing; (∃) on the part of the object: the fact that a natural being and a supernatural one have the same way of impacting the intellect, *i.e*. through a species separated from all matter;[25] (() the third factor in what it takes is on the part of both: the fact that a supernatural being is contained under what it takes to be a being, which is the what-it-takes that specifies the intellect.[26]

Aquinas would also say that a created intellect, through the light of glory, becomes a participant in the divine nature and knowing. He would have thought it nonsense to claim that the creature's intellect is thereby attaining an "extensive object" outside the scope of its equivalent object. Such talk would show plain ignorance of the meaning of the phrase `equivalent object of such-and-such intellect'. But Bañez does not seem to be making so gross a mistake. He seems rather to be dividing the equivalent-object class into two parts, an intensive part and an extensive part. This interpretation is confirmed by the third alleged factor in what it takes for this "extension" to occur, namely, that a supernatural being is contained under the very *ratio* that specifies our intellect. In that case, since this *ratio* can hardly be that of natural being, the *ratio* that specifies our intellect has to be "a being vaguely taken" (in which case God is already within the equivalent object of our intellect). But then the problem Bañez was left with after he rejected

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[25] It is fair to say that the natural knowable which is what-an-angel-is stands to us on the same epistemological footing as the supernatural knowable which is what-God-is-in-Himself-as-Trinity, in this respect: neither presents a species abstractible from material singulars; but for Aquinas this is precisely the reason why *neither* "impacts our intellect" in the way our faculty needs to be impacted if it is to know *naturally*, with the result that *neither* an angel *nor* God is knowable by man *naturally* for WHAT-IT-IS. See 1 ST q. 13, a. 9.

[26] Sed postea cum dividimus ens in naturale et supernaturale, explicamus duas rationes primo diversas non solum in ratione entis, sed etiam in ratione cognoscibilis. Nam obiectum proprium intellectus divini est ens supernaturale. Et ita intellectus creatus per quamdam participationem potest pertingere ad cognitionem entis supernaturalis, quoniam fit particeps intellectus divini. Et sic ens naturale cognoscitur a potentia naturali, ens supernaturale a potentia supernaturali servata proportione obiecti cum potentia. Et ita Deus clare visus vocatur obiectum extensivum intellectus creati, quoniam ad illud potest extendi per participationem. Triplex vero est ratio huius extensionis. Prima est ex parte potentiae, quoniam potentia est spiritualis, et ita est capax perfectionis spiritualis, et potest esse particeps divinae cognitionis. Secunda est ex parte obiecti, quoniam ens naturale et supernaturale habent eundem modum immutandi intellectum, scilicet per speciem separatam ab omni materia. Tertia ratio est ex parte utriusque, quoniam ens

the "first solution" is still unsolved. This he concedes, as he now goes on.

> The whole difficulty, then, is to say why the created intellect is not inclined na-turally to supernatural being and to God-clearly-seen, given that the formal defining makeup *[ratio]* specifying a created intellect's object its found in supernatual being. For just as this colored thing can differ in species from that one in its defining make-up *as a being* and yet [the two] *as visibles* are individuals of the same species,[27] so also natural being and supernatural being may well differ in species in the line of being and yet have the same makeup defining specifically what it takes to be knowable and may differ only numerically in that respect. Ergo, if a created intellect inclines naturally to the one, it inclines naturally to the other.
>
> Well, the answer is that a natural being and a supernatural being differ in kind, indeed in category, even in their makeup as knowable, and yet can specify one facul-ty. To explain this, one should notice that intellect and will, since they are utterly universal faculties, can be specified by a makeup that is analogical, not [purely] equivocal, even in what it takes to specify. Much as some say that intellect is specified by "a being" as it abstracts from real being and thought-produced being, and yet the two do not agree univocally in the makeup explaining why they are knowable (for a thought-produced being is known dependently upon a real being). Again, the object of the will is "a good" as it abstracts from real or apparent; and yet an apparent good does not have what it takes to be good *alongside* a true good, but "what it takes to be good" is analogical as between the two. The reason for this is as follows. It is a distinctive characteristic of "form" that it yields an effect which it does not have in itself. Whiteness renders white and yet is not white in itself. And since an object stands to a faculty and to a habit as an outside form *[forma extrin-sica],* an analogical object not having in itself all-around oneness *[omnimodam uni-tatem]* can yield *one* faculty specifically. Thus Cajetan (*De nominum analogia,* c. 10) and Son [cinas] (c. 4, Meta. q. 10, ad 5)[28] say that metaphysics, which is spe-cifically one science, can be specified by one analogical object, *i.e.* by the defining makeup of "a being" as it abstracts from God and creatures, from substance and accident. Again, it is a probable opinion that [someone's] concept of "a being" is one not only specifically but numerically, and yet its object [*i.e.* what it is a concept of] is analogical [*i.e.* is one only by analogy]. So in the case at hand, intellect and will [each] have a single, specific makeup determining what-it-takes to be that faculty, and yet "object of each," in what it takes to be its object, is not one in species but has one analogical makeup defining it. Hence a natural being and a supernatural being, even in what it takes to be knowable, do not have the same specific

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supernaturale continetur sub ratione entis, quae est ratio specificativa intellectus. (col 443 C-E).

[27] *E.g.* a green leaf is in a different species from the green chameleon sitting on it *as a being*, but the leaf is in the same species with it *as a visible thing* (that species being the green ones).

[28] The reference is to Paulus Soncinas, *Quaestiones in XII Libros Metaphysicorum.*

> makeup but differ in category. And so it is not surprising that a created intellect inclines differently to a natural being and to a supernatural being — to the former naturally; and to the latter, supernaturally. For what it takes to be a knowable is unequally participated by the two.[29]

Bañez has attempted to extricate himself from his difficulty by appealing to analogy, and such an appeal is usually heart-warming to a Thomistic reader. But in this case the appeal is fruitless. Aquinas would agree that a specific science-habit can be specified by an object-class that is one by analogy only, and that such an object-class can be used to define a faculty (*via* specifying its acts). That is what Bañez was doing here. The specifying makeup or *ratio* for an object-of-created-intellect was 'a being vaguely taken', he said, and this now turns out to be the same as 'a being' taken independently of which analogate it is being used of. In that case, it is 'a being in some manner' (uncaused or caused, natural or supernatural, as something having being

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[29] Tota igitur difficultas est, quomodo intellectus creatus non inclinetur naturaliter ad ens supernaturale, et ad Deum clare visum, cum in his reperiatur ratio formalis specifica sui obiecti? Nam sicut hoc coloratum et illud possunt differre specie in ratione entis : in ratione tamen visibilis sunt individua eiusdem speciei : ita ens naturale, et supernaturale, quamvis differant specie in genere entis, in ratione tamen cognoscibilis habent eandem rationem specificam, et solum differunt numero. Ergo si intellectus creatus naturaliter inclinatur ad unum, naturaliter inclinat ad aliud.

Respondetur tamen, quod ens naturale et supernaturale different specie etiam in ratione cognoscibilis, imo genere: et nihilominus possunt specificare unam potentiam. Ad cuius expositionem est advertendum, quod intellectus et voluntas quoniam sunt potentiae universalissimae possunt specificari ab aliqua ratione analoga non univoca etiam in ratione specificandi. Sicut dicunt aliqui, quod intellectus specificatur ab ente, ut abstrahit ab ente reali et rationis, et tamen ens reale, et rationis non conveniunt univoce in ratione cognoscibilis. Nam ens rationis cognoscitur dependenter ab ente reali. Item obiectum voluntatis est bonum, ut abstrahit a vero bono, vel apparenti; tamen bonum apparens non habet rationem boni cum vero bono, sed ratio boni est analoga ad utrumque. Ratio est. Nam hoc est proprium formae, quod faciat effectum, quem in se non habet. Albedo enim facit album, et tamen in se non est alba. Et quoniam obiectum habet se respectu potentiae et habitus veluti forma extrinseca: ideo obiectum analogum, quod in se non habet omnimodam unitatem, potest facere unam potentiam specie. Et. ita dns. Caiet. in opusculo de analogia nominum c.10. et Sonc.4.Meta.q.10.ad quintum dicunt, quod Metap. quae est una scientia specie, potest specificari ab uno obiecto analogo, scilicet a ratione entis ut abstrahit a Deo et creaturis, a substantia et accidente. Item probabilis sententia est, quod conceptus entis est unicus non solum specie, verum etiam numero, et tamen eius obiectum est analogum. Ita in proposito intellectus et voluntas habent unicam rationem specificam potentiae et tamen obiectum earum etiam in ratione obiecti non est unicum specie, sed habet rationem analogam, unde ens naturale et supernaturale etiam in ratione cognoscibilis non habent eandem rationem specificam, sed different genere. Et ita non mirum quod intellectus creatus diversimode inclinet ad ens naturale, et ad ens supernaturale : ad ens naturale naturaliter : et ad ens supernaturale supernaturaliter. Nam ratio cognoscibilis inaequaliter participatur ab utroque. (col. 444 B — col 445 A)

or as how something is, *etc*.) Please note that, if God-clearly-seen meets the condition of being a being in the supernatural manner, it meets the condition of being a being in some manner; ergo God-clearly-seen meets the condition for being within the equivalent object of our intellect according to Bañez. Why, then, is our intellect **not** naturally inclined to it? Bañez' answer is that supernatural and natural being "participate" in this *ratio objecti* unequally, and that our intellect inclines naturally only to those knowables that participate in the said *ratio* as natural beings do.

But this talk of participation is misplaced. The several analogates to which the term 'being' is applied all verify in some way the independent use of that word, which is abstracted from its several applications to those analogates, but they do not *participate* in it. Being a being in a given manner (say, self-subsistently) is not participating in "being a being in some manner," any more than being penicillin is participating in "being healthy in some manner." If there is any participating to be done, it is done by the secondary analogates, and what they participate in is the prime analogate. Every creature can be said to participate in some way in the completeness of God, and it is fair enough to say that each being has what it takes to be called a being at all because it participates in some way in the completeness of God; plus, the completeness of God is nothing less than the whole completeness of *esse;*[30] but the whole completeness of *esse* is anything but "a being vaguely taken"![31]

With the reader's permission, I shall correct Bañez' language, so as to make a better presentation of what he needed to say. Any "object of understanding" is "a being." But the explanation *(ratio)* thanks to which a creature is a being differs from the explanation thanks to which God is a being. So the term 'a being' is not being used univocally but analogously when

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[30] 1 ST q. 4, a. 2

[31] *Cf.* 1 *ST* q. 3 a. 4 *ad* 1.

both are called "beings." And so the term 'object of understanding' is being used analogously, too, when both God and a creature are called "objects of understanding." So since creatures are such objects under a different *ratio* from God, it is not surprising that a created intellect inclines naturally to the objects that are such under the creaturely *ratio* but does not incline naturally to God-clearly-seen, because that is an object-of-intellect under another *ratio.*

There you have it: the appeal to analogy that Bañez needed to make and tried to make. But it is not enough. He needed to tell us why the analogy matters — why created intellects incline to the one analogate and not to the other. He needed to say that created intellects *incline naturally* to objects of such-and-such a type only, and that all objects of this type fall under the created analogate, and that is why created intellects do not *incline naturally* to God-clearly-seen. Bañez had in front of him the resources to do this in the first solution (created intellects *incline naturally* to their proportionate objects only), and he threw it away.[32] So he still has not managed to tell us what it is that a created being has (and God lacks) that our intellect should incline naturally to the one, and not to the other. Until he does, the overall objection is still unsolved. As we return to his text, we shall see that he senses this.

> If someone objects that a created intellect in its essence and nature includes an order-relation to its object, but its object is "a being" as that abstracts from a natural being and a supernatural being, and so [the created intellect] bespeaks order-relation naturally to both — the thing to say is that a created intellect includes in its nature and essence that it is a certain vital source *[principium]* which, having been put into act, can go forth into act with respect to its object. It is put into act naturally with respect to a natural being and is put into act supernaturally with respect to a super-natural being, especially God-clearly-seen. And for a fuller explanation, one should note that a created intellect, with respect to the Beatific Vision, is naturally apt to be elevated to that matter and has an obediential potency — but not in such a

[32] Well, he threw it away unless you count empty verbal gestures. He divided natural and supernatural being, made them analogates as objects of knowledge, said natural knowers incline only to natural beings, and said this salvages "proportion." So natural intellects are proportioned to natural beings because they are, uh, natural. Compare this empty answer to Aquinas's account of proportionate objects in 1 *ST* 12, 4.

> way that the intellect stands purely passively. For it has an active power *[virtus]* whereby it can elicit the Beatific Vision provided it is first put in act by the light of glory — as Cajetan says below, on q. 79, a. 2, that the intellect denuded of any intelligible species is a vital source and a sort of animal strength *[vis]*, which has an active power *[virtus]* provided it is put into act through an intelligible species. So, in the case at hand, created intellect has the power to elicit a clear vision of God, provided it has been put in act. From these remarks, the answer to the second argument and its confirmations is clear.[33]

One regets to say it, but the answer is anything but clear. In this final paragraph of his answer *ad* (2), Bañez appeals to the fact that the faculty or potency called intellect is receptive in one way and yet active in another. It is initially receptive, in that it needs to receive an impressed species and, in some cases, an extra "light." Once in act with such a species and light, however, the intellect is active in "eliciting" its operation (the *ipsa intellectio*). But given the light, it is perfectly natural for the intellect to elicit its operation towards any object whose species it has received; so its lack of natural inclination towards God-clearly-seen cannot lie on the intellect's vital-elicitive side. Why even bring it up?

No, the problem must be further back, on the receptive side. Bañez says the intellect receives the species of a natural being "naturally" but that of a supernatual being "super-naturally," so that its potentiality to receive the latter sort of species is obediential potency. But where is this answer coming from, other than from an indefensible division of being itself?

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[33] Quod si quis obijciat, quod intellectus creatus in sua essentia et natura includit ordinem ad suum obiectum, sed suum obiectum est ens, ut abstrahit ab ente naturali et supernaturali, ergo ad utrumque dicit ordinem naturaliter. Dicendum est, quod intellectus creatus in sua natura et essentia includit, quod sit principium quoddam vitale, quod factum in actu potest exire in actum respectu sui obiecti. Fit vero in actu respectu entis naturalis naturaliter, respectu entis supernaturalis et praecipue Dei clare visi fit in actu supernaturaliter. Et ad maiorem explicationem notandum est, quod intellectus creatus respectu visionis beatificae aptus naturaliter est, ut possit elevari ad illam materiam et habet potentiam obedientialem, non ita tamen quod intellectus mere passive se habeat. Nam habet virtutem activam ut possit elicere visionem beatificam, si tamen prius fiat in actu lumine gloriae, sicut Caieta. ait inf. in q.79.art.2. quod intellectus nudatus omni specie intelligibili est principium vitale et vis quaedam animalis, quae habet virtutem activam, si tamen fiat in actu per speciem intelligibilem. Ita in proposito intellectus creatus virtutem habet ad eliciendam claram Dei visionem, si tamen fiat in actu. Ex dictis patet ad secundum argumentum et eius confirmationes. (col. 445 B-D)

Contrast Bañez' case, then, with Cajetan's. The latter, too, had held that the intellect as receptive is in obediential potency to the Vision, not natural potency. But he had reached that conclusion after a searching discussion of what it takes for a potency to be natural, in the course of which he had rejected the claim that a potency inclines naturally to any act receivable in it. In other words, he rejected the claim that a faculty inclines naturally to anything within the range of its equivalent object. This is the precise point that Bañez has not thought through. He has conceded that God-clearly-seen is within the range of equivalent object for our intellect, and that the latter inclines naturally to every object in that range. With these concessions in place, our intellect must incline naturally to God-clearly-seen even if its potency to receive the species of that Object is obediential. In sum, having missed the right answer *ad* (2), Bañez has made no answer at all.

His failure, however, is less interesting than the nature of his attempt. Read back through the objection and the response, and savor the air of a scholasticism no longer in contact with Aristotle's work *as science*. 'Tendency'/'*inclinatio'* has lost its roots in the *'orexis'* of the *Physics*. It has become a term so wrapped up in abstract bafflegab about *rationes formales*, that one can no longer tell what it makes sense to say or deny. 'Nature' itself is losing its roots in '*physis'* as naming a source of change and is drifting up into metaphysics to mark a first (a first, no less!) division of *ens in quantum ens*.

2. The sixth objection and Bañez' response

The topic of this objection is the cogency of St. Thomas's natural-desire argument, and what it proves if it is cogent. We save words with frequent use of the abbreviation, NDA.

> (6) Lastly, *[antecedent: major:]* if the second part of St. Thomas' argument [*i.e.* the NDA part] concluded to anything, it would be to this: God-clearly-seen is our natural end; but *[antecedent: minor:]* this is impossible.

> *[Inference:]* Ergo [the NDA part of the argument concludes to nothing]. The antecedent [minor] is supported thus: God clearly seen is of the supernatural and divine order; ergo, it is impossible for it to be our natural end.[34]

The reader will recognize the major part of the antecedent as Soto's idea of what follows from the NDA, given his Augustinian definition of 'natural end'. There is a cultural fact of significance to be learned here. For Bañez, Soto's position was the "going" position, the theory to beat. Having acquired the conviction that a supernatural Vision cannot be a natural end, Bañez had a motive to defeat Soto. Here is how he proceeded.

> *ad* (6) The answer to the last argument is that St. Thomas is not trying to demonstrate that there is a natural desire in man for seeing God. But given the faith saying that a Beatific Vision is possible, he shows that such a Vision is fully agreeable *[consentaneum]* to a created intellect . . . . St. Thomas is not proving this beyond doubt *[evidenter]* but tenably *[probabiliter]* and after the fashion of the *Topics.*[35]

This response *ad* (6) needs to have a lot of steps laid out before its point is clear. Step one is a fact about the faith: it said that a Vision delivering U+ is the goal allotted to humanity by God, so that our reaching U+ is possible. Step two is a fact about Aquinas: he put together an argument to show, without revealed premises, that there was warrant for thinking U± possible. Step three is a fact about Soto: he made a case that certain premises in Aquinas'argument gave it a further entailment, namely, that U+ (or the Vision delivering it) is a natural end for us. The fourth and final step is a fact about Bañez: he fashioned Soto's case into objection (6) and is now trying to answer it.

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[34] Ultimo arguitur. Si secunda pars rationis D.Tho. aliquid concluderet, hoc esset, quia Deus clare visus esset finis noster naturalis, sed hoc est impossibile, ergo. Antecedens probatur. Deus clare visus est ordinis supernaturalis, et divini, ergo impossibile est, quod sit finis noster naturalis. (col 441 B)

[35] Ad ultimum argumentum respondetur, quod D.Th. non vult demonstrare quod in homine sit naturale desiderium videndi Deum, sed proposita fide, quae dicit visionem beatificam esse possibilem, ostendit illud esse maxime consentaneum intellectui creato. (col. 447 B) . . . Hoc vero non probat D.Tho. evidenter, sed probabiliter et topice. (col. 447 C)

With the sequence of steps laid out, we need to see steps two and three in more detail. At step two, Aquinas used the premises

(1) a natural desire exists in man (and *a fortiori* in any higher intellectual creature) for understanding the causes of seen effects;
(2) this comes to include the First Cause;
(3) a cause is understood as fully as one naturally desires only when it is known quidditatively (and to know the First Cause that way is U±); and
(4) a natural desire cannot be unrealizable,

to reach the conclusion that

(5) ergo, U± is possible (somehow) for an intellectual creature.

Such was step two (the NDA in 12/1). At step three, Soto seized upon premises (1)-(3) of Aquinas' argument to derive a new entailment, *via* a definition of 'natural end'. It said that 'natural end' meant 'what can satisfy a natural desire'. So long as that definition remained in place, premises (1)-(3) already implied analytically that U± is a natural end of man. In other words, as long as Soto's definition stood, Soto had a necessary implication:

Necessarily, if NDA's premises are true, U± is a natural end of man.

This is how Bañez saw the problem which he presented as objection (6).

Now, in his reply, Bañez has observed that the relevant premises of NDA were not demonstrated by Aquinas. This observation is correct. Premise (1) was borrowed from Aristotle without proof. Indeed, the right way to take the whole NDA is as a plausible argument, not a demonstration (and in a portion of the response I have not quoted, Bañez gave other examples in Aquinas of such arguments).

But what has been the point of making this observation? This is what we are finally in a position to get clear. Given Soto's implication that

necessarily, if NDA's premises are true, U± is a natural end of man,

Bañez must have seen that if NDA's premises *are not demonstrated* to be true, then it *is not*

demonstrated to be true that U± is a natural end of man. Correct again. But is objection (6) thereby solved?

No. For what Bañez has not said, but may well have known, is that insisting on the non-demonstrational status of the NDA does not break Soto's implication. It blocks the detachment of

U± is a natural end of man

as a fact or demonstrated truth in its own right, but it leaves the implication itself untouched. What is worse, it leaves the implication necessary. For it is made necessary (even analytic) by Soto's *definition* of 'natural end'. And worse still, as long as the implication itself is necessary, we have this:

if the premises of NDA are *possibly* true, U± is *possibly* a natural end of man.[36]

And then by transposition we have what is absolutely worst of all, namely:

if it is *impossible* that U± is a natural end of man, NDA's premises are *impossible*.

And there in a nutshell is objection (6) still standing.

In order to finish responding to it, therefore, Bañez had to come up with a different interpretation of NDA — one that would leave its premises possible and even true, while this "natural end" of man is ejected as impossible. Let us see how Bañez proceeded.

> A second answer is that in a spiritual creature there is a certain velleity and a certain incomplete desire for seeing God. From this St. Thomas infers tenably that the Beatific Vision is possible, lest such a natural desire be frustrated. But whether God-clearly-seen is our natural end is customarily disputed in 2/1 *ST* q. 3, aa. 6, 7, and 8, and some writers also raise this issue at 1 *ST*, q. 1, a. 1. But I say that the legitimate place for this controversy is in 2/1 *ST*.

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[36] The argument is an instance of a basic schema of modal logic: ~(p ε q) ε (□p ε □q). The schema is valid in even the weakest systems of modal logic, such as those that support an epistemic interpretation of the modalities. See M. J. Cresswell and G. E. Hughes, *A New Introduction to Modal Logic* (New York: Routledge, 1996) pp. 23-48.

> Nevertheless, I will briefly lay out some thoughts on this difficulty here.[37]

Here we come to the heart of the matter. Commendably, Bañez sees that the natural-end issue has been mixed in where it does not belong. Getting rid of it requires a better interpretation of the NDA in 12/1. The core of Bañez own interpretation is going to be a new view of the complication with which this study started, the *desiderium naturae* itself. No longer will it be seen as an *ordo* or *inclinatio* in the intellect; it is moving to another faculty and changing in status to an elicited velleity.

How is this move going to help, and how can it be defended? These are matters for a second disputation, Bañez tells us.

B. Second Disputation — what to make of the *desiderium naturae.*

> The doubt, then, is whether man has a natural yearning *[appetitus]* towards seeing God as He is, and whether God-thus-clearly-seen is a natural end.[38]

Having stated the issue, Bañez followed *disputatio* procedure — as much as he cared to. The full procedure would have been (a) to survey the outstanding opinions with their supporting grounds, (b) then to state his own opinion with grounds to support it, then (c) to answer the grounds that supported any opinion he had disagreed with. With respect to Soto's opinion, Bañez did follow this procedure. He gave not only the opinion but also its supporting grounds, as Soto had laid them out in his commentary on *IV Sentences* d. 49, q. 2. (they added almost nothing to

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[37] Secundo respondetur, quod in creatura spirituali est quaedam velleitas, et quoddam desiderium imperfectum videndi Deum. Ex quo colligit D.Thom. probabiliter, quod visio beatifica sit possibilis, ne frustretur tale desiderium naturale. Utrum vero Deus clare visus sit finis noster naturalis disputari solet in 1.2.q.3.art.6.7. et 8, a quibusdam etiam disputari solet in hac 1.p.q.1.a.1. Sed fateor legitimus locus huius disputationis est in loco citato in 1.2. Nihilominus breviter nunc quid de hac difficultate sen[ten]tiam exponam. (col 447 D)

[38] Dubitatur ergo 2. an homo habeat naturalem appetitum ad videndum Deum sicuti est, et an Deus sic

the grounds that had emerged in *De natura et gratia* except to show further dependence on Scotus); and after stating his own *solutio* in the form of four supported conclusions, Bañez then answered the grounds appealed to by Soto. In short, as a *disputatio* against Soto, this part of B12/1 is in perfect form. But to give the appearance of a larger discussion, Bañez threw into his survey the names of Cajetan and Scotus. Their views he stated in briefest form with no supporting grounds, and he made no return to them to show how his own conclusions impacted either view. That he did not return to Scotus' opinion is understandable, since it stood or fell with Soto's. That he did not return to Cajetan's is puzzling. Perhaps we shall get a clue if we read what he thought the deceased Cardinal's opinion was.

> Cajetan on this article and above on q. 1, a. 1, denies "independently" *[absolut□]* that a natural yearning is in a rational or intellectual creature towards seeing God as He is in Himself. And when St. Thomas says that there is in man a natural desire, he is not saying this about man taken independently *[absolut□ considerato]*, according to his natural traits, but as ordered to eternal life. And after the same fashion, he understands the arguments St. Thomas makes in 3 *CG* c. 50, where he shows that the natural desire of the angels does not come to rest in a natural cognition.[39]

This summary of Cajetan's position is slightly better than Soto's. But like the latter, Bañez gives no sign of having learned anything from the commentaries on articles 6-8 in 2/1 *ST* q. 3. Bañez is clear that what Cajetan was denying of man *absolut□ considerato* was a natural desire for U+ (the supernatural-object problem), but Bañez shows no sign of distinguishing this from the more basic excess-of-object-over-faculty problem, which arises with a natural desire for U. Nothing here shows whether Bañez understood "absolute consideration" as the natural-science

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clare visus sit finis naturalis? (col. 447 E)

[39] Caietanus in hoc loco et supra q.1.ar.1. negat absolute appetitum naturale esse in creatura rationali, seu intellectuali ad videndum Deum, ut in se est. Et cum S.Tho. ait Inest homini naturale desiderium, loquitur de homine non absolute considerato secundum naturalia, sed ut ordinato ad vitam aeternam. Et ad eundem modum intelligit rationes quas S.Th. facit lib.3.contra gent.c.50, ubi probat naturale desiderium angelorum non quiescere in cognitione naturali. (col. 447 E — col. 448 A)

perspective (so that its language was NS language, the topic of U+ would not come up, and the sense of 'natural' would be mode-natural), or whether Bañez understood this *consideratio* as a theological stripping of man to pure naturals (where the issue would be what man as theology knows him can do without grace, the language in which to discuss the issue would still be theology's language, and Cajetan would be denying that a desire for U+ is natural in any real sense). The latter reading is confirmed, alas, in Bañez' unpublished commentaries. Instead of seeing that Cajetan defended a residence-natural desire in man for U in the absence of revelation and a residence-natural desire for U+ in the presence of revelation, Bañez read Cajetan as allowing the desire for U± to be natural only *supposita fide*, leaving no room for Aquinas' NDA at all, unless it were construed as talking about a desire that arises *with and from* revelation and grace.[40] That had been Soto's reading, too, as we saw in Chapter Five. We may as well call this way of reading Cajetan the Iberian reading. It made Cajetan a hard-nature minimalist, on the far left of the opinion spectrum. If Bañez could supply even a frail reality for the NDA to be talking about in pure naturals — real enough to be at least a wish, but too frail to give man a natural end — he would be holding the middle ground, he thought, between Cajetan on the left and Soto on the right. That way, his own conclusion supporting such a reality would be all the answer than Cajetan's opinion needed.

The reader will soon see that what I have just sketched is how things go in B12/1. Let us just observe in advance that what we are seeing is how the real sense of Cajetan's opinion was lost from Thomist school-history, how the feel for a distinction between NS and SD senses of key words got lost, how the distinction between mode-natural and residence-natural disappeared, and how a unified scholastic vocabulary acquired its one sense of 'nature.'

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[40] Sentit enim ille [Caietanus] quod est homini naturalis hujusmodi appetitus, supposita tamen fide.

We return now to Bañez' text, where Scotus' opinion was stated next in a single sentence (the natural desire is borne towards seeing God),[41] and then Soto's opinion was stated with its grounds. We have seen most of them before. Bañez understood it quite well. The interested reader can see a translation in the footnote.[42]

Comentarios ineditos I, p. 122.

[41] Scotus vero in q.1.prologi super 1.Sent. et in 4 [Sent.] d.49, q.9 ait, naturale desiderium ferri ad videndum Deum. (col. 448 A)

[42] Master Soto in book 1 of *De natura et gratia,* c. 4, and in *IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 2, says three things relevant to the present matter. First, he says man has a natural yearning for true beatitude, which lies in the Vision of God. Second, he says that this end is unqualifiedly natural to man. Third, he says that no one can naturally seek that true beatitude with an elicited act. And by way of explaining his opinion, he notes that 'natural yearning' is said in two ways: in one, it is an act elicited from an appetitive power, *e.g.* all men naturally desire to know; in the other, the very inclination and bent of a nature to some end is called natural yearning, *e.g.* a stone has natural yearning towards the center [of the world] not through any elicited vital act, but by its heaviness it is determined to that place. It is in this second way, then, that he says man has a natural yearning to see God. He supports his opinion first from St. Thomas in many places.

• In the prologue to *I Sentences,* Aquinas says, "Each thing is sweetly disposed when it is together with the end it naturally desires. And this was granted to us through Christ, when He led us into eternal glory." Ergo man naturally desires that eternal glory.

• In this article [12/1] St. Thomas says, "There is in man a natural desire to know the cause when effects are seen." This text cannot be explained in terms of knowing the cause *as cause* and not according to its quiddity, as Cajetan seems to suggest at this place, because St. Thomas immediately infers, "The thing to do then is to concede without cavil that they [the blessed] do see God's essence." And certainly he is talking about this kind of knowing in the article, and in 3 *CG* c. 50 he makes the same argument about God's substance and not about God as a cause.

• There is another place in 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8, where he says, "From knowing God's effects, there remains in man naturally a desire for knowing the what-it-is of that Cause.

Secondly, he supports it from St. Augustine (*De praedestinatione sanctorum*) c. 5 (tome 7), where he says the potential *[posse]* to have faith and charity belongs to man's nature, while the actual having belongs to believers.

Thirdly, he supports it by reason. Man's yearning *[appetitus]* is natural, forced, or neutral. Man's striving to see God is not forced or neutral. Therefore it is natural. The argument is Scotus's, and Soto uses it.

Fourth support. It is natural to man that he become the image of God, since, when God said, "Let us make man in our image and likeness," He meant that man should be to His image according to nature and not just according to grace. But every similar thing naturally seeks its like; ergo [man seeks by nature the God he is like], etc. And this is confirmed: man's yearning comes to rest in nothing of this world, as

With the opinions stated, Bañez began to state his own conclusions. They were four in number and ran as follows:

(1) seeing God according to His essence is not humanity's natural end;

(2) we can have a natural *appetitus, i.e.* one elicited from our natural *vires*, i.e. a certain conditional and inefficacious desire, for seeing God;

(3) neither a man nor an angel has from his nature, strictly speaking, either a bent *[pondus]* or an inclination or a natural aptitude or a natural potency to the clear Vision of God;

(4) there is in man an openness *[capacitas]* of his nature and an aptitude according to obediential potency to be elevated to see God.

For the purposes of this study, it will not be necessary to read past the first two of these. For the third one, about inclinations and potencies, is fully determined by the ground on which Bañez reached conclusion (1). And the fourth one, about *capacitas*, gives the usual proof texts but does not explain in any way what *capacitas* is. It will turn out, then, that by reading the first two, we learn the whole substance of Bañez's solution to the natural-desire and natural-end problems.

1. Bañez's first conclusion

> To solve this difficulty, let our first conclusion be as follows: (1) seeing God according to His essence is not man's natural end. This conclusion is supported as follows:
>
> • Unqualifiedly speaking, it is a supernatural end; ergo it is not natural.[43]

Augustine said in his *Confessions I,* c. 1: "Thou has made us for thyself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it come to Thee."

Fifth argument: each thing has a determinate natural end, towards which it is carried by its own nature, as fire is carried aloft, dirt down below. But no natural end can be attributed to man wherein he may rest, other than God-seen. Ergo God-clearly-seen is man's natural end. (col. 448 B — 449 C)

[43] Pro solutione huius difficultatis sit nobis prima conclusio. Visio Dei secundum essentiam non est finis naturalis hominis. Haec conclusio probatur. [1] Illa simpliciter loquendo est supernaturalis finis, ergo non est naturalis. (col. 449 D)

This first *probatio* is a peremptory declaration, made possible by Bañez' new, absolute division of being into natural and supernatural. Once that division is in place, nothing can be natural in one way or in one comparison, supernatural in another. Without a supporting proof of its own, of course, such a division simply begs the question against a man like Scotus, who thought that a thing could be supernatural in itself and yet natural in some relative status, *e.g.* as an end or an object. Thus God-clearly-seen could be supernatural in itself and yet be the natural end of some creature, the object naturally sought by some creature, etc. If Bañez thought this position was incoherent, he had to show why (as Cajetan did in *De potentia neutra* without appealing to an absolute division).[44] Bañez continues:

> • A thing's natural end is the one to which the thing can naturally attain, as one sees case-by-case. A stone is carried naturally to the middle regions be-cause of its heaviness, and fire is carried aloft because of its lightness. Aris-totle in *II Coeli*, text 50, says that if the stars had [as their end] progressive motion, nature would have given them means whereby they might move with progressive motion. But man cannot naturally arrive at God-clearly-seen. Ergo seeing God according to His essence is not man's natural end.[45]

This is what we have been waiting for, to break objection (6) in the previous disputation. This is Bañez' semantic resolve as to what 'natural end' shall mean, contradicting the resolve of Soto and breaking the implication that allowed Soto to infer a natural end (in a serious sense of

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[44] Bañez shouldered this duty to only a minimal extent in his unpublished commentary on 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8. Having stated the same peremptory argument, he added the following. Patet consequentia, quia ratio finis supernaturalis distincta est a ratione finis naturalis. Ergo si Deus clare visus est finis supernaturalis, non potest sub eadem ratione esse finis naturalis. Et *confirmatur*, quia simpliciter loquendo ordo naturae non est ordo gratiae. Ergo simpliciter loquendo finis naturalis non est finis supernaturalis. Patet conse-quentia, quia ratio ordinis sumitur ex fine. *Comentarios ineditos I*, p. 126. The reader should have little trouble seeing that this "support" will work only against someone who says the Vision is our natural end *and* our supernatural end under the same *ratio finis* — which no one has ever said!

[45] Secundo probatur. Finis naturalis est ille, ad quem res naturaliter potest pertingere, ut patet inductive. Lapis enim fertur naturaliter in centrum ratione suae gravitatis, et ignis sursum fertur ratione levitatis. Unde Aristo.2.caeli tex.50. dicit quod si astra haberent motum progressivum, natura contulisset illis instrumenta, quibus moverentur motu progressivo: sed homo non potest naturaliter ad Deum clare

'end') from a natural desire.

Bañez' definition of 'natural end' has the advantage of being the meaning that Aquinas found in the *libri naturales.* My bracketed insertion shows how Bañez was using the Aristotle text. The other examples are used by Aquinas as well.

> • This is supported by St. Thomas in 2/1 *ST* q. 109, a. 5, where he says that eternal life is not the end connatural to man. Nowhere in St. Thomas does one find that Vision called man's natural end.[46]

Bañez is correct, and his citation is aptly chosen. 2/1 *ST* 109, a. 5 is a crucial document. As a whole, it deals with whether man can merit *(mereri)* eternal life without grace. But the third objection and its answer deal with whether we can reach *(consequi, pertingere)* our end naturally. They have been mentioned before. Here they are again.

> Eternal life is the ultimate end of human life. But any natural thing can reach its end through its natural powers. Much more, therefore, can man, who is of a higher nature, reach eternal life by his natural powers, without any grace.[47]

St. Thomas's answer *ad* (3) went as follows:

> That objection arises from the end connatural to man. But human nature, by the fact that it is nobler, can be brought, at least by the help of grace, to a higher end [*i.e.* to another end higher than the one connatural to man], to which lower natures cannot attain in any way [*i.e.* not with any kind of help]. In much the same way, a man who can reach good health with doses of medicine to help him is better disposed towards health than a man who cannot reach good health in any way, as Aristotle remarks in *II Caelo,* text 64-65.[48]

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visum pertingere, ergo visio Dei secundum essentiam non est finis naturalis hominis. (col. 449 D-E)

[46] Tertio probatur ex D.Th. 1.2.q.109.art.5. ubi ait, vitam illam aeternam non esse finem connaturalem homini. Et nusquam apud D.Th. invenitur, visionem illam Dei esse finem naturalem hominis. (col. 449 E)

[47] Praeterea, vita aeterna est ultimus finis vitae humanae. Sed quaelibet res naturalis per sua naturalia potest consequi finem suum. Ergo multo magis homo, qui est altioris naturae, per sua naturalia potest pervenire ad vitam aeternam absque aliqua gratia.

[48] Objectio illa procedit de fine homini connaturali. Natura autem humana ex hoc ipso quod nobilior est, potest ad altiorem finem perduci, saltem auxilio gratiae, ad quem inferiores naturae nullo modo pertingere possunt; sicut homo est melius dispositus ad sanitatem qui aliquibus auxiliis medicinae potest sanitatem consequi, quam ille qui nullo modo, ut Philosophus introducit in *II Caelo,* text. 64 et 65.

Aquinas' answer admits that man is a natural thing, albeit of a nobler kind, and admits that any natural thing can attain its "end" by its natural powers — provided that 'end' means connatural end, *i.e.* the fulfillment that follows from the thing's nature. But, Aquinas continues, eternal life is not such an end for humanity; it is a "higher end," to which we are better disposed than mice, simply because our nature can be brought to this higher end by grace-given helps, whereas mouse nature cannot be brought to it with any sort of help. The text is a key one for seeing how Aquinas proposed to combine the SD talk of "man's end" with the NS talk of it.

Bañez was right, then, to cite this text. But in his hands it had a new use. Henceforth, the NS meaning of 'connatural' was to determine the theological meaning of 'natural' in the unified scholastic vocabulary. The problem thereby posed would be what to do with 'natural' in front of 'desire'. To this Bañez was now ready to turn.[49]

2. Bañez' second conclusion

> Second conclusion: (2) Man can have a natural yearning *[appetitus], i.e.* one elicited from his natural powers *[vires], i.e.* a certain conditional and inefficacious desire for seeing God.
>
> • This is supported by St. Thomas' argument in this article. "There is in man a natural desire," *etc.* He lays out this argument more fully in 3 *CG* cc. 49-50. But if you say that St. Thomas is not speaking about an elicited act but about that "bent" that Soto imagined, your argument would have no weight. On that view, he would not be saying, "There is a natural desire in man to see the cause *when the effect is seen;*" if he were speaking about that bent, man would be [so] inclined even without an effect seen. Again, there is what he says in 3 *CG* c. 50: *from knowledge of the effects* there is stirred up

[49] Another problem would be what to do with 'natural' in front of the 'can' whereby some natures *can be helped* to a non-connatural end. Aquinas spoke of this 'can' elsewhere as *capacitas* and said we were *naturaliter capax Dei* or *capax gratiae* (2/1 *ST* q. 113, a. 10; 3 *ST* q. 2, a. 3). Did this use of *'naturaliter'* mean that our openness to the higher end followed from our NS nature, or did it demand the SD sense of 'natural', of which Bañez never made a mention? (See n. iii in Cajetan's commentary on 2/1 *ST* q. 113, a. 10.)

naturally a desire for seeing the cause.[50]

This is the most crucial passage in B12/1. It gives us Bañez' analysis of the central complication, the *desiderium naturae.* Notice that '*naturae'* in this phrase is to name a source: desire "elicited from natural faculties," *i.e*. flowing from our nature, *i.e*. connatural. The talk of being "elicited" only applied to acts *(operationes),* and so *'desiderium'* now has to name an act. Which natural faculty shall elicit it? Soto selects the will, and the word 'inefficacious' confirms this selection. Efficacious *vs.* inefficacious was a division of willing. Efficacious willing was the sort that changes things, *i.e*. choosing or intending. Inefficacious willing was the sort that does not change things but is mere wishing. Having made this selection, Bañez applied it to the NDA. '*Desiderium naturae'* was to name wishing for U+ in an act arising from the "will" taken as a natural human faculty.

This is Bañez' further revolt against his old teacher, Soto. Soto's analysis of wonder had insisted that the *objects* of wonder (the topics wondered about) had to be the objects of elicited acts of wondering. These may have been acts of the will in his view, but his problem was that their objects were variable. Soto had therefore set them aside in order to focus on wonder as something underlying such acts, a pure inclination in the intellect. The *inclinatio*, he had said, was to a unique satisfier, a stopper of wonder, which was either U+ or the Vision delivering it. This supernatural good, thanks to Soto's definition of 'natural end', became a natural end of man automatically.

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[50] Secunda conclusio. Homo potest habere appetitum naturalem, idest, elicitum ex viribus naturae, idest, desiderium quoddam conditionale et inefficax videndi Deum. Probatur ratione illa S.Tho. in hoc art. Inest homini naturale desiderium, etc. Quam rationem magis explicat lib.3.con.gen.c.49 et 50. Dicere autem quod S. Thom. loquitur non de actu elicito, sed de illo pondere, quod imaginatur Soto, nihil ponderis haberet ratio ista. Quorsum enim diceret, naturale desiderium inest homini viso effectu videre causam; at si de illo pondere loqueretur, etiam non viso effectu inclinaretur. Item quod ait 3.con.gen.c.50. Ex cognitione effectuum naturaliter excitatur desiderium ad videndam causam. (col. 449 E — 450 B)

This last Bañez was determined to avoid, and he has made a good start. He has replaced Soto's definition of 'natural end' with his own ('end achievable by one's natural powers'). But now this replacement needs support. An attractive good can be an end, after all, and a naturally attractive good can be a natural end. Whatever had what it took to satisfy a natural inclination was an attractive good. Ah, but was it *naturally* attractive? Cajetan had said: if it can satisfy a natural inclination *proportionately,* then, yes, it is naturally attractive. But as we saw above, Bañez threw this answer away. His failed attempt to invoke analogy showed that he had no coherent way to limit the natural attractors (and so the natural ends) to those achievable by natural powers. So he had to strike elsewhere as well. He had to break Soto's analysis of wonder.

This, too, he could have done by returning to Cajetan's analysis, in which wonder had no unique stopper distinct from its variable objects. But Bañez could not do this either. Why not? Because, I suggest, he was persuaded by one part of Soto's case: a mere inclination could not have objects posed by perceived effects; such objects of wonder had to be the objects of intensional, elicited acts. Well, the intellect's elicited acts are intensional, but so are the will's. The difference is that the intellect's acts are acts of understanding, not loving or wishing or seeking. "Wondering about *x*" hardly seems to be an act of understanding *x.* It sounds more like an act of "wanting to understand *x,*" and this became Bañez' clue to how to demolish Soto. If an act of wondering was an act of wanting to understand, it was an act of the will, and an act of inclination X should be in the same faculty as X. That way, the whole idea of wonder as an inclination in the intellect could be dismissed as mythology. No inclination would be involved here except the one in the will, which was a bent towards good-in-general, as we shall see below. With these ideas in mind, Bañez proceeded to attack Soto's analysis as resting on a figment of the imagination.

Bañez' attack would have merit, if wonder could not be a sheer inclination and yet focus on

objects, or if intellect and will were more sealed off from each other than they are.

Suppose the natural bent of the intellect is for its act, and its act is to understand. Suppose understanding *x* is knowing the cause of *x* and why it is so. Then for any perceived effect *x*, the natural bent of the intellect will be to know the cause and why it causes. This bent will be wonder, and its object (the item wondered about, the cause of *x*) will arise from the perceived effect *x* that triggers wonder. But it makes perfectly good sense to say that what is triggered is the underlying bent. The focus on the cause-of-*x* is a focus of that very bent. So the theory that *desiderium naturae* is an *inclinatio* within the intellect is not so easy to dismiss.

At the same time, wonder can hardly be triggered without an impact upon the will.[51] "I wonder what *y* is" seems to imply analytically "I should like to know what *y* is;" and a sweeping negation of appetitive interest, such as "I couldn't care less what *y* is," seems to preclude analytically "I wonder what *y* is." Anyone who wonders wants to know; and whoever is wholly indifferent about knowing does not wonder. But these points do not prove that wonder is itself volition rather than an affair of the intellect; they just show that the intellect naturally gives the will its objects. When one's mind encounters an intellectual problem, one does not have to "intend' to wonder; one does not deliberate and then "choose" to wonder. One proceeds spontaneously into wonder, and the present point is that the intellect in so proceeding carries the will with it, at least to the point of wishing. It seems eminently plausible, therefore,

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[51] Thomistically speaking, when one wonders which item, *y*, causes *x*, and what nature *y* must have if it does so, one's intellect implicitly judges that it would be good to understand *y*, *i.e.* good to "know the *quid est* of *y*." Already, then, there is an object for one's will; and absent an obstacle, the will responds to it. Likewise, when evidence of a first cause is accepted, and wonder arises as to what the first cause is, an implicit judgment is arising to the effect that U would be a good level of understanding to have, and (absent an obstacle) the will begins to desire U. Hence it seems plausible that wonder immediately secures a certain cooperation of the "appetitive" faculty.

that the wishing involved in wondering is not the wonder itself but an effect of it.[52] Bañez simply overlooked this possibility. Thus far, then, Bañez' central and crucial move is not very per-suasive. Will this picture improve, or will it get worse? Let us read on and see.

> • Again, some have thought that the first created intelligence sees God [by its natural powers]; so thought Avicenna. Ergo that angel could have a [natural] desire for seeing God.
> • Confirmation. Man naturally desires to know that of which he knows himself to be ignorant. But man can naturally know that God is pure act, is hyper-excellent [and can know that he does not know how anything manages to be such]. Therefore man can also desire [naturally] to know what God is and how *[quomodo]* He is [such].[53]

This *confirmatio* is focused on the adverb 'naturally'. It seeks to show that a wish to know what God is can arise *naturally*. To see what is peculiar about this, replace the word 'God' with the word which, given the naturally known arguments, is the right word. I mean, 'first cause'. Then we have:

> people naturally desire to know what they know they are ignorant of, and they can naturally know that the first cause is pure act, hyper-excellent, *etc*., and realize that they are ignorant of how the first cause manages to be that way. Hence people can naturally desire to know what the first cause is, *etc.*

Now correct the major premise. It is far too sweeping to be true. I know that I am ignorant of many things, and I do not desire, naturally or otherwise, to know them *all*. At most, I desire to know *some*. The rest don't interest me; they would be boring to learn or (as Aquinas would say) they just don't contribute to the completion of created understanding (1 *ST* q. 12, a. 8 ad 4). So the major is sloppy.

When the major is re-written more selectively, the real problem emerges. There is no way to

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[52] In short, it seems eminently plausible that (a) my wondering and my wishing to know are inseparable, but (b) I wish to know because I wonder, and not vice-versa.

[53] Item aliqui opinati sunt primam intelligentiam creatam videre Deum, ita opinatus est Avic., ergo ille poterat habere desiderium videndi Deum. Confirmatur. Naturaliter homo desiderat scire id cuius ignorantiam cognoscit se habere: sed naturaliter potest homo cognoscere Deum esse purum actum, esse

go from ‘first cause’ back to ‘god’, much less to ‘God‘, without many additional conditions being met. From the premises that

> (1) people can naturally know that the first cause is pure act, and
> (2) the first cause is in fact a god,

no conclusion such as

> (3) people can naturally know that a god is pure act,

follows. For in order for this to follow, we need the additional premise that people can naturally know that the first cause is a god.

If this additional premise seems obvious, think about the matter from the point of view of a Greek philosopher. Call him Noetocles. Noetocles has been thinking about what it takes to explain the phenomena of change and motion, and he has reached the conclusion that what it takes is a first cause in which there is no potency. He knows that this theoretical entity is very different from anything worshipped as a god in his culture (since all of the gods have bodies they can move, dwellings they can leave, favors they can bestow, and other areas of potency), and he may very well retain some disposition to believe in those gods. He will conclude quite validly: ergo, the first cause is not a god. Or perhaps he thinks that the first cause to which he has concluded is nobler than the so-called gods, and that these latter are in fact fictitious. He still need not conclude: ergo the first cause is a (or the) real god. For he may take the view that a god must be a power responsive to prayers and thus in potency, that the first cause is therefore unresponsive to prayers, so that the first cause is not “a god” and that, indeed, there are no “gods.” Only under the luckiest of circumstances, in short, will Noetocles hit upon the idea that the first cause of change/motion is the true director of human affairs, zealous for our worship and accessible to our prayers without being in potency, so that this theoretical entity alone is truly “a

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superexcellentem, ergo et desiderare cognoscere quid sit et quomodo sit. (col. 450 C)

god." And only a philosopher who had hit upon that very idea would understand what Bañez meant by calling the first cause by the capitalized name 'God'. Aquinas showed some appreciation, at least, for this good luck. When knowledge of God is acquired by natural reason, he said, it is attained by very few, takes a long time, *and comes to the public in a mixture with many errors* (1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1). He may well have meant to suggest a point which is, in any case, true, namely, that even though there is a *demonstratio* that there is a first cause of change/ motion, there is no *demonstratio* that this entity is God or a god. One has to form a religious conviction that this entity is God or a god; and while one can defend this conviction, one cannot "prove" it by natural reason alone. If in fact a first cause of change/motion corresponds to "what we mean by 'God'," that is a blessed cultural accident (and Aquinas simply took advantage of it).

So look:

(1) people can know by rational demonstration that the first cause is pure act;
(2) people can defend by dialectical argument the religious conviction that the first cause is a (or the) god (but this is reasonable belief, not knowing).

Now does it follow that man can *know* naturally that God is pure act? Of course not.[54] Bañez' use of the verb phrase 'naturally know' is very sloppy, if he is talking about the situation of a pagan philosopher or that of a thinker in pure naturals.

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[54] Compare: 'anyone can see that Lord Peter is sorry about something' (because he looks downcast, etc.), and 'Lord Peter is in fact sorry about insulting Bunter' (as he knows in his heart); do these premises imply 'anyone can see that Lord Peter is sorry about insulting Bunter'? No, because the object of his sorrow is not visible from his demeanor. It cannot be known in the same way. It can only come to light if Lord Peter discloses it.

But almost certainly Bañez had in mind a different situation, where his use of 'naturally know' and 'naturally wish' could be defended in another sense, a much weaker sense. Such a sense was in use among the scholastics to describe Muslims, Jews, heretics, and even Catholics in mortal sin. In this sense, 'natural' did not preclude revealed information but only the internal grace which was said to elevate or supernaturalize a human faculty, so that 'naturally' could mean 'by a human faculty not internally graced'. Take the case of a Moorish philosopher, Jew or Muslim. Call him Ibn Kitab. This thinker would possess not only the demonstration that there is a first cause but also the revealed information that this cause is the true God. Now what is learned by assenting to a genuine revelation is said to be "known" (at least by Thomists);[55] and if Ibn Kitab is thought of as cut off from grace, his assent will be non-salvific, and his knowing that the true God is pure act, etc., can be called natural in this weaker sense (*i.e*. non-graced). This way of reading Bañez preserves his focus on the SO-problem, and it will become explicit below that Bañez meant natural wishing to exclude cases that were graced. Meanwhile, back to the text.

> • Soto himself in *IV Sentences* [d. 49, q. 2] says there is not a mortal of any religion who, if asked whether he wanted to see God, would not answer that he did. It is surprising that he brought forward this argument to support [his idea of the desire as] a natural yearning and not as an elicited act, since he who says he wants to *[cupit]* indicates an act of desire.[56]

Again, the present writer does not find this persuasive. What is prompted by the question may well be an avowal of desire (as an elicited act of the will), but what is motivating the avowal

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[55] 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 5. The point that what is learned by accepting revelation is a second department of *knowledge* (rather than, say, a department of opinion or conjecture) was subsequently defined at Vatican I; *Denz.* # 3015.

[56] Et ipsemet Soto in 4 [Sent.] ubi supra, ait, neminem esse mortalium cuiuslibet sectae, qui si interrogetur, an cupiat videre Deum, qui non respondeat se cupere. Et mirum est, quod hanc rationem afferat, ut probet esse naturalem appetitum, et non sicut actum elicitum, cum tamen qui dicit se cupere,

could still be an the underlying bent of the intellect. Soto was appealing here to the universality of the avowal as evidence of the naturalness of the underlying bent. There is nothing surprising about that. Bañez continues:

> We, however, say in this second conclusion that man *can* have such a desire, because not all do have it, as not all know God.[57]

This rejoinder makes sense only if one is focusing on the wish with the object U+. To have that object, a wish-to-know does indeed presuppose special information, which Ibn Kitab would have, and Noetocles would not. But why here, where Bañez is supposed to be giving his general account of the *desiderium naturae,* should he limit the topic to the natural desire *with that object?* The only likely explanation is that he has taken up the SO-problem in such a way as to overlook entirely the E-problem. To see how unsatisfactory this is, the reader should pause to distinguish three propositions.

(1) Everyone wonders about (and so desires to know) the ultimate explanation of things.

(2) Everyone wonders about (and so desires to know) a god he worships.

(3) Everyone wonders about (and so desires to know) the true God.

Under a layer of learned Aristotelian exposition (according to which the ultimate explanation of things is the what-it-is of the first cause), Aquinas was probably affirming proposition (1). Under the assumption that everyone considers some god whom he or she worships an ultimate explanation of things (which is a tenable assumption, anthropologically), Soto was affirming proposition (2) as evidence in favor of proposition (1). Bañez, however, without a word of justification, has switched the issue to proposition (3). Once one accepts the switching of the issue, one can agree with Bañez that (3) is too strong and needs to be replaced with a weaker

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actum desiderii significet. (col. 450 C)

[57] Nos autem diximus in hac secunda conclusione, hominem posse habere tale desiderium, quia non

claim, such as

(3N) Some do wonder about the true God, and everyone can, if informed.

But why accept the switching of the issue? Cajetan certainly posed a *dubium* about whether the natural desire would reach to the true God as He is in Himself, but that was done to test the **limits** of the *desiderium naturale*, not to offer a general account of it! Let us read on:

> I have said it is conditional, because by the powers *[vires]* of nature a man cannot be certain that such a good is possible; ergo such a desire is conditional, "if it were possible." *E.g.* a man can desire and will that he never die, if it were possible. And even if such a condition is not explicit in one's mind, it is still implicitly contained in the object [desired], inasmuch as it [the object desired] is represented as a good and not as a possible.[58]

Bañez thinks a philosopher like Ibn Kitab would know that God is pure act, *etc.*, and not knowing how a thing can be like that, would want to know the what-He-is of God. But the said philosopher could not know whether his desire was satisfiable. He would therefore hold it in a form that was explicitly or implicitly conditional.

This is all very confusing in two ways. To see the first, one must say something further about conditional volition. Velleity is wish-volition, as opposed to practical volition. Practical volition leads to concrete steps, and a velleity does not. Either kind of willing can be conditional. Practical volition is very often conditional: I intend to go out, if it stops raining; I intend to finish this chapter today, if I can. I will go into Macedonia, if God wills it. Notice that the if-clause is indicative in such cases, not subjunctive or counterfactual. The expression, 'I intend to finish this chapter, if it were possible' makes no sense. The counterfactuality of the subjunctive if-clause contradicts the 'I intend'. The rules of coherent speech are more permissive with a velleity; they

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omnes habent, sicut nec omnes cognoscunt Deum. (col. 450 D)

[58] Dixi conditionale, quia ex viribus naturae non potest homini certum esse, tale bonum esse possibile, ergo tale desiderium est conditionale, si esset possibile, v.g. Homo potest desiderare et velle nunquam mori, si esset possibile. Et quamvis talis conditio non sit explicita in mente : tamen implicite continetur in

seem to permit either kind of conditional. I have long wished, for example, that I could play second violin in an amateur string quartet. But I do not foresee having the time. So I take no concrete steps, and my wish remains just that: a wish, a mere velleity. Perhaps Bañez and Aquinas are right that, in a velleity, I entertain an object as a good but not as a possible (*i.e.* achievable) good; and perhaps Bañez is right that a velleity is therefore implicitly conditional: "I will, if I ever can" or "I would, if I could." In other words, it may well be the case that, where a velleity is present, the state of one's will can be expressed by an indicative conditional about non-practical willing ("I want to play in a quartet if I ever have the time") or by a counterfactual conditional about practical willing ("I *would* intend to play in a quartet (and so I *would* take steps, *etc.*), *if I had* the time." But even with a velleity, the conditional must be one or the other. It must be indicative or subjunctive; it cannot be half the one and half the other. "I wish to, if I were able" still makes no sense. Yet this is how Bañez expresses his conditional desires: "I desire to see God, if it were possible"; "I want to never die, if it were possible." These solecisms suggest that Bañez could not make up his mind whether the "natural desire" he was prepared to defend was an indicative affair ("I do want to see God, if it is possible") or a subjunctive affair ("I would want to see God, if it were possible"). Which in turn means that he could not make up his mind whether the natural wish-maker is in doubt about a possibility ("I don't know if it is possible for people to see God") or convinced of an impossibility ("people can't see God, though I wish they could").

Which in turn means that Bañez' remarks are confusing in a second way. Aquinas' NDA, which Bañez is supposed to be interpreting and defending here, used the point that a "desire of nature" cannot be in vain *to support the conclusion* that a particular object of said desire (to see what the first cause is) is possible. As Aquinas saw things, the unevangelized thinker who

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obiecto, quod repraesentatur ut bonum, et non ut possibile. (col. 450 D)

accepted a first cause and came to know the premises of NDA would have warrant for believing *that it is possible* to see what the first cause is (though he could not know *how* it is to be done).

When a man does not know how to achieve what he desires, he cannot order means to it, and so he cannot will the object of his desire in the practical way of efficacious willing. But that is not the issue here. One does not need to "know how," if one is willing inefficaciously. Bañez has been saying that an unevangelized thinker would naturally will to know what the first cause is *inefficaciously* and also *conditionally* ("if it were possible"). But with this last, Bañez seems to have forgotten that the NDA was supposed to prove something in 12/1, or at least make it plausible. It was supposed to make plausible the point that a level of understanding as high as U± is possible for a created intellect. Bañez interpreted the NDA in such a way that our thinker ends up *with no warrant for believing* that the vision is possible.

His own words confirm this, as does the following point. A wish can be for an impossible, unattainable object. This was a point that everybody knew who read the second chapter in *Nicomachean Ethics*, book III.[59] In that text, Aristotle was trying to figure out what choosing is, as opposed to mere yearning or wishing. He argued that choice is not mere yearning (appetite). Then he said,

> But neither is it wish, though it seems near to it; for choice cannot relate to impossibles, and if one said he chose them, he would be thought silly; but there may be a wish even for impossibles, *e.g.* for immortality. And wish may relate to things that could in no way be brought about by one's own efforts, *e.g.* that a particular actor or athlete should win in a competition; but no one chooses such things, but only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own efforts.[60]

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[59] 1111b20-25.

[60] The translation is from Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 968.

This was a splendid piece of ordinary-language philosophizing. Aquinas' commentary on this text emphasized the same point and used the same example: mere wishes can be for impossible things like immortality.[61] From this text alone, Bañez should have seen that he was ruining the NDA in 12/1. For its use there was to warrant an inference. An unevangelized thinker was supposed to get from the naturalness of the desire a warrant for inferring that seeing God is *possible somehow*. On Bañez' analysis of the natural desire, this is precisely what he cannot infer!

Have we missed something? Bañez certinly must have thought so. He said Aquinas made a "tenable" inference, "lest such a natural desire be frustrated." So he seems to have thought that what we missed is this: not every wish is a natural wish. One is blocked from inferring that one's desire is satisfiable from its mere status as a wish; but one is not blocked, perhaps, from inferring something from its status as a *natural* wish.

To make good on this nuance, Bañez will have to offer a further sense of 'natural' in which the naturalness of wishing will make a difference. What he said before — that 'natural' just means 'elicited from a connatural faculty' — would not make a difference, because the wish for an impossible immortality arises from just such a faculty. But perhaps Bañez had more in mind. So let us read on, as he turns to face a scenario which threatens to make the *desiderium naturae* unconditional and thus (he thinks) no longer a wish but a serious intention.

> But someone might say: "What if somebody thinks it *is* possible? Won't he then be able to desire unconditionally?" The answer is that, if somebody thinks it is possible through the powers of nature, he will be able to perform

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[61] Electio enim, quia refertur ad nostram operationem, non dicitur esse impossibilium. Et si quis dicat se eligere aliquod impossibilium, videbitur esse stultus, Sed voluntas, quia respicit bonum absolute, potest esse cujuscumque boni, licet sit impossibile. Sicut aliquis potest velle esse immortalis, quod est impossibile secundum statum hujus corruptibilis vitae. Ergo electio et voluntas non sunt idem. Aquinas *In III Ethicorum, lectio* 5; *Opera Omnia*, vol. 25 (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 334.

> what he *supposes* to be needed for the end. But from 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8 *ad* 2, I answer that not everything that can be had by the powers of nature as reason apprehends things is [an object of?] natural desire. Thus if someone thought it possible to fly, his yearning to fly would not be a natural yearning. Rather, natural yearning comes from the natural light [of reason in such a way as to be] towards good in general, one's own good *[bonum proprium]*. [62]

To puzzle out what this answer meant, we must turn to the citation Bañez made. He cited a reply-to-objection in 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8. But when one compares the reply cited with a neighboring one (the reply *ad* 3), it is not clear whether Bañez cited the one he really meant to.[63] As which one he meant is important to the question of whether Bañez had a further sense of 'natural' to offer in 'natural desire', we must take the time to review the texts.

The issue in 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8 was whether every human being seeks fulfillment *[appetit beatitudinem]*. Here was objection (2):

> (2) Besides, the essential core of fulfillment is seeing the divine essence, as I said above. But some people think it is impossible for God to be seen by man through His essence, and so they do not seek to do so. Hence not all human beings seek fulfillment.[64]

And here was the reply to it:

> *ad* (2): since one's will follows the grasp *[appehensio]* that one's intellect or reason has achieved, it comes about that, just as an item is one and the same

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[62] Sed dicet quis. Quid si quis putat esse possibile, tunc nonne poterit desiderare absolute? Respondetur, quod si quis putat esse possibile per vires naturae, poterit quidem operari ea, quae aestimat necessaria ad finem. Sed ex 1.2.q.5.artic.8.ad 2.respondetur quod non est naturale desiderium omne illud, quod viribus naturae ex apprehensione rationis haberi potest. Sic enim appetitus volandi, si putaret quis esse possibile volare, non esset naturalis: sed appetitus naturalis est ex lumine naturali, ut ad bonum in communi, ad proprium bonum. (col. 450 E — 451 A)

[63] One is not helped by turning to Bañez's unpublished commentaries. In the one on 2/1 *ST* 3, 8, he repeated almost word for word the remarks we have just read but dropped the reference to 2/1 *ST* 5, 8 *ad* 2 and redescribed the scope of natural desire as not just "appetitus boni in communi" but also "boni proprii et desiderium sciendi." *Comentarios ineditos I*, p. 128.

[64] Praeterea, essentia beatitudinis est visio essentiae divinae, ut dictum est. Sed aliqui opinantur hoc esse impossibile, quod Deus per essentiam ab homine videatur: unde hoc non appetunt. Ergo non omnes homines appetunt beatitudinem. *Leonine VI*, p. 54.

> in the real and yet is different [objects] thanks to reason's consideration, so also an item is one and the same in the real and yet is sought in one way, not sought in another. Fulfillment, therefore, can be considered under the de-finition of "ultimate and complete good," which is its common definition, and in that way the will tends towards it naturally and of necessity, as I said. But fulfillment can also be thought of along the lines of other, special considerations pertaining to the activity that yields fulfillment, or pertaining to the operative faculty involved, or pertaining to the object [whose possession delivers fulfillment]; and in those ways the will does not tend towards it of necessity.[65]

This answer certainly begins in a way germane to Bañez' topic. It makes the important point that objects of the will are not just things but things-apprehended-a-certain-way. Thus one and the same thing can be willed under one description but not willed under another. I suppose it follows that flying can be willed under a description which is false, like 'something I can do by myself', and ditto for seeing God. But the topic of *natural* willing comes up only in the last part of the answer, and this part can hardly be germane. For here natural willing is taken in the sense of necessary willing, and nothing is willed this way except fulfillment itself under the general description 'complete good'. So if the 'natural' in 'natural desire' were taken in this sense, there would be no such thing as a natural desire to fly, right enough, but neither would there be any such thing as a natural desire to see God! For that is a more "special consideration" of fulfillment, not naturally desired in the first place, so that a mistake about its possibility would have no bearing on the matter.

Let us move on, then, to the possibility that Bañez meant to cite the reply to objection (3). Here is the objection itself:

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[65] Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum voluntas sequatur apprehensionem intellectus seu rationis, sicut contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem quod tamen est diversum secundum rationis considerationem, ita contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem et tamen uno modo appetitur, alio modo non appetitur. Beatitudo ergo potest considerari sub ratione finalis boni et perfecti, quae est communis ratio beatitudinis: et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, ut dictum est. Potest etiam considerari secundum alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius operationis, vel ex parte potentiae

> (3) Furthermore, Augustine says, "Happy is the man who has all he wants, and who wants nothing wrongly." [66] Well, not everybody wants this: some want some things wrongly and yet will themselves to want those things. Therefore not all want fulfillment.[67]

And here is the reply to it:

> *ad* (3): this definition of fulfillment that some people propose ("Happy is the man who has everything he wants" or "whose wishes all work out") is good and sufficient if understood in one way, but flawed if understood in another. If it is taken as talking unqualifiedly about everything a man wants with natural yearning, it is true that he who has everything he wants is happy; after all, nothing satisfies a man's natural yearning except "complete good," which is fulfillment.[68] But if the definition is taken as talking about the things a man wants just because he has thought of them, then the having of some of the things the man wants does not pertain to fulfillment, but rather to wretchedness, insofar as such things impede a man, when had, from getting what he naturally wants. In much the same way, a man's thought sometimes accepts as true points that impede him from learning the truth. Thanks to this consideration, Augustine added the amendment that, for the completion of fulfillment, the man should "want nothing bad." Still, the unamended version ("Happy is the man who has everything he wants") could suffice, if it were rightly interpreted.[69]

This fits better. Aquinas took a definition of fulfillment from Augustine — 'having everything

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operativae, vel ex parte obiecti: et sic non ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam. *Leonine VI, loc.cit.*

[66] *De Trinitate XIII,* c. 5; *PL* 42, col. 1020.

[67] Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod *beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, et nihil male vult.* Sed non omnes hoc volunt: quidam enim male aliqua volunt, et tamen volunt illa se velle. Non ergo omnes volunt beatitudinem. *Leonine VI,* p. 54.

[68] Aquinas' explicit account of what all is wanted with natural *appetitus* is found in 2/1 *ST* q. 10, a. 1 and q. 94, a. 2. It turns out that man naturally wills everything his reason *naturally* apprehends to be good, and that what makes reason naturally apprehend a thing to be good is our having a natural inclination to it.

[69] Ad tertium dicendum quod ista definitio beatitudinis quam quidam posuerunt, *Beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult,* vel, *cui omnia optata succedunt,* quodam modo intellecta est bona et sufficiens; alio vero modo est imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter de omnibus quae vult homo naturali appetitu, sic verum est quod qui habet omnia quae vult est beatus: nihil enim satiat naturalem hominis appetitum nisi bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo. Si vero intelligatur de his quae homo vult secundum apprehensionem rationis, sic habere quaedam quae homo vult non pertinet ad beatitudinem, sed magis ad miseriam, inquantum huiusmodi habita impediunt hominem ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult: sicut etiam ratio accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus addidit ad perfectionem beatitudinis, quod *nihil mali velit.* Quamvis primum posset sufficere, si recte intelligeretur, scilicet quod *beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult. Leonine VI,* p. 54.

you want'. To make it acceptable, he distinguished the cases of wanting-something that arise out of natural inclination from the cases that arise out of one's own thinking. Wanting bad things (or indifferent things badly) were cases of the latter. Having everything you want as a result of natural inclination counts as fulfillment, he said. Having everything you have thought up to want

may not, because you may have thought up bad things which, if had, will disappoint you bitterly, etc. Clearly, Aquinas was distinguishing the willing which leads to fulfillment from the willing which does not (or may not), and Bañez (I propose) was using the basis for this distinction (the presence or absence of natural inclination) to distinguish natural willing from non-natural willing. The example of desiring to fly now looks germane. Flying is something a person might think up as good to do; and given some mistaken beliefs about her abilities, she might desire unconditionally (*i.e.* intend) to do it. Bañez says correctly that this person's intent to fly would not be a *natural* desire, but the reason he assigns is puzzling.

The story should be that humans (unlike birds) have no natural inclination to fly, and so human practical reason does **not naturally** apprehend flying as a good. But Bañez says the desire to fly is not natural because **natural** desire bears upon the rationally discerned good in general, one's own good in general. This remark cannot have been meant to say what a surface reading would suggest.

■ It cannot have been meant to say that natural desire is *only* for "the good in general." For in that case there would be no room at all for the word 'natural' in Bañez' account of the NDA. For if the "natural desire to see God" is an elicited wish, the question has to be under what circumstances a wished-for object is "naturally desired." If any object more specific than "good in general" is not naturally desired, Bañez could not possibly claim that the wish to see God was a natural one in anybody.

■ And it cannot have been meant to say that natural desire is for "good in general" in the sense that *anything apprehended as good* is naturally desired. For in that case Bañez would be giving no answer to the problem he just posed. The person who thinks she can fly and intends to do so has obviously apprehended flying as good. Why, then, is her intent not natural willing? Ditto for the philosopher who thinks he can see God by his natural powers.

■ It must have been meant to say that natural desire is for "good in general" in the sense that *anything **naturally** apprehended as good* is naturally desired. Under this interpretation, if I have a natural inclination to *x*, then my practical reason will "naturally apprehend" *x* as a good, and my faculty-of-will will "naturally" desire *x* quite often. Thus, if I have a natural inclination to know the truth (as Aquinas elsewhere says I have), then my practical reason will "naturally apprehend" knowing-the-truth as a good (as Aquinas elsewhere says it does), and my faculty-of-will will "naturally desire" to know the truth quite often. I do not will it always or necessarily, in every intention I form and in every choice I make.[70] I can choose to pursue other goods; I can even make immoral choices in which I willingly violate the good of knowing the truth, in myself or others, in order to achieve some other benefit; and yet I naturally desire to know the truth.

Something interesting now emerges. If one explicates '*desiderium naturae*' along the lines of volition, as Bañez did, one can take Aquinas' NDA as saying that within the natural volition to know the truth there is contained a natural volition to know the causes of perceived effects, and that this volition extends even to a first cause, so that one *naturally* (but not necessarily) wishes to know what the First Cause is. Surely this is the sense in which Bañez has been seeking to say that the elicited wish to see God is a *natural* wish. It is a wish for something included (by implication) in an object-class to which we have a natural inclination — unlike flying, to which we have no natural inclination.

But now comes a critical juncture. The plausible thing to say next, surely, would be that a natural wish is *natural* prior to and independently of any judgments about whether or how it can be satisfied — be those judgments ever so sound or ever so mistaken — and thus one would get a robust sense of 'natural' to appear in 'natural desire' and to make a difference (arguably) in what

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[70] This is the difference between natural willing in the sense of the answer *ad* 3 in 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8, and

could be inferred about the satisfiability of the desire. One could argue that what is *naturally* willed cannot be utterly unattainable, whether it is normally willed in a practical way or as a mere wish. This was the path taken by Francis Sylvestris of Ferrara in his famous commentary on the *Summa contra Gentiles*, at 3 *CG* c. 51.[71] It is a path Bañez is overwhelmingly likely to have known. But there was a famous problem with it. It seemed to be blocked by 1 *ST* q. 62, a. 2, where Aquinas was explicit that *natural volition* extends no further than natural ability:

> As I said above,[72] the will's natural movement is the starter *[principium]* of all the things we will; but the will's natural inclination is towards that which is nature-set as suitable *[conveniens secundum naturam]*. And so if anything is above one's nature, one's will cannot be drawn towards it, unless it is aided by a supernatural starter . . . Well, it was shown above . . . that seeing God through His essence . . . is above the nature of any created intellect. Hence no rational creature can have a motion of the will directed towards that fulfillment, unless it is moved by a supernatural agent; and this we call the "help of grace." [73]

Now if the phrase 'a motion of the will' covers natural *wishing* as well as other kinds of volition, this passage is no less fatal to Bañez than it was to Silvestris. For if seeing God is above our nature and beyond its powers (as it is), and even wishing for something above our nature is no longer natural volition, then there cannot be any such thing as a natural wish to see God. But suppose 'a motion of the will' in this passage from Aquinas covers only practical, efficacious

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natural willing in the sense of the answer *ad* 2.

[71] Leonine XIV, pp. 141-142.

[72] The reference is to 1 *ST* q. 60, a. 2; cf. 2/1 *ST* q. 159, a. 6; *In II Sent*. d. 5, q. 2, a. 2; d. 21, a. 4; 4 *CG* c. 72.

[73] Sicut enim superius dictum est, naturalis motus voluntatis est principium omnium eorum quae volumus; naturalis autem inclinatio voluntatis est ad id quod est conveniens secundum naturam. Et ideo, si aliquid sit supra naturam, voluntas in id ferri non potest, nisi ab aliquo alio supernaturali principio adjuta . . . Ostensum est autem supra . . . quod videre Deum per essentiam . . . est supra naturam cujuslibet intellectus creati. Unde nulla creatura rationalis potest habere motum voluntatis ordinatum ad illam beatitudinem, nisi mota a supernaturali agente: et hoc dicimus auxilium gratiae. *Opera Omnia*, vol. I, p. 386. For the attempts by F. Sylvestris to elude the force of this passsage, see Leionine XIV, p. 142.

volitions: then there cannot be a natural *resolve, choice, or intention* to accomplish what is above one's nature, but there can still be a natural wish to do so.

I think this is the ground which Bañez was trying to eke out and occupy. As we just read, he wanted the desire to see God to become non-natural as soon as it became a serious intent to see Him. Bañez also advanced a ground for this: mistake about one's natural powers. He made the intent to see what-God-is comparable to the intent to fly.[74] And the ground for this comparison? Both lie beyond human natural ability, and so neither can be intended without illusion, and hence neither can be intended "naturally" in the sense of 2/1 *ST* q. 5, a. 8 *ad* 3. Because his citation of this last was bungled, getting clear what Bañez meant to say has taken an inordinately long time. But with clarity in hand at last, let us read on.

> Besides, that man is so desiring and so operating out of ignorance. Hence one does not conclude that his end is one natural to him.[75]

The question was not whether the end, to fly, was natural, but whether the desire for it was natural. But what an interesting slip! Dare one suppose that Bañez had still not separated these issues cleanly, because he was still haunted by Soto's definition of a natural end? [76]

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[74] Cf. 1 *ST* q. 62, a. 2 *ad* 2.

[75] Insuper ex ignorantia sic desiderat ille homo, et sic operatur. Quare inde non colligitur, esse finem sibi naturalem. (col. 451 A)

[76] Recall the connexion we have just been seeing between natural inclination and natural volition. Given that connexion *plus* Soto's definition of a natural end, there follows this implication: if one's desire for *F* is natural desire, then *F* is a natural end. By transposition one gets: if *F* is not a natural end, then one's desire for *F* is not natural desire. Bañez knew that Soto's definition needed replacing (to make a natural end be an end reachable by one's natural powers), but suppose he did not see the full implications of replacing it; suppose it still influenced him. Then he could have reached very reasonably for the right Thomistic definition of 'end' itself. By that definition, an "end" is something intended. One "has" an end by pursuing it, and pursuing an end is efficacious volition. Then the implication we saw above became this: if one's desire for *F* is natural and efficacious desire, then *F* is a natural end, which transposed to

if *F* is not a natural end, then one's desire for *F* is not natural or not efficacious.

Whatever the truth of that may be, Bañez has not escaped the difficulty we have been examining now for some time, namely, that there is no inference from a wish to its satisfiability, so that if anything is to be salvaged of Aquinas's NDA, it hangs on the sense of 'natural' with which Bañez could say that the *desiderium* is a *natural* wish. We have heard Bañez insist that willing (in ignorance) *as possible* what is in fact not naturally possible is not *natural* willing. Now let us read on.

> The same would apply if somebody prepared some drugs, thinking to elude death thereby, desiring to live forever. [77]

In Chapter Two above, on p. 45, I quoted a text in which Aquinas said that desiring to live on and on, without a time limit, expresses a natural yearning in man. Let us assume (safely enough) that Bañez knew this text; for if he did, a conjecture comes to mind which puts real coherence into what we have been reading. If Bañez thought this deluded chemist was not desiring *naturally,* it must have been because (this is my conjecture) he thought that illusion denaturalizes desiring, even even when the desiring has a natural inclination behind it. In that case, the philosopher who desires to know the what-it-is of the First Cause desires this *naturally* only so long as he desires it conditionally ("if possible") because then he is under no illusions, and he ceases to desire it *naturally* as soon as he thinks his desire is naturally satisfiable (because then he is under an illusion). I suppose he also ceases to desire it naturally as soon as he begins to desire it supernaturally (because then he is desiring it under the influence of grace, which is not

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Now given Bañez' conviction that the Vision was not a natural end of man, it made perfect sense for him to insist that the "natural desire" for U± was not efficacious volition. With efficacity ruled out, the *desiderium* could stay natural without making the Vision a natural end.

[77] Si quis aliqua medicamina pararet, quibus putat mortem evadere, desiderans vivere semper (col. 451 A).

natural). We read on:

> But if the man thinks it possible to see God through grace, and thus he so desires absolutely, or has a will for the end and the means, then this is already from grace, and not from his natural powers. [78]

Supposition confirmed. And there the text ends. Having identified natural desiring with elicited wishing, Bañez had no sense of 'natural' left with which to describe wishing to understand the First Cause as natural, except a sense which is not at all robust. The desire is natural insofar as it has behind it a natural inclination (to get at the truth, to explain things, etc.), but this naturalness survives only so long as the desire is a conditional wish, vanishing as soon as the desire is graced or becomes an intention compromised in any way by illusion.

Well, in this sense, the unevangelized thinker who desires to see what the First Cause is has a "natural" desire just so long as he is very, very hesitant to believe what Aquinas told him to infer, namely, that seeing this is possible! For as soon as he draws the inference that U± is possible, he will no longer wish for it "if possible." He will drop the if-clause and desire U± as a *possible* good. Then *if he makes any assumpion about* ***how*** *it is possible except the right one,* the naturalness of his desiring is lost, and (poof!) the warrant he had for inferring that U± is possible vanishes. In general, then, on Bañez' account, the inference from 'I naturally wish for *x*' to '*x* is possible' demands all the delicacy of handling a butterfly and all the caution of handling an explosive.

Worse than that, the inference is flatly unreliable. Go back to the natural inclination to keep on living, without a time limit. Instead of a mad chemist, think of a perfectly ordinary person, say, a peasant in ancient Greece, who one day wishes a simple wish: "I wish I could live forever." It seems to me that this peasant meets every requirement set by Bañez for his wish to be a natural

one. It has a natural inclination behind it, and it is a simple velleity, inefficacious and implicitly conditional. And yet the object wished for is impossible. Don't say: no, the resurrection makes it possible. The resurrection does not make "it" possible (but only something like it), so long as 'it' refers to the object of the peasant's wish. For what the peasant had in mind was not the exotic idea of coming back to life in a new biology, despite dying, but the perfectly ordinary idea of living-on in his present biology, without ever dying. The content of that idea, however naturally it is wished for, is impossible. In short, in the context of natural science or natural reason, the inference from 'I naturally wish for *x*' to '*x* is possible' is utterly unreliable, and hence the naturalness of the wish confers no warrant upon the inference — as every reader of Aristotle would have known.

Once one sees that Bañez analyzed the *desiderium naturae* in such a way that it became preposterous for Aquinas to have put the premises of the NDA together, there is really nothing more to say.

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[78] At vero si homo existimet esse possibile videre Deum per gratiam Dei, et sic desideret absolute, aut habeat voluntatem aliquam finis et mediorum, iam hoc est ex gratia, et non ex naturae viribus (col. 451 A).

Afterword

From the six chapters of the preceding study, there emerge certain definite matters of fact and certain orientations for future research. As to the matters of fact, let us lay them out in a convenient order.

(1) Aquinas posited in man his famous *desiderium naturae* with a terseness remarkable even for him. Nowhere did he provide a detailed exposition of what he meant. Nowhere did he address explicitly the basic question of whether this *desiderium naturae* was an affair of the will or one of the intellect, a naturally arising operation or a naturally present inclination. Nowhere *a fortiori* did he address more detailed questions such as how exactly this *desiderium* related to the specific object that most interested him, namely, "to grasp the what-it-is of the first cause."

(2) Inevitably, therefore, an interpretation of Aquinas's natural desire argument is a matter of conjecture and inference. Whether the interpreter is Cajetan, Soto, Bañez, the present writer, or the esteemed reader, there is no way to proceed except to *conjecture* what Aquinas meant and *draw inferences* from this conjecture, testable for consistency with other claims which Aquinas is known to have advanced. The conventions of late Medieval and early Modern commentary tended to obscure this process by folding it into the conduct of a *disputatio,* but we have certainly seen it going on in the texts read in Chapters Two through Six.

(3) Within this process, primacy of place belongs (and must belong) to the basic conjecture as to what '*desiderium naturae'* refers to. Before the interpreter even looks at other texts and other doctrines, he must construe *'desiderium naturae'* in a way consistent with the description given to it within the NDA itself.

- It must be the desire "to grasp the causes of seen effects."

• As that very desire, it must extend to ideal grasping, which is grasping the very essences of those causes, and it must apply to any first cause of seen effects.

• It must be or yield the human phenomenon of wonder.

• It must be plausible to call this desire *natural* in a sense of 'natural' that supports a reliable inference from 'this desire is natural' to 'this desire is satisfiable' and also supports the inference from 'this desire is natural' to 'complete fulfillment would include its satisfaction'.

(4) As we saw in Chapter Six, the basic conjecture of Bañez failed already at this first stage of interpretation. He took *'desiderium'* to refer to an elicited wish and said that calling this operation "natural" meant that it was elicited from *vires* connatural to man. These would be just the *vires* that Aristotle knew about, when he said that a wish differed from a choice in that a wish could be for an impossible thing. Aquinas said the same. Bañez thus fixed the sense of 'natural' and the reference of *'desiderium'* in such a way that, from 'this desire is natural' to 'this desire is satisfiable', there was **no reliable inference**, according to the sources Aquinas knew and endorsed. Either Bañez' conjecture is wrong, or Aquinas' NDA was a preposterous argument by Aquinas' own standards. The conjectures of Soto and of Cajetan do not pose any such problem.

(5) Bañez' conjecture was framed in response to Soto. The central effort of Bañez was to define 'natural end' and interpret *'desiderium naturae'* in such a way that the combination would not do what Soto claimed it must do, namely, make a very lofty stopper of wonder, "God clearly seen," the natural end of man.

(6) Soto took *'desiderium naturae'* to refer to a natural *appetitus* (tendency, bent, inclination) of the intellect, but he defined 'natural end' in such a way that whatever had what it took to fully satisfy a natural *appetitus* in man automatically became a "natural end" of man in the interesting sense of an available goal. Indeed, defending this Augustinian (and Scotist) definition, with its obvious application to the intellect's *inclinatio* and the Vision of God, was Soto's princi-

pal interest. It was what led him to do two things: (1) to borrow from Scotus the idea that a faculty has *(mode)-natural appetitus* towards the greatest perfection receivable in it, and (2) to attack Cajetan's remarks on 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 1.

(6) Soto's construal of *'desiderium naturae'* was eminently defensible, but his definition of 'natural end' (precisely as the definition of an available end and not just as the definition of a genuine good) was an alien importation into Thomism, flatly inconsistent with Aquinas' appreciation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and with his explicit statements about man's connatural end. Either Soto's definition is wrong, or Aquinas' account of what it takes to be the real end of anything, by connaturality or by assignment of Providence, is incoherent. Nothing in Cajetan's position poses any such problem.

(7) Any hope of building upon the example of Soto the case that there once existed a more conservative, more Augustinian Thomism is doomed. Soto was an eclectic thinker, whose extensive and explicit borrowings from Scotism can no longer be denied.

(8) What Cajetan's solution amounted to has been stated in the "concluding evaluation" sections at the ends of Chapters Two, Three, and Four. There is no need to repeat it all. Suffice it to say that he construed this use of *'desiderium'* as referring to a bent or tendency of the intellect and construed *'naturae'* as describing that tendency either (a) as natural in a weaker sense than Aristotle's mode-naturality, namely, as a species-wide tendency of man (or of any other intellectual species) or (b) as natural in a sense distinctive to *sacra doctrina*, namely, as expressing what intellectual creatures were created to do. In the first of these senses, an inference from 'this desire is natural' to 'this desire is satisfiable' could be defended; in the second, it was perfectly reliable.

(8) Whatever its merits, Cajetan's solution was lost from the subsequent history of school-Thomism. Part of the blame falls on Cajetan himself. He left too much unsaid in his com-

mentary on 1 *ST* q. 12, a. 1. He did not make clear how the solution he presented in section *x* of that commentary was supposed to be solving the first of the two *dubia* raised in section *ix*. He should have been explicit that the distinction between residence-natural and mode-natural, drawn already in his commentary on 1 *ST* q. 1, a. 1, was meant to apply again in solving that *dubium;* but he did not make this explicit until a decade later, when he commented on 2/1 *ST* q. 3, a. 8. There he finally managed to say what he meant . The rest of the blame falls on Soto, who misread Cajetan and passed his misreading down to Bañez, who in turn passed it down to later Iberian Thomists. The crucial point for present purposes is that Cajetan's solution required more senses of 'natural' than either Soto or Bañez (or their successors) understood or acknowledged.

There are at least two ways to react to this last fact, and they introduce a direction for further research. One can entertain the hypothesis that Cajetan was not well understood and was not followed on this question because he was too much of an innovator, tossing up novel, unfamiliar, untraditional distinctions. Or one can entertain the hypothesis that Cajetan was not understood or followed because he came at the end of the tradition of pre-Reformation Thomism, one of the last men in Europe to have mastered the technical subtleties required for the pre-humanist debates about the Aristotelian sciences and their relation to *sacra doctrina.* The present writer has adopted the second hypothesis, partly for reasons stated in the preface and partly for reasons which have emerged in Chapters Two through Six. To test these rival hypotheses further will require research into how key terms were used by other pre-Reformation Thomists, especially Capreolus and Francis Sylvestris. If Cajetan's feel for the difference between natural-science language and traditional theological language, his sense of Thomism as a strategy for coordinating these languages (and his sense of Scotism as a rival strategy), and his techniques for drawing distinctions can be paralleled in these other writers, the case for regarding him as an eccentric innovator will be weakened, perhaps fatally.

More broadly, if the present writer has succeeded in chapters Two through Four in showing that Cajetan's solution has real merit as a contribution to Thomism and to theology in general, then the question arises of how to evaluate some other solutions of his — his doctrine of *esse* (so little esteemed by Étienne Gilson), his explication of analogy (severely criticized by Ralph McInerny), his "shocking" remarks on how little is proved in the First Way (compared to what Joseph Owens thought was proved), his "shocking" claim that the immortality of the soul is plausibly but not demonstratively supported by St. Thomas' philosophical reasons, his insistence on the one *esse* in Christ (against Scotus, but now also against de la Taille and Galot), to mention only a few famous examples. Is Cajetan really *passé* on these topics, or waiting to be rediscovered? There is currently on the scene a fledgling coalition of "Analytical Thomists," as sensitive to linguistic issues as Cajetan was. Do they have an undiscovered ally in the prelate from Gaeta, or a potentially deadly enemy? Only a broad reassessment of Cajetan's work (accompanied, let us hope, by new and creditable translations) will answer these questions.

But what really needs further research is a question larger than individual reputations. How does one introduce the insights of natural science (and hence the language of science) into theology without illegitimately Christianizing the science but also without losing or marginalizing the language of Christian tradition? I have suggested that the answer is a correct bilingualism, pioneered by Aquinas and preserved by Cajetan. Recovery of that bilingualism will not only preserve theology from the temptations of dogmatic relativism but will also aid the Church in her main ecumenical aim: to restore understanding between the Christian West (which underwent the Aristotelian shock) and the Christian East (which did not). The pre-Reformation Thomists could speak the language of Aristotle **and** the language of St. John Damascene, without confusion of tongues. Today's theologians need to recover the same ability.

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